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1. 'I'm hopeful. I know there is a lot of ambition in\ Washington, obviously. But I hope the 
ambitious realize that they are more likely to succeed with success as opposed to failure.' 
George W. Bush 
Interview with Associated Press, January 18,2001. 
This thesis, Chapter 10 
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This thesis, Chapter 11 
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The outcome of such research is policy relevant; after all it is about policy, even 
when it is not cast in the form of policy recommendations. 
4. Drinking is a form of irrigation of which the importance is hugely 
underestimated in the study of irrigation management performance. 
5. 'In order to understand domination we have to turn away from an exclusive 
concern with social relations and weave them into a fabric that includes non-
human actants, actants that offer the possibility of holding society together as a 
durable whole'. 
From: Technology is society made durable' (Latour, 1991:103) 
6. Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) is a contemporary Dutch consequence of a Calvinist 
work ethic. We cannot help it. It is our culture. 
Insight generated in the process of writing this thesis 
7. 'After one look at this planet any visitor from outer space would say, 
"I want to see the manager". 
William S. Burroughs 
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1 
Introduction: 
A research journey 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the origtyv 
Management Transfer (IMT) 
transfer of government-managed 
has radically changed irrigation 
Internationally, Mexico's IMT 
widespread attention because 
propagated as a model for other 
public irrigation systems and 
study firstly critically examines 
success. Secondly, it discusses 
process and outcomes of the Mexican policy of Irrigation 
Under the influence of neo-liberal government policies, the 
irrigation districts to water users' associations (WUAs) 
management in Mexico during the past fifteen years, 
programme has been heralded as a success and has drawn 
of its rapid implementation. Consequently, it has been 
countries seeking to improve the performance of their 
ipit burgeoning public expenditures (Groenfeldt, 1998). This 
the emergence of this policy model and its proclaimed 
the impacts this has on everyday irrigation management. 
appeared Most studies that have 
transfer have reproduced this 
ideological claims that undeiflie 
other things, the currently 
systems analysis that de-
This leads to two analytical 
policy formulation and implementation 
the political process of policy 
Secondly, policy implement ition 
technical processes that can 
into logical and inevitable 
perspective on policy reform 
contribution to the study of 
analyse them as political 
human action and social ordering. 
poli tii 
l>e 
On the one hand, the thesis 
IMT policy. It traces the idea 
the idea gained political 
This shows that the IMT 
with the past and the future 
the assembling of a policy 
still an intensely political 
accelerated effectuation in 
the Mexican IMT policy 
huge success. This aspect of 
so far on the Mexican experience of management 
appealing imagery of success and have not contested the 
the Mexican IMT model. This occurs because, among 
dominant policy and management literature is based on a 
icises policy implementation and irrigation management, 
fjlaws that are sustained by the false dichotomies between 
and between politics and management. Firstly, 
making is not finished after the formulation of a policy, 
and irrigation management are not neutral and 
reduced to a blackbox, in which inputs are transformed 
outputs. This book aims to provide an alternative 
^nd irrigation management, by overcoming these flaws. My 
policy and irrigation management is that I consistently 
that are also expressive of the cultural dimensions of 
To do this, the book sets out in two directions. 
system 
practices 
offers a comprehensive analysis of the entire life cycle of the 
of transfer back to its bureaucratic roots and reviews how 
corrulmrment as the result of a prolonged bureaucratic struggle, 
policy has a fascinating political history and that it is tied up 
of the hydraulic bureaucracy. Then, the thesis discusses how 
package that materialised the changes at the field level was 
process of policy making that, in the end, contributed to 
Mexico's irrigation districts. Towards the end, I focus on how 
became an international policy model that was propagated as a 
the book results in the understanding that policy is political 
2 The Success of a Policy Model 
throughout its life cycle and that policy making is a continuous and profoundly cultural 
undertaking. 
On the other hand, this book takes a close look at the everyday organisational practices 
that have emerged in a WUA around the strategic resources of water, maintenance 
machinery and irrigation fees. It shows how a political group based in a WUA maintains 
a network of political and institutional relations by controlling this set of resources. The 
outcome of this process in this case is that the organisation becomes a platform to further 
the careers of the group's proponents and their ascendancy to important posts in the 
regional government. Central to the group's efforts is the organisation and cultural 
performance of a series of election events. This aspect of the book illustrates how the 
continuous political nature of IMT affects the outcomes of the policy and focuses 
attention on the cultural aspects of irrigation management and politics. 
1.2 Prelude 
Looking back at my research, I have made a journey that has led me along several 
passage points, critical moments through which new insights emerged, some of which 
were predictable and others most unexpected. They determined the further course that 
the research has taken, and therefore also the outcomes. In this chapter I take the reader 
through some of these points in time, so that you understand both the product and the 
path that led me to it. 
The seed of this thesis was sown what seems like ages ago. For my MSc, I studied 
Tropical Land and Water use (Tropische Cultuurtechniek) at Wageningen University. I was 
part of a wave of irrigation students who tried to incorporate the social sciences in an 
attempt to arrive at an interdisciplinary understanding of irrigation management, 
something that later settled as the sodo-technical approach of the Irrigation and Water 
Engineering Group (Mollinga, 1992; Bolding et al., 1995; Vincent, 1997; Oorthuizen, 
2003). Because I inclined more towards the social sciences, I left the development of my 
engineering skills aside. However, the heated ideological and political debates with my 
fellow students and former professors shaped my perspective on the possibility of 
ordering and stabilising social and organisational life by means of irrigation technology. 
Another influence that shaped me was the actor-oriented approach of Norman Long 
(Long, 2001), which centres human agency as the point of departure for analysing social 
life. The academic climate that he created in Wageningen triggered and nourished my 
skills and preference for ethnography as a means of analysis. Long's influence is notable 
throughout this study. To start with, in the choice of methods, of which many can be 
traced back to the Manchester School. I cannot imagine a better stimulus for conducting 
ethnographic research than familiarity with an extended case study such as that of the 
multiple enterprises and social networks of Romero in the Central Highlands of Peru 
(Long, 1979; Long, 2001). An aspect that I particularly value about the actor-oriented 
approach is that it opens up a perspective on actual social behaviour that is very 
productive for research, without providing a closed theoretical model that 'explains' 
things beforehand. Further, early on in my MSc. study I read the article Long wrote with 
van der Ploeg about 'de-mystifying planned intervention', which radically changed my 
Introduction 3 
understanding of policy and 
outcomes (Long and van der 
the role of social interfaces in generating a variety of 
Ploeg, 1989,1995; Long 1989). 
At the same time, I developed 
1994). I found it most useful 
and natural in the analysis 
domains, where one prevails 
analysis of irrigation, organisation; 
an interest in actor-network theory (Latour, 1987; Law, 
because it attempted to integrate the social, technological, 
of scientific research, without seeing them as separate 
over the others. I considered this also applicable to the 
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materiality with a methodological 
material practices. On the 
understanding of the role of 
social ordering. 
my conviction that the actor-oriented approach and the 
have a mutually enriching influence on each other. On the 
approach opens up possibilities to study technology and 
sensibility for the cultural dimensions of social and 
other hand, the actor-network approach enables an 
rnateriality in all forms of power, practices, and processes of 
research 
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combined Rural Development 
acquaintance with the field 
organisation studies. The 
Grullo Irrigation District inji 
to be transferred to a water 
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van der Zaag, whose thesis 
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way as the official policy 
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lies in an intensive four months of fieldwork in Mexico 
end of my MSc study. This final piece of research that 
Sociology and Irrigation was a slightly unexpected re-
irrigation, although now from a different angle, that of 
involved a detailed organisational study of the FJ 
ilisco (See map 1: 094), the first irrigation district in Mexico 
users' association - in 1989. An interesting aspect of this 
been studied under government management by Pieter 
had read with great interest (van der Zaag, 1992). I was 
happened after the transfer. At the time of my research, the 
achieved the status of a success, and visitors from all 
from abroad (like myself) started to arrive in FJ Grullo to 
workings of WUAs. 
research 
had 
that in this district nobody referred to success in the same 
accounts did. Without doubt, the practice of irrigation 
gnificantly, and in some aspects such as maintenance and 
fie better but, in everyday practice, the changes to 
much more complex than usually acknowledged in policy 
I|rrigation District, people differed about the extent to which 
to them. This often depended on their own position in the 
the local groups involved in the WUA. The WUA's board 
(ex-)politicians and members of the regional elite who all 
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4 The Success of a Policy Model 
Although the above clearly co-determined the outcomes of the IMT policy, I found few 
similar observations in the policy literature. The prevailing categories of success and 
failure mystified rather than explained what was happening in actual irrigation 
management under the WUA. It led to a very incomplete picture of the reality of transfer 
in the field. For example, I observed that dominant approaches to irrigation management 
lacked a perspective on the politics of irrigation management, and therefore, conciously 
or not, deleted it from their accounts. As far as I could see, there was a clear discrepancy 
between what was described in the literature and what was happening in the field. To 
me it clearly did not correspond to the narrative of success that had become connected to 
the Mexican model. There was no public counterperspective to the official perspective 
that heralded the success of the IMT policy, although there were several elements in 
society, in academia and in the irrigation districts that objected to, and resisted, the 
policy under the proposed conditions. But they remained unorganised, dispersed and 
therefore developed no effective countervailing power. At that moment I was not able to 
fully explain this. It was only much later, towards the end of writing this book, that 
several of these threads, spun out over many years, came together and I was able to 
formulate the beginning of an explanation. This constitutes the last substantive chapter, 
Chapter 10, situated before the conclusions. 
LXtring the research itself, I became more and more fascinated by the topic of IMT, as it 
combined several of the themes in which I had developed an interest during my study 
and which I wanted to explore further: knowledge, organisation, technology, power and 
policy. After graduation, I had several, only partially related jobs, but my interest in doing 
research remained alive and grew in the back of my head. In order to be able to continue 
my work on this theme of IMT, I decided to write a PhD research proposal for the Dutch 
research foundation WOTRO (Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical 
Research). The research proposal that follows below was approved, and on this basis I 
started with the fieldwork in September of 1997. When my contract started, I 
immediately went to Mexico in order to maximise the two-year period of fieldwork, as 
people kept reminding me that this would be the only period in my life that I would be 
able to do extensive field research. Recently, when I re-read my original proposal, it 
struck me that it already contained the ingredients for a large number of the different 
arguments that I will make in the chapters of this book. The proposal also reads as a 
product of the diverse sources of influence indicated above. Hence, despite several 
changes, the research proposal is still an adequate point of departure for understanding 
what this book is about. 
1.3 The Research Proposal 
Neo-liberal Irrigation Policy Transformations in Western Mexico: 
An Organisational Perspective on Management Transfer 
Theme of the research 
Neo-liberal policies are restracturing state organisation and national economies in many 
parts of the world. Irrigation is a field in which they have a large impact. An important 
policy in this respect, which many Third World countries are presently considering, is 
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only mentioned for the adoption of the IMT policy in 
inaintenance had deteriorated the state of the irrigation and 
causng low responsiveness to farmer water demands and low 
In addition, the contribution of water user fees to the 
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transferred the majority of its larger irrigation districts to 
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maintenance (O&M) of the modules is the responsibility of the WUAs. The executive 
council hires a manager who is responsible for carrying out and supervising the work. He 
contracts the rest of the staff necessary for O&M and admirdstration. The water guards 
(called canaleros) distribute the water to the fields according to an irrigation plan. Water 
distribution is carried out on demand. Only when water users comply with a number of 
by-laws of the WUA, such as current payment of fees and maintenance of on-farm 
canals, are they authorised to get water. 
The second stage of the transfer programme foresees the creation of Societies of Limited 
Responsibility (SRLs) at the district level. These user organisations are to be responsible 
for the aclministration and operation of the main irrigation and drainage network and 
the maintenance equipment and machinery, thus achieving greater 'economies of scale' 
than individual modules (Gorriz et al., 1995). Since 1994, WUAs have been represented 
at the national level by the National Association of Irrigation Users (ANUR). 
At the level of everyday organisational practices, the formal models presented above are 
clearly problematic in respect to the following points: 
First, notwithstanding the formal rules and sanctions, practices such as unauthorised use 
of water and fee default remain common among water users. In practice, only in rare 
cases do offenders receive the official penalty, namely the refusal of water. These 
conflictive problems are most directly negotiated by the canalera, who only rarely 
decides to resort to official rules. Canaleros are inadequately portrayed as mere 
implementors of managerial rules and the irrigation plan. In practice, they have 
considerable discretion in conflict resolution and water distribution (van der Zaag, 1992). 
Empirical findings in Jalisco, Mexico, indicate that canaleros have retained their 
discretion and reproduced many of their existing practices under a newly established 
WUA. 
Second, in contrast to the policy rhetoric concerning the 'structure of participation', 
Levine and Garces-Restrepo (1995) note the low level of direct participation of water 
users in the Mexican WUAs. They observe that, in many cases, large and powerful 
farmers have occupied the principal functions in WUAs. Menchaca and Torregrosa 
(1995) confirm that shifts and struggles among power and interest groups are central to 
IMT. 
Third, although policy literature suggests that the government (CNA) transforms its role 
to a distant supporting agency, in practice it continues to intervene in the daily 
management of the district (Levine and Garces Restrepo, 1995), regarding the 
management of headworks, irrigation planning, the supervision of water use. In 
addition, CNA officials do not radically withdraw from influence, but tend to devise a 
variety of strategies to protect the sorts of interest they have in relation to irrigation, for 
instance by resisting the transfer, or allying themselves with particular user groups (van 
der Zaag, 1992). 
Relevance and research question 
There is a growing international interest in the impact and performance of the Mexican 
policy model. This model is internationally renowned and widely admired for the rapid 
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pace with which irrigation systems have been transferred. The Mexican case is viewed as 
a successful example of IMT (Vermillion and Johnson, 1995), and the World Bank is 
promoting it as a model for Asia and other continents (Levine and Garces-Restrepo, 
1995). This study, then, aims to have relevance to both national and international 
debates on IMT. For this purpose, it is important to critically assess the nature and 
background of the impacts of IMT and to establish whether the Mexican model is as 
widely applicable as currently suggested. 
Instead of taking for granted neo-liberal policy discourse or formal organisational 
models, the questions I have to confront are what IMT means for local organisational 
practices as regards the allocation of scarce irrigation resources, which new forms of 
organisation are developed in response, and how actors impute meanings to these forms 
of organisation. The key research question that follows from this is therefore: 
How have the organisational practices of different rural actors pertaining 
to the allocation of irrigation resources evolved over time and how are they 
rearranged in response to the transfer of irrigation districts to water users' 
associations? 
State of the art 
Since the second half of the nineteen eighties, a rich body of irrigation management 
literature has been developed on IMT policy. The vast majority of such writing adopts a 
neo-liberal standpoint, by portraying state intervention as the main obstacle to the 
numerous historical attempts to improve the management performance of large-scale 
irrigation systems (for instance Repetto, 1986; Svendsen, 1993; Vermillion and Johnson, 
1995). These authors attribute a central role to the market for developing a more rational 
and efficient allocation of irrigation resources. The reader is often left with the 
impression that IMT is an irreversible, unproblematic and smooth transition from 
bureaucratic state control towards complete user determination. In virtually all 
discussions about the impact of IMT, the literature reports 'improved irrigation 
management performance' (Svendsen, 1993; Merrey, 1995; Garces-Restrepo and 
Vermillion, 1995). This is assessed using such performance criteria as efficiency, equity, 
accountability and adaptability. Explanations for these improvements are typically sought 
in the following institutional, financial and legal reforms associated with IMT: 
1. Institutional reform: The analysis of institutional arrangements and reforms in the 
irrigation literature is strongly influenced by the new institutional economics of Ostrom 
(see Ostrom et al., 1993). She defines institutional arrangements as the specific rules that 
individuals use to relate to each other. Incentives are the result of these rules, which 
reward and constrain the benefits and costs of activities such as the operation and 
maintenance of an irrigation system. In Ostrom's analysis, this incentive structure 
determines the actions of social actors, because the individual is regarded as a rational 
decision maker, faying to generate net benefits in every resource allocation situation. As 
such, unsustainable irrigation infrastructure is caused by 'perverse incentives', motivating 
individuals to generate net costs rather than net benefits by neglecting maintenance 
(Ostrom et al., 1993). Individual, rational decision making and maximisation behaviour 
are considered sufficient to explain both organisational practices and larger social and 
political processes. 
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The management literature examines IMT in terms of the improvement of rules and 
corresponding incentives. These rules and incentives are considered to provide the basic 
direction and energy for organisations to meet their stated performance objectives 
(Vermillion, 1991). Public service organisations are characterised by their bureaucratic 
rules, hierarchical structure, rent-seeking and upward accountability (Merrey, 1995). 
Bureaucrats have few incentives to manage irrigation infrastructure according to users' 
needs and are generally incapable of performing O&M tasks, whereas non-
governmental institutions have a proper structure of incentives to manage according to 
performance criteria (Vermillion, 1991). Democratic electoral principles in the 
representative structure of WUAs are assumed to ensure accountability of management 
towards users. 
2. Financial reform: IMT in Mexico is accompanied with substantial increases in the fees 
that water users pay for O&M and aclrninistrative services. These are aimed at improving 
cost recovery and making WUAs financially self-sufficient (Small and Carruthers, 1991). 
Because the WUA management is dependent on the water users' fees, it is forced to be 
accountable to users' needs, since only satisfied users will pay (Vermillion and Johnson, 
1995). The literature also discusses the introduction of positive financial incentives such 
as performance bonuses and higher wages, which are expected to lead to improved 
individual performance of personnel 0ohnson et al., 1995). 
3. Legal reform: The development of new water laws and water rights are found to be 
essential in enacting the new duties and obligations of institutions (Vermillion and 
Johnson, 1995). For instance, in the Mexican case, the 'clear policies', the new National 
Water Law and the Concession Titles, which WUAs receive, specify how irrigation 
districts must be financed and locally managed and are considered as the basis of their 
success (Gorriz et al., 1995; Vermillion and Johnson, 1995). 
There are four major shortcomings of the above analysis: 
First, it is assumed that the implementation of the IMT policy follows a linear process, 
which leads via neatly planned stages to 'most likely aggregate outcomes' (Ostrom et al., 
1993). These approaches utilise a top-down and centralised policy model with the market 
instead of the state as the supreme rational regulator (Long and van der Ploeg, 1995). Such 
models are problematic, because transfer interventions enter into the existing lifeworlds 
and affect the interests of social groups such as water users, managers and bureaucrats, 
and are therefore contested and transformed in sometimes quite unexpected ways (Long 
and van der Ploeg, 1989). Governmental policies are interpreted and reconstructed by 
policy implementors and other actors in local arenas. The specific political, institutional 
and economic context significantly affects policy implementation and its outcomes 
(Grindle, 1977,1980; de Vries, 1992). I want to argue that it is more useful to analyse IMT 
as a socially constructed process. It is political in nature, because it involves struggle, 
conflict and negotiation among interest groups trying to control others and the crucial 
resources involved (Law, 1994). 
Second, the management literature explains social practices and processes by means of 
individual cost-benefit assessment (methodological individualism). This ignores the fact 
that IMT is a political process. Furthermore, its abstract notions of accountability and 
performance allude to simple tacit common interest or universal notions that things should 
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work efficiently, people should interact democratically, and clients should control their 
service providers. I would like to argue that these notions tend to de-contextualise and de-
politicise actual social practices and processes (Arce, 1994). 
Third, the sort of institutional analysis that Ostrom and her followers apply inadequately 
represents irrigation organisations as purposive functional systems geared to the fulfilment 
of a clear set of performance objectives (Reed, 1992). The implicit model of human 
behaviour is essentially a behavioural detenninistic one, suggesting that individual and 
collective organisational practices strictly emanate from a rational response to simple sets 
of institutional and legal rules and incentives. However, as I have argued, this cannot 
account for the concrete social intricacies and conflicts between different social actors in 
everyday organisational life. The analytical weakness lies in disregarding the considerable 
'room for manoeuvre' or 'discretion' that different social actors have in dealing with these 
situations (Lipsky, 1980; Clay and Schaffer, 1984). Consequently, it fails to appreciate and 
analyse existing and emerging forms of organisations. 
Fourth, this literature conceptualises the stakeholders involved in the transfer process as 
coherent and homogeneous groups of social actors with singular functional roles. Little 
attention is generally paid to social differentiation, particularly when it is based on non-
economic or non-legal factors. However, for example in Mexico there is a wide variety in 
groups of water users regarding socio-economic, cultural and technological aspects: e.g. 
ejidatarios/private landholders, maize/sugar-cane/vegetable producers, subsistence/export 
farmers, etc. (Levine and Garces-Restrepo, 1995; Menchaca and Torregrosa, 1995). 
Furthermore, water users, managers and bureaucrats have diverse (and multiple) 
economic, political and institutional sources of power that influence their social actions 
and the unfolding of the transfer process. 
Analytical framework 
The innovativeness of my approach lies in the fact that I aim to go beyond the discussed 
shortcomings of current analyses by adopting an alternative analytical framework. I 
propose to use an actor-oriented approach, which analyses IMT as a socially constructed 
process involving diverse groups of social actors. An actor-oriented approach implies 
taking, as the point of departure, actors' perceptions, practices and strategies pertaining 
the IMT process, and analysing how these are connected with their livelihood strategies 
(Long, 1989). I will incorporate a number of concepts from actor-network theory in my 
analytical framework in order to deal with the sodo-technical nature of irrigation 
management. 
Organising practices 
In order not to assume that organisation is a given system or a stable sodal order, I 
analyse it as a recursive network that is the precarious outcome of actors' interactions, 
practices and strategies. The argument here is that there is no such thing as a single 
sodal order underlying patterns of organisation (Law, 1994). My approach focuses on the 
reproduction and transformation of these networks and on emergent organisational 
forms. Such a focus reveals how crudal practices and networks crosscut formal 
organisational boundaries, state and market regimes (Long, 1989), and conventional 
boundaries between the sodal, political, technological, etc. These analytical 
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preoccupations are pursued by studying organising practices related to the scarce 
resources to be allocated in the operation, maintenance and aclrnirristeation of irrigation 
systems. Organising practices can thus be defined as: the sets of sodo-technical practices 
that organise the access to and control over resources such as water, maintenance 
machinery, administrative means and other political and economic resources involved in 
irrigation management. 
Control 
The proposed analysis is operationalised by studying the organising practices regarding 
two dimensions of control. This corresponds to current analytical tendendes to study 
organisations from the perspective of practices of control (Reed, 1992; Mollinga, 1992). 
These two dimensions are separated for analytical purposes, but are intimately related in 
practice: 
1. Socio-technical control: In the first place,-my interest is to research how different 
organisational actors attempt to establish everyday (managerial) control over the use of 
irrigation resources. The notion of sodo-technical refers to the fact that irrigation 
management is not only practised by human actors but that humans also mobilise sets of 
non-humans such as technological artifacts, physical materials, paper inscriptions, etc. 
(Mollinga, 1992). For instance, a manager of operation, who wants to get water from 
location A to B is not finished when he has instructed his subordinates to do so; he also 
needs to ensure that the necessary water distribution devices are in place and function 
according to his will. Irrigation management is thus practised through networks of 
humans and non-humans, and its organising aspect is also performed, embodied and 
represented in materials (Law, 1994). I aim to analyse how different sets of actors 
mobilise, manage and control these sodo-technical networks and how this changes in 
the process of IMT. 
In the second place, I want to investigate the sodal and institutional impacts of 
calculative practices and representations (Miller and Hopwood, 1994), i.e. the 
programmes, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which 
institutions seek to embody their governmental ambitions. Miller and Rose (1992) show 
how contemporary calculative practices or technologies of government enable neo-
liberal efforts to autonomise state institutions from direct control and responsibility over 
the actions of individuals, organisations and sodetal domains, whilst retaining some 
form of action or control at a distance. Law and Akrich (1994) illustrate this with the 
example of how the introduction of accountancy in a privatised organisation leads to the 
reshaping of organisational spaces and activities, in order to express these activities in 
terms of calculable cash equivalents. The centres that accumulate these new data have 
the possibility to visualise and govern organisational spaces. The authors also suggest 
that such new practices lead to the engineering of the 'good customer', a docile and 
disdplined user who is willing to pay a certain fee in exchange for a specified service. At 
the same time the image of a 'good seller' is constructed, by creating a picture of 
accountable costs for specific activities (Law and Akrich, 1994). 
This study intends to investigate whether IMT engenders the introduction or the 
transformation of calculative practices. I am interested in the impacts on organisational 
spaces and activities in irrigation, the level of control at a distance and the construction of 
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new images concerning users and management. In relation to IMT, the importance of 
accountancy and regular audits of WUAs by neutral agencies has been signalled by some 
authors (Svendsen and Vermillion, 1995; Vermillion and Johnson, 1995). Furthermore, a 
range of performance appraisal methods are currently being used in irrigation 
management (Palacios-Vélez, 1995). Also relevant is the policy ideal to implement 
volumetric measuring by means of control points in the irrigation systems (Gorriz et al., 
1995). 
2. Economic and politico-institutional control: I intend to study how IMT leads to new 
opportunities and constraints for diverse interest groups in the local arena, which can 
result in renewed struggles over crucial resources. Central are the practices, projects, 
strategies and alliances which are (reconstituted with the aim of establishing economic 
and politico-institutional control over these resources. Long and van der Ploeg (1995) 
view actors' projects as the diverse representations and the material and social 
capabilities to mobilise resources utilised for achieving certain goals or ordering the 
future. These projects reflect specific sets of interests, commitments and prospects. 
Rather than assuming a hegemonic social structure, they choose to explore how actors' 
projects are being interlocked, through negotiation, enrolment, mobilisation or 
distantiation. 
De Vries' concept of institutional projects is useful to identify the differential manners in 
which IMT can be implemented. Institutional projects are grounded in a particular, 
practical understanding of how relations between the institutions and their clients ought 
to be governed. They are the outcome of a learning process by which state managers 
develop a way of negotiating the demands of the central government, the political 
environment and the various organised client groups. In addition, policy implementors 
may face similar policy directives and intervention ideologies, but they interpret their 
tasks in different ways. They employ differential operational styles in response to the 
conflicting demands of the administrative and field domains in which they operate and 
to the different socio-political commitments and interests they have (de Vries, 1992). 
Agency 
An actor-oriented approach is bound to attribute agency to social actors, i.e. the capacity 
to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life (Long, 1989). hi line 
with post-structuralist debates on the de-centring of the subject, I do not designate 
agency as a purely individual or human characteristic, but conceive of it as embodied in 
sodo-technical practices and networks, through which it can become effective (Foucault, 
1977; Callón and Law, 1995) 
1.4 The Course of the Research 
Changing the research location 
Originally, I wrote this research proposal with the irrigation district Cienega de Chapala 
(024) in Michoacan as the intended research location. This was a pragmatic choice as it 
lay close to the Colegio de Michoacan, a research centre in Zamora, the base from which 
I had explored potential research locations during an earlier visit. When I started my 
12 The Success of a Policy Model 
fieldwork in Zamora, I became less convinced that the Cienega was an ideal location for 
research. The rains had been very bad that year, and the irrigation would be severely 
limited and mainly for fodder crops for the local cattle husbandry industry. I decided that 
I would have to compare a number of irrigation districts to see which best fitted with my 
plans. I selected five districts in the West of Mexico within reasonable travelling distance 
of Zamora, Michoacan and Guadalajara, Jalisco. My choice was determined by the factor 
of access. It was not an option to just drop by any irrigation system and explain my 
research objectives to a WUA official. Although the WUAs are officially autonomous 
from the CNA, the CNA District Head remains an influential authority in the districts, to 
whom I would sooner or later become accountable. Presenting myself just like that to a 
District Head would trigger the bureaucratic need to consult the higher echelons and 
required me to go through the CNA headquarters in Mexico City. After that, it would still 
be very uncertain whether I would be given permission to carry out my work. Apart from 
saving time, it was important for me to remain independent from the CNA headquarters, 
as I needed to be able to diverge from their interpretation of affairs in the districts. I 
knew this could be understood as an attempt to discredit the institution, although this 
was not my intention. 
What I needed was a personal introduction to the District Heads and subsequently to the 
WUAs. I used a network of contacts that I had built up during my earlier stays in the 
irrigation districts. Among them were several irrigation officials who brought me into 
contact with current District Heads. By means of these personal relations, I started 
visiting and making an inventarisation of these districts in order to make up my mind 
about a suitable research location. In addition, it gave me an impression of the kind of 
achievements and the range of problems that the WUAs were facing several years after 
transfer. A former District Head was helpful in pointing my attention towards the 
Northern Coast of Nayarit (024). 
The old engineer introduced me to the District Head based in Tepic, with whom I 
developed a cordial relationship, and he sent me through to Santiago Ixcuintla - the tour 
that you make through the mountains before descending towards the coast in Chapter 4. 
There I was received with open arms by the manager of the Left Bank WUA, and I 
immediately felt welcome. On one of the first days, I was invited to a banquet that he 
organised in honour of the District Head. I describe it in Chapter 6, and this pleasant 
type of encounter subsequently became central to my later research and my 
understanding of the region's politics (see also Chapter 8). I loved the whole 
environment. The wonderful seafood, the beer, and the music all enjoyed in the open, 
hot and humid air contributed to a cheerful atmosphere among these people that I came 
to like. It affected me in a way that, as I later found out, affected many other visitors to 
the region and that I today consider as essential to the culture of the region. This was not 
only very different from my own Calvinist upbringing in a relatively cold country (in 
whatever way you like to read that), but also from the more conservative Jalisco with 
which I had become acquainted during my MSc research. 
It took me some time to decide on the Left Bank as my research location, because I felt 
that I had to take a balanced decision based on solid scientific grounds. I constructed a 
long list of criteria with which I gave the different regions a score for their suitability as 
research location. Amongst these criteria were: the size of the module, the number of 
years they were transferred, a mixture of different types of landholding, water users and 
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crops, the degree of water scarcity, the nature of the water source, the irrigation 
infrastructure and field irrigation technology, the maintenance machinery capacity and 
the self-sufficiency problems, the degree of farmer organisation, state and agro-industrial 
intervention in the irrigation district, etc. Adding up the scores resulted in a draw 
between the Left Bank and the Ciénega de Chápala. The advice of a friend, Luz Nereida, 
was decisive. She told me to go for the region that I felt most passionate about, because I 
would have to work and live there for an extended period. After this, there was not a 
single doubt left. The Left Bank of the River Santiago became my research area and 
home. 
Fieldwork and methodology 
This book is based on the ethnography of an organisation and the study of policy in the 
field of irrigation. Characteristic of ethnography is the study of daily life as it develops, 
while attempting to avoid intervention in its course. The basic methodological idea 
behind the research was therefore to map the sets of organising practices of different 
groups of social actors involved in the making of irrigation policy and organisation. This 
demanded the in-depth study of actual practices through the methodological device of 
'following the actors' (Latour, 1987; Long, 1989). 
In the first stage of my fieldwork in Nayarit, I concentrated initially on the organisational 
practices within the irrigation district. When I had established contacts within the Left 
Bank WUA, it was relatively easy to identify the key actors within and around the 
organisation. What helped here was my familiarity with WUAs in other places, which are 
similarly composed and named: la Asociación (the association). According to the 
methodological principle of 'studying up' (Nader, 1972), I started working my way 
through the organisation from below. This meant developing a relation with the lower 
level personnel of the WUA in the field and the office. 
I started off exploring water distribution practices by means of participant observation 
(Burgess, 1984) of the WUA's field personnel in their daily practices and routines. By 
accompanying several canaleras on my motor bike, I followed them through their 
operational sections, whilst they were operating the infrastructure, interacting with 
ejidatarios and private producers, and attempting to convince diverse groups of water 
users to pay their irrigation fees. In the process, I became friends with the canaleras. 
After identifying two canaleras with contrasting loyalties and personal histories, I 
constructed case studies of these field workers that focus on how the concrete social, 
material and spatial arrangements that make up their workspace affect their daily 
practice. I call these situated case studies. In addition, I used life histories and 
occupational career histories to understand the different strategies they employed for 
dealing with their daily work environment and for resolving certain problematic 
situations (Long, 1979). A chief advantage of these case studies was that they provided 
the opportunity to highlight and analyse the different organising practices that canaleras 
engaged in to distribute crucial resources and to manage everyday social problems 
(Long, 1989). At the same time, I also studied a variety of water users to reveal the 
different ways in which they strategically obtained access to water or maintenance 
services. 
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Regarding the maintenance of the irrigation system, it was difficult to arrange to follow 
the machine workers who operate the maintenance machinery of the association in their 
daily routines. However, the advantage of spending time with the canaleros in the field 
was that we frequently encountered the machinery and talked with the machine 
workers. In addition, I went to the field on several occasions with the driver who 
provided diesel and oil to the machines and the trucks that were working scattered 
around and outside the Left Bank. This gave me a good idea about the motivations 
behind machinery movements. With the head of maintenance, I had a plus, because of 
the merit of being a compatriot of Leo Beenhakker, his all-time favourite coach of the 
football club, America. 
I developed a basic understanding of the administration of a WUA by being in the 
WUA's office for long periods, waiting for the manager - which often became waiting for 
Godot. The great thing about a Mexican office from a researcher's point of view is that, 
once you have established a legitimate presence, nobody asks you to leave and you 
automatically become part of the office life or the furniture, whatever is your ambition. 
The drama then develops in front of your eyes. Through observation of the daily office 
routines, it became clear to me how fee collection and expenditure worked within the 
association and who were crucial actors in this respect. On occassions, I was able to help 
the secretaries with the kind of Microsoft problems that frustrate office work all around 
the globe. Being in the office also entailed the possibility of participating in the little 
parties and festivities that were organised among the personnel of the association. 
The experiences described above gradually drew my attention to several managerial 
decisions and practices that brought the management of the WUA into view. I developed 
a friendship with the manager who enjoyed taking me with him on his trips around the 
region and demonstrating to me the importance of his work and the incentives that 
make it worthwile. In this manner, I was able to establish that his managerial practices 
and decisions were often related to wider politico-institional issues that extended beyond 
the immediate district level. The manager was part of a political group that maintained a 
network of political and institutional relations by controlling the association and its 
personnel, resources and facilities. This was the beginning of what became an extended 
case study of this political group to investigate the different strategies and practices that 
they developped to create space for their political and institutional projects (Long, 1989). 
The value of this approach is not necessarily to prove the typicality of a case, but rather to 
infer some theoretical principles pertaining to the IMT policy process and the 
organisational transformation and practices that this involves (Mitchell, 1983). 
Interesting insights were obtained through social network analysis that explored how the 
political group in question mobilised networks of friends, real or ritual kin (co-parent 
ties), patrons and other local power holders, farmer leaders and their organisations, state 
officials and politicians in order to enrol them in their projects. However, it is important 
to stress that my use of the notion of network was different from that utilised by 
Boissevain (1974) and Mitchell (1983). In addition to purely social relations, my focus 
also encompassed non-humans such as technological artifacts, canals and maintenance 
machines, material resources like water, buildings, legal and planning documents and all 
manner of other things that these social actors use to establish, extend, and consolidate 
their network. 
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There was something that I clearly did not anticipate in my research proposal, but to 
which the method of participant observation drew attention. When I accompanied the 
manager in his pick-up and we were driving at full speed between all kinds of offices and 
the field, I became increasingly intrigued about the following matter. This immensely 
dynamic personality of a manager was not only involved in the management of water 
flows or the coordination of machine movements. A significant part of his time went in 
organising and attending private parties and public meetings. The location of these 
meetings to which people were invited was often not the association's office, but the 
local seafood restaurant or the cantina. 
What made the atmosphere of these meetings and the ongoing discussion or negotiation 
so much more pleasant was the practice of enjoying beer, local dishes and music 
simultaneously, or the prospect of doing so afterwards. This was a side of irrigation 
management that I had never thought and read about, although it only confirmed the 
nowadays widely accepted view that water always flows towards the use with the 
highest added value. The organisation of these events appeared to be enormously 
important to the way in which the manager and his patrons established wider relations, 
essential negotiations took place and strategies were developped. These events revealed 
how the cultural richness of organisational and political life in the region becomes 
intimately entangled with irrigation management. I came to understand these events as 
cultural performances that turned out to have an electoral and political purpose. 
As a participant-observer at several such events that took place in the run-up to local 
elections, I saw how the WUA's staff, facilities and resources were drawn into the 
organisation of a campaign for a local political position. In order to reconstruct and 
analyse these events, I observed and described them by means of situational analysis 
(van Velsen, 1967) and event analysis (Handelman, 1990). In order to contextualise and 
understand my findings, I organised a series of semi-structured interviews with 
academics, politicians, government officials and journalists. I also collected data to 
acquire an historical understanding of contemporary socio-economic and political 
changes in the region by consulting official documents, government records and local 
and national newspapers. 
About a year into my field research, things were going well, and then another 
unexpected development added a new dimension to my investigative endeavour. This 
initiated the second stage of my research. A former study companion, Flip Wester, came 
to work in the state of Guanajuato for the local International Water Management 
Institute (fWMI) office. In explorative discussions we considered the possibility of doing 
research on the genesis of the IMT policy. I had already been intrigued by this topic for 
several years, but was not sure how to research it. Coinddentally, a few weeks later I 
received a call from the Irrigation and Water Engineering Group of the Wageningen 
University inviting researchers and policy makers to write papers for a conference 
entitled The long road to commitment. A socio-political perspective on irrigation reform. To 
both of us this seemed a perfect opportunity to develop our ideas for research more 
concretely, and we dedded to take up the invitation. 
Because this second stage of the research concerned the life cyde of the IMT policy, 
which extends in time and space beyond what can be observed, ethnography of the 
policy process was only possible to a limited extent. We incorporated ethnographical 
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impressions from our earlier fieldwork, policy conferences that we had attended and 
interviews that we had about the subject. However, the bulk of our research consisted of 
interviews with the key players in the conceptualisation and the execution of TMT, plus 
those people who were involved from different positions in state and society. Our list 
included former government officials, politicians, functionaries of international agencies, 
academics, and farmer leaders. Getting access to these people and interviewing them 
was a different ballgame than my usual method of following actors in the field, the office, 
or the cantina. They were people, usually males, living in the capital with busy jobs. 
However, getting an appointment was sometimes easier than I thought, in some cases 
through personal contacts, the institutional links of the IWMI office, and in other cases 
by just looking up an address and calling on a person. During the interviews I noticed 
that I had to adapt my language that had largely been shaped by the peasant 
environment to which I had grown accustomed. My strong language and behaviour 
occasionally led to frowns, which reminded me that I was in the capital, dealing with a 
different class of people. I should still offer my apologies for that. 
We scheduled several trips to Mexico City for a round of interviews. We started out with 
basic propositions concerning the IMT process that we tested and improved through a 
round of semi-structured interviews with a carefully prepared questionnare. From the 
answers of our respondents came new propositions and questions that we used for the 
next round of interviews. Through experience, we learned to release a fixed order of 
questions to enable the respondents to set out their perspective on the IMT process, and 
then we posed leading questions to guide the interview. At a later stage, Luz Nereida 
joined us and helped to contextualise and frame the paper that we were writing for the 
Hyderabad Conference. The general policy background of IMT was examined with the 
help of policy and legal documents, internal reports and professional literature that we 
collected on the subject. Discourse analysis was useful for unravelling the concepts and 
arguments used in the policy literature to address certain conflictive issues (Parkin, 
1990). 
One of the most exciting moments of my research occurred in Hyderabad. Unexpectedly, 
the day before the presentation of papers, Dr. Gonzalez Villareal came walking into the 
conference room. He was the ex-Director of the CNA and the main initiator of the IMT 
policy. He had come to the conference in his capacity as irrigation advisor to the 
Agricultural and Natural Resources Department of the World Bank in Washington. Our 
paper described his carreer and the achievements of his group (see Chapter 2). We had 
not yet succeeded in interviewing him. His presence provided a critical test for our 
findings, because he was probably the most qualified person to comment on our paper. 
He graciously agreed to referee it the next day. Powerpoint and Flip's perfect timing of 
bullets helped me through the presentation of the paper. Dr. Gonzalez Villareal, in his 
comments afterwards, said that it reminded him of many of his own experiences. He also 
made very useful critical remarks, which we have tried to incorporate in later versions of 
the paper. A most interesting remark that he made was that he did not really like our use 
of the term 'hydrocraf, which draws together the words hydraulic and bureaucrat or 
technocrat. Obviously, the latter two words sound derogatory. He preferred the notion of 
hydro-politician. 
This thesis deals with many controversial issues and raises high political stakes. 
However, it is not my intention to criticise or affect individual people and their careers. 
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Therefore, I have changed the names of most protagonists. Dr. González Villareal is one 
of the persons whose actual name I use, because his appointment as Director of a 
government institution was political and he publicly assumed this reponsibility. 
Concluding, the study of policy and the ethnography of an organisation were basically 
intertwined throughout my research journey, although the emphasis shifted. This 
divided my fieldwork into two stages. The first stage concerned a detailed organisation 
study of the Left Bank WUA on the Northern Coast of Nayarit. The second stage of my 
research covered the entire life cycle of the IMT policy, from its earliest roots until its 
international celebration as a policy model. 
Analytical developments 
During my research, the subsequent analysis of the empirical material, and the writing of 
this thesis, my analytical approach changed in two ways that require explanation. 
Firstly, I prefer to use the concept of soao-material instead of sorio-technical analysis, 
because I think it is more appropriate for the broad variety of irrigation and policy 
practices that I analyse. The difference is not fundamental, as the former approach builds 
on the insights of the latter. Irrigation performance studies conceptualise irrigation 
technologies as neutral tools that fulfil practical and productive ends alone. The socio-
technical approach has a strong focus on the role of irrigation technology in water 
management and the wider political economy. The improvement is that it demonstrates 
that irrigation technology enables some powerful groups to get privileged access to 
water, whilst excluding others, as is the case in the classic example of the head-end 
versus the tail-end farmers (Mollinga, 1998). Hence, irrigation technology also mediates 
relations of power. 
A socio-material aproach aims to show that, apart from irrigation technology, there are 
many other material artefacts and resources that also shape the politics and policy of 
irrigation management, such as for instance maintenance machines, irrigation fees, 
policy documents. The irrigation system that I studied has not experienced a major 
change in irrigation technology, but did experience a change in the form of management. 
Nevertheless, irrigation techology is one of several material elements that structure 
actual managerial practices and outcomes. For example, in Chapters 5 and 71 will show 
that maintenance machinery is used as a tool in the hands of political players who 
operate from the WUA. Another example of the broader sets of materials involved in the 
politics of irrigation management are cultural materials such as food and drink. Chapters 
6 and 8 illustrate the important role that the consumption of beer and local dishes plays 
in the political life of the group that controls the WUA and shows how this affects 
irrigation management. Hence, technologies and other material artefacts are also 
opportunities for the performance of taste and self-identity (Bourdieu, 1984), as articles 
of consumption and use. 
A socio-material approach attempts to bring into view the totality of associations 
between people, technologies and resource flows that are engaged in irrigation 
management. As Latour has noted, in daily life we are never faced with technologies or 
social relations on their own, but always with combinations of humans and non-humans 
(Latour, 1992). In Chapters 5, 6 and 7,1 indicate that irrigation management involves the 
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control over various mobile and sometimes elusive composite entities, such as canaleros-
on-motor-bikes operating the network of canals, pump-operators-with-sprinkler-
installations using water from canals, and machine-operators that maintain the 
irifrastructure. Further, I analyse the concrete socio-material arrangements that are 
mobilised in actual water distribution practices. I will call these operational 
arrangements. Operational arrangements are the host of physical devices, monetary 
resources, legal documents and human actors that a farmer would have to enrol to 
obtain access to water from the main system level for his crop (van der Zaag et al., 2001). 
Like Michael (2000), I intend to explore how mundane technologies and other materials 
reinforce and undermine the typical arrangements and practices that comprise everyday 
life. Mundane, in this case, refers to the lack of novelty and technologies that are an 
unremarkable part of everyday life. For a WUA, such technologies are for example motor 
cycles, pick-ups, and Michael shows that mundane technology enables and constraints 
various modes of social, cultural and political comportment. These performances emerge 
from the relations between technologies, bodies, cultures and materials. When I say that 
technologies enable multiple performances (see Chapter 7), both meanings of the word 
performance are implied: an achievement and a staged presentation. Irrigation 
management studies use its first meaning when they design criteria to measure irrigation 
management performance. Anthropology mainly refers to its second meaning, when it 
studies social events as cultural performances. By bringing these two meanings together, 
I suggest that both aspects are valid lenses through which to study the use of mundane 
technologies in everyday life. Box 1 presents an example of the different uses of the 
concept of performance. 
Secondly, both in the study of policy and the ethnography of an organisation my 
attention initially focused on the political and institutional, but later shifted to include 
also the cultural aspects of policy and irrigation management. The first focus I had 
anticipated with the poHtico-institutional axis of control in my analytical framework. 
However, this shift of focus towards the cultural richness of organisational and political 
life in irrigation management as well as in policy making, I did not really foresee. 
Nevertheless, I have incorporated these points in the perspective that I developed on 
Mexican politics: 
In Mexico, the academic debates about politics have been dominated for a long time by 
state-centred perspectives. This perspective on the Mexican political system has 
emphasised the authoritarian, corporatist, and clientelist nature of the regime in 
explaining its prolonged stability (Aitken, 1999). The post-revolutionary Mexican state is 
seen as an all-powerful and pervasive authoritarian organisation that has effectively 
dominated civil society by incorporating peripheral areas and social sectors and co-
opting or coercing the opposition through vertical power chains and clientelist 
mechanisms (Pansters, 2000). In this perspective, power is understood as something that 
is amassed and brokered at the centre (Rubin, 1997), embodied by the figure of the 
president, and transmitted downward through corporatist mechanisms in the peasant, 
labour and popular sectors. The regime created political legitimacy and lubricated the 
patronage machine by sending a vertical flow of material benefits (e.g. subsidies and 
social programmes) from the centre through state hierarchies to its constituencies 
(Demmers, 1998). 
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Box 1 The multiple performances of a pick-up 
On a tour around his state, the governor of Nayarit recently received a petition from residents of an 
urban compound, the lower part of which was flooded because of a leaking canal. He passed it on to 
the CNA with instructions to the neighbouring WUA to solve the problem with its machinery. Today, 
two CNA officials arrive at the WUA office and convince its manager that he needs to accompany 
them to look at the problem. Because the manager has other plans and seems hardly interested, they 
tell him that the governor himself wants a direct answer. The officials' idea is that all three should go 
together in the CNA vehicle, but the manager insists on going in his own pick-up, which is a much 
newer and classier model with airconditioning. I join him and notice that he is annoyed because the 
CNA engineers pressed him to come. He starts the motor and steps on the gas and we drive away at 
full speed. He grumbles about government officials having a pleasant job, because they have nothing 
else to do. He points out the difference in work pressure between them and himself. Through the rear 
window I watch the CNA engineers in their much older pick-up disappearing from sight, because 
their vehicle is slow to build up their much more moderate speed. 
On the road to the compound, the following sequence of events occurs twice. The WUA manager has 
to stop and parks on the side of the road to attend an employee and a user wanting to speak to him. 
The CNA pick-up passes us, but when the manager has resolved his business, he quickly speeds up, 
overtakes them, and disappears into the distance. Near the compound he has to wait at a crossroad for 
the two engineers, because he has no idea where to go. During the drive, we discuss the federally 
financed rehabilitation programme. The manager explains that it is delayed because of tramites 
(procedures) that have to be followed in the CNA because authorisation has to come from the 
national headquarters in Mexico City. These delays make him so angry, he states. 'Everything roith them 
goes so slowly and is neoer dealt with directly'. The way in which he exhibits this difference by outracing 
the government vehicle twice is clearly no coincidence. When the government officials arrive and take 
their time to get out, the manager starts complaining that he has only ten minutes to get to his next 
appointment. One of them quips that, at the speed he drove over here, he will need only five minutes 
for the fifteen-minute drive. The man remarks that I look terrified because of his driving. 
In the above scene, the two pick-ups play a part in different performances. Firstly, when the 
performance of the pick-ups is measured in terms of speed and acceleration, the manager's pick-up is 
clearly superior to the government vehicle. However, to focus only on that aspect of performance 
would be to miss the point. The pick-ups also participate in a cultural performance. Through his use of 
the accelerator pedal, the manager makes visible his view of the difference between a dynamic, hard-
working and hands-on type of manager and the slow, inefficient and bureaucratic government 
officials. The CNA officials do not participate in his contest and ridicule his behaviour and what it leads 
to. In the end, they cover the same distance and he has to wait for them. In addition, the condition of 
the pick-ups reveals the favourable financial situation of the WUA, by means of which the manager 
emphasises the prestige of his position. At times, he makes the government officials feel this 
difference. The whole scene also has a political aspect, because the governor pushes the WUA to 
mobilise its maintenance machinery for a political performance: a public work that benefits the 
governor's profile and that of his party in a pre-election year. In conclusion, technological artefacts are 
enrolled in multiple performances. 
The state-centred view of political power attributes an instrumental role to the cacique 
(regional strongman) in the reproduction of the political system, elite domination, and 
the incorporation of the regional periphery by the political centre (Wolf, 1966; Bartra 
1975; de la Pena, 1986). Caciques are understood to act as power brokers who operate 
between unequal societal levels and negotiate conflicting claims and regional interests by 
manipulating a network of patron-client relations. As resource brokers, they maintain 
their power by winning resources from above for the communities they represent 
(Gleclhill, 1994: 109 quoted in Demmers, 1998). In this view, the corporatist system 
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effectively controls this locally based form of clientelism and the decentralising potential 
of relatively autonomous caciques and their followers (Kaufman Purcell, 1981: 211 
quoted in Demmers, 1998). In these state-centred approaches to politics, both power and 
resources thus find their origin in the state and, more precisely, the political centre from 
which they are hierarchically controlled and vertically disseminated and brokered by 
corporatist institutions and political mediators. 
My line of analysis sympathises with contemporary scholarly work that questions the 
state-centred perspective on Mexican politics and aims to overcome its problems by 
'decentring the regime' (Rubin, 1997; Aitken, 1999; Demmers, 1998; Pansters, 2000). 
These authors argue against an idea of the state as a discrete entity (Aitken, 1999) and 
the sole locus of power, with a strong and coherent centre driven by well-defined 
political programmes and omnipresent structures that effectively maintain societal 
domination over time (Rubin, 1997; de Vries, 2002; Pansters 2000). Hence, the tendency 
to overstate the presence of the corporatist state in provincial Mexico is questioned. In 
contrast to the conventional view, the establishment and entrance of corporatist 
organisations into regions has been a slow, uneven and contested process with a variety 
of outcomes in different parts of Mexico (Rubin, 1997; Aitken, 1999). In some states, 
regional power groups and bosses have been successful in retaining power for long 
periods, whereas in other states centralist tendencies dominated. At the local level, the 
influence of corporatist organisations and the nature of regional political processes vary 
considerably. 
A common starting point has been to broaden the concept of politics, which was 
restricted to state and party politics, formal political institutions and electoral processes, 
by opening up space for locations and flows of power outside both the centre and official 
politics. Rubin makes a case for placing culture, the everyday practices of civil society 
groupings, and the region as a political location, within the discussions about power and 
the state (Rubin, 1997). As a result, the attention shifts to local and regional practices of 
rule in the context of national projects of state formation and intervention, and the 
specific cultural and political dynamics and effects that this has in different regions of 
Mexico (Aitken, 1999), for example in terms of local identities, political and popular 
cultures. 
From the perspective of a study of the policy of IMT, I think two aspects are generally 
lacking in such studies of state formation and regional political cultures, which 
potentially provide new axes along which one can centre and de-centre the Mexican 
regime: firstly, the role of the federal bureaucracy as a powerful player in the formulation 
and execution of policy and the rise of high-level technocrats as a new political group in 
the government (Greenberg, 1970; Grindle, 1977; Centeno, 1994; Torres Espinosa, 1999). 
In Chapters 2, 3 and 10,1 demonstrate that the emergence, execution and success of the 
IMT policy cannot be understood without considering the historically important, but 
contested, economic and political role of the hydraulic bureaucracy in agriculture, the rise 
of a transnational class of technocrats within it and the particular culture that such a 
bureaucracy represents. Secondly, a socio-material dimension to political organisation is 
absent from this literature. The hydraulic bureaucracy has manifested itself by creating a 
spatially distributed irrigation infrastructure that has transformed the political landscape 
of Mexico's rural regions. Besides constituting an (infrastructure of control for the state 
bureaucracy, these irrigation districts have become locations of power by themselves, 
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partly based on the de-centralised capacity to control and distribute water and other 
scarce resources (see Chapters 4 and 8). 
1.5 Limitations of the Study 
The approach of this book is limited in three ways. Firstly, it does not aim to provide an 
analysis of the political economy of either policy reform or irrigation management. This 
is without doubt an important task, but one that this book has not set for itself, because 
it aims to point to other dynamics that have received too little attention within such a 
framework. Secondly, the book reveals the unarticulated orientation of the author 
towards the powers that be and the ways in which they become what they are. The 
drawback is that this study does not sufficiently call attention to the exclusion of the 
much less powerful agents from neo-liberal policy processes and irrigation management, 
in spite of its participatory rhetoric, and largely ignores the rural poverty, migration and 
marginalisation that this has reinforced. Thirdly, this study is largely based on an 
international literature on policy and irrigation management and directed towards an 
international audience by means of the English language. A shortcoming is that it 
inadequately represents the existing Mexican literature on some of these topics. 
1.6 Outline of the Chapters 
After this introductory chapter, the book contains nine substantive chapters that provide 
material for the conclusion. Each individual chapter presents empirical material that 
challenges an assumption regarding the IMT policy or irrigation management that has 
become accepted wisdom in the field. The chapters are organised according to the part 
they play in either the study of policy or the ethnography of an irrigation organisation. 
The ethnographical fieldwork in Nayarit is presented in five chapters that constitute the 
central part of this book. The three chapters that study the life cycle of the IMT policy 
sandwich these. Chapters 2 and 3 are placed at the start as they trace back the roots of 
the IMT policy and discuss how it developed and became effective throughout different 
parts of Mexico. Chapter 10 reviews the wider impact of Mexican IMT policy, as it 
became known as a successful case and a model for the rest of the world. Although the 
latter chapter continues the policy theme of those two earlier chapters, it is placed at the 
end of the thesis, as it builds on insights from all of the chapters and provides a contrast 
to the case study that precedes it. Chapters 4 to 9 present the organisational ethnography 
of a WUA and the impact of IMT in Nayarit. This part of the book is sub-divided 
according to the common understanding that irrigation management involves three 
types of activities: operation, maintenance and administration; and three sorts of material 
resources: water, maintenance resources (machinery and works), and finances. 
Chapter 2 recounts the history of Mexican irrigation reforms that culminated in IMT. 
Contrary to what is generally believed, the political commitment to this policy was not 
triggered solely by the financial crisis of the state that led to a downward spiral in the 
districts; it also emerged from a much longer process of bureaucratic struggle revolving 
around the autonomy of the hydraulic bureaucracy and its control over the irrigation 
districts. 
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Chapter 3 shows that the articulation, engineering or making of the IMT policy was a 
contested process. Hence, the actual policy package with which senior officials had to 
effectuate the transfer was experimented with, resisted and adapted significantly. After 
some time, this led to a standardisation of the package that contributed to an unforeseen 
acceleration in the pace of transfer in Mexico. I also argue that, contrary to what is 
generally expected, IMT in Mexico did not lead to a withdrawal of the state from 
irrigation, but served to reorder and strengthen bureaucratic control over irrigation 
management from a distance. 
Chapter 4 takes the reader to the Northern Coast of Nayarit and situates the irrigation 
system on the Left Bank of the River Santiago in a wider regional landscape. In this 
manner, I emphasise that the analytical approaches that isolate an irrigation system as 
separate from its environment are flawed, because it overlaps with several political and 
administrative domains that affect irrigation management. This introductory chapter also 
questions the unproblematic use of the concept of 'water users' as a coherent and 
homogeneous group of social actors with similar interests. The chapter then recounts the 
contemporary history of the transfer of the Left Bank irrigation system and introduces 
the social actors and material artefacts that play a role in the organisational ethnography 
of the water users' association (WUA). 
Chapter 5 falsifies the neo-iratitutional assumption that water distribution in particular, 
and organisational practices in general, are governed by a system of agreed rules and 
incentives. It presents the first of two contrasting case studies of canaleros in water 
distibution. These cases investigate the role of the canalero in relation to the operational 
arrangements with which he deals in his daily work and his social position vis-a-vis the 
WUA management. This chapter shows how a canalero's work is shaped, not by a set of 
rules, but by his frequent interactions with sprinkler irrigation and small-scale tobacco 
producers and the fact that he has rather distant relations with his superiors. 
Chapter 6 challenges a popular view on the relation between patron-client relations and 
organisational practices in a Latin American context. It discusses the case of a canalero 
who is a client to the political group that is in control of the WUA and performs an 
important role in a network of large-scale rice producers that irrigate using the surface 
irrigation method. This case addresses the need to revise simple sociological models of 
patron-client relations in which the patron monopolises the power and resources on 
which his clients depend. I do this by focusing on the role that the client in this case 
plays in the distribution of various material and cultural resource flows that are essential 
in the reproduction of the political group. 
Chapter 7 examines maintenance as an organisational practice that is a particularly 
useful entry point to analyse the transfer and functioning of irrigation systems, contrary 
to most analysis that automatically assumes that water is the most contested resource 
and its distribution the central activity of irrigation management. The approach taken 
illustrates that the managerial group, through their connection with maintenance 
machinery and the works it enables, engages in multiple performances. Machine use 
contributes not only to operational performance, in line with formal performance 
objectives, but also to other social, material and political practices and performances that 
transcend and change what are conceived to be the boundaries and objectives of an 
irrigation system. 
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Chapter 8 argues that resource allocation is profoundly and inherently political, in 
contrast to contemporary managerial approaches that model it as an act of service 
provision and therefore essentially different from politics. A situational analysis of an 
election rally is the starting point to illustrate the political nature of resource allocation, 
the WUA as a political platform, and the rally as a cultural performance. It is a central 
chapter that shows how the political group in control of the WUA draws for electoral 
purposes on the material resources that are discussed in the other chapters of the 
organisational ethnography. 
Chapter 9 focuses on the financial management of the WUA in order to challenge the 
policy view that the WUAs have generally achieved financial autonomy as an outcome of 
IMT and that they are accountable, both financially and electorally, to the larger 
community of water users. 
Chapter 10 puts 'the success of the Mexican IMT model' - which has rarely been 
questioned or really qualified - between quotation marks. It analyses the cultural process 
of policy making that has generated the Mexican IMT policy model and follows the 
practices, means and events through which it has achieved increasing transnational 
circulation and popularity. The argument is that the success of a policy model is only a 
success within the cultural and ideological understandings and practices of the policy 
network in which it is generated and disseminated. 
Chapter 11 presents the conclusions of this book and tries to explain the contrasting 
findings of the two directions in which this book has set out: the study of the IMT policy 
in Mexico and the organisational ethnography of actual practices, processes and 
outcomes in Nayarit. The gap between the internationally celebrated success of the 
policy and the empirical practice in the field needs to be made intelligible. 
Notes 
1 Many different terms are used in relation to IMT, such as turnover, self-governance and 
privatisation. The most important distinction is that IMT refers to cases in which only the management 
of an irrigation system is transferred, while privatisation refers to cases in which the juridical ownership 
of the infrastructure and related resources is also handed over. 
2 Of the 5.2 million hectares of Mexico's irrigated land, 3.2 million hectares are organised in eighty 
irrigation districts, varying in size from a few thousand to systems of more than 200,000 hectares in the 
north of the country. The rest is organised in privately or collectively run small-scale systems called 
irrigation units. Most of the irrigation systems are gravity-based, with water being derived from storage 
reservoirs, by means of diversion dams and conveyance canals. At the end of 1994, the CNA had 
transferred thirty-six districts completely and eighteen partially (Gorriz et al., 1995). 
3 The land reform which followed the Mexican Revolution of 1910 resulted in the establishment of 
two forms of land tenure: the ejido, which are corporately organised agrarian communities, and the 
pequeña propiedad (private ownership). Ejido land is government property but is granted to an ejidatario 
for use. Currently, as a consequence of articulo 27 of the new agrarian law and the national policy 
programme, PROCEDE, which have been implemented during the last few years, every ejidatario has 
to receive ownership documents of his plot and is presently legally entitled to sell or rent out his land. 
In spite of altered responsibilities, the ejido remains an important administrative unit both for the 
government and farmers, not least because of the ejidos' representation in the WUAs. 
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The Politics of Creating Commitment: 
Irrigation reforms and the reconstitution of the hydraulic 
bureaucracy in Mexico1 
2.1 Introduction 
In the past ten years, water management in Mexico has been radically reformed under 
the influence of neo-liberal government policies. The creation of the Comisión Nacional 
del Agua (CNA: National Water Commission)2 in 1989, the transfer of government 
irrigation districts to water users' associations (WUAs) (1989-present) and the 
promulgation of a new water law (1992) exemplify this. Internationally, Mexico's 
Irrigation Management Transfer (EMT) programme has been heralded as a success and 
has drawn widespread attention for its rapid implementation. Consequently, it has been 
propagated as a model for other countries seeking to improve the performance of their 
public irrigation systems and cut burgeoning public expenditures (Groenfeldt, 1998). 
Surprisingly for a reform of this magnitude, no attempt has been made to explain how it 
came about. Policy documents single out the strong commitment of the political 
leadership and policy managers to the IMT programme and the creation of appropriate 
legal and institutional frameworks as explanations for the origin and success of IMT 
(Gorriz et al., 1995; Groenfeldt, 1998). However, how and in which arenas this 
commitment was created and which actors were fundamental to this process remains 
unexplained. The literature presents the occurrence of IMT in Mexico as a logical and 
unavoidable outcome of the economic crisis of the 1980s. The argument goes that this 
crisis led to a large decrease in government funding for irrigation and a reduction in the 
payment of water fees by water users, resulting in a poor performance of the publicly 
managed irrigation districts and a widespread deterioration of the irrigation 
infrastructure. The irrigation reforms were thus an inevitable response of the Mexican 
government to this state of affairs (Gorriz et al., 1995; Johnson, 1997a, 1997b; Kloezen et 
al., 1997; Palacios Vélez, 1997, 1998). I posit that this line of argument does not suffice 
when it comes to understanding the emergence of the IMT policy and the strong 
commitment it enjoyed from senior politicians and bureaucrats.3 
To understand why IMT became a reality in the 1990s it is necessary to broaden the 
analysis to include the historical, political and bureaucratic4 processes that engendered 
and sustained Mexico's water reforms. Such an analysis, which takes policy actors as the 
unit of analysis and the articulation5 of reforms as the focus of attention, clarifies why 
and when water reforms are effectuated and how alliances are negotiated through which 
reforms gather momentum. Focusing on their political and bureaucratic embeddedness 
makes it possible to understand the trajectories and variable content of water reforms, 
the conflictive dynamic of their articulation, and their ramifications. In this regard it is 
important to acknowledge that policy making in Mexico '(...) does not result from 
pressures exerted by mass publics, nor does it derive from party platforms or ideology, 
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nor from legislative consultation and compromise. Rather, it is an end product of elite 
bureaucratic and political interaction (...)' (Grindle, 1977:7). As a consequence, I focus 
on the political and bureaucratic actors, arenas and conditions that play a role in 
engendering policy ideas and bureaucratic transformations.6 
The water reforms in Mexico were part of a larger set of neo-liberal reforms enacted 
during the presidency of Salinas de Gortari (1989-1994) with the support of international 
funding agencies. Decentralisation policies, such as the transfer of irrigation districts, are 
assumed to weaken the position of the bureaucracy by devolving authority and control 
over resources to organisations external to the government, reducing government 
subsidies and downsizing bureaucratic staff. This has led many people to believe that the 
hydraulic bureaucracy7 in Mexico had no part in defining or supporting the water 
reforms and that either the Mexican president or international funding agencies must 
have imposed it. This perception of reform processes also partly explains why policy 
documents place such emphasis on the need for a strong commitment to reform on the 
part of policy managers. 
In contrast to this reading of the water reforms, this chapter argues that the composition 
of, and the commitment to, the water reforms emerged from a complex and protracted 
process of interaction and enrolment between policy actors such as senior hydrocrats/ 
the Mexican presidential candidate, and World Bank officials. Segments of the hydraulic 
bureaucracy played a crucial role in the generation of policy ideas and the articulation of 
the water reform package in the 1980s, as part of an ongoing struggle within the 
Mexican bureaucracy. I argue that IMT became feasible because it was embedded in a 
broader reform package that resulted in greater autonomy for the hydraulic bureaucracy 
through the creation of a single water authority and the reordering of control over 
bureaucratic domains and resource flows. Thus, these neo-liberal water reforms were 
only possible as they combined decentralisation with the concentration of bureaucratic 
powers and generated important benefits for segments of the hydraulic bureaucracy. 
The aim of this chapter is to stimulate debate on the role of hydraulic bureaucracies in 
water reforms. The management of irrigation by bureaucracies became a target of 
criticism in the late 1970s and 1980s' rural development literature (Bottrall, 1981a, 1981b; 
Chambers, 1988; Moore, 1981; Repetto, 1986; Wade, 1978, 1982; Wade and Seckler, 
1990). This literature stressed the need to study the hydraulic bureaucracy, but only 
focused on the discrepancies between policy objectives and implementation, 
Wghlighting the problematic role of low-level field staff. By sustaining the divide 
between policy formulation and implementation, this literature viewed the bureaucracy 
solely as an instrument for attaining policy objectives, thus disregarding the role of 
senior hydrocrats in poUcy-making activities both before and after policy legislation 
(Clay and Schaffer, 1984; Long and van der Ploeg, 1989; Yanow, 1988). To overcome this, 
I view bureaucracies as 'the accumulated product of a social history of past policies [that] 
become congealed in institutional form and develop a network of interests around them, 
both inside and outside the bureaucracy' (Beetham, 1987:51). These networks of interests 
and concerns are rooted in the history and culture of particular bureaucracies, their 
relationship to larger socio-political constellations, as well as in actors' education and 
professional experiences. By focusing on the historical and cultural embeddedness of 
these overriding concerns, I do not attribute them to isolated individuals and therefore 
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avoid placing too much emphasis on the intentional behaviour and strategic action of 
individuals. Hence, no criticism of individuals and their motives, values and beliefs is 
implied. Although this analysis of the water reforms in Mexico is by no means a 
comprehensive account of 'what really happened' and is at times speculative,9 it 
demonstrates the benefits of bringing the bureaucracy back in when analysing water 
reforms. 
The following section explores how the Mexican hydraulic bureaucracy developed a set 
of overriding concerns between 1926 and 1976 relating to control over irrigation 
infrastructure and bureaucratic and financial autonomy. These overriding concerns help 
us understand, in Section 3, why the merger between the hydraulic and agricultural 
bureaucracies in 1976 was so traumatic and led to an energetic struggle for renewed 
autonomy. Against this backdrop, the consolidation of the water reform package is 
analysed in Section 4, while Section 5 reviews how this consolidation resulted in IMT 
and the reconstitution of the hydraulic bureaucracy through the formation of the CNA. 
Lastly, Section 6 discusses the conclusions and implications of my analysis. 
22 The Construction Era (1926-1976) and the Formation of the Hydraulic 
Bureaucracy 
To understand policy articulation processes in Mexico, it is necessary to place the 
struggles between policy actors in the broader frame of historical, political and 
bureaucratic transformations. The answer to the question as to what is distinctive about 
the link between the Mexican political system, its bureaucracies, and the policy process 
can be found in several key developments in the country's political history. The political 
authorities that have ruled Mexico since the 1920s have managed to establish a relatively 
stable political regime compared to other parts of Latin America. The Mexican revolution 
(1910-1917) was appropriated by the triumphant political elites in the Partido 
Revoluáonario Institucional (PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party). Since its foundation 
in 1929, the PRI has ruled the country uninterruptedly, and, until a decade ago, without 
much politically organised challenge. According to some authors, the PRI owes its 
success to its early establishment of political and economic mechanisms for resolving 
conflicts within the elite and for ensuring mass support and political control. Through 
clientelism and corporative representation and control, the party successfully 
incorporated workers, farmers and the middle class (Camp, 1999; Grindle, 1996). 
In agriculture, the expansion of irrigation10 and the centralisation of decision making was 
used by the Mexican regime to keep in check sharp socio-economic differences and to 
increase political control (Vargas Velazquez, 1996). This centralisation" entailed the 
federal government strengthening its role in water management and consolidated the 
state's control over water through the formation and expansion of a hydraulic 
bureaucracy that enjoyed a large degree of bureaucratic and financial autonomy.12 This 
section reviews this process from 1926 to 1976 to understand how the network of 
interests and overriding concerns of the hydraulic bureaucracy were formed; it points out 
those aspects of bureaucratic transitions, culture and politics important for elucidating 
the creation of the CNA and the articulation of the IMT policy. I view these concerns not 
28 The Success of a Policy Model 
as historical or cultural constants, but as accumulated products of a history of legal, 
bureaucratic and policy transformations, embedded in a larger process of centralisation. 
In his insightful work, El Agua de la Nation, Aboites (1998) shows that the process of 
centralisation by which the federal government of Mexico increased its control over 
water had already started at the end of the 19* century during the Porfirian regime. This 
trend was consolidated in Article 27 of the constitution drawn up after the Mexican 
Revolution in 1917, in which water in Mexico was defined as belonging to the nation and 
falling under federal jurisdiction. Article 27 also established that the only legal way to 
gain access to the nation's water is through a concession granted by the federal 
government. Based on Article 27, the centralisation of water management began in 
earnest in the 1920s, when President Calles launched a programme for the construction 
of large-scale irrigation systems (termed irrigation districts in Mexico). This programme 
found its legal expression in the Irrigation Law issued in 1926, which also created the 
Common National de Irrigation (CM; National Irrigation Commission), the first 
government agency solely devoted to the design and construction of irrigation districts 
and their subsequent management. Although exact data on the area irrigated before the 
creation of the CM are not available, Orive Alba (1970) estimates it to have been some 
800,000 ha. In twenty years (1926-1946) the CM doubled this figure through the 
construction of 816,200 ha of large-scale irrigation systems and 21,343 ha of small-scale 
systems, mainly in Northern Mexico (SRH, 1975). Dam storage capacity in Mexico, 
which amounted to 88 million cubic meters (MCM) in 1900, increased to 22,717 MCM by 
1946 (SRH, 1976). 
Control over irrigation districts 
The construction, settlement and management of medium and large-scale irrigation 
districts entailed control over large sums of money as well as political control over the 
selection of beneficiaries of government programmes and their access to irrigated 
agriculture (Martinez, 1988). As a result, control over the irrigation districts and the 
resources allocated to this function were subjects of much bureaucratic competition 
between 'functional rivals'. Greenberg (1970) argues that the functional rivals of the 
hydraulic bureaucracy consisted of those agencies whose activities were similar enough 
that their personnel felt them to be in competition with each other. The Ministry of 
Agriculture in particular fits this bill. 
Between the 1920s and 1940s, the content of irrigation policy was subject to both inter-
bureaucratic struggles and the ups and downs in the relationship between the state and 
the peasantry. This revolved around the long-standing tension between policies 
targeting private capital as a means of increasing agricultural production and those 
directed at peasants to retain political support in rural areas (Fox, 1992; Gates, 1988; 
Stanford, 1993). Under President Calles in the 1920s, the construction of irrigation 
districts served to replace large landholdings (latifundia) with medium-sized family 
farms. The CM was instrumental in the creation of this new class of farmers through the 
settlement and land distribution efforts it oversaw in the irrigation districts. In the mid-
1930s, President Cardenas dealt with this challenge in quite a different manner by 
proceeding to make true the revolutionary promise of giving the Tand to the tiller', 
especially in regions where large landowners were amongst his political opponents. 
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During his term, nearly half of the irrigated area was incorporated into ejidos13 
(Wionczek, 1982). As the CM was too closely linked with Calles' policies, Cárdenas 
transferred the aclministration and colonisation of the irrigation districts to his trustees at 
the Bank of Agricultural Credit in 1934. The CNI was vehemently opposed to this move 
and in 1943 won the inter-bureaucratic struggle and regained control over the 
administration and colonisation of most of the irrigation districts (Orive Alba 1970). 
During this period, responsibilities for water development were spread over several 
federal ministries and agencies: irrigation with CNI, flood control with the Ministry of 
Communications and Public Works, potable water with the Ministry of Health, and 
hydroelectricity with the Federal Electricity Commission. During the presidential election 
campaign of 1946, the then director of the CNI convinced Alemán, the presidential 
candidate, of the need to correct this dispersion of administrative efforts. After Alemán 
became president this came to pass, and in December 1946 the Secretaría de Recursos 
Hidráulicos (SRH: Ministry of Water Resources) was created. This was a pioneering move 
in many respects and was the first time water was elevated to the level of a rriirtistry in 
the Western Hemisphere. The SRH integrated the use of water resources and 
concentrated the government's efforts in this field in a single organisation. However, 
when the ministry was still being formed, the Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería (SAG: 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock) persuaded Alemán that it should have authority 
over the irrigation districts, thus continuing its struggle with the hydraulic bureaucracy 
(Orive Alba 1970). Once again this met with severe resistance from the hydraulic 
bureaucracy, and Agriculture's control over the irrigation districts was to last only a short 
period, with the SRH regaining control over them in 1951. 
The above shows how legal and policy transformations concerning irrigation 
management are subject to bureaucratic struggles between functional rivals, such as the 
SRH and the SAG. These transformations revolve around two crucial political 
phenomena in Mexico: presidentialism and the presidential term of six years (the 
sexenio). Presidentialism refers to the dominant role played by the president in reordering 
bureaucratic domains and in the materialisation of political and economic reforms during 
his sexenio. The sexenio amounts to a calendar of political time, as described by Grindle 
(1977). A relative rupture with the preceding aclrrurtistration typically characterises the 
beginning of each sexenio, through changes in the leadership at all levels of the federal 
administration. At the end of the sexenio, bureaucratic groups align themselves with and 
offer their support to close allies of the presidential candidate, as these will probably be 
appointed to top posts in the upcoming administration (Greenberg, 1970). These 
prospective senior government officials influence the presidential candidate's views on 
institutional and policy reforms as well as on the division of bureaucratic functions and 
allocation of resources. Policy changes and bureaucratic transitions are thus most 
frequently shaped and defined at the end of a sexenio, to be initiated at the beginning of 
a new sexenio. When viewed in a longer time frame, it becomes apparent that the radical 
ruptures in control over the irrigation districts are structured by the political calendar of 
the sexenio and in that regard turn out to be an element of continuity. 
In the following decades until the creation of the Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos 
Hidráulicos (SARH: Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources) in 1976, the SRH 
consolidated its control over the irrigation districts and managed to keep the Ministry of 
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Agriculture out. This culminated in 1972 with the promulgation of the Ley Federal de 
Aguas (Federal Water Law). Article 46 of this law establishes that the SRH is completely 
responsible for the irrigation districts, from construction to management, effectively 
forbidding user management of the districts (Diario Oficial, 1972). However, the various 
water laws promulgated between 1926 and 1947 contained provisions for the creation of 
water users' associations or water boards to manage irrigation districts. The 1929 water 
law already mentions water users' associations and confers legal status to them (SAyF, 
1929)." Subsequent water laws also allowed for the operation of irrigation districts by 
user associations or water boards, only to become illegal under the water law of 1972. 
For example, the irrigation law of 1947 mentions that: 
"Until the (...) the users are organised and sufficiently trained as to take 
charge [of the operation of the irrigation districts and irrigation units], 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock will be in charge of the 
maintenance of the structures, water distribution and the overall 
operation of irrigation districts. For this reason, it will make efforts to 
organise water boards and water user associations, to whom in the end 
the operation of the irrigation districts will be handed over. When it is 
judged opportune, the districts or units will be turned over to their 
respective users, so they can operate them directly, albeit under the 
vigilance and supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.' 
(Diario Oficial, 1946:16; my translation) 
In line with the law's provisions, water boards were charged with the operation of 
several districts in the north, such as Río Yaqui, Río Mayo, Rio Colorado and Delicias. 
But water monopolisation by commercial farmers combined with the lack of strong 
government support was in most cases detrimental to the continued existence of water 
boards. The control of most of these districts was returned to the SRH from the SAG in 
1951, effectively ending the experiments with water boards15 (Palacios Vélez, 1993; 
Vargas Velazquez, 1996). 
Financial autonomy 
The monopoly of the CNI and the SRH in the construction of irrigation systems secured 
it a large and steady income flow between the 1930s and the 1970s. These resources 
represented an important element of continuity for the hydraulic bureaucracy and largely 
account for the financially wealthy and autonomous bureaucracy that the SRH became 
during this period. The SRH's budget was one of the largest among the federal agencies 
with 61 to 100 per cent of pubic investments in the agriculture sector going to the 
construction of irrigation works between 1926 and 1976. Further, it managed its own 
funds and had relative budgetary freedom from other bureaucratic entities, although 
subject to presidential and party priorities (Duran, 1988; Greenberg, 1970; Grindle, 1977; 
Wionczek, 1982). 
It was only in the early 1960s that foreign loans started to become important for SRH 
( D u r a n , 1988; Greenberg, 1970; World Bank, 1983b). Because of its international 
reputation as an efficient and technically competent ministry, the SRH was very 
successful in acquiring international loans for irrigation construction purposes, thereby 
The Politics of Creating Commitment 31 
generating urgently needed foreign currency for the government. From 1966 to 1975, 
foreign loans constituted more than fifteen per cent of the SRH's irrigation investments 
on average (Duran, 1988; World Bank, 1983b). Mexico, and more particularly its 
hydraulic bureaucracy, became favoured clients of the World Bank. As a major recipient 
of external funding, the SRH was granted privileges not given to other ministries, such as 
a large degree of autonomy in making technical decisions and a significant budget to 
hire a cadre of well-trained professional engineers (Greenberg, 1970). 
Another source of income for the hydraulic bureaucracy was the water charges it levied 
on irrigators. However, this source of income was much less stable and controllable. 
Apart from the fact that the water charges collected in the districts were never sufficient 
to fully cover Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs, the fees were not paid directly 
to the SRH but to the Ministry of Finance (van der Zaag, 1992). The initial policy 
intention under Calles was that those who benefited from state-built irrigation works 
would reimburse the state for its investment as well as fully cover the O&M costs of the 
irrigation systems (Wionczek, 1982). This objective was reiterated in the 1947 irrigation 
law. Nonetheless, fee payment generally covered only a fraction of irrigation investments 
and O&M costs (Aboites, 1998). Between 1950 and 1964, cost recovery averaged sixty 
per cent (Orive Alba, 1970). From 1965 to 1976 this average slipped shghtly to around 
fifty-three per cent, but between 1977 and 1982 it dropped drastically to around twenty 
per cent (Johnson, 1997a). 
Although it is unclear how fees were actually established by the different agencies 
responsible for the irrigation districts throughout the years, political criteria were often 
more relevant than technical and financial ones (Ascher, 1999; Wionczek, 1982). The 
argument often used to justify low water charges was that the poorer farmers in the 
districts would not be able to pay if the fees were raised (Wionczek, 1982). However, this 
does not explain why the fees were not adjusted in accordance with the increased value 
of irrigated land. Policies favouring low fee levels and the government's priority to invest 
in large construction works rather than in optimal use of the available infrastructure led 
to a sub-optimal use and deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure.16 However, this 
deterioration presented itself selectively, especially harming small farmers. Medium-
sized and large producers were financially able to solve maintenance problems for 
themselves. Although supported in the name of social equity, low water service fees 
were mainly beneficial to larger farmers. 
The above shows how financial autonomy became an important concern of the hydraulic 
bureaucracy. This concept refers to the degree to which a bureaucracy can generate and 
control its income flows, set its own budgets and decide on expenditure and investment 
independently from other bureaucratic entities. The more affluent a bureaucracy is, and 
the more budgetary freedom it has, the larger its degree of financial autonomy. 
Bureaucratic autonomy 
At the centre of the Mexican political system stand the president and the party. Officially, 
they decide on the programmes that the bureaucracies should undertake, in line with the 
political projects that they intend to carry out in the corning sexenio. The party has the 
power to appoint and remove officials at all levels of the bureaucracy (Greenberg, 1970). 
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Hence, officials must maintain good relations with the party, and party activity is an 
important prerequisite for high-level appointments in the bureaucracy (Grindle, 1977). 
The co-ordination of water management at the ministry level during the SRH era 
implied that senior hydrocrats stood in direct contact with the president. The minister 
was the central figure in the SRH, appointed by the president and directly responsible to 
him for all the actions of the ministry. The president allowed his minister - often a friend 
or political confidant - to appoint his own team (equipó) of trusted collaborators and left 
the internal operations and the management of funds to the discretion of the minister. 
The minister thus enjoyed a considerable degree of operative and budgetary autonomy, 
within the broad policy lines negotiated with the president. Historically, well-qualified 
men, all trained as dvil engineers and with experience in the ministry led the SRH. The 
minister's technical qualifications were considered important to impress donor agendes 
during loan negotiations and to convince them that their money would be well spent. At 
times, the SRH minister played an important role in national politics and at least once in 
the presidential succession (Castañeda, 1999; Greenberg, 1970; Orive Alba, 1970). 
During its thirty years of uninterrupted reign, the SRH was not constrained by any 
superior bureaucratic entity, such as for instance the Ministry of Agriculture. An 
important concern of senior hydrocrats thus became their bureaucratic autonomy, i.e. 
the degree of operative freedom and internal control that a bureaucracy has and the 
extent to which it can prevent external influence on decision making. In part this was 
possible because of the close relations with several Mexican presidents and the PRI and 
the important role that the hydraulic bureaucracy played in their political projects. 
To illustrate how these overriding concerns are embedded in the history and culture of 
the hydraulic bureaucracy, it is necessary to review the composition of its staff and the 
consequences this had for the internal relationships, bureaucratic culture and network of 
interests that developed. The expansion of the hydraulic bureaucracy and the 
professional and bureaucratic formation of its cadre occurred in a complex of education 
and research institutions, professional assodations, private construction companies and 
international organisations with which the hydraulic bureaucracy maintained dose 
relations. 
A distinct attribute of the hydraulic bureaucracy was the relatively homogeneous 
composition of its staff, with similar academic and bureaucratic careers, which 
contributed to the dosed and hierarchical culture of the SRH and the strong sense of 
identity of hydraulic bureaucrats. The professional staff of the CNI and SRH consisted of 
dvil and irrigation engineers with similar educational backgrounds and bureaucratic 
careers. The majority of these engineers were trained in two major Mexican engineering 
schools: the Faculty of Fjigineering of the National Autonomous University of Mexico 
(dvil engineers) and the Chapingo National School of Agriculture (irrigation engineers). 
Apart from professional skills, students developed strong friendship bonds and clientele 
networks in these schools that benefited them in their bureaucratic careers. In addition, 
the relation between the bureaucracy and these education and research institutions was 
actively maintained, with SRH offidals returning to their universities as lecturers and 
vice versa. 
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The similar training and bureaucratic trajectories of most of the engineers had an 
important impact on the bureaucratic culture of the SRH. The SRH was a rninistry with a 
small staff of well-paid engineers that worked in a structured and organised manner. 
There was little room for disobedience and both orders from superiors and the periodic 
transfers of officials ordered by headquarters were followed and accepted. In comparison 
with the Ministry of Agriculture, the SRH was known for its closed, conservative and 
authoritarian culture and the strong discipline of its staff. During the first decades of the 
hydraulic bureaucracy, its engineering staff developed a keen sense of its hydraulic 
mission and possessed a strong esprit de corps. Officials of the hydraulic bureaucracy 
identified with the grand tradition of Mexican hydraulic engineering and its major 
accomplishments and defined themselves as a distinct group with its own bureaucratic 
history and culture. This permitted a sense of pride towards the profession and the 
institution, strengthened by closed networks (to the outside world) of friendship and 
mutual support. 
These networks of the hydraulic bureaucracy extended to construction companies. In the 
early 1940s, the SRH decided to tender contracts for the construction of dams and large 
irrigation works. This resulted in the formation of several Mexican construction 
companies, which played a major role in the development of the SRH, since they served 
as contractors and consultants to the ministry. In addition, former members of the 
hydraulic bureaucracy frequently staffed them, and senior hydrocrats were advisors for 
these companies or had financial interests in them. The hydrocrat thus fulfilled different 
roles, namely that of bureaucrat, politician and businessman. Understandably, the close 
links with contractors resulted in pressures to give priority to construction projects and 
partly explains the strong construction bias of the hydraulic bureaucracy (Greenberg, 
1970). 
The relations with international organisations form another important field of 
institutional interactions. Because of the good reputation of the Mexican hydraulic 
bureaucracy, senior SRH engineers undertook consultancies for international 
organisations, such as the FAO, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World 
Bank. These contacts facilitated the negotiation of international loans in which the SRH 
became reasonably successful (Greenberg, 1970) and played an important role in 
obtaining the World Bank's support for the prestigious National Water Plan at the 
beginning of the 1970s, as detailed in the next section. 
To recapitulate, three main points emerge from this section. First, from the 1920s to the 
1970s, irrigation development and management were characterised by increasing federal 
government intervention. Second, this centralisation of water management, coupled 
with the government priority for the development of large-scale irrigation, led to the 
formation, expansion and specialisation of a hydraulic bureaucracy. Over time, this 
bureaucracy developed specific overriding concerns, namely control over irrigation 
districts and bureaucratic and financial autonomy, and cemented its relative autonomy 
through the relations it maintained with the president, the party and a broader set of 
state institutions and funding agencies. Third, it is clear that user management of 
irrigation districts is not new, although the government did not actively support the 
operation of irrigation districts by users. This partly explains why most of them did not 
endure. 
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2.3 Loss of Autonomy and the Emergence of Policy Ideas in the SARH Era (1976-
1988) 
The SARH fusion 
In 1976, President López-Portillo merged the smaller but financially affluent SRH with 
the larger but financially poorer SAG to create the Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos 
Hidráulicos (SARH: Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources). The creation of the 
SARH was linked to several political, adrninistrative and economic considerations. 
Apparently, senior SRH officials had backed a rival presidential candidate in 1975. This 
persuaded López-Portillo to 'punish' the SRH and remove certain bureaucratic groups 
from the political stage. In addition, as a Minister of Finance during the Echevarría 
aclrrunistration (1970-1976) he had experienced severe problems with the SRH's lack of 
budgetary discipline. Although economically the tide was against him in 1976, López-
Portillo decided to expand the state's role in the economy.17 This was made possible by 
the discovery of new oil deposits and substantial increases in oil prices (Grindle, 1996). 
López-Portillo announced a far-reaching administrative reform to rationalise the wide 
array of bureaucracies created in previous decades (Martinez, 1988). This included the 
creation of the Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (SPP: Ministry of Prograrnming 
and Budget), a ministry that unified financial planning functions previously distributed 
among various ministries.18 The creation of the SARH was part of this aclministrative 
reform and served to unify all activities related to agriculture in one ministry (Arce, 
1993). 
With the creation of the SARH, the SRH was dissolved and effectively downgraded to 
the level of an under ministry. The SARH was divided into three under rrunistries, each 
headed by a deputy minister: Agriculture and Operation, Planning, and Hydraulic 
Infrastructure, to which most of the old SRH officials were assigned. As a result, senior 
hydrocrats were no longer in direct contact with the president. The deputy minister now 
had to submit his policy initiatives to the SARH minister, significantly curtailing his 
discretionary powers. I will illustrate below that senior hydrocrats lost control over 
crucial bureaucratic domains and resource flows to other bureaucratic groups that 
increasingly started to dominate the SARH. The hydraulic bureaucracy thus lost its 
dominant position and bureaucratic autonomy and was subjected to the control of the 
agricultural bureaucracy. 
The bureaucratic merger entailed a serious demotion for the hydrocrats and provoked 
'institutional turmoil' (Mestre, 1997). The SRH top echelons opposed the fusion, as they 
clearly understood that it would entail a significant loss of autonomy. For many 
hydrocrats, the fusion was traumatic, and they experienced the demise of the SRH as the 
end of the grand era of hydraulic engineering in Mexico. To make matters worse, they 
were fused with an old-time functional rival.19 In 1970, unaware of the fusion to come, 
Greenberg wrote that The sharing of power with the Agriculture Ministry is the result of 
a long history of struggle which saw first one, and then the other agency, in a position of 
dominance' (1970:87). The merger started a new phase in this historical struggle and 
engendered an energetic and politically expressed demand for renewed autonomy on 
the part of the hydrocrats. 
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Although the irrigation districts were left intact, they became the responsibility of the 
Under Ministry of Agriculture and Operation, implying that the hydraulic bureaucracy 
lost control over the irrigation districts as well as the income flows associated with those 
districts (Palacios Vélez, 1994). In addition, after an initial phase in which the hydrocrats 
continued to dominate in the state delegations and the irrigation districts, many of them 
were replaced by agronomists (Arce, 1993). The subordinate position of the hydrocrats 
led to intensive conflicts between groups of ex-SRH and SAG officials. Not only were the 
academic and bureaucratic careers of the hydrocrats and the agronomists dissimilar; the 
conservative and authoritarian culture of the SRH, the bureaucratic discipline, the 
professional identity they shared and the strong pride they felt towards the grand 
tradition of hydraulic engineering also made them feel very distinct from the SAG 
agronomists. These antagonistic cultures contributed to severe tensions between these 
two groups over the internal operation and control of the SARH. Ex-SRH officials at the 
time jokingly referred to the merger of SRH and SAG as the confusion instead of the 
fusion. 
The displeasure of the hydrocrats over the loss of control was directed not only at the 
agronomists, but also at the growing influence of 'politicians' and 'adxriinistrators' in the 
ministry, i.e. non-engineers without experience and interest in hydraulic matters. The 
first SARH rrtinister (1976-1982) was a politician without a professional degree, and the 
second minister (1982-1988) was a lawyer, something which radically broke the SRH 
tradition of being led by well-qualified men, trained as civil engineers and with a career 
in the SRH itself (Greenberg, 1970). In the SARH, ex-SRH officials were thus confronted 
with politically appointed acurtirustrators in positions that used to be occupied by 
engineers. The changed set of decision criteria, and especially the ignorance or neglect of 
specific technical criteria, was a recurrent source of frustration for them. 
The hydrocrats in the SARH were also severely constrained in their financial autonomy. 
In the SRH, the major source of income had been the funds for the construction of 
irrigation systems. In the SARH, decisions about the construction funds were taken out 
of the hands of the hydrocrats and their deputy minister. Agronomists interfered with 
the decisions about construction funds and succeeded in diverting much of this funding 
to other purposes. The construction companies, the traditional beneficiaries of the 
contracts tendered by the SRH, were especially affected by this shift in decision-making 
power. 
At the end of López-Portillo's sexenio, influential groups of civil engineers started to 
lobby for renewed bureaucratic autonomy and explicitly expressed their demand for an 
autonomous water authority during the election campaign of presidential candidate, De 
la Madrid, in 1982. During this campaign, a working group was formed to define water 
policies for the upcoming sexenio, and several campaign meetings were held on water, 
co-ordinated by Dr. Gonzalez Villareal in close collaboration with De la Madrid's 
campaign manager, Carlos Salinas, who later also became president (IEPES, 1982). 
Several politically influential ex-SRH ministers and senior hydrocrats participated in the 
working group and identified policy ideas strikingly similar to the one adopted six years 
later with the creation of the CNA. The working group agreed on the need to create a 
'new water culture' among users and to increase their active participation. They also 
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suggested the need to manage water at the level of the river basins. Another 
recommendation was the proposal to organise a 'financial system for water7 that would 
give the hydraulic bureaucracy large discretionary powers over funds destined for the 
water sector. Lastly, the working group repeatedly stated that the authority to manage 
water should be located in a 'single water agency* (González VTUareal, 1982a). 
This attempt to re-establish autonomy did not succeed. After De la Madrid became 
president in 1982, the Under Ministry of Hydraulic Resources was maintained as a 
separate but dependent part of SARH. It is likely that a more autonomous authority was 
not feasible at this time because of the economic crisis that held the country in its grip. 
Thus, the ex-SRH engineers had to accept their subordinate position in the SARH for 
another six years, during which time their financial and bureaucratic autonomy was 
further curtailed. The working group of ex-SRH officials achieved only partial success 
through the appointment of their co-ordinator as the new Deputy Minister for Hydraulic 
Resources. 
The financial situation of the SARH severely worsened between 1982 and 1988, largely 
as a result of the unprecedented economic crisis that hit Mexico in 1982. To deal with the 
crisis, De la Madrid, the first economist after a string of lawyers as president, adopted a 
neo-liberal approach that strongly departed from the populist and interventionist 
economic policies followed by previous presidents. This resulted in a restructuring of the 
SARH, the reduction of barriers to commerce, the abolition of subsidies for agricultural 
inputs and a liberalisation of agricultural prices (Vargas Velazquez, 1996). According to 
some observers, De la Madrid gave much less priority to agriculture than previous 
adrruxustrations not only because of the economic problems but also because it had lost 
its strategic importance for the country. This is understandable, as agriculture's share of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped to six per cent at the beginning of the 
1980s, down from eleven per cent in the 1960s (Palacios Vélez, 1994). 
The emergence of a planning team, new experiences and policy ideas 
Partly in response to the difficult SARH era, new ideas concerning irrigation policy and 
the restoration of autonomy for the hydraulic bureaucracy were developed by senior 
hydrocrats. To understand their origins it is necessary to go back a little. The Plan 
Nacional Hidráulico (PNH: National Water Plan), a water master planning organisation 
created in 1973 to provide a frame of reference for future lending programmes in the 
field of water resources, played an important role in this. This new bureaucratic body led 
to the formation of a team of water resource planners that departed from the traditional 
construction bias of the hydraulic bureaucracy by developing a broader vision on water 
resource planning and management. The influence of multilateral funding and foreign 
expertise was significant in this respect, as we can see in Appendix 1. The planners 
working in the PNH developed policy ideas and accumulated particular experiences 
favouring participation by water users and the handing over of government tasks in 
water management. These can be seen as precursors to the creation of the CNA and the 
IMT policy. Other groups within the bureaucracy, more related to construction or O&M 
departments, were much less receptive to these ideas. 
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The first plan was received well by both president Echevarría and the World Bank in 
1975, and two of its major recommendations were immediately implemented (Herrera 
Toledo, 1996). Firstly, the PNH was converted into a permanent planning agency falling 
under the SARH in 1976, thereby institutionalising the planning process. Dr. Gonzalez 
Villareal continued to co-ordinate the PNH and basically kept on the same team. He 
reoriented the objectives of the PNH to support the implementation of policies and 
programmes contained in the first plan and to continue studying present and future 
water needs. During this time, the commission gained sufficient technical authority to 
play an important role in policy formulation and decision making at the highest levels of 
government (Herrera Toledo, 1996). 
Secondly, the recognition that traditional large-scale irrigation development would not 
work in the humid tropical lowlands of the Gulf Coast resulted in the Programa de 
Desarrollo Rural Integrado del Trópico Húmedo (PRODERTTH: Programme for the 
Integrated Rural Development of the Humid Tropics). Interestingly, PRODERTTH fell 
under the PNH Commission, which was directly charged with executing works. In 1976 
several pilot projects were started, centring on drainage, small-scale supplemental 
irrigation and intensive agricultural development. PRODERTTH aimed to stimulate the 
social and productive development of traditionally marginalised villages in these regions 
(Herrera Toledo, 1996). The World Bank played a role in preparing the programme and 
also partially financed it. By 1985 when the pilot projects had been successfully 
implemented, a second phase was entered, in which the efforts were concentrated on 
transferring the developmental process and decision making to organisations of 
beneficiaries (Herrera Toledo, 1996). 
Some of these regions had a conflictive history of authoritarian government intervention 
in terms of land development and forced resettlement schemes. The explosive social 
situation led to popular protests and military interventions. PRODERTTH entered with 
an alternative approach, based on 'social participation', to the paternalist manner in 
which the government had intervened and tried to develop these regions in the past. The 
approach entailed negotiations with the communities in which people could participate 
in developing a local development plan on the basis of their problems and priorities. 
These plans served to involve and organise the communities and to detennine the 
programme support activities in the region. The programme successfully established 
relations with the communities and carried out the development plans. 
Different SARH officials acknowledged that the experience with this model of 
community participation in decision making was important in the development of policy 
ideas that also applied to the irrigation districts. Some observers state that it was a pilot 
or try out for what later became the transfer of irrigation districts. The group of planners 
accumulated valuable experiences with the organisation of producers, their participation 
in decision making and the handing over of responsibilities that were traditionally 
exercised by the government. In senior SARH officials' circles, concrete policy ideas 
started to develop in favour of more substantive user participation and the handing over 
of government tasks in the irrigation districts. 
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Shifting policy agendas 
The hydraulic bureaucracy especially felt the financial consequences of the economic 
crisis of 1982. During De la Madrid's sexenio, only 44.5 billion pesos were invested in the 
irrigation sector, compared to 89.8 billion pesos during the previous sexenio (in constant 
1979 pesos) (Palacios Velez, 1994). To make matters worse, the World Bank temporarily 
stopped lending to Mexico, as a response to the moratorium on payments of foreign 
debts that the government had declared.20 For the irrigation sector this was a strong 
departure from the past twenty years during which the Bank lent more than $800 million 
(World Bank, 1983b). In the World Bank, the construction bias of the hydraulic 
bureaucracy also started to be a matter of debate around this time. Buras (1983) 
mentions that the World Bank wanted to see the orientation of the hydraulic 
bureaucracy change and was no longer willing to support the construction projects that 
many hydrocrats and construction companies had in mind. Although construction 
activity in these years did not stop, it was significantly reduced. 
In line with international debates on irrigation management (Bottrall, 1981b), the 1983 
World Bank review of the Mexican irrigation sector concluded that Mexico needed to 
shift attention away from the construction of new irrigation systems to improving the 
management and efficiency in existing systems. The report outlines a programme of 
repair and upgrading of existing systems and an increased role for users in decision 
making (World Bank, 1983a). The report goes on to recommend the bulk sale of water by 
the government to users' associations in the districts, who would then sell and distribute 
the water to its members, citing the successful use of this system in the Rio Yaqui 
irrigation district. Although 'turnover' or TMT' is not mentioned as such in the report, it 
is striking to see how its recommendations strongly coincide with the core of the IMT 
programme in the 1990s. The 1983 report signified an important shift in the Bank's 
agenda for the irrigation sector, and its recommendations influenced both the 
emergence of the IMT policy idea and its content. 
Although user management of irrigation districts has been a recurrent theme throughout 
the history of irrigation development in Mexico, transfer as such was not on the policy 
agenda in the early 1980s, although discussions on user participation in irrigation 
increased during the 1970s and early 1980s. A key recommendation of the 1975 PNH 
was to reduce the subsidies to the irrigation districts and to increase user participation in 
the financing of irrigation development, operation, maintenance and rehabilitation 
(SRH, 1975). During the period of the oil boom (1977 to 1982), the government's 
subsidies to the irrigation districts sharply increased to forty-six billion pesos, compared 
to twenty-two billion pesos between 1971 and 1976 (in constant 1979 pesos) (Palacios 
Velez, 1994). However, the 1982 economic crisis led to a reconsideration of the amount 
of subsidies going to the irrigation districts. During De la Madrid's election campaign in 
1982, several meetings on water issues were held, at which it was suggested to improve 
the 'participation' of users in the financing of the irrigation districts. 
The Mexicans with access to (...) drainage and irrigation services are in 
a privileged situation. But those who benefit from these services also 
have a greater responsibility towards the nation; a responsibility which 
should imply an increased participation (...) in the financing of the 
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admimstrarion of water and the works to utilise i t ' (Gonzalez Villareal, 
1982b:21; my translation) 
This recommendation was mirrored in the conclusions of an important World Bank 
study on the irrigation sector in Mexico, which singled out an 'across-the-board increase 
in water charges' as the most important policy decision that needed to be taken by the 
Mexican government concerning the irrigation sector (World Bank, 1983a). This proposal 
materialised in an amendment of the Ley Federal de Derechos (Federal Rights Law) in 
1983. It legislated for the payment in 1984 of water charges sufficient to cover the costs of 
operation, maintenance and improvement of irrigation districts. In 1985, such payments 
would have to be sufficient to create a fund for improvements and expansion of the 
districts, and in 1986 to recover government investments in irrigation (World Bank, 
1983b). 
Actual cost recovery seriously lagged behind these ambitious objectives. Even though 
water charges were raised in many districts, inflation was much higher due to the severe 
economic crisis, rendering the rises largely superfluous. In addition, the government 
severely reduced the subsidies to the irrigation districts. The dramatic failure to persuade 
farmers to pay much higher water charges made it clear to senior hydrocrats that more 
drastic measures were needed. An increased role for water users in the management of 
irrigation districts became more important as an option to improve cost recovery in 1983 
and 1984. 
Tt is fundamental to look for new ways in the operation of the districts 
that would permit a more comprehensive participation of users in their 
administration and financing, with the aim of rationalising possible 
subsidies and preventing excessive bureaucratic intervention.' 
(Gonzalez Villareal, 1982a:123; my translation) 
Loss of control over the irrigation districts and further developments 
As one of the many reorganisations of the SARH during De la Madrid's sexenio, the 
irrigation districts were combined with the rainfed districts in 1985 to form rural 
development districts (Palacios Velez, 1994). Ostensibly, the reason behind this policy 
was to reduce costs and improve the use of resources. However, it also entailed the 
further reduction of the hydraulic bureaucracy's control over the irrigation districts. The 
new rural development districts, which fell under the Under Ministry of Agriculture and 
Operation, became to an increasing extent the domain of agronomists. Moreover, due to 
the severe lack of funds, the irrigation districts' infrastructure was deteriorating quickly. 
This situation was completely unacceptable to senior hydrocrats, and the need to 'rescue' 
the irrigation districts was to play an important role in the definition of the IMT policy 
(Vargas Velazquez, 1996). 
In 1985, a working group was formed between the SARH and the Ministry of Finance to 
review the tax law and to further define a fiscal policy for the use of water, with the aim 
of achieving financial self-sufficiency in the water sector. Besides industry and the 
commercial service sector, it was decided to include irrigated agriculture in the law, 
implying that farmers would have to pay an annual tax for the right to use water on top 
40 The Success of a Policy Model 
of water charges. The proposal was sent to Congress at the end of 1985, but, due to the 
serious problems agriculture faced as a result of the economic crisis, Congress 
established a zero tariff for the agricultural water tax (Palacios Vélez, 1996). This was a 
severe blow to the SARH, as it had been agreed in negotiations with the Ministry of 
Finance that the irrigation districts would no longer be subsidised and that the proposed 
water tax would be used to finance the irrigation sector. 
According to several senior irrigation engineers, the then Deputy Minister of Hydraulic 
Resources, Dr. González Villareal, seriously started to consider the possibility of 
transferring the irrigation districts to water users in 1985. The ramifications of transfer 
and how to initiate it were discussed at a breakfast meeting in 1985 between the Minister 
of Agriculture, Dr. González Villareal and other senior SARH officials. They saw no way 
to reverse the already serious deterioration of the districts and to resolve the financial 
problems without drastic changes in the way the districts were administrated. They also 
understood that to obtain desperately needed external funds they had to accommodate 
the World Bank's new agenda. It was clear at this point that such elements had to be 
incorporated in the policy agenda for the next sexenio if it were to accomplish something 
for the hydraulic bureaucracy, i.e. the renewal of autonomy. To formally initiate the 
transfer of irrigation districts was not politically feasible in the middle of the sexenio, and 
the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City, which disrupted the country and destroyed the 
central SARH offices, seriously slowed down concrete initiatives. 
In 1986, the World Bank resumed talks with the SARH and started to suggest possible 
new irrigation loans for the upcoming sexenio. The negotiations were led by Dr. 
Gonzalez-Villareal, who proved to be a sldlful negotiator and came up with a number of 
home-grown policy imtiatives,21 among which the loan proposal for Ixansferring a 
limited number of irrigation districts. At the same time, a number of experiments with 
user management of irrigation districts in the Northwest and the formation of a river 
basin council and agency in the Lerma-Chapala Basin were initiated by the Deputy 
Ministry of Hydraulic Resources. From 1985 to 1987, transfer remained a policy idea with 
its modalities and characteristics still largely undefined, although its financial and 
institutional basis was seriously worked on. 
The further loss of financial and bureaucratic autonomy and a weakening of the control 
over the irrigation districts by the hydraulic bureaucracy during the De la Madrid sexenio 
was unacceptable to most hydrocrats. For them, the major issue in water management 
was the dispersion of responsibilities and resources over different bureaucratic agencies. 
Although the SARH was legally responsible for the nation's waters, urban and industrial 
water use, water for hydropower, and water quality fell under other ministries (TEPES, 
1987). It was argued that the lack of mter-ministerial co-ordination made it very difficult 
to manage water adequately. To senior hydrocrats it was clear that radically different 
policy scenarios had to be explored to extract the hydraulic bureaucracy from its worst 
crisis. Ideally, this would entail the re-constirution of an autonomous water authority 
that would concentrate the responsibilities and financial resource flows related to water. 
The emergence of IMT as a policy idea was closely intertwined with the aim of the 
hydraulic bureaucracy to re-establish financial and bureaucratic autonomy and control 
over the irrigation districts. To achieve this aim, different groups of ex-SRH engineers 
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started exerting political pressure towards the end of the De la Madrid sexenio, setting 
the stage for the creation of an autonomous water authority. 
2.4 Towards a Reform Package 
The policy actors 
In January 1989, Salinas created the CNA less than six weeks after he became president, 
and in June 1989 the National Development Plan, which endorsed IMT22 and a wider 
water reform package, was released. These rapid developments indicate that in 1987 and 
1988 disparate policy ideas, such as the transfer of irrigation districts, the creation of an 
autonomous water authority and water pricing, were articulated further and combined in 
a single reform package. This occurred during the run-up to the presidential elections in 
1988 when an influential segment of water resource planners within the hydraulic 
bureaucracy negotiated the water reform package with the presidential candidate. 
Although international lending agencies were not directly involved in these negotiations, 
their position on necessary water reforms and the prospect of new loans played a crucial 
role in defining the reform package. This section outlines the different positions and 
agendas of these three policy actors and shows how they agreed on a reform package 
that included both a concentration23 and a decentralisation24 of bureaucratic domains and 
resource flows related to water. In particular, the role of the group of water resource 
planners in the articulation, packaging and consolidation of the reform package is 
highlighted. 
The team of water resource planners formed by the PNH and led by Dr. Gonzalez 
Villareal took the lead in proposing IMT to Salinas and convincing him of the need for an 
autonomous water authority during his election campaign.25 In this they were supported 
by different groups of civil engineers working for the Under Ministry of Hydraulic 
Resources in SARH, for construction companies or stationed at the Faculty of 
Engineering of the UNAM. The construction companies especially played an important 
role in supporting the demands of these engineers in line with their interests. When 
Salinas became a presidential candidate and started galvanising support from the 
bureaucracy for his campaign, this coalition of engineers offered him its support in return 
for the creation of an autonomous water agency (van der Zaag, 1992). 
The three key policy actors involved in the articulation of the reform package were very 
familiar with each other's dispositions and agendas due to frequent interactions in the 
past. These can be summarised as follows: 
1. Salinas espoused a neo-liberal agenda that aimed to modernise state-society 
relations and reduce government expenditures through decentralisation, shared 
responsibility between the public and private sector, and social reconciliation. 
2. Dr. Gonzalez Villareal and his team of water resource planners represented the 
hydraulic bureaucracy in its strong will to re-establish bureaucratic and financial 
autonomy, whilst supporting policy ideas concerning user participation and a 
financial system for water. 
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3. The World Bank supported policies to reduce government intervention and 
expenditure in irrigation, amongst other things through decentralisation, water 
pricing reforms and increased user participation in decision making. As a 
favoured client of the Bank, Mexico had become eligible again for new loans after 
a period of austerity, implying that reform initiatives would be looked upon 
favourably (see Appendix 1 on the World Bank Lending History). 
During the Salinas sexenio (1989-1994), De la Madrid's neo-liberal agenda was 
continued with increased intensity. During his election campaign in 1988, Salinas 
launched the plan to modernise rural Mexico by means of a set of economic, political and 
social reforms. He emphasised the need to break with the paternalist practices of the 
government in the rural areas with a strategy that would allow for more participation on 
the part of the social and the private sector. Key concepts in Salinas' discourse were 
shared responsibility (coresponsabilidad) and social consensus building or consultation 
(concertacidn social). These ideas originated from his academic research on popular 
support for the political regime in rural communities and experiences with organising 
farmers (Cornelius et al., 1994; Gordillo de Anda, 1988). 
In Salinas' vision, shared responsibility would be reached through social reconciliation 
efforts, both in the rural and urban areas. He proposed a mode of governance termed 
'social liberalism', which sought to avoid the excesses of both unfettered free market 
capitalism and heavy-handed state intervention, thereby leading to the reduction of 
absolute poverty and an increase in social well-being (Cornelius et al., 1994). Salinas' 
ambitious agenda aimed to modernise the relations between state, society, and the 
market and strongly favoured decentralisation and participation of the social and private 
sector in water management. During his sexenio, Salinas followed a policy of liberalising 
trade, deregulating the economy, privatising parastatals, reforming the financial sector 
and fractionalising the corporate structure of the PRI (Grindle, 1996). 
The group that played a key role in mapping out the course of the hydraulic bureaucracy 
and the irrigation districts during the 1980s and 1990s was the team of water resource 
planners under the direction of Dr. Gonzalez Villareal, as already indicated in Section 
2.3. They were the intellectual authors of many of the policy ideas presented to Salinas 
during his election campaign. Through his different contacts and positions in the 
bureaucracy, Dr. Gonzalez Villareal came to represent the broadly shared claim of the 
hydraulic bureaucracy for bureaucratic and financial autonomy.26 
As a SARH deputy ministry during De la Madrid's aclministration, Dr. Gonzalez Villareal 
led the hydraulic bureaucracy in a time of severe crisis. In this period he frequently 
interacted with Salinas, who had an important say in setting SARH's budgets as Minister 
of Budget and Plamrung. Their discussion and interaction on water reforms in view of the 
state's difficulty to continue financing the irrigation districts and other forms of water use 
date from this period. Their public discourse suggests that they shared certain opinions 
and discursive topics, for example on 'social participation', although their formation is 
very different. Both also showed interest in the shared responsibility of the social and 
private sector in the financing of water management (Gonzalez Villareal, 1982a; Poder 
Ejecutivo Federal, 1989). Finally, the IMT policy idea fitted with Salinas' plans to 
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'modernise the countryside', in which strategies of 'social reconciliation', deregulation 
and decentralisation played an important role (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1989). 
In addition, Dr. Gonzalez Villareal and his team of water resource planners knew the 
world of international funding agencies well. They had developed good relations with 
officials of the World Bank during the PNH and were well informed about international 
trends in loan policies and irrigation management reform. The World Bank stopped 
making loans available for irrigation projects after 1982 and indicated the need for a shift 
in irrigation policies. As the Under Minister of SARH, Gonzalez Villareal stayed in touch 
with the World Bank and initiated discussions on possible loan packages. 
Thus, in 1988, Dr. Gonzalez Villareal found himself centrally positioned to propose water 
reforms. He represented different groups of hydrocrats in the SARH and maintained 
good relations with academia and the influential construction sector. His respected 
vision and expertise on water resources and irrigation and his political participation in 
the PRI27 were important for his capacity to convince a wide array of political, 
bureaucratic and societal actors of the transformations needed in the water sector. In him 
Salinas saw a person with a vision of how to reform the water sector, the skills and 
authority to deal with potential resistance in the bureaucracy or among water users, and 
the necessary relations with influential interest groups and the World Bank. He thus 
became a central actor for Salinas in bringing about a reduction in public spending, 
giving a strong push to his policy agenda of modernising the relations in the countryside 
through decentralisation, reorganising the bureaucracy and acquiring international 
funding to support the proposed transformations. 
The election campaign 
In December 1987 and January 1988, five national meetings on water were held as part 
of Salinas' election campaign. That Salinas made this effort indicates that he saw the 
political and electoral importance of problems in the water sector. During these meetings 
co-ordinated by Villalobos Guerrero, an influential civil engineer, the contours of the 
water reform package for the next sexenio became clear. At the first meeting in 
Acapulco, Salinas asked Rovirosa Wade, who had been the SRH minister at the 
begirming of the 1970s, what he thought of the SAG/SRH fusion. Rovirosa Wade 
responded: 
"I was slightly concerned [as] the conception of the water resource could 
get lost. Giving all the power to an independent entity, I think, would 
be a solution that the whole country is demanding for the management 
of water as a vital resource. In fact, I propose not that the SRH comes 
back, but that at least there would be an independent authority located 
in the Presidency of the Republic and that it is given all the power 
necessary for water management.' (IEPES, 1987:10; my translation) 
It is remarkable that he rejects the possibility of recreating a ministry, something that 
certainly not everybody agreed upon at that point. During the same meeting, Salinas 
asked Dr. Gonzalez Villareal his opinion on the risks of transferring irrigation districts to 
the users. His answer is iUuminating: 
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The transfer of irrigation districts to users already was an established 
policy of this administration [of De la Madrid], which has encountered 
some difficulties. (...) Those of the Northwest are prepared to adopt 
their own adrrunistration. As a matter of fact, in the Rio Yaqui irrigation 
district users already manage the maintenance, administration, and 
collection of fees and the delivery of water at lower levels. (...) In a 
programme that will be financed in the near future with international 
credit, called 'modernisation of irrigation districts', a subsequent phase 
after the original construction of the districts is proposed, consisting of 
the bulk delivery of water to the users and an administration directed by 
them (...). However, in the districts in the centre of the country (...) we 
believe that the process has to be more gradual. First, some 
rehabilitation and public investment will be needed, before a first phase 
of user organisation, if the process is to be effective.' (IEPES, 1987:7; my 
translation) 
This indicates that the discussions with international lending agencies initiated in 1986 
to negotiate loans for modernising and transferring a number of irrigation districts had 
reached such an advanced stage that Dr. Gonzalez Villareal felt confident enough to 
announce publicly to Salinas that international loans for IMT would be formcoming. 
Another element of the reform package proposed during these meetings was the 
'financial system for water7, which had already been presented in the PNH (SRH, 1975). 
It was argued that a key aim of reforming the administration of water was to: 
"Allocate sufficient economic resources to show the will of our society to 
solve the problems of water, with larger federal, state and municipal 
contributions, and with a larger participation on the part of the users. 
The financial system for water, consisting of the investments, the water 
rights, the payment of differentiated tariffs for services, would be more 
sound if the fees and taxes collected are re-invested in the sector.' (PRI, 
1988:41; my translation) 
The financial system for water clearly reflects the concern of the hydraulic bureaucracy 
for financial autonomy. IXiring the SARH period, the income flows relating to water 
were not controlled by the hydraulic bureaucracy, but were dispersed over different 
rruTtistries. A concentration of the control over these income flows would significantly 
strengthen the financial autonomy of the authority. 
At a meeting two months later, it became clear that the various policy ideas had been 
discussed in more detail with Salinas, as he publicly accepted the need for institutional 
reform in the water sector and the transfer of the irrigation districts. He stated that he 
took Wade's remarks on an independent water authority seriously, but emphasised that 
he did not want to 'take a step back on this track' (TEPES, 1987:14), thereby countering 
the demand for a new rninistry. He did call for careful reflection on how the co-
ordination of different water uses could be strengthened and agreed with the need to 
create 'one single water authority'. He attributed many capacities to this new authority, 
including the authority to determine its own programmes and budgets, something that 
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the existing Under Ministry did not have. Lastly, he acknowledged that the creation of 
this new authority was a precondition for his proposed policies of decentralisation and 
social reconciliation and reaffirmed that the irrigation districts would be transferred (PRI, 
1988). The reform package as a whole, containing both IMT and the creation of a new 
water authority, came together at the end of the campaign meetings on water in a PRI 
document published in June 1988 outlining the party's election platform. 
The integrated management of water quantity and quality, by an 
authority constituted as a water authority, creates the need to realise 
legal adjustments that leave no doubt about the national property of 
water, on the one hand, and that make the administrative reorientation 
possible on the other. (...) It is a priority to rehabilitate and modernise 
the irrigation and rainfed zones with the participation of the users and 
the state government, so that when they are in a condition to operate 
efficiently, they can be transferred gradually to the users.' (1EPES, 
1988:33; my translation) 
The same document considers four options for the legal structure of the new water 
authority. 
1. Consolidation of the current aclministrative structure. 
2. Integration of the water authority into the SARH by strengthening the Under 
Ministry of Hydraulic Resources or creating a deconcentrated authority28 in the 
ministry with full responsibility for all water related activities. 
3. Creation of a new ministry, which would entail high political and financial costs 
and would go against the policy of austerity and a slimmer government, 
according to the document. 
4. Creation of a public, decentralised authority {TEPES, 1988). 
Although the creation of a new ministry was unlikely, the group of water resource 
planners formulated its charter, regulations and organisational structure in full detail in 
the latter half of 1988. In November 1988, Salinas resolutely ruled out this possibility, as 
the PRI did not have a majority in parliament to approve the creation of a new ministry. 
Instead, it was decided that the new water agency would become a deconcentrated 
authority that would fall under the SARH. The hydraulic bureaucracy was thus forced to 
accept the 'second besf option and had to go back to the drawing board to define the 
legal and financial structure for the new water authority.29 
The above shows how different policy ideas became an integral part of the water reform 
package and how, as a consequence, it became more articulated during the election 
campaign of Salinas. This transition occurred in a small circle of policy actors, consisting 
of the president, senior hydrocrats and World Bank officials, as part of the policy agenda 
setting for the upcoming sexenio. Combining these different policy ideas in a reform 
package increased their feasibility, as it had become clear during De la Madrid's 
administration that merely recreating a water ministry as an individual reform was 
politically and financially unfeasible. To make the creation of an autonomous authority 
feasible, it had to be accompanied by a set of apparently paradoxical reforms: a 
concentration of bureaucratic domains and resource flows, a decentralisation of the 
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irrigation districts and an active water pricing policy. If successful, this composite strategy 
would reduce government expenditure in water management, secure higher and more 
stable income flows from water use in different sectors, and attract international loans. In 
addition, it would enjoy the political support of the president and international lending 
agencies. When Salinas stated during his campaign that the new water authority was a 
precondition for his proposed policies of decentralisation and social reconciliation (PRI, 
1988), he acknowledged the link between concentration and decentralisation measures. 
The composite strategy of concentration, decentralisation and water pricing made the 
reform package a financially, politically and bureaucratically viable option. 
The reform package offered another advantage. Many observers state that Dr. González 
Villareal faced groups of middle and senior hydrocrats opposed to the transfer of the 
irrigation districts. The advantage that he could project to them was that the EMT policy 
opened up the possibility of reconstituting an autonomous water authority and that it 
would return a certain level of control over the districts, which at that time fell under the 
agricultural bureaucracy. 
The World Bank did not directly influence the creation of the CNA or the selection of its 
director, but its financial and ideological support for the proposed reforms was crucial in 
making the creation of an autonomous water authority feasible. The role of the World 
Bank in promoting IMT was more direct, as it was clear that new irrigation loans would 
become available if EMT was implemented. However, it would be too simplistic to posit 
that the World Bank unilaterally imposed EMT and water reforms on the Mexican 
government and its hydraulic bureaucracy. This is not to deny the element of financial 
and ideological coercion, as every international loan is accompanied by some 'arm-
twisting', as one CNA official expressed it. The policy ideas leading to EMT were a 
product of historical experiences and concerns of a particular group of water resource 
planners, admittedly developed in close interaction with World Bank officials. If EMT was 
a condition attached to loans 'it did not cost the World Bank much trouble to convince the 
Mexicans', according to a well-informed interviewee. In light of the calibre of the 
hydrocrats as discussed above, it is difficult to see how they could have accepted a 
completely 'foreign' imposition of a policy that would affect them in such a drastic 
manner. The World Bank is limited in its influence when its policy agenda is not 
supported by, and does not create benefits for, the hydraulic bureaucracy. 
From a definition of presidentialism, which attributes a dominant role to the president in 
policy and bureaucratic transformation, it could be argued that Salinas imposed the 
reforms on the hydraulic bureaucracy. However, it has been shown here that the 
hydraulic bureaucracy proposed concrete policy ideas to the presidential candidate and 
actually enrolled him in their effort to re-establish autonomy. As a presidential 
candidate, Salinas needed the political support of the hydrocrats as well as their support 
for achieving his ambitious reforms in the rural sector. Reciprocally, the authorisation of 
Salinas was crucial for the senior hydrocrats to achieve their objectives. His full support 
was especially needed to overcome potential resistance within the bureaucracy. Also, it is 
clear that Salinas did not concede all of the proposals made by the hydraulic 
bureaucracy, as exemplified by his refusal to create a new rruhistiy. 
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Without denying the political, financial and ideological coercion that is needed for a 
reform programme of this magnitude, it is clear that for all three policy actors there was a 
limit to the realisation of their agendas. I have highlighted the active role that segments 
of the bureaucracy played in the definition of the reform package. This is something that 
is often underrated by approaches that analyse policy formulation and implementation 
by focusing on the required commitment of politicians and international funding 
agencies to a single, isolated and black-boxed policy. This analysis shows that there was 
not one policy, well defined and isolated, to which the policy actors could choose to 
commit themselves or which was imposed by one of these actors. The individual 
elements of the reform package meant different things to the policy actors involved. At 
the end of the 1980s, the interaction between the different policy actors and their 
agendas had already gone through a trajectory that started with the PNH. During 
Salinas' election campaign, a process of interplay and mutual enrolment occurred in 
which the exact shape of the mdfvidual reforms was defined and hardened and the 
reform package as a whole became more irreversible. The corrtmitment of the political 
leadership and influential segments of the bureaucracy to an individual policy such as 
IMT was the outcome of this protracted process of interplay. 
2.5 The Creation of the CNA and Irrigation Management Transfer 
Bureaucratic autonomy 
In January 1989, Salinas created the Comisión Nacional del Agua as a deconcentrated 
agency of the SARH and designated Dr. González Villareal as its director. This 
appointment was long kept uncertain by Salinas, as the co-ordinator of his campaign 
meetings on water, Villalobos Guerrero, was also considered an eligible candidate.30 The 
CNA was the first 'modern institution' created by Salinas. However, its institutional set-
up remained unclear for several months after its creation, as all the effort in 1988 had 
gone into developing a charter and regulations for a ministry instead of a deconcentrated 
authority. A SARH official remembers that it basically took the whole of 1989 to establish 
the normal functioning of the CNA. This caused delays in implementing the ambitious 
reform package agreed in the campaign. The argument that was used for the creation of 
the CNA was as follows. 
The "sectorisatíon" of the Federal Government's role in relation to 
water caused serious problems in co-ordinating water policies that were 
defined and implemented as a result of sectoral objectives, with very 
little intervention of SARH in its managerial role, thus aggravating the 
already critical problems of scarcity, conflicting uses and pollution in 
several of the major river basins in the country. Due to these existing 
institutional problems, (...) the Federal Government created the 
Comisión Nacional del Agua as an autonomous agency (...) as the sole 
federal authority dealing with water problems and conflicts.' (CNA, 
1990:5) 
The sectoralisation mentioned above refers to the dispersed government responsibilities 
and resource flows regarding water in the SARH period. During the Salinas sexenio, 
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these dispersed bureaucratic domains and resource flows were gradually concentrated in 
the CNA. The CNA integrated the quantitative aspect of water management, regarding 
for instance clrinking water, industrial use, and irrigated agriculture in both irrigation 
districts and the smaller irrigation units, but it also became responsible for the qualitative 
aspects, such as water pollution. The concentration of these different domains 
strengthened the CNA in its bureaucratic autonomy. 
As a deconcentrated agency, the CNA fell under the SARH but could function with 
relative autonomy. The choice of a deconcentrated authority was partly motivated by the 
intention to confine the financial autonomy of the new agency. In matters such as 
negotiations with funding agencies over international loans, the CNA would depend on 
the SARH.31 However, in spite of the chosen legal form, in practice the CNA gained a 
large degree of financial and bureaucratic autonomy. 
When Gonzalez Villareal was appointed as director of the CNA, he brought with him the 
team with which he had worked in the PNH and later in the Under Ministry of SARH. 
An important part of his group were water resource planners from the PNH, others were 
civil engineers with a more traditional construction background. Gonzalez Villareal also 
included experts from different disciplinary backgrounds and experiences, such as 
lawyers and social scientists. He appointed the members of his team to middle and high 
level posts, creating a group of subordinates that he could trust and with whom he had 
unambiguous hierarchical working relations. He knew what he could expect from them 
because of his intimate knowledge of their disciplinary background and bureaucratic 
trajectories. Several people have indicated that this was of crucial importance for the 
difficult bureaucratic reforms that the CNA was facing. During this period, the CNA was 
an institution in which civil engineers (re)gained a certain dominance, at the expense of 
other bureaucratic groups, particularly agronomists. 
It is generally observed that Dr. Gonzalez Villareal had a direct relation with the 
president. The co-ordination of the EMT policy, which was a central activity of the CNA 
during its early years, was effected between the director and the president, with very 
little interference from the SARH minister.32 The federal status of the commission was 
strengthened with the creation of its technical council or governing body in 1991, which 
consisted of all the ministers from all the ministries involved with water policy. 
Institutional and sector co-ordination was set at the federal level within the technical 
council (Herrera Toledo, 1996:41). 
Control over the irrigation districts 
To regain control over the irrigation districts and to increase the levels of water charges 
paid by farmers, the CNA followed a seemingly paradoxical strategy of decentralising the 
management of the irrigation districts to the users. Although the involvement of user 
organisations in irrigation management sharply increased as a result of EMT, at the same 
time the hydraulic bureaucracy's control over the irrigation districts was reasserted 
through EMT. To unravel this paradox, this section indicates how the transfer of the 
irrigation districts strengthened both the financial and bureaucratic autonomy of the 
CNA.33 
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The main objective of the Mexican HMT programme was to reduce public expenditure on 
irrigation through creating financially self-sufficient Water Users' Associations (WUAs) 
that would recover the full O&M costs of the irrigation systems (CNA, 1994a; Espinosa 
de León and Trava Manzanilla, 1992; Gorriz et al., 1996; Johnson, 1997a, 1997b; Trava 
Manzanilla, 1994). Although the programme had the full backing of the Mexican 
president and its objectives were clear, it got off to a slow start in 1989, for several 
reasons discussed in more depth in Chapter 3. A particularly vexing problem was 
presented by the inadequacy of the legal framework, as the water law of 1972 prohibited 
the transfer of the irrigation districts. 
The resolution of the legal problems in 1989 removed one of the hurdles to really start 
with EMT in the field. Equally important, the CNA regained control over the irrigation 
districts from SARH during the second half of 1989 and started establishing itself as the 
only water authority in the country (Palacios Velez, 1996). 
The EMT programme in Mexico consisted of the transfer of the management of 
secondary canal units to WUAs, and in several districts also the transfer of the 
management of the main canal system to a federation of WUAs. During the first phase 
of the transfer programme, the CNA divided the irrigation districts into irrigation units, 
termed módulos (modules), varying from 1,500 to 50,000 ha in size, on the basis of 
hydraulic boundaries (generally a secondary canal command area) and established a 
WUA in every module. The WUAs were formed as legally recognised non-profit civil 
associations to whom the CNA granted renewable concessions for the use of water and 
the irrigation infrastructure, for periods ranging from five to fifty years. The concessioned 
infrastructure generally included all the canals and drains falling within the boundaries 
of the modules as well as the roads and irrigation structures. 
The WUAs were charged with the operation and maintenance of their module, which 
they had to fully finance by collecting irrigation service fees from their members. The 
instructions for the operation, aclministration and maintenance of the module, drawn up 
by the CNA in conjunction with the WUA are an important element of the Concession 
Title (Titulo de Concesión). These instructions set out, amongst other things, how 
irrigation service fees should be determined and how the WUA should maintain their 
module. 
The state, represented by the CNA, retains ownership of the nation's waters as well as 
the irrigation infrastructure. The CNA remains ultimately responsible for the 
management of the irrigation districts, while the responsibility for operation, 
adrninistration and maintenance is transferred to the WUAs (CNA, 1994). EMT did not 
imply a complete transfer of bureaucratic authority and control over the irrigation 
districts, because the CNA retains control over the head works and the main canal 
system and important oversight functions. Rather, the hydraulic bureaucracy regained 
and reordered its control over the irrigation districts, which contributed to its 
bureaucratic autonomy. 
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Financial autonomy 
Another important benefit of the water reforms was that they strengthened the CNA's 
financial autonomy. A crucial component of the creation of the CNA was the 
establishment of a 'financial system for water7. Under this system, CNA gained direct 
control over a range of financial resource flows as it became responsible for 'the 
collection and administration of the resources originating from the payment of rights for 
the use of the nation's waters. According to the law, all revenues generated by these 
rights are specifically allocated to the CNA' (CNA, 1994b:50; my translation). Through 
this legal provision, the CNA succeeded in concentrating the income flows related to 
water use in different sectors without interference by other rninistries, thereby 
strengthening its financial autonomy. These water rights represented a significant and 
growing source of income for the CNA: water rights for the exploitation of the nation's 
waters (industry and service sector), bulk water delivery to the urban sector (drinking 
water levies), and water charges paid by the WUAs. 
Analysing the income flows from the collection of water rights during the first six years 
of the CNA reveals a rapid increase: from 498.6 million pesos in 1989 to 2,341.3 million 
pesos in 1994 (see Table 1). The shares of these different income flows are significant, 
about sixty-three per cent originates from water rights taxes, eighteen per cent from bulk 
water delivery to cities and a mere five per cent from water charges paid by irrigators. 
This indicates the major importance of the water rights and urban water for the CNA's 
financial autonomy. Although the share of irrigation charges in total CNA income 
between 1988 and 1994 was relatively small, this needs to be seen in the context of the 
radically reduced government subsidies to the irrigation districts after their transfer and 
their increased self-sufficiency. In 1988 the level of cost recovery in the irrigation districts 
was eighteen per cent. In 1994, the water charges paid by water users in transferred 
districts fully covered O&M costs, while at the national level cost recovery significantly 
increased to eighty per cent. In addition, the WUAs were paying the CNA for the 
operation of the head works and main system in the transferred systems (CNA, 1994b). 
Table 1 Development of the CNA's income from water rights and fees 
(millions of constant 1994 pesos) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Bulk water 
delivery to 263.0 219.2 291.0 338.2 437.9 413.7 
cities 
Water rights 
taxes 188.0 682.1 964.0 1,376.1 1,639.6 1,460.7 
Irrigation 
service fees 45.0 85.5 129.3 144.8 127.1 112.6 
Other income 
sources 2.6 13.6 25.8 118.1 307.0 354.3 
Total 498.6 1,000.4 1,410.1 1,977.2 2,511.6 2,341.3 
Source: CNA 1994b. 
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Table 2 Financial self-sufficiency levels of the CNA 
(millions of constant 1994 pesos) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
External credit (1) 
Fiscal budget (2) 
Total Budget 
(3=1+2) 
Income (4) 
152.4 
818.2 
970.6 
498.6 
262.1 
1,531.0 
1,793.1 
1,000.4 
996.9 
1,797.2 
2,794.1 
1,410.1 
1,527.7 
1,781.4 
3,309.1 
1,977.2 
881.1 
1,871.8 
2,732.9 
2,511.6 
726.0 
2,184.0 
2,910.0 
2,341.3 
Financial Self-
sufficiency (=4/3) 51% 56% 50% 60% 92% 80% 
Source: CNA 1994b. 
As all funds collected by CNA remain within the bureaucracy, its degree of financial self-
sufficiency sharply increased, from fifty-one per cent in 1989 to ninety-two per cent in 
1993 (see Table 2). Although the hydraulic bureaucracy increased its financial autonomy 
significantly through the establishment of the financial system for water, it could not 
directly negotiate international loans with funding agencies and was dependent on the 
SARH in this respect. However, new international loans for the irrigation and drinking 
water sector were initiated after a sexenio of financial drought, further strengthening the 
financial position of the CNA. 
It can be concluded that, with the creation of the CNA as a deconcentrated authority, the 
hydraulic bureaucracy achieved its objective of re-establishing a relatively large degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy. The concentration of resource flows relating to the exploitation 
of the nation's waters and the international loans secured a growing income source, 
thereby accomplishing to a large extent the aim of financial autonomy. Through a 
carefully thought out composite strategy, consisting of concentration, decentralisation 
and water pricing, the CNA thus succeeded during the Salinas sexenio in establishing a 
large degree of autonomy. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In a sense, user management of irrigation districts has come full circle in Mexico if a 
longer historical view is taken. By the early 1990s, user management of irrigation districts 
was once again enshrined in policy and law, as it had been in the 1930s and 1940s. 
However, there was nothing logical or unavoidable about this happening. This chapter 
shows that to understand the articulation of reform policies it is necessary to centre on 
the interactions between policy actors and the short and long-term circumstances that 
shape the ways in which they try to advance particular policy ideas. As stated in the 
introduction, the aim of this chapter is to stimulate debate on the role of hydraulic 
bureaucracies in water reforms, thereby complementing the manner in which EMT and 
bureaucratic reform in Mexico have been discussed in the literature to date. I have 
shown how the creation of the CNA and the launching of EMT were strongly linked with 
the engagement of the Mexican hydraulic bureaucracy in policy articulation. It is clear 
that to understand water reforms, or the lack thereof, it is necessary to bring the 
hydraulic bureaucracy back into the analysis. 
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Many observers assume that EMT was imposed on the hydraulic bureaucracy by the 
Mexican president and the World Bank, as they perceive an inherent contradiction in 
senior hydrocrats supporting a policy that apparently weakens their bureaucracy. This 
chapter highlights the inadequacies of this line of argument by widening the frame of 
analysis to include political and bureaucratic processes, mcticating that the reforms were 
part of an ongoing struggle within the Mexican bureaucracy. It shows how the reform 
package did not entail a complete devolution or reduction of bureaucratic powers, but 
that it served to reorder bureaucratic control over essential domains and resources. The 
reform package enabled senior hydrocrats to express and materialise some of their 
pressing concerns, such as regaining bureaucratic and financial autonomy. Contrary to 
popular belief, the water reforms in Mexico generated important benefits for segments of 
the hydraulic bureaucracy. This indicates why they were committed to a broad reform 
programme of this nature. 
The commitment to the water reform package was a temporal, situational and content 
specific outcome of a complex interplay between the presidential candidate, the World 
Bank and a group of senior hydrocrats. By focusing on these policy actors and their 
agendas, this chapter elucidates how the reform package emerged as an outcome of 
mutual persuasion, compromise and coercion between these policy actors. It gained 
momentum when the concentration of bureaucratic domains and resources in a single 
water authority, the decentralisation of the irrigation districts and active water pricing 
policies became part of the reform package. This packaging strategy made the reform 
viable financially, politically and institutionally, as it would attract international funding, 
reduce government subsidies, secure a steady income flow for the hydraulic bureaucracy, 
receive authorisation from the president and find sufficient support among the upper 
reaches of the hydraulic bureaucracy. 
We have argued that it is necessary to rethink the relationship between water policy 
making and senior levels of the hydraulic bureaucracy. That commitment and political 
will are outcomes of policy articulation rather than prerequisites for reform has several 
implications for researching water reforms. Firstly, it suggests that it is necessary to 
conceive of contemporary water reforms as effects of specific political and bureaucratic 
policy practices and experiences. Secondly, it entails analysing how officials of 
international funding agencies, researchers, consultants, politicians and hydrocrats 
engage in their institutional reproduction by artiailating reforms that reorder the control 
over contested bureaucratic domains, redirect essential resource flows, and redefine 
themselves and their clientele. 
Notes 
1 This chapter is based on a published paper written together with Flip Wester and Luz Nereida 
Perez Prado (Rap et al., 2004). 
2 Throughout the text, Mexican acronyms and abbreviations are used and Spanish words are 
generally italicised. For Spanish words frequently used in the text, this convention is dropped. 
3 This becomes apparent if one takes into account that many of the conditions that are said to have 
led to IMT were often in place throughout the history of irrigation development in Mexico, without this 
leading to transfer. For example, Mexico suffered various serious economic crises between 1930 and 
1980, with drastic consequences for irrigation, without this resulting in IMT. In addition, nearly all the 
works on IMT in Mexico single out the declining levels of water fee payments during the 1980s as the 
most important reason for transfer. Nevertheless, the concern for cost recovery is not new in Mexican 
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irrigation policy circles and dates back to the Irrigation Law of 1926, which decreed that irrigation 
districts were to be financially self-sufficient. At several points in time, the Mexican government 
considered the level of water fee payment too low and made attempts to increase them, however in 
most cases without a lasting effect. Likewise, the poor maintenance of irrigation districts has been a 
recurrent theme in Mexico and the need for extensive rehabilitation was already identified in the 1960s. 
Lastly, ideas of increased user involvement in irrigation management were present in irrigation policy 
circles since at least the 1930s, and several districts were actually managed by users' associations from 
this time onwards. Although the legal conditions for such involvement were in place for several 
decades, this never resulted in a substantial number of irrigation districts being managed by its users. 
1 The use of the term bureaucratic to qualify actors or processes is not intended to be derogatory, 
but simply refers to the actors and interactions within and between government agencies that influence 
the articulation of policies and reforms. 
5 Defined here as the process by which policy actors support, modify, displace and translate 
different interests concerning a policy idea with as outcome that a policy or reform package becomes 
irreversible, or not. Seen in this way, commitment to policies is the outcome of struggles and 
negotiations between different policy actors. A 'successful' policy follows an unstable trajectory from a 
policy idea to a policy likelihood, and finally to a policy reality, i.e. it becomes more articulated, through 
which its content and composition is redefined and transformed. Focusing on policy articulation 
eliminates the artificial divide between policy formulation and implementation. 
6 This poses the methodological challenge of 'studying up', where participant observation and other 
research methods 'may not be readily portable to elite contexts' (Gusterson, 1997:116). In our research, 
'studying up' meant interviewing senior members of the hydraulic bureaucracy and other key figures in 
the Salinas government, as well as staff of international organisations. I also interviewed Mexican 
scholars knowledgeable on irrigation development and policies and extensively read official documents 
and newspaper articles. 
7 Defined here as the various government agencies that were responsible for the allocation, 
distribution and use of the nation's waters and the construction and administration of hydraulic 
infrastructure. 
8 This term is a contraction of hydraulic bureaucrats and is used here to refer to engineers working 
in water bureaucracies. I thank Alex Bolding for suggesting this term. Others have pointed out that it 
may be better to designate senior hydrocrats as hydro-politicians, as this more accurately reflects their 
activities. 
9 Due to the limitations of my study, such as the lack of public information on the processes 
underlying reforms in Mexico and the methodological difficulties in accessing this type of information, I 
can only present a schematic overview of the events, actors, arenas and processes that were 
fundamental in defining and constituting the water reforms. 
1 0 Irrigation has been practised in Mexico since pre-Hispanic times, and by 1919 some 800,000 ha 
were irrigated (CNA, 1994b). At present, some 6.1 million ha are irrigable, of which 3.3 million ha are 
contained in 81 irrigation districts, constructed and, until recently, managed by the state, while 2.8 
million ha are either in private or farmer-managed irrigation systems. Irrigated land contributes about 
50 per cent of the total value of agricultural production and accounts for nearly 70 per cent of 
agricultural exports. Although agriculture only accounts for around 6.5 per cent of Mexico's GDP, it 
employs 22 per cent of the economically active population (INEGI, 1998). 
" See Aboites (1998) for a legally precise and Mexico specific definition of centralisation/ 
fédéralisation and an excellent historical overview of this process from 1888 to 1946. 
1 2 The term autonomy is not used to suggest absolute independence or isolation, but is used in a 
relative sense to express the position of the hydraulic bureaucracy in comparison with other 
bureaucracies. 
1 3 Land reform communities created after the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Before the revision of 
Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992, ejido land belonged to the state, with a combination of 
community (ejido) and private (ejidatorio) usufruct. Ejido members are called ejidatarios. 
" Instances of user management of irrigation districts in the 1930s based on this law were 
mentioned in interviews. However, I have been unable to document this and it remains unclear why 
and how many user associations were formed and what their attributes were. 
" Water boards continued to function in several irrigation districts until the transfer programme 
started in the 1990s, such as in the Ciudad Juarez and the Tula districts. The most frequently mentioned 
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and only documented case is that of Rio Yaqui (IMTA n.d.), which was managed by water boards since 
1947. 
M In 1960 the SRH estimated that more than 200,000 ha of the irrigation districts, or ten per cent of 
the irrigable area at that time, could not be used due to deteriorated or incomplete infrastructure. That 
same year, a proposal to increase water charges led to nothing. It was opposed by a group of 10,000 
large producers with a strong commercial and productive weight at the national level (Wionczek, 1982). 
1 7 The number of federal government employees grew from 0.3 to 1.3 million between 1969 and 
1976, the public sector deficit rose from 2.8 per cent of GDP in 1972 to 4.6 per cent in 1976, and 
inflation and foreign debt were also on the rise. This forced the government to devalue the peso in 1976 
and to sign a stabilisation agreement with the IMF, in which it pledged to reduce government spending 
(Grindle, 1996). 
1 8 In the following two sexenios, this ministry functioned as a stepping-stone for its two subsequent 
ministers, Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas, to become president (Castañeda, 1999). 
" A telling joke that recalls the fusion of these long-time rivals recounts that it was like merging 
America and Chivas, the two major football clubs of Mexico with a long tradition of mutual rivalry. 
2 0 This was only the case for new loans. Loans that had already become effective before 1982, for 
example those to the irrigation sector of in total $335 million, continued throughout the 1980s (World 
Bank, 1983b). 
2 1 Insiders stress that during the negotiations the concrete policy proposals came from the Mexican 
side. 
2 2 The Plan mentions that 'the formation of organisations (...), which will become responsible for the 
operation and maintenance of the hydraulic infrastructure, is considered expedient. It is expected that 
the irrigation districts will be financially autonomous and administratively independent' (Poder 
Ejecutivo Federal, 1989:77; my translation). This phrase was used repeatedly in subsequent CNA policy 
documents to justify IMT. 
2 3 Concentration is used to refer to the integration of existing bureaucratic domains and resource 
flows regarding the exploitation of the nation's waters, formerly dispersed over different government 
agencies, into a 'single water authority'. 
2 4 Decentralisation is used here as the delegation of authority and financia] resources concerning 
water management from the federal government to user or other lower level organisations, generally 
with the aim to reduce government expenditure through the creation of self-sufficient water 
management organisations. The choice of this definition is pragmatic. The disadvantage of the term is 
that it suggests a delegation of political power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, implying a 
political redefinition of the territory (Smith, 1985). It is questionable if this is so in the case of IMT. 
Although this debate is not entered into here, the reader is warned that this is not implied by the use of 
the term. 
2 5 In October 1987, De la Madrid designated Salinas as the presidential candidate for the PRI. The 
Mexican tradition of presidentialism and the dominance of the PRI for more than sixty years created a 
system of political transitions according to which the old president 'uncovered' the presidential 
candidate. This has been an important element of stability for the political system (Camp, 1999; 
Castañeda, 1999; Grindle, 1977). 
2 6 Dr. González VUlareal had good relationships with leaders of the guild of hydrocrats (ex-ministers 
and deputy ministers) and with important political actors. Through his position as president of the 
College of Civil Engineers he also maintained good relationships with civil engineers in the 
government, the academic world and in construction companies. He started his bureaucratic career 
during Echevatria's sexenio (1970-76), after completing an academic training in civil engineering at the 
UNAM and obtaining a PhD at the University of California at Berkeley, specialising in water resource 
planning. He worked as General Co-ordinator of the PNH from 1972 to 1982, first under the SRH and 
later under the SARH. The co-ordinator of the PNH was widely respected for his vision and expertise 
concerning the planning and management of water resources. In addition, he knew irrigation from a 
practical perspective. His father was a producer in the irrigation district of Rio Yaqui in the northern 
state of Sonora, a system that was user-managed for several decades. His respected position was 
acknowledged when he co-ordinated campaign meetings on water for De la Madrid in 1982. During 
these meetings he developed a set of ideas that were basically in embryo what was proposed at the end 
of the 1980s to Salinas. 
2 7 Dr. González VUlareal was PRI candidate for governor of his home state of Sonora more than 
once. 
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2 8 In Mexico, a deconcentrated authority is a semi-autonomous federal agency with the power to set 
its own policies, levy taxes and fines, issue permits and carry out acts of authority. This contrasts with 
decentralised public agencies, which are also semi-autonomous, but depend on their mother ministry 
for overall policy guidelines and direction. 
2 9 A senior SARH official mentioned this course of events at the time. 
3 0 Villalobos Guerrero became the CNA Director during the next sexenio of president Zedillo (1994-
2000). 
3 1 Based on interviews with senior SARH officials. 
3 2 Based on interviews with ex-CNA and senior SARH officials. 
3 3 This presentation is necessarily schematic and does not pay attention to the actors involved in 
transfer, how the CNA overcame resistance from the users and parts of the hydraulic bureaucracy, nor 
how the IMT policy was further articulated in the field. 
1 
3 
Engineering a Policy Package: 
From the slow to the fast track1 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 showed how interactions between various policy actors led to the production 
and articulation of water reforms in Mexico. Policy articulation is the process by which 
policy actors support, modify, displace and coalesce around a policy idea with as 
outcome that a policy or reform package becomes less or more standardised. 
Government bureaucracies often play a crucial role in this because of the way policies are 
institutionalised and made routine. A 'successful' policy follows a trajectory through 
which it becomes more articulated and dominant, through the enrolment of the 
necessary actors. Trials of strength' may transform the characteristics and meaning of 
the policy, but they also result in the hardening of the reform package and the increasing 
momentum with which it expands outwards and becomes more 'real'. 
Chapter 2 also argued that there is nothing 'natural', logical' or 'unavoidable' about 
irrigation reforms, but that they are produced by particular institutional constellations 
and have particular effects. Its focus was the gestation period leading to the birth of 
irrigation management transfer (TMT) as a reality in Mexico. Chapter 3 continues this 
theme, looking at the birth and early development of the project. I construct this 
argument by investigating the development of the irrigation transfer policy, not as a 
centrally controlled and uncontested process but as one that results from interactions 
between policy actors such as hydrocrats2, water user leaders, politicians and 
international lending agencies, ttansfonrdng what was initially a weak policy idea into an 
internationally declared success halfway through the 1990s. I am particularly interested 
in how a standardised EMT package was developed, consisting of specific technologies of 
governance and how this contributed to the acceleration of the transfer process after 
1991.1 use the term 'technologies of governance' for the programmes, techniques, legal 
documents, and procedures through which agencies seek to embody their governmental 
or managerial ambitions3. For example, technologies of governance that played a role in 
the effectuation of IMT were a step-by-step procedure for transfer, in addition to legal 
and organisational models that helped to materialise water user management. 
3.2 Standardising the Transfer Package: Assembling Technologies of Governance 
through Initiatives and Resistance on the Ground (1989-1991) 
The previous chapter details the historical, political and bureaucratic transformations in 
Mexico relating to water that resulted in the consolidation of a water reform package in 
the run-up to the presidential elections of July 1988. The composition of these reforms 
and the commitment to them emerged from a protracted process of interaction and 
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enrolment between policy actors such as senior hydrocrats, the Mexican presidential 
candidate and international lending agencies. 
Assembling the transfer package through initiatives on the ground 
Although TMT had the full backing of the president and senior hydrocrats, it got off to a 
slow start in 1989. As a policy initiative, the broad outlines were clear. The intention was 
to gradually transfer a selected number of irrigation districts to financially self-sufficient 
user organisations, combined with the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure where 
necessary, but how the hydrocracy was going to effectuate the transfer was completely 
unclear. Several issues had first to be resolved. Firstly, IMT had to be designed from the 
ground up. Secondly, the transfer of irrigation districts to WUAs was illegal under the 
1972 water law. Thirdly, the irrigation districts were still part of the rural development 
districts, over which the Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA: National Water Commission) 
had no control. Fourthly, the large majority of the irrigation districts were not financially 
self-sufficient, with the government subsidising eighty-five per cent of O&M costs on 
average. Achieving financially autonomous districts seemed difficult, as efforts to 
convince farmers to pay modestly higher water fees had consistently failed in the past 
(Wionczek, 1982). In addition, many of the irrigation districts were severely run down in 
the perception of the farmers, making it unlikely that they would willingly accept the 
infrastructure. Lastly, the fact that the CNA had just been created meant that most of 
1989 was dedicated to establishing CNA as an autonomous organisation. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the concept of IMT was not new in Mexico when it was 
formally introduced in 1989. Many actors on the ground had already considerable 
experience in this regard. The Plan Nacional Hidráulico (PNH: National Water Plan) led 
to the formation of a team of water resource planners who had departed from the 
traditional construction bias of the hydraulic bureaucracy by developing a broader vision 
on water resource planning and management. The planners working in the PNH 
developed policy ideas and accumulated particular experiences favouring participation by 
water users and handing over of government tasks in water management. Dr. González 
Villareal was leading actor whose respected position was acknowledged when he co-
ordinated campaign meetings on water for presidential candidate, De la Madrid, in 1982. 
During these meetings he developed a set of ideas that were basically in embryo what 
was proposed at the end of the 1980s to Salinas. Expertise was thus available, but the 
choice of people who would make IMT a reality was crucial. At the end of 1988, Dr. 
Ramos, who had worked4 under Dr. González Villareal in the SARH as Director of Water 
Development and was present at early discussions on transfer, was appointed as Head of 
Irrigation Districts to initiate LMT. Dr. Ramos was a respected irrigation engineer with 
not only a solid track record in the SRH and SARH5 but also international experience. 
Around the same time, the World Bank hired new staff with extensive experience in 
water management in the private sector to be stationed in Mexico to work on the LMT 
programme. Officials of the Bank were enthusiastic about the prospects for such a 
programme in Mexico and in 1988 sent staff missions to pledge its support and initiate 
loan discussions. 
When Dr. Ramos and his team started working on transfer in 1989, they had little to go 
on except for several initiatives with transfer on the ground, initiated in the 1980s in 
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selected irrigation districts, mduding FJ Grullo (see Map 1, Jalisco Sur: 094), Rio Mayo 
(038), Rio Yaqui (041) and Delidas (005) (Palados Vêlez, 1992; van der Zaag, 1992). In 
particular, the way irrigation management was organised in Rio Yaqui, where water 
distribution and maintenance from the secondary canal level and down had always been 
managed by users, appeared to be a useful model for the IMT programme. These transfer 
initiatives on the ground had developed their own momentum and initially appeared to 
escape the control of the CNA at the federal level. 
Through a careful process of co-optation and appropriation by senior hydrocrats in 1989, 
these initiatives were brought under the control of the CNA and used to assemble the 
technologies of governance that came to constitute the EMT policy package. Attempts to 
initiate transfer in other irrigation districts in 1990 and early 1991 encountered resistance 
from farmers, unions, regional bureaucratic staff and the admirù^trative section of the 
hydrocracy. This resistance further shaped the development of a set of technologies, such 
as a step-by-step procedure to organise, promote and enact transfer, as well as particular 
legal and organisational models. In addition, a new water law was drafted to legalise' 
transfer, and substantial international funding was secured for the IMT programme. The 
pre-1989 history of how the technologies of governance that came to constitute the EMT 
package were assembled is detailed in Appendix 3. 
A particularly vexing obstade facing EMT was that the legal framework was inadequate, 
as the water law of 1972 prohibited the transfer of the irrigation districts. To resolve this 
issue, a group of CNA lawyers and senior hydrocrats devised an ingenious legal 
construction, based on the transfer initiatives on the ground, which consisted of dividing 
the districts into irrigation units. Under Artide 77 of the 1972 water law, irrigation units 
are defined as farmer-managed irrigation systems with users' assodations fully 
responsible for O&M and collecting water fees. Artide 78 of the law states that two or 
more irrigation units could be joined to form an irrigation district piario Ofidal, 1972). 
Based on these dauses, the lawyers argued that an irrigation district could be considered 
to exist of various irrigation units, which were called môdulos (modules) to prevent 
confusion (Palados Vêlez, 1994a). An additional spin given to this legal construction by 
the CNA lawyers was to constitute the WUAs as dvil assodations. This was necessary to 
ensure that the WUAs would fall under the control of CNA, as 'normal' WUAs for 
irrigation units as provided for by the 1972 water law would fall under the responsibility 
of the SARH (Espinosa de Leon, 1994). 
The above shows how contested the WUAs were in 1989 and indicates that transferring 
the irrigation districts was not simply a question of creating WUAs and handing over 
operation and maintenance tasks to them. A very specific technology of governance was 
assembled in the form of WUAs constituted as dvil assodations, which made it possible 
to circumvent the legal restrictions on transfer on the one hand, while ensuring that the 
CNA would retain control over the irrigation districts and the WUAs on the other. This 
technology of governance was subsequently used in other districts, and was legally 
sanctioned in 1992 when a new water law was enacted. The technology ensured 
bureaucratic control over the irrigation districts for the CNA in its attempt to gain 
bureaucratic autonomy. 
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Map 1 Irrigation Districts in Mexico 
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During 1987 and 1988, SARH officials helped farmer leaders in the El Grullo District to 
form a WUA (see Appendix 3). Towards the end of 1989, the board of the El Grullo 
WUA learnt that local and state CNA engineers were sending negative messages to 
headquarters about their capability to manage their module. The board saw the need to 
call on the governor of Jalisco, who was in favour of transfer, to exert political pressure. 
The governor accompanied the board on a trip to Mexico City in late 1989, where they 
obtained an audience with Dr. Gonzalez Villareal. Their intention was to show that they 
were well organised. The governor made it clear to Dr. Gonzalez Villareal that he wanted 
to be the first state to have an irrigation system transferred. According to the impression 
of the board members, Dr. Gonzalez Villareal was not pleased with the speed at which 
things were developing in FJ Grullo. Apparently he was not convinced that the WUA 
could already operate and maintain the system, and he thought it would be important to 
have an engineer as manager of the WUA. The proposal was made that the board's 
secretary, who was a civil engineer by training, would be the manager. This was 
important to convince Dr. Gonzalez Villareal, and in the end he agreed to the transfer. A 
CNA official remembers: 
The president [Salinas] obviously had the Director of the CNA under pressure, 
asking him what was happening with the transfer, but no progress was 
forthcoming. That's when they pulled the El Grullo Association from up their 
sleeve and said to the president that El Grullo was transferred. El Grullo was 
transferred with a procedure that was corrupted from the beginning. It did not 
really follow a democratic procedure, as we did in other districts. But it was 
forced by the circumstances. 
After the meeting in Mexico City, the board held several talks with CNA district officials 
to prepare for the official transfer. In 1989 and 1990, senior CNA engineers visited FJ 
Grullo several times to draw up the new regulations and charter of the association as 
well as the Concession Title (Jitulo de Concesidn). During these visits the CNA officials 
expressed their concern that the elections for board positions might create or revive 
conflicts between ejidatarios (members of ejidos*) and private landowners. After lengthy 
discussions, this issue was resolved by deciding to alternate the posts of president and 
treasurer of the WUA every three years between representatives of the ejidatarios and 
representatives of the private farmers. Thus, in the first three years an ejidatario could be 
president and a private farmer secretary, and the next three years it would be the other 
way around. This technology of governance combined traditionally separate spheres of 
influence on the WUA's board. This was crucial for reaching agreements between groups 
of farmers that had historically been opposed to each other and served to establish 
alliances between the leaders of these groups. The altemancia (alternation) was 
established in the charter of the FJ Grullo Association, which served as the basis for the 
charters drawn up in other associations later on. At the beginning of 1990, the operation 
was turned over and the Concession Title was presented to the WUA in May 1990. A 
CNA official remarked: 
The first district to be completely transferred was El Grullo, Jalisco, in 1990. The 
users even wanted to start operating the district a year before, but we said: "You 
have to learn a bit, let's do the operation in a parallel form with personnel of the 
CNA during this year.' So the process of transfer was started in 1989 and in 
1990 it was completely transferred: the concession was handed over. 
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In FJ Grullo, the transfer process developed a momentum that was difficult for the CNA 
to control, because of political pressures from the governor and the Mexican president 
himself. However, the CNA ingeniously appropriated this transfer already initiated on 
the ground and then used it to promote IMT. The transfer initiative in FJ Grullo served to 
develop several crucial technologies of governance, such as using the loopholes in the 
1972 water law to form WUAs, constituting WUAs as civil associations, alternating the 
presidency of the WUA, joint operation of the irrigation district in the first year after 
transfer, and the Concession Titles which outlined in detail the tasks and responsibilities 
of the WUA and the CNA, that were to form the core of the EMT programme in later 
years. These technologies of governance also ensured that the CNA would not lose 
control over the irrigation districts or the transfer process. 
Based on the experiences of transfer initiatives on the ground in FJ Grullo and in Rio 
Mayo in 1989, Dr. Ramos and his team started to assemble a transfer package consisting 
of specific technologies of governance that would make transfer possible. At the same 
time, a serious start was made with drawing up a new water law. This was necessary not 
only to legalise EMT but more generally to confer powers on the CNA as the single water 
authority in the country. To formulate the new water law, a select group of lawyers and 
senior engineers was formed in the CNA in 1989. One of the key CNA lawyers at the 
time remembers: 
At the start of 1989 we had a very general idea about how to ensure user 
participation. However, we started from zero as far as the legal issues were 
concerned. Everything had to be designed and worked out from a legal point 
of view. The legal design was drawn up in 1989 by this team and me. We 
wrote the concession titles and the statutes for the associations. During this 
process it was very important to listen to the users. We held many meetings 
in several irrigation districts, mainly in Sonora, in which I carefully listened 
to the complaints put forward by the users. I did not go to El Grullo, but we 
also had engineers working there. The idea of alternating the presidency of 
the associations came up at this time, based on experiences in the field. This is 
included in the statutes. The content of the concession titles, the statutes and 
the rest did not change much after 1989, although it was refined a bit. I 
would work until late at night in 1989 on these legal issues to make transfer 
possible. 
The resolution of the legal problems in 1989, based on initiatives on the ground in FJ 
Grullo and hard work at the national level, lay the groundwork for the design of the 
transfer package. Another important development in 1989 was that the CNA regained 
control over the irrigation districts from the SARH in September 1989 by extracting them 
from the rural development districts and started establishing itself as the sole water 
authority in the country. Based on these achievements, the National Programme for the 
Decentralisation of the Irrigation Districts was drawn up towards the end of 1989, 
outlining twenty-one districts to be transferred between 1990 and 1994. These districts 
were carefully selected based on an assessment by the CNA of the willingness of the 
users to accept EMT (CNA, 1991a; World Bank, 1991). Most of them were large, 
commercially-oriented districts located in the north of Mexico with few infrastractural 
problems. 
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The slow track and the standardised transfer package 
The transfer of irrigation districts to users was officially initiated by the CNA towards the 
end of 1989, with two modules (out of a total of fifteen) in the Rio Culiacan irrigation 
district having the honour to be the first to be formally transferred, in January 1990 
(CNA/SARH, 1992:6). All sixteen modules in Rio Mayo were transferred in 1990, as well 
as one module in Jalisco Sur (El Grullo) in May 1990. By the end of 1990, a total of 
130,366 ha had been transferred in Mexico, all located in these three irrigation districts. 
Thus, the progress with transfer in 1989 and 1990 was rather slow, in keeping with the 
original slow track transfer programme designed by Dr. Ramos and his team around 
three key activities: substantially raise irrigation service fees, rehabilitate and modernise 
the twenty-one irrigation districts listed for transfer, and finalise the transfer of eight 
districts by the end of 1992, three by the end of 1993 and the remaining ten by mid 1994 
(CNA, 1991b). 
Although the number of hectares formally transferred in 1990 was quite low, this does 
not mean notfiing happened on the ground. In nineteen irrigation districts, the CNA 
undertook steps to initiate transfer, while in all irrigation districts attempts were made to 
substantially increase irrigation fees, as a prerequisite for transfer (CNA, 1991b:7). People 
directly involved with transfer in 1990 and 1991 indicated that it was a period of many 
confrontations and frictions, as Dr. Ramos and his team largely encountered users who 
were opposed to EMT. This again emphasises the element of overcoming resistance. 
"The transfer of the districts was not an easy task; it was necessary to 
overcome many obstacles of which several stand out, namely the 
acceptance on the part of the users of the change to an operational set-up 
[for the irrigation districts] to which they were not accustomed and that 
demanded a higher degree of responsibility; the acceptance of the 
infrastructure in the poor state of maintenance it was in; and the increases 
in the water fees to achieve financial self-sufficiency.' (Espinosa de Leon, 
1998: 6; my translation) 
Attempts by the CNA to convince users to accept the poorly maintained irrigation 
infrastructure, while at the same time agreeing to pay significantly higher water fees and 
taking on greater responsibilities in the management of the irrigation districts, were met 
with staunch resistance in 1990 and early 1991. In addition, many of the CNA field staff, 
heads of irrigation districts and the actministrative section of the CNA strongly resisted 
EMT, as it was clear that they would lose either their jobs or control over financial 
resource flows. These difficulties with transfer were likened to pulling a cart up a hill. In 
the beginning the going is very slow and heavy, and you need to mobilise a lot of power 
to get the cart rolling. You know things will be easy once you get the cart to the top of 
the hill, but until then it will be very hard work. To mobilise this power on the ground, 
the transfer package was further refined, while a crucial shove was given to the EMT cart 
by international lending agencies. 
In 1991, the CNA was successful in obtaining international funding to support its full 
irrigation and drainage programme, including the EMT programme (see Appendix 2). 
The loan, for a total of US$400 million, was to finance part of the CNA's irrigation and 
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drainage investment programme for the fiscal years 1991 through 1994, totalling US$1.2 
billion. It was the first time that the World Bank financed a government7s full irrigation, 
drainage and flood control programme for a specified number of years - termed a time-
slice operation in Bank jargon - anywhere in the world. For the Bank this was an 
important innovation, as it provided much more scope for policy dialogue and flexibility 
during loan execution. Instead of funding the construction of a specific irrigation system, 
the time-slice loan made it possible to reassess investment priorities and redirect 
resource flows. Not surprisingly, the loan enshrined the slow track transfer model, 
targeting the twenty-one irrigation districts earmarked for rehabilitation and transfer 
(with US$100 million from the loan), while deferred maintenance would be carried out 
in the remaining fifty-six districts (with US$49 million from the loan). Interestingly, 
US$200 million of the loan were earmarked for the construction of three new irrigation 
districts and the completion of works in twenty-three other districts, while only US$5 
million were earmarked for institutional development (read IMT). The objective of 
transfer, in the Bank's perspective, was to reduce government subsidies to the irrigation 
districts to zero and to seek the long-term sustainability of the irrigation systems. 
Under Dr. Ramos, the transfer package and its constitutive elements were adapted and 
redesigned in response to a set of experiments, consensus building, experiences and 
clashes in the field. These experiences were fed back to the national level, where they 
were discussed and evaluated by a transfer policy committee presided over by Dr. 
González Villareal, and during loan negotiations with the World Bank. This led to new 
ideas that were consequently brought back to the field. Such feedback mechanisms, 
which were centrally directed by the CNA, led to a convergence of dispersed experiences 
and ideas on how to implement the transfer. The central tenets of the transfer package 
emerged out of this process of centring (CNA, 1991c). The package consisted of a set of 
carefully selected and designed technologies of governance: the step-by-step procedure 
for organising and promoting transfer, the organisational and legal models, and legal, 
technical and adnúrtistrative documents and requirements, as well as substantial funds 
for rehabilitating the irrigation districts and promoting transfer. The following briefly 
describes the transfer procedure, while how the transfer package played out in the field 
is explored in greater detail in the next section. 
In July 1991, the CNA published an important document entitled Instructions for the 
Transfer of the Irrigation Districts to Water Users (CNA, 1991c). This document contains 
detailed instructions for CNA staff and water users on how to organise and transfer the 
irrigation districts, and indicates that the transfer programme should consist of two 
phases. Ln the first phase, WUAs constituted as civil associations are organised per 
module. The CNA concedes a water volume and transfers the operation, maintenance 
and administration of part of the infrastructure and machinery to these WUAs. After an 
unspecified period of time, during the second phase it is decided how the main irrigation 
system is to be managed, either by a federation of WUAs called a SRL (Sociedad de 
Responsabilidad Limitada), a private company or by the CNA. At all times, the CNA 
retains control over the dams and headworks of the irrigation system and supervises the 
WUAs and SRLs according to institutional, admmistrative and technical criteria to which 
they have agreed in the Concession Title. The most important criteria are that the WUAs 
and SRLs have to be administratively independent and financially self-sufficient, by 
means of the fees paid by WUA members. The first phase of the transfer programme 
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consisted of the following steps (CNA, 1991c): Diagnosis; Promotion; To constitute a 
WUA; Acceptance of commitments; Concession title; Physical transfer of the module; 
Parallel operation. These steps are spelt out more fully in Appendix 4. 
The publication of these transfer guidelines brought closure to the package on which Dr. 
Ramos and his team had worked so hard in the previous two years. In effect, the point of 
no return had been reached. The IMT policy no longer only consisted of statements of 
intent, but had become a programme with objectives, benchmarks, deadlines to be met 
and procedures to be followed. In effect, policy discourse was materialised in specific 
technologies of governance. By publishing the instructions, the CNA top management 
not only reaffirmed its commitment to the policy but also made it that much less 
reversible. 
The slow track runs aground 
Although Dr. Ramos and his team managed to design the slow track transfer 
programme and obtain funding for it - significant achievements in and of themselves -
they were less successful in convincing the users to accept transfer. After the easy 
successes in three irrigation districts where transfer imtiatives had already developed 
their own momentum, the slow track ground to a halt in 1991 in the other eighteen 
irrigation districts listed for transfer. For example, in the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation 
district, located in the central part of Mexico and covering some 112,700 ha, it was 
planned to transfer 29,579 ha in 1991,27,124 ha in 1992,42,246 ha in 1993 and 13,832 ha 
in 1994 (CNA, 1991b). A diagnosis carried out by the Instituto Mexicano de Technologfa del 
Agua (TMTA: Mexican Institute of Water Technology) in early 1991 to initiate transfer 
revealed that both ejidatarios and private farmers were vehemently opposed to transfer. 
Wealthy, commercial farmers were of the opinion that the transfer of secondary canals 
would not solve anything; that only with the transfer of the main irrigation system and 
the dam would make things better. A group of wealthy farmers even offered to buy the 
dam from the government. Middle-income farmers were not that opposed to transfer, 
but only if the irrigation infrastructure was rehabilitated and transferred to them in good 
condition. They were divided on the issue of the dam, with some siding with the large 
farmers and others stating that the government should continue to control the dam, as it 
would lead to too many conflicts between farmers if the dam was in private hands. The 
ejidatarios, mostly poor to very poor farmers, did not want transfer at all, as they feared it 
would only lead to more conflicts between farmers and further rises in irrigation service 
fees. The strong resistance to transfer in Alto Rio Lerma resulted in zero hectares being 
formally transferred in 1991 and contributed to the dismissal of Dr. Ramos. 
Towards mid 1991 it became apparent that the slow track transfer programme was not 
making much headway, as only 82,716 ha of the 479,360 ha planned for 1991 had been 
transferred. Around the same time, Dr. Ramos was relieved of his post as Head of the 
Irrigation Districts and demoted to EMTA. Several people have suggested that the reason 
for his dismissal was that he was against transfer. The description above of the very 
active role he played in designing the transfer package belies this conclusion. A more 
accurate assessment would be that the administrative section of the CNA was opposed 
to IMT, as they would lose control over the procurement of equipment, and hence 
substantial sums of money, if WUAs were formed in the irrigation districts. Also, more 
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generally in the hydrocracy there was resistance to EMT, and it is likely that a 
conjunctural coalition of discontent formed to oust Dr. Ramos. Lastly, Dr. Ramos' 
approach to transfer, with its emphasis on rehabilitation first and then the gradual 
transfer of a limited number of districts, became a liability. He had opted for the slow 
track and was a real técnico7 who was reluctant to make political deals and wanted to 
carry out the transfer based on a well-defined plan. People close to him mentioned that 
he had a linear and bureaucratic approach to implementing the transfer package, and 
that the political dimensions of transfer surpassed him. To more fully understand the 
replacement of Dr. Ramos by Dr. Urzúa, it is necessary to consider the shifting political 
tide in Mexico in mid 1991, and the transition of LMT from the slow to the fast track. 
3.3 Over the Hill: Accelerated Transfer and Success (1992-1994) 
A shifting political tide 
In August 1991, when Dr. Urzua was appointed as the new Head of the Irrigation 
Districts, the Partido Revolucionario Imtitucional (PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party) 
regained an outright majority in Congress in mid-term elections. This political victory for 
President Salinas, who started out as one of the weakest presidents of Mexico (Grindle, 
1996), is generally considered the major turning point of his presidency. After August 
1991, Salinas used his renewed electoral legitimacy to carrying out a radical neo-liberal 
reform programme (Centeno, 1994, Cornelius et al., 1994, Grindle, 1996, Teichman, 
1997). The widely disputed nature of his election in 1988 had motivated Salinas to take a 
balanced approach in his plans to modernise the state and the economy under the 
banner of social liberalism, which he had carried during his election campaign. This was 
necessary to regain political support among rural groups and urban popular movements, 
which the PRI corporate structure was losing. The strategy of concertacion social 
(consensus building) focused on establishing problem-solving partnerships between the 
state and independent peasant and urban popular movements. With consensus building 
agreements, Economic Solidarity Pacts and the National Solidarity Programme 
(PRONASOL), Salinas had access to powerful political and financial instruments for 
building consensus between his adrruriistration and those groups who had supported the 
opposition during the last elections (Demmers, 1999). His intention to rebuild links with 
the peasant sector was seen to be embodied in his appointment of several widely 
respected academics and representatives of non-PRI peasant organisations to crucial 
posts in his administration. Dr. Gordillo, whose ideas on autonomous peasant 
organisation were very influential in Salinas' electoral campaign, was appointed as 
Undersecretary of Concertatidn in the SARH, a post specifically created to attend to 
peasant organisations and form solidarity pacts (Gordillo de Anda, 1988). 
The appointment of Luis Tellez, a young technocrat and Salinas confidant, as SARH 
Undersecretary of Planning and Carlos Hank Gonzalez, an important PRI dinosaur, as 
SARH Minister in the beginning of 1990 cast doubt on Salinas' social liberalism project 
for the rural sector. Although from different political groups, both enjoyed full support 
from the private sector. These bureaucratic rearrangements curtailed the influence of 
Gordillo within the SARH and ended the effective use of consensus building agreements 
with which the Under Ministry of Concertacion had aimed to establish alliances with and 
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mobilise the demands of peasant groups during the first two years of Salinas' 
administration (De la Fuente and MadKinlay, 1994). It also opened the way for preparing 
more comprehensive neo-liberal reforms in legal matters concerning the ownership of 
land and the management of water. However, such constitutional and legislative reforms 
were not viable without a majority in the Mexican Congress, which the PRI did not have 
before the August 1991 elections. 
PRONASOL, a massive social welfare programme to alleviate rural poverty carried out 
directly by the Office of the Presidency, had a much more sustained political impact. The 
programme emphasised self-help, community participation and limited bureaucracy, 
and financed a wide array of local community projects, varying from schools, 
electrification, (drinking water, and health care, to rural infrastructure. PRONASOL was 
particularly used to strengthen the presidency, reinforce presidentialism, and restore the 
personal credibility of Salinas by the close personal identification of the programme with 
the president (rather than with the party). The programme was also instrumental in 
rebuilding electoral support for the PRI (Cornelius et al., 1994). It did so by especially 
favouring areas that had supported the opposition, undermining the alliance of social 
movements and diffusing much of the grass-roots opposition to the government 
(Centeno, 1994). At the same time it had a depoliticising and demobilising effect, by 
focusing on local community projects and 'technical issues' rather than mobilising 
independent political demands and alliances (Cook et al., 1994; Demmers, 1999). 
The electoral victory of 1991 significantly strengthened Salinas' position as a statesman, 
restored the traditional authority of the presidency, and prepared the way for the neo-
liberal authoritarian style of government that characterised the latter half of his 
adrruriistration (de la Garza Toledo, 1994). The fact that Salinas started to put through a 
more pronounced neo-liberal policy programme in the rural sector was reinforced by the 
increased influence of the technocratic elite in the SARH with more direct links with the 
business community, who advanced policy ideas in respect of modernising the rural 
economy, restmcruring state intervention and trade liberalisation. Consensus building 
and corresvonsabilidad (shared responsibility) between the government and the social 
sector was pushed into the background of government discourse, and the participation 
of the private sector in public projects was more broadly welcomed. The CNA also, in 
itself favouring a more moderate and bureaucratic approach and gaining in autonomy 
from the SARH, was confronted with this stronger neo-liberal policy surge. For example, 
the bill for a New Water Law, originally prepared in secret by a team of lawyers 
contracted by the CNA, was significantly altered under the influence of more radical 
neo-liberal ideas of the economist Tellez to drastically liberalise water markets, as 
appeared in discussions at the World Bank in 1992. The appointment of Dr. Urzua as 
Head of the Irrigation Districts fits in with this set of broader developments within the 
government and the agricultural bureaucracy. 
In 1992, Salinas succeeded in putting a revision of article 27 of the Mexican Constitution 
through the PRI-dominated Congress without a lot of opposition or public dissent, 
although it was widely debated in the press and academic circles (Grindle, 1996, Nuijten, 
1998). This changed the legal basis of land ownership and the ejido system. Later that 
year, the National Water Law, which forms the legal basis of the transfer programme 
and the concession of water rights, enabled the CNA to create river basin councils, and 
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partly opened up water markets, was accepted with even fewer public problems for the 
president. Although part of the opposition walked out on the voting of the bill, a public 
and academic debate on these reforms did not ensue. It was argued that these legal 
adjustments would improve the productivity and competitiveness of Mexican agriculture, 
which was considered necessary because the Salinas aclrninistration had entered into 
negotiations on a free trade agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States. 
By 1993, the presidency was stronger than ever (Grindle, 1996). Through a series of legal 
irutiatives and government programmes, supported by encouraging economic recovery 
and a significant reduction in inflation, Salinas centralised and enhanced presidential 
power. He shifted the centre of political decision making from the political areas of the 
government (PRI, Ministry of Interior) to the financial planning areas (Ministries of 
Finance and of Planning and Budget), something which coincides with the rise within 
many sections of the government bureaucracy of technocrats educated abroad (Centeno, 
1994). Towards the end of his adrruriistrarion, Salinas was increasingly praised as one of 
Mexico's most successful presidents and rumours mentioned him as a candidate for the 
post of director of the World Trade Organization (Centeno, 1994). His policies found 
ample resonance in international organisations, such as the World Bank, WTO, IMF, 
IADB and the FAO, and he received international recognition for his demonstrated 
commitment and capabilities to realise drastic economic, legal and government reforms.. 
A senior SARH official wrote the following on the relation between the general wave of 
optimism within the government and the acceleration of the transfer during those years: 
From 1992 and the approval of the new article 27 onwards, an extremely 
optimistic vision prevailed in the entire government on the possibilities of 
deepening the reforms without any political cost. They took for granted a 
consensus, which in the case of the rural sector had to be renewed constantly. In 
this context in which in many areas the reforms were being implemented based 
on a delicate process of consensus, they changed to a relatively frantic phase of 
fast track." 
The shifting political tide during the Salinas administration thus greatly enhanced the 
acceleration of the transfer programme. In particular, the optimism among technocratic 
elites in the agricultural and the hydraulic bureaucracy about the possibility of reforming 
the state and the economy played a role. It was considered possible that Mexico would 
join the ranks of first world countries. The encouraging results and enthusiastic 
responses from the international community inspired this optimism. Informed 
government officials and members of Congress expressed the view that Salinas wanted 
to demonstrate to the world his abilities as president of Mexico and reforming statesman 
and was starting to show signs of megalomania.9 A congress member claimed that the 
transfer of much more than the number of districts and irrigated area originally planned 
would have been very much in keeping with Salinas' psychology.10 A government 
official speculated that Salinas increased the political pressure on the director of the CNA 
to speed up the rate of transfer and to transfer as much as possible before the end of his 
aciministration. He added to this that Salinas was not the kind of president that 
permitted disobedience on the part of his ministers and directors - a common trait 
within the Mexican regime of presidentialism which grants maximum authority to the 
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president. 'When Salinas ordered something to be done in three weeks, it had to 
happen'.11 
Enter Urzua; the "big mover' 
In the summer of 1991, Dr. Urziia was called by acquaintances in the government asking 
if he was interested in the position of Head of the Directorate of Irrigation Districts 
(DID). Given his career in the SRH and SARH and his experience in managing irrigation 
districts, this is not really surprising12. Urziia's profile reveals a distinguished irrigation 
expert with valuable experience in the operation and management of large irrigation 
districts in the north of the country. Throughout his career he demonstrated his 
adaptability to different local and national conditions, as well as to politics. Having 
worked in different bureaucratic, educational and commercial contexts he knew how to 
participate in teams, to follow up orders from superiors and to issue orders to 
subordinates. During his professional career, he built up a network of contacts within the 
agricultural and the hydraulic bureaucracy, irrigation districts, educational institutions, 
the private sector and within the government in different parts of the country. This made 
him very suitable to reorganise the preparatory work of his predecessor in order to 
successfully execute the objective of transferring a large variety of irrigation districts in a 
relatively short time. Insiders praised Urzua for his skill in dealing with the political 
aspects of fulfilling a bureaucratic mission and his capacity to strike deals with 
government officials, ejido leaders and associations of private farmers, politicians, and 
private sector interest groups. He was typified as inquisitive and sensitive to the political 
realities of negotiating between different powerful interest groups and stakeholders 
affected by the transfer, and getting them to accept the indicated policy line. Under 
Urziia, the role of private capital in the realisation of the transfer increased. His own 
experience in the private sector explains his firm belief in the capacity of private 
enterprises to work more efficiently than government bureaucracy as aclministrators of 
resources. Correctly formed WUAs, created to provide services, could also obtain this 
advantage of private enterprise in the management of water and related resources. In 
such a conducive environment, a user could develop an entrepreneurial spirit: 
"The responsibility acquired by the user with the transfer encourages 
him to better take care of the infrastructure of which he is in charge, to 
make more efficient use of the available resources, to raise productivity, 
and to develop an entrepreneurial spirit, to seek to increase the value of 
his produce, just like an agricultural irrigation company'. (Espinosa de 
Leon and Trava, 1992: 7; my translation) 
Accelerating into the fast track 
When Dr. Urziia joined the CNA, it was clear that rapid progress had to be made with 
EMT. He was made responsible for producing concrete results for the CNA's political 
superiors and financing agencies, to prove that the CNA was taking its transfer mission 
seriously and that it was capable of carrying it out. The conditions he encountered were 
undoubtedly more favourable than those his predecessor had faced. A large amount of 
work had already been done by many parts of the CNA dedicated to transfer, and he 
found the general framework for ttansferring the irrigation districts in place, designed by 
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Dr. Ramos and his team. As a result of the period full of clashes and conflicts, meetings 
and negotiations that his predecessor experienced when he was bringing the idea of 
transfer to the field, and the consultation and feedback which took place within the CNA 
on the basis of these experiences, a workable model of transfer was produced. Urzua also 
found an organisational structure at his disposal that was organised to promote transfer, 
to get water users organised and committed, and to prepare them for actual transfer. 
Urziia thus started off with a team of engineers experienced in working with and 
developing the procedures, models and technologies for transfer. This paved the way for 
a more routine-like implementation of the policy package in different parts of the 
country and significantly facilitated the acceleration of the transfer. Urzua is generally 
credited as the 'big mover' and the person who gave the proverbial cart, already rolling 
and approaching the top of the hill, the final push. After this, the transfer process 
accelerated into the fast track, seemingly travelling downhill effortlessly by the natural 
pull of gravity. I have tried to nuance this idea by showing the conditions under which 
he entered the CNA. Urziia and his team took up a standardised policy package, 
maintained and consolidated it by applying it in an ever-increasing number of irrigation 
districts, firstly mainly in Sinaloa and Sonora, Alto Rio Lerma, and the North, where the 
main large-scale districts are located, and then also in other corners of the country, 
where more medium and small-scale and often the poorer, more run down and socially 
and politically problematic systems are located. 
At the end of 1991, a great effort was made to make up for the first part of the year in 
which actual transfer was negligible and the process had seemed to stall. The efforts of 
Dr. Urzua and his team concentrated on the Northwest and particularly the Culiacan 
District (010) in Sinaloa and the Rio Yaqui District (041) in Sonora. In the former district, 
successful efforts to convince and negotiate with important regional leaders led to a 
massive transfer of two-thirds of the District - almost 200,000 ha. This very much 
surprised official expectations, because the transfer of this district had been planned for a 
later date and at a much slower pace. In the Rio Yaqui District, the earlier transfer 
initiatives started to pay off, with more than half the district, approximately 144,000 ha, 
transferred in the last months of 1991. In the Central Northern region, more than half of 
the Delicias District (005) was transferred. Although in other districts less progress was 
made, the two huge districts in the Northwest alone sufficed to nearly comply with the 
planned transfer of 479,360 ha in 1991. Thus, in the last months of 1991, Dr. Urziia 
succeeded in quickly catching up with the original planning agreed with the World Bank 
in loan documents, giving a much needed boost to the transfer programme and proving 
his worth. 
At the beginning of 1992, it was already becoming clear that the original idea of 
ftansferring twenty-one districts over a period of four years was outdated. The transfer in 
those districts was proving to take less time than originally envisaged. This resulted from 
the increasing political pressure and the increased interest on the part of producer 
groups to take over the modules, because they became aware that there was something 
at stake. Mention was made that it would perhaps be possible to exceed the original 
planning and transfer more districts. This was met with assent at the national political 
level. It was expected that the chain of events brought about in the districts first 
transferred could be accelerated by more intensive promotion of the transfer and that the 
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transfer of the rest of the eighty irrigation districts would require much less work. In 
1992, transfer activities around the country multiplied, and the fast track was seriously 
pursued. Urzúa's team succeeded in transferring nearly a million ha, some 300,000 ha 
more than originally planned under the slow track. More than half of this area was 
located in the Northwest. In addition, the DID broadened its focus on the Northwest 
and included the Central Northern region and the Mid-Western region of the Lerma-
Balsas watershed. The process of transfer was also chsseminated to a much larger 
number of districts. Some of these had not even been considered in the original 
planning. In the Northwest, the Districts of Rio Sinaloa (063) and Río Fuerte (075) 
spectacularly surpassed expectations with, respectively, around 100,000 and 200,000 ha. 
In the North, Bajo Río San Juan (026), a district where Urzúa had worked, was 
transferred and Delicias was completed. Particularly striking is the complete devolution 
of the Alto Rio Lerma District (011) at the end of 1992, after Urzúa had reached 
agreements with influential political and entrepreneurial groups (see Chapter 11). In 
addition, transfer was initiated in several other districts in the centre of Mexico. 
In 1993, the transfer policy was consolidated, although the area transferred decreased 
somewhat to approximately 725,000 ha. Nonetheless, this was 300,000 ha more than 
planned under the slow track programme, and also 100,000 ha more than planned under 
the fast track programme. The activities of the DID were now even more clearly 
dispersed among different regions. Relatively, the Central Northern Region became 
more important, particularly the Bajo Río Bravo District (025) of around 250,000 ha, 
which was completely transferred. Again, the number of districts where the DID 
achieved transfer increased significantly in the Central Northern and the Lerma-Balsas 
region. In general, these are smaller districts than the large ones of more than 50,000 ha 
which were transferred during the first years. In 1994, the transfer slowed down 
signfficantly, because the end of Salinas' term was approaching - a period in Mexican 
politics in which the bureaucracy concentrates on the presidential succession. Around 
230,000 ha were transferred, mainly in the Northwest. Figure 1 is a diagrammatic 
representation of the area transferred in the period 1989-1994. 
The standardisation and closure of the transfer policy package initiated under Dr. Ramos 
was completed with the arrival of Urzúa and the increased political pressure to get the 
process going. As a result of the subsequent phase of institutionalisation and 
routinisation through which the CNA implements, promotes and generalises the policy 
package, it became standardized and black-boxed. Thus there was a strong tendency 
towards a policy package mixed out of a given set of available options and inputs. Such 
an objectification of the IMT policy, the process through which it acquired a seemingly 
tangible existence and legitimacy (Shore and Wright, 1997), again contributed to a more 
rapid dissemination. 
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The policy package, with its ever more routine application, was still adaptable to different 
local circumstances and demands, in terms of a set of variables, such as the number of 
delegates of an ejido, the size of a module or the exact sequence in which the steps of the 
transfer procedure are taken. This allowed it to be flexibly adjusted in response to 
particular local conditions and demands of local producer groups and organisations. 
However, the general framework remained intact. The closure of the policy model and 
its accelerated dissemination means that the space, time, effort and resources available 
for broad consensus building and careful assessment of the implicated costs and benefits 
of the policy were reduced. This corresponded with a more general political trend in the 
Salinas administration, as discussed above. During the first years of his administration 
(1989-1991), the political climate was in favour of consensus building, and a large 
number of meetings were organised in the irrigation districts first in line for transfer, 
such as Culiacan, Delicias and Alto Rio Lerma and other districts in the Northwest of the 
country. For example, in Alto Rio Lerma more than 400 meetings were organised with 
thousands of farmers from the district (Gorriz and Groenfeldt, 1995), among other 
reasons because of significant resistance and difficulties in convincing influential groups 
of farmers. When Urzua arrived, he found the users more 'tame' and more adapted to 
the idea that the government would apply this policy. After the elections of August 1991, 
broad consensus building processes lost their direct political importance to the 
government, and a more authoritarian president and government pursued a neo-liberal 
agenda. The CNA increasingly prescribed the general parameters within which the 
policy had to be accepted, and according to which water users had to organise 
Figure 1 Area transferred in the period 1989-1994 
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themselves for transfer. After 1991, the targeting and enrolment of potential leaders and 
producer groups which were granted access to the negotiations leading to transfer 
became more selective and directed by the DID. 
At the beginning of 1992, the expectation also began to take hold among CNA officials 
that the Mexican model could be exported to other countries. At World Bank meetings, 
the attention of government representatives from other countries was drawn to the 
Mexican case, and it was suggested that the CNA should play an advisory role and 
undertake consultancies in other countries in order to explain the Mexican experience, 
the procedure followed and the organisational models underlying IMT. At the end of 
1992, the Mexican transfer model was presented to the world at an international 
conference of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID), where it 
was declared a success and drew the attention of irrigation experts from all over the 
world as the first example of transfer in the history of irrigation development (Espinosa 
de León and Trava, 1992). In 1993, the CNA received unusual praise from the director of 
Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources of the World Bank. In a national paper, the SARH 
proudly announced this, emphasising that the Bank normally does not send this type of 
congratulations. The public recognition goes as follows: 
"The progress realised in Mexico in the past three years in relation to the 
participation of water users in the administration of their irrigation 
systems is extraordinary and indeed without comparison in the world. (...) 
In no other country have similar successes be achieved compared to those 
in Mexico regarding the transfer of the adniinistration of large-scale 
irrigation projects'. (El Financiero, 13 July 1993; my translation) 
A CNA official characterises the general mood within the CNA around that time as 
follows: 
In 1993 and 1994 they began transfers without being certain yet that they were 
going to function, without having resolved the social problem totally. In 93 and 
94 the Salinas sexenio was coming to an end...I feel that they grew fond of it: 
One went well, two, then you are certain you can launch five, ten, twenty. You 
become enthusiastic. You start to take up things without being totally certain 
how the last one functioned, the other one has to function. 
3.4 The policy package in action 
Although the IMT policy package became more standardised under Urzúa, DID 
strategies to convince water users of the need to take over the irrigation district in 
practice varied per district. The local willingness or resistance of groups, the relationships 
between different power bases and leaderships, the conditions of the infrastructure and 
the difficulties with getting the substantial fee increases accepted, forced the DID to 
follow different approaches. However, in most cases there is a clear element of political 
and financial force applied by the CNA, following the presidential instruction. It was 
argued that the transfer had to be enforced, because otherwise the irrigation districts 
would stop functioning. The government would not renew subsidies. Opposing groups 
of farmers from irrigation districts were faced with a situation in which they had to agree 
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to the transfer. However, this led to very complicated situations, both socially and 
politically, which were often related to other existing social, ethnic or political problems. 
In some extreme cases, violent protests resulted, such as in the Tula District (003) 1 3 where 
the CNA offices were set on fire. The broad opposition met among many farmers was 
also dealt with by other more subtle means that limited public conflict and open 
opposition. In fact, the CNA used an array of techniques and strategies, partly already 
engrained in the policy package, to overcome the problems of opposition and advance 
with the transfer. For example, several techniques of governance enabled the DID to 
associate with those leaderships and interest groups that were in favour of, or could be 
persuaded to accept, the transfer. Negotiations took place with selected local leaders. 
Calculated distribution of resources, and sometimes of positions, further facilitated the 
surmounting and neutralisation of essential points of opposition. In addition, the 
concerted effort of the CNA to promote transfer further improved its acceptance among 
a public of producers not directly involved in the process. 
The manner in which Urzua and his team put the policy package into use shows 
significant similarities with what the literature on change management identifies as key 
activities for successful policy implementation (Sutton, 1999). The diagnostics stage 
provided for under the transfer guidelines served among other things to 'identify change 
agents' and 'recognise barriers to change' in irrigation districts where the CNA initiated 
efforts to transfer. The subsequent phases of intensive promotion of the transfer were 
instrumental in building support for reform, reforming organisational structures, and 
mobilising resources. This model, which prescribes how policy can be promoted and 
disseminated, significantly contributed to the accelerated dissemination and 
consolidation of the transfer. Below, I will review how the diagnostics, promotion and 
further steps taken by the CNA, actually work out in practice. 
Although Urzua and his team largely took up the master plan as developed by his 
predecessor, they kept adapting it in actual use and in response to the circumstances and 
demands encountered on the ground. The diagnostics were applied more strategically as 
a 'sounding out of opinion' to evaluate the willingness of different groups of farmers and 
their leaders to participate in the transfer. The approach taken was to interview 
important and influential people in an irrigation district and to ask their opinion about 
the transfer: included were leaders of ejidatarios, private landholders, political leaders, 
such as municipal presidents, special interest groups, e.g. rich and powerful farmers, and 
representatives of producer organisations. 
Initially, in many districts the mood was against the transfer, among other things 
because of the bad state of the infrastructure and the substantial increase of irrigation 
service fees that preceded the transfer (TMTA, 1992). Well-informed government officials 
estimate that, when the CNA started their efforts, around sixty per cent of farmers in the 
irrigation districts opposed the transfer, thirty per cent were not aware of the changes, 
and only around ten per cent supported IMT. Many farmers had a very negative opinion 
about the physical state and functioning of the infrastructure. In many cKstricts, farmers 
argued that the infrastructure had to be improved to an acceptable level before they 
would agree to take over the district. However, CNA engineers opined that the situation 
was not so bad at all and that farmers had a very local, and thus limited, view of 
infrastructural and operational problems. Scenarios were discussed in which the 
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government committed itself to invest in the rehabilitation and deferred maintenance of 
semi-run down infrastructure. 
By means of the diagnostics, CNA officials detected other iDarriers to change'. As part of 
a set of basic components of the IMT programme, a senior CNA official mentions the 
following two explicit aims: 
• Elimination of the nefarious O&M workers' union, which during the past 
twenty years had been a serious obstacle, rather than a facilitator, of the water 
distribution process through the canal network. 
• Elimination of corrupt campesino (peasant) leaders who, through their political 
influence, systematically hindered any attempt being made at district level to 
raise the water fees and improve O&M conditions14. 
These 'corrupt unionised people' were especially found among the canaleros (people in 
charge of chstributing water at the field level) and at the SARH, who would lose their 
jobs, influence and income sources because of the transfer. The diagnostics also served to 
assess the position of the District Head and his higher level district personnel, who could 
potentially block or slow down the transfer because it would lead to a serious reduction 
of the district and its influence.15 
Teams of engineers and lawyers were sent from CNA headquarters in the Federal 
District to the CNA state and district delegations and to the different irrigation districts 
to promote and negotiate the transfer and to get it organised. The District Head received 
instructions to divide the district into different 'homogeneous modules' (command 
areas) and to prepare a fee increase to be paid by the water users in order to achieve self-
sufficiency. 
Because the organisation of farmers at the field level was blocked by the district field 
personnel, the idea of forming temporary companies of promoters 'to bypass the 
blockade of the canaleros' was taken up from loan negotiation meetings at the World 
Bank. The concept of teams of field organisers had been used by the World Bank and 
USAID in earlier loan projects in the Philippines and in Sri Lanka during the 1970s and 
1980s (Uphoff, 1992). They are formed by engineers, economists or sociologists from 
outside the irrigation district with organisational capacity and are trained to deliver the 
promotional message. The companies of promoters were instructed by the DID about 
the general strategy of transfer and the steps that had to be taken to form a WUA. 
Subsequently, they went around the assemblies of ejidos and associations of private 
landholders to inform them about what the government was proposing. They explained 
the objectives of transfer, the rights and obligations involved and the need for a 
substantial fee increase. Groups of producers were informed that to realise the transfer 
they would have to organise themselves in a certain way. These companies of promoters 
soon detected the need to designate delegates. They encountered the practical problem 
of having to deal with large numbers of 'water users' organised according to different 
types of landownership: ejidos and private landholding. In response, they generated the 
idea of creating from all the assemblies of ejidos and the associations of private 
landholders in a designated area a fictitious assembly called the assembly of delegates. 
This corresponded with an existing practice of state and bureaucratic intervention and 
civil representation in rural organisations. After the acceptation of this idea at the highest 
level, the promoters were given the responsibility to organise the assembly of delegates 
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with a fixed number of delegates from the assemblies of ejidos and the associations of 
private landholders. 
The assembly of delegates was then given the responsibility of constituting the WUA. 
For the CNA, the inclusion and emolment of an assembly of delegates to mediate with 
all water users facilitated the political problem of implementing the transfer in a context 
where a majority of water users opposed it. 
Models designed by the CNA define the legal and organisational form of the WUA. They 
dictate that the assembly of delegates is the body with supreme authority in the civil 
association. The assembly elects a board with a president, secretary and a treasurer from 
among themselves. Furthermore, they assign a Control Committee, presided over by a 
president and with CNA participation. The board contracts personnel on a temporary 
basis for the operation, maintenance and administration of the module. Unlike the 
government-based workers, these people do not get fixed salaries, are generally not 
organised in a union and can easily be fired. In this way, the influence of the unions is 
eliminated. 
A process of inclusion and exclusion 
The information produced by the diagnostics basically served as a useful starting point 
for granting selective access to the negotiations leading to transfer. It was the basis on 
which the CNA could target and convince potentially willing leaders and enrol them to 
lead and direct the organisation of the water users according to a number of prescribed 
steps and models. The diagnostics also looked at the possibility of reaching agreements 
between different influential local leaders and groups (CNA, 1991c) in order to form an 
alliance of forces that would support the transfer. At the same time, the diagnostic 
information could be used to identify and target those groups and leaders resistant to the 
idea of transfer, because they expected to lose as a result of it. The next step would then 
be to neutralise, by-pass, or exclude the resisting or blocking elements from the process 
in order to proceed with the following steps. The teams of CNA engineers and 
communication specialists from the IMTA who were sent out to the districts to 
undertake the diagnostics received careful instructions. Urzúa's concern was to be 
informed about whom to talk to and whom not to, in order for the DID to negotiate the 
transfer. 
The DID thus entered a selective process of mcluding certain leaderships and interest 
groups in the negotiations and preparations for the transfer and excluding others. It 
targeted the politically influential, economically powerful and organised groups in the 
district. This group of farmers was generally more favourable to the transfer than the 
large majority of farmers. They had their power bases in local PRI-affiliated organisations 
for peasants and for private producers, the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos (CNC: 
National Peasant Confederation and the Confederación Nacional de Propietarios Rurales 
(CNPR: National Confederation of Rural Proprietors), or in other existing producer 
organisations. As such, they maintained close relations with the district, with local 
political forces within the PRI, and elite interest groups, such as agricultural 
entrepreneurs. They often operated with the political support of local deputies (MPs), 
senators, or governors. Their experience with the leadership of producer organisations, 
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their political support for the PRI and government policy, influenced their favourable 
position towards the transfer. In addition, from their position they were well informed 
about the significant financial and political importance that the WUAs would have. 
Further, they were aware of the significant control over water, maintenance services and 
other crucial resources that managing a WUA would imply. These types of leaders were 
in many cases enrolled to mediate for 'the water users' and negotiated the transfer with 
the DID. 
The agreements that were negotiated with these groups in the end often materialised in 
positions for their members on the board of the newly established WUAs. Leaders who 
participated in the process from the beginning were also likely to take up a post on the 
board of the WUA or place one of their supporters on it. Because these leaders were 
identified and targeted from early on, they received first hand information about how to 
organise a WUA. Ln socially and politically more complicated and divided districts, the 
CNA negotiated the transfer between different political and interest groups by assigning 
posts to them, or established alliances between the different leaders or groups. Under 
the alternation concept pioneered in FJ Grullo, in most cases the majority group was 
given the presidency for the first period and the minority group the treasury. In this way, 
an alternation between spheres of influence was secured on the committee. In practice, 
this was found to be essential to solve the problem of reaching agreements with and 
associating different groups of ejidatarios and private landholders, or influential leaders 
and opposing interest groups, who originally envisioned different forms of organisation. 
It served to establish alliances of leaders and to unite different groups in one 
organisation of users. 
The selective access granted by the DID significantly simplified the process of securing 
the increase in irrigation service fees and acceptance of the transfer. It also contributed to 
the acceleration of forming WUAs. A senior CNA official says the following about this: 
One of the important things was to choose the leaders; one had to look who was 
the leader, go to him and convince him. For example, the president of the 
Association of Farmers of Culiacan. At the beginning we had four or five 
meetings which were very tense. We said to him: 'look, the problem is that the 
government does not have money anymore to go on subsidising the irrigation 
districts. If you do not take charge of the infrastructure, you will end up without 
water. In the end, many of these leaders, agricultural entrepreneurs also, in the 
Northwest of the country began to see that these changes were necessary, and we 
began to have a good acceptance in some districts like Río Mayo, Delicias, the 
central part of Rio Lerma. The district chiefs did very intensive work. 
Initially, the position of the economically powerful groups of large agricultural 
entrepreneurs was generally more neutral. These producers, who own agro-industrial 
companies and adininister large areas in irrigation districts for export agriculture, often 
maintained close relations with the district and already enjoyed relatively privileged 
access to water and maintenance services. They were not directly interested in the 
transfer because they would have to pay higher fees. However, they became convinced 
of the need to support the transfer, in part because they saw evidence in the first districts 
transferred that they could acquire direct control over crucial resources, such as water, 
and that the WUAs were becoming politically and financially powerful organisations. An 
78 The Success of a Policy Model 
example is the Alto Rio Lerma District where a group of influential agro-industrial 
entrepreneurs linked to the then Minister of Agriculture, Usabiaga, at first opposed the 
transfer. Early in 1992, they reached an agreement with the DID, after which they 
supported the creation of the WUAs in which several of them received the post of 
president. More generally, the participation of private enterprises in the transfer 
increased when Urzúa was head of the DID and in line with a general shift in 
government priority during the latter part of the Salinas administration. Private capital 
entered as a possible concessionary of maintenance and administration services of the 
modules or the SRL. 
As an effect of the selective approach pursued during the diagnosis and promotion, DID 
mainly engaged with popular leaders, local politicians and entrepreneurs who 
represented organisations allied to the PRI regime. In most modules the board was 
therefore occupied by PRI supporters. Only a limited number of modules were controlled 
by popular leaders with links with the opposition. In particular, the left wing party, 
Partido de Revolución Democrática (PRD), the main opponent of the PRI in the 1988 and 
1991 election, had a substantial rural following. However, they did not really gain 
influence in the districts through the modules in the way that the PRI did. El Carrizo is 
an exception (076). In El Carrizo, Sinaloa, in order to prevent conflicts in the district the 
DID had to negotiate with leaders linked to the PRD, and the district was divided into 
two modules with PRD supporters and two with government allied leaders. 
The employment of the standard model of a Water Users' Association as the 
organisational unit to which a module is transferred served a bureaucratic need of 
establishing a certain level of control at a distance. CNA officials emphasise that the 
advantage of the selected and prescribed form of a WUA is that modules could not be 
transferred to existing forms of organisations. Four different levels of farmer 
organisations existed in the irrigation districts before the transfer: 
1. Ejidos and organisations of private producers which are part of respectively the CNC 
and the CNPP, the PRI affiliated organisations with local delegations at the 
municipal level 
2. Associations of ejidos and private producers 
3. Associations of Collective Interest (ARIQ, e.g. ARIC of tobacco producers in Nayarit 
(see Chapter 8) 
4. Large national federations of producers organised on the basis of a product, e.g. 
National Federation of Vegetable Producers. 
However, these existing organisational forms, which were traditionally used by the 
Mexican State for political and bureaucratic intermediation and exercising patronage, 
were not taken by the CNA as a point of departure for the transfer. Neither the 
corporative organisation CNC nor the ARICs are included in the organisational set-up 
for the transfer. The CNA made very selective use of the existing organisational base in 
the districts. At the lowest level, the ejidos and the private landholders were represented 
by delegates to the assembly. At a higher level, the influential leaderships and political 
groups, who had their power and economic base in producer organisations, were 
consulted and included in the negotiation process, if this was deemed necessary for 
advancing the transfer. However, this did not lead to a formal representation of those 
organisations in the process of transfer, the WUAs and irrigation management. A leader 
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from a popular organisation active in one of the districts reflects on the origins and 
effects of the WUA model. He suspects that it stems from a recommendation of the 
World Bank, because he thinks that otherwise it would have been much more likely for 
the Mexican government to involve the CNC or other existing organisations more 
directly. He elaborates: 
These are conceptions of organisation which are going to influence everything. 
The management of the district will be with those who are organised in some 
way. By making the associations obligatory, you can be in a cooperative society 
or in an ejido, but as such you cannot enter the management of water, when you 
are not in the association. So, you are obliged to become part of a system which 
is super controlled by the CNA16 
When asked for the underlying motivation behind the application of this WUA model, a 
influential CNA official argues that water is a public good whose administration should 
not be mixed with existing organisations based on type of land tenure, crop, or credit 
provision. This would only lead to favouritism in the distribution of water and a general 
division between the water users, he argues. Within a WUA, both ejidatarios and private 
landholders become 'water users' of the system. The decision to alternate the board 
positions between leaders from the two land tenure sectors contributed to this sense of 
community. CNA officials assert that a positive impact of the WUA and the alternation is 
that the users become a homogeneous group. They tell anecdotes in which farmers have 
stopped addressing each other as 'ejidatarios' and 'private landowners' and prefer to call 
each other 'water users' nowadays. According to these accounts, the formation of user 
organisations was accompanied by a homogenisation which caused these social groups 
to mitigate their mutual divisions, conflicts and hatred. 
A number of other potentially opposing interest groups, identified through the 
diagnostics, that threatened to oppose the transfer were effectively externalised as a 
result of the organisational models that were designed and applied: the ejido and CNC 
leaders, the O&M workers' union of the SARH, and the district chiefs and confidence 
personnel. In the new organisational set-up, these potentially restraining influences 
were externalised from influence in the WUAs and in irrigation management. According 
to a senior CNA engineer, the 'corrupt campesino leaders' used to enjoy considerable 
influence on irrigation management and traditionally opposed substantial fee increases 
in the districts to defend their electorate. However, their influence was curtailed by the 
transfer. He points out that decisions on the increase of irrigation service fees are taken 
by the Hydraulic Committee. The campesinos or ejidatarios are democratically 
represented in this body as 'water users' by the presidents of the WUAs. As a 
consequence of this changed mode of representation, the ejido and CNC leaders that 
used to influence such matters no longer have direct influence. The increases in 
irrigation service fees are therefore not in danger in his opinion. Another impact of the 
chosen form of WUA organisation is that only 'water users' can act as delegates and 
therefore also as members and board members. To determine who qualifies as a water 
user, a technology of governance called the padron de usuarios is used. This is a list of 
registered users compiled by the CNA and included in the Concession Title. Only the 
farmers with a normal water right, i.e. those who own a specified parcel of land within 
the module and the physical boundaries of the districts are included. Those with a 
temporary or precarious right are excluded from access to the WUA. Any rural leader not 
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organised according to this model of organisation, and not registered as a water user, 
can expect to be excluded from the new WUAs and thus from controlling irrigation 
management and the resources involved. 
The SARH unions lost influence because the WUA personnel were employed under 
temporary contracts and could no longer be organised in government unions. Under the 
Salinas government, the influential government unions were severely weakened, and 
Salinas made a point of not accepting opposition to his policies. Officials confirm that 
the reduction of base personnel was a consequence of the transfer, and the pension 
regulations were negotiated on a personal basis with the SARH union leader, who was a 
Congress member at the time. The number of CNA district personnel was reduced in 
phases. Most of the base workers in the CNA (around 5,000 people) were retired and 
received a pension, others were shifted to other CNA departments, and a limited group 
was contracted by the WUA on temporary contracts. 
Something which is less emphasised in the literature on IMT is the phased strategy of 
rotating and removing District Chiefs and State Delegation Heads. This was crucial in 
neutralising potential opposition or retaining the influence of CNA higher level 
personnel in the districts and state delegations. A senior CNA engineer recounts how a 
generally applied rule within the CNA was that a District Chief plus his close associates 
were removed from their posts and shifted to other districts in the country, in most cases 
to be fired at a later stage. The intention of this rule was to prevent the District Chief 
resisting and resttaining the transfer, or mobilising a protest against the personnel cuts 
and the reduction of their influence in the district and the insecurity of their mcoming 
resource flows. The functionary admits that this was a sort of a 'kamikaze exercise', 
because the District Chiefs, who played an important part in organising the transfer, in 
the end also lost their jobs17. 
Promotion of the transfer: show cases and public campaigns 
The acceleration of the process of transfer occurred because of a concerted effort on the 
part of the CNA in cooperation with IMTA to promote and disseminate the idea of 
transfer. Documents, videos and other audio-visual materials were produced by experts 
in mass communication from especially instituted departments in the CNA and IMTA 
(see Chapter 10). Information on the transfer process, largely conceived from within the 
DID, was communicated to the irrigation districts and contributed to the public 
awareness of the intended mode of transfer and the opportunities and benefits for 
protagonists. These campaigns of government information transmitted a precise scenario 
of how the CNA believed the transfer process should take place in order to prevent 
misunderstandings and presumptions about its form and implications. Further, these 
communicative means allowed a rapid distribution of information to state level and 
district CNA representatives closely involved in extending this information and starting 
up the process of transfer, and who thus had to be aware of the implications of the 
process. 
Besides the centrally-coordinated circulation of information, documents, videos and the 
use of mass media, a vast movement of people around the country was also organised by 
the CNA Social scientists from IMTA were mobilised to diagnose the situation in 
irrigation districts. Teams of engineers and lawyers were sent from the CNA 
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headquarters to the CNA state and district delegations and to the different irrigation 
districts to promote the transfer and get it organised and started. They assisted locally 
organised companies of promoters and, at a later stage, trained water users to take over 
the management of a module. In addition, groups of board members and managers of 
WUAs were taken on trips to early pilot projects of WUAs to convince them of the 
possibilities, the opportunities and the benefits to be gained from taking over irrigation 
infrastructure, maintenance machinery, and adrrunistratíve resources. Irrigation districts 
such as El Grullo were visited by many delegated groups of water users from all over the 
country as exemplars or showcases of successful WUA management. These delegations 
were then used to promote the message of positive results in their own districts. After 
1991, the number of available showcases increased, as more districts were transferred. 
The careful selection by the CNA of the more commercially oriented and relatively 
modern and well-maintained irrigation districts added to the positive image of transfer. 
International interest also increased, as EMT in Mexico became a model in itself. 
A review of the national and regional newspapers at the time shows that the press only 
paid attention to official government information on IMT. In contrast to the broad public 
and academic debate on the revision of famous article 27 of the constitution concerning 
landownership that was amply aired in the press, the water management reforms 
received little attention. The papers mainly reported on the official ceremonies of transfer 
throughout the country, which were generally attended by important political leaders, 
party representatives, top-level bureaucrats and large crowds of people. During these 
ceremonies, the Concession Title was handed over to WUAs. These public events of high 
political importance were often presided over by the president himself, the Minister of 
Agriculture, or the Director of the CNA. They made speeches on the agricultural and 
irrigation policy of the Salinas aclministration, emphasising the need to eradicate 
government paternalism and to stimulate the shared responsibility of the water users 
and the private sector (CNA, 1992). The achievements and successes of the Salinas 
government were enumerated. Local government functionaries and WUAs presidents 
thanked the president and his functionaries for their beneficial policies. These 
ceremonies and the way they were reported via the media were thus crucial for 
government information campaigns and public awareness of CNA policies and 
achievements and progress concerning EMT. Besides reporting on these ceremonies and 
reproducing CNA data on the progress and benefits of the transfer, few papers actually 
discussed the process and its impacts on the rural sector in more depth18. In addition, 
virtually no attention is given to the widespread dissent in the irrigation districts 
concerning the transfer. As a result, the opposition in different irrigation districts 
remained isolated, deprived of information from other districts, and took place mostly 
behind the scenes. 
Calculated distribution of resources 
Another strategy used by the DID to manage opposition in the irrigation districts was 
through 'the calculated distribution of public resources' (Grindle, 1996). This approach 
made producers focus on the allocation process instead of opposing the transfer itself. By 
opening or closing access to resources and by promising to invest more or less in a 
district, the DID selectively enticed and sanctioned organised user groups according to 
their willingness to go along with CNA directions. User groups who were retarding the 
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advance of the transfer risked missing out on the resources and projects that the DID 
distributed among the irrigation districts. A huge reservoir of financial resources 
available to the CNA was associated with the time-slice loan agreed in 1991 for 
construction, modernisation, rehabilitation, deferred maintenance, and O&M equipment 
for irrigation districts. However, these investments were programmed in twenty-one 
districts that were part of the original plan. The majority of the expenses were targeted at 
eleven districts in the north of the country, particularly those in the Northwest. 
The aim of rehabilitating and modernising twenty-one districts shifted to transferring the 
majority of the districts, and the transfer accelerated, as discussed above. The districts 
that were subsequently considered for transfer generally had a less modern and more 
run down infrastructure. The promise of rehabilitating the districts and undertaking 
deferred maintenance in exchange for transfer was implicitly maintained. This improved 
the acceptance of the transfer, although in reality it was impossible to earmark financial 
resources for this purpose, because the government was already committed to its 
financial contribution required by the time-slice loan. The rehabilitation in those districts 
that were not part of the original loan agreement was carried out by patching on a very 
selective basis. The barely available resources for this purpose were allocated as a result 
of negotiations between the DID and local producer groups, something that helped to 
improve the acceptance and the advance of transfer in those districts. The lack of actual 
rehabilitation in those districts was partly compensated by giving the modules new 
maintenance machinery. Also, the allocation of these machines was used to stimulate 
the producers to accept the transfer. Another partial solution on the part of the CNA was 
to promote decentralised funding schemes for rehabilitation and modernisation projects. 
Under the programme, Alianza vara el Campo, such projects were co-financed by 
combining federal, state and municipal efforts and resources together with those of the 
modules. 
3.5 Conclusion 
I have looked at the standardisation, acceleration and effects of the irrigation transfer 
policy in Mexico in order to study the process of policy articulation. My focus was 
primarily on how a standardised policy package was developed, consisting of a set of 
specific technologies of governance. During an initial phase, these technologies were 
selected and redesigned in response to a set of dispersed trials of strength: experiments, 
consultations, and clashes in the field, and negotiations and discussions at the national 
level. Feedback mechanisms co-ordinated by the hydraulic bureaucracy led to a 
convergence of dispersed experiences and ideas on how to implement the transfer. In 
addition to the increase in political pressure and the finalisation of a loan agreement to 
fund the transfer, the EMT package reached closure with the arrival of a new hydrocrat 
who was made responsible for the progress of the transfer. The standardised policy 
package allowed the CNA to promote, organise and expand transfer on a large scale. The 
institutionalisation and routinisation of the package in action enhanced an acceleration 
of transfer. 
In the districts, the ground was prepared using a step-by-step approach, starting with 
diagnostics, followed by a targeted promotion of the transfer. The basic idea behind the 
Engineering a Policy Package 83 
first step was to map out elements neutral or favourable to the transfer, and to locate the 
barriers to change. Subsequently, the policy package worked to include and direct the 
well-disposed leaderships and exclude resisting or uncontrollable elements. The DID 
entered a process of preparation and selective negotiation with politically influential and 
economically powerful and organised groups in the district. Interest groups identified as 
opposed to the transfer were effectively externalised as a result of the use of the WUA 
model and related technologies of governance. Promotion campaigns and a calculated 
distribution of resources further improved the acceptance of the transfer and resulted in 
its acceleration. 
Chapter 2 and 3 showed how through EMT the hydraulic bureaucracy regained 
autonomy and reordered its control over the irrigation districts. The institutionalisation 
and routinisation of a standardised set of governing technologies contributed for the 
CNA to a certain control at a distance over the WUAs. This is significant in the context of 
a prolonged bureaucratic struggle over the irrigation districts, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
However, this sort of bureaucratic control at a distance is not entirely new. Enge and 
Whiteford (1989) also observe that rural organisations, such as ejidos and farmer-
managed irrigation units, have structural and procedural limitations that are imposed by 
SARH regulations. In spite of limited control of the SARH over the decentralised 
irrigation units that these authors study, they all have comparable by-laws, personnel, 
election procedures and operation modes. Hence, the users must from an association or 
junta de agua (water board) to assure compliance with the conditions set forth by the 
SARH (Enge and Whiteford, 1989:127-129). 
Concluding, I argue here that in spite of its ideological promise, neo-liberal policy does 
not lead to less government but to more subtle and less visible technologies of 
bureaucratic reproduction, intervention and control. In practice, neo-liberal reforms 
often result in more subtle methods of intervention and control based on ideas of 
freedom, enterprise, management and the market; all of which function to make the 
regulatory power of the state more diffuse and less visible (Shore and Wright, 1997). In a 
similar fashion, Miller and Rose (1992) show how contemporary calculation practices, 
such as used in accountancy, enable state agencies to withdraw from direct control and 
responsibility over the actions of individuals, organisations and societal domains, while 
retaining control at a distance. 
Likewise, Mosse (1999) shows that the transfer of social technologies associated with 
contemporary ideologies of 'community management' in Indian tank irrigation, e.g. 
criteria for group membership, meetings and account keeping, serves to meet 
admirtistrative needs of irrigation bureaucracies lay providing a means to consult with 
local people to harness local leadership, mechanism to channel development inputs, and 
meet bureaucratic requirements of orderliness, uniformity, quantifiability and control'. 
He goes on to argue that the uniformity and standardisation of social organisation in 
local irrigation systems and the politics of institutional change are essential to a recasting 
of the irrigation organisation in bureaucratic terms. The unit of adntinistration becomes 
the homogenised farmers' association. These observations correspond with what was 
discussed in this chapter. 
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Nevertheless, the technologies of governance that were discussed in this chapter do not 
produce a unilateral expansion of bureaucratic state control. The organisational 
ethnography that follows in Chapters 4 to 9 shows that the newly formed WUAs can 
become convergence points for a form of control over people, resources, and 
infrastructure, which is not necessarily located within the state, but also does not 
singularly represent market forces or civil society. 
Notes 
1 A previous version of this chapter was written as a paper together with Flip Wester of the 
Irrigation and Water Engineering Group, Wageningen University. 
2 This term is a contraction of hydraulic bureaucrats and is used here to refer to professionals, 
generally civil and irrigation engineers, working in hydraulic bureaucracies (termed hydrocrades in the 
remainder of the text for consistency). 
3 I have adapted this term from Miller and Rose's 'technologies of government' (Miller and Rose, 
1992). Their concept suggests the expansion of state bureaucratic power, whereas I think that the 
technologies I refer to also enable the acquisition of power outside of the government. The term 
governance is not used in a normative sense, as in 'good governance'. 
4 Dr. Ramos had left SARH in 1986, frustrated and traumatised by the loss of influence of irrigation 
and civil engineers in decision making. 
5 Dr. Ramos graduated from the National School of Agriculture in Chapingo in 1956 as an irrigation 
engineer and, like many of his generation, immediately went to work for the government. For thirteen 
years he climbed the ranks in the SRH and gained much experience in the management of irrigation 
districts. In 1969 he went to Columbia to work on irrigation projects there. In the early 1970s he 
returned to Chapingo to obtain his masters degree at the Colegio de Postgraduados and in 1976 
received his PhD from the University of Arizona, both of which degrees dealt with improving the 
operation of irrigation districts. In addition, he personally knew many of the chief engineers working in 
the irrigation districts. When he was invited in 1988 to become Head of Irrigation Districts, he was 
working in the Dominican Republic on an irrigation transfer programme financed by USAID. 
6 Land reform communities created after the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Ejido land belongs to the 
state, with a combination of community (.ejido) and private (ejidatorio) usufruct, and since the 
amendment of Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992 ejidatarios can sell their land. The other category of 
landowners in Mexico are called pequeños propietarios: private farmers with a limit on land ownership of 
100 ha. 
7 Centeno (1994: 104-106) defines políticos as the 'dinosaurs' of the regime, responsible for 
managing the corporate structure of the party and ensuring that elections are won through militancy. 
The burócratas políticos make their careers inside the national office of the party and traditionally were 
the most powerful wing of the governing elite concerned with maintaining political stability. The 
técnicos are the specialists in the bureaucracy, committed to their area of expertise and generally 
reluctant to play the 'dirty games' of politics. The tecnócratas, finally, combine the educational 
credentials of the técnicos with the political acumen of the políticos and were able to transfer their 
control over technical areas to overall command of the state. Characteristically, they are committed to 
the imposition of a single, exclusive policy paradigm, based on neo-liberal models of economics, 
through political negotiation. 
8 Written response to questionnaire, September 1999. 
9 Interview, Mexico City, August 3,1999. 
1 0 Interview, Mexico City, August 3,1999. 
" Interview, Mexico City, August 3,1999. 
1 2 Dr. Urzúa was educated as an agronomist with a speciality in irrigation in the 1950s at the then 
military college of Chapingo. There he met many, later colleague, engineers among whom the senior 
students Ramos and Vargas, who both also played a crucial role in the transfer. During the 1950s and 
1960s he worked as a district engineer in large irrigation systems in the Northeast (Bajo Bravo, Bajo San 
Juan) and Northwest (Rio Fuerte) of the country and specialised in the operation of irrigation systems 
over 100,000 hectares. After changing to the irrigation and drainage engineering section within the 
SRH, he discovered the need for more in-depth study of soil-water-plant relations. He retired from the 
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SRH to do a Master's degree at the Colegio de Postgraduados in 1972, at that time led by Dr. Ramos' 
brother. Subsequently, he got the opportunity to do a PhD at the Colorado State University and 
decided to further investigate the optimisation of an on-farm water allocation system. When the SRH 
was merged into the SARH in 1976, Urziia was working as a professor at the Colegio. In 1977 he was 
asked to become state manager of the SARH in the Northwest (Baja California) where he stayed for the 
next decade. He then returned to the federal district of Mexico where he broadened his horizons by 
working for the state government for two years. At the start of Salinas' administration, he became a 
businessman by creating a company specialising in PVC pipes for irrigation systems. 
1 3 At the end of 1999, the Tula District was one of the few remaining districts still not transferred. 
1 4 Written response to questions on the origins of IMT by a ex-CNA official. 
15 These higher level bureaucrats have a different type of appointment than the lower level 
personnel. These 'confidence personnel' are more direcdy dependent on their superiors for continued 
employment. This means they cannot unionise and can be more easily dismissed (Grindle, 1977). 
1 6 Interview Mexico City, August 1999. 
" Interview with an ex-CNA official. 
1 8 For an exception see El Financiero of July 13,1993. 
r 
Photo 2 The first metres of the main canal 
Photo 3 Santiago Ixcuintla from the Right Bank of the River Santiago 
Photo 4 A fisherman repairing his net 
Photo 5 A cross-regulator from on top of a tobacco truck 
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An Introduction to the Region: 
The Left Bank of the Santiago River 
It is hot, we are going through sugarcane fields, there is a putrid smell of 
fermented cane juice, we pass by sugar refineries, whose names become 
famous every six years, because at the beginning of each period it is discovered 
that they are badly administered, after that they are forgotten and remain 
badly administered for another six years. 
From a travel story of Jorge Ibargiiengoitia, who is driving through 
the countryside of Vera Cruz, Mexico. My translation. 
DRAMATIS PERSONAE: 
Pérez 
Nuñez 
Guttiérez 
Hijar Juárez 
Becerra 
Carninarite 
Emilio González 
Flores Muñoz 
Gascón Mercado 
first president of the Santiago Patronato and the Left Bank WUA, local deputy 
(MP) and large producer and leader of a political group 
second president of the WUA and ejido president 
manager of the WUA 
local doctor and other leader of (he political group 
head of operation of the irrigation district, later district head 
local leader and president of the San Bias Patronato 
governor (1981-1987), union leader 
governor (1945-1951), minister of agriculture (1952-1958) 
governor (1963-1969) with influential political family 
PROPS: 
Left Bank 
Santiago River 
Aguamilpa 
Amado Nervo 
Irrigation infrastructure 
WUA office 
Sprinkler installations 
Crops 
Tobacco barns 
Rice-processing plant 
Bridge 
Right Bank 
Boundaries 
Maintenance machines 
run-of-the-river irrigation system 
the river feeding the irrigation module 
hydroelectric dam on the Santiago River 
headworks of the Left Bank module, concrete diversion weir 
network of connected canals and drains of distinct levels 
in Villa Hidalgo 
systems used for sprinkler irrigation 
beans, tobacco, cereals, rice, vegetables, etc. 
clusters of barns for flue-curing tobacco 
near Sauta 
palm-log bridge replaced by a concrete bridge, connects the Left with the Right 
Bank 
irrigation system in extension on the other river bank 
intersecting limits of irrigation module, electoral districts and the Santiago and 
San Bias municipalities 
machinery to carry out maintenance of irrigation works 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will commence with a description of the regional landscape that has shaped 
the life and work of the inhabitants of the Northern Coast of Nayarit. As an informed 
outsider who has learned to read the landscape, I will lead you through the Santiago 
Valley. By means of observations about the scenery, inspired by Jorge Ibarguengoitia, I 
shall point out what have become meaningful landmarks to me and what it is I see 
through them. We proceed with a tour around the irrigation system on the Left Bank of 
the River Santiago, which is the topic of my study. I focus on the way in which public 
infrastructural works tell us something about the historical and political landscape of the 
region and, conversely, about how the placing of these works in the wider coastal 
landscape has influenced regional politics. The section ends with a description of the 
climatic contrast between the wet and the dry season that affects the rhythms of 
agricultural, economic, and cultural life of the region. Thereafter, Section 4.3 shows how 
the irrigation system is situated within this landscape. I discuss the most essential 
ecological, physical, and technological aspects of irrigation and drainage. In the chapters 
to come I will show how those material elements constrain, as well as enable, the 
management of the irrigation system. A concise analysis of the distribution of land and 
crops in the system follows, in order to indicate the socio-economic differentiation 
among producer groups and to explain why I am cautious with using the concept 'users'. 
In Section 4.4, this extensive descriptive introduction impels me to discuss a matter that 
is not immediately visible in the landscape, although it could perhaps be inferred. I will 
show that the irrigation system is not an isolated entity, but overlaps with several 
political and organisational domains that affect irrigation management. The end of this 
section recounts the contemporary history of the transfer of the Left Bank irrigation 
system. It illustrates how this policy intervention became politically and institutionally 
embedded and tied up with the vicissitudes of a local political group. It also introduces 
the actors who play a role in the organisational ethnography of the Water Users' 
Association (WUA) that follows in the corning chapters1. The last section draws 
conclusions about the region of study. 
4.2 The Regional Landscape 
Entering the region 
The study is situated in the northwest of the state of Nayarit, facing the Pacific Ocean. 
On leaving the central capital of Tepic and headed for the coast, taking the western 
branch of the Pan-American Highway in a northwesterly direction, you have to cross a 
capricious mountain range, after which you slowly descend to sea level. Between the 
twists and turns of the road you catch a glimpse of the Southern Pacific Railroad that 
traverses canyons via bridges that hang over unfathomable depths. Over the last 
kilometres to the coast, the mountain range changes into foothills that gently slope into 
the Santiago Valley. As you are coming down the highway, an unexpected, panoramic 
view opens itself up to you. The great Santiago River meanders in broad curves through 
the tropical lowlands to find a final escape in the Pacific Ocean. Whilst you admire the 
lush green vegetation interspersed with occasional palm trees, you feel a moist heat that 
slowly penetrates the vehicle and begins to affect you. This first experience of 
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ovewhelrning natural exuberance is meaningful. These are the forces that have shaped 
the tropical coastal landscape, and they permeate all human effort to transform and 
manage its resources. Irrigation is, as we shall see, a living testimony. 
The Northern Coast of Nayarit is a coastal plain roughly forty kilometres wide and eighty 
kilometres long (see Map above). It extends from a line of low mountains south of the 
Santiago River into the northern state of Sinaloa and is locked in between the ocean and 
the western mountain range called Sierra Madre Occidental that comes down along the 
coast all the way from the United States. The geographical isolation from the rest of the 
state has shaped the history of the region. It provides a partial explanation for why 
culturally the mestizo2 population from the northern coast feel they stand apart, and why 
at times they experience more cultural proximity to the southern plains of Sinaloa than 
to the central plateau and the southern coast of Nayarit, which bear more of the 
conservative influence from Jalisco, or to the mountain area which is dominated by 
Indian groups3. 
The tropical climatic conditions further distinguish the coastal region from neighbouring 
regions. Throughout the year, green vegetation dominates the coastal panorama, unlike 
other more arid parts of Western Mexico. The coast has a sub-humid tropical savannah 
climate with a rainy season in the summer (climate type AWws according to Koppen). 
The average annual temperature is 23.4°C. The hottest months, with temperatures up to 
40°C, are between May and October. The average annual rainfall is high, more than 
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1,600 mm, but it largely falls in the period from June to October. This rainy season (las 
lluvias) is thus characterised also by the hot and humid climate, a rapid growth of natural 
vegetation, flooding and occasional tornados. The intense sensation of moist heat gives 
life to the telling story that people from the coast do not fear the devil, because they 
welcome the heat that makes hell such an unpleasant place for other mortals. After the 
rains, the temperatures become lower for a few months but then rise again towards the 
rainy season. However, the heat is then generally not felt so much, because of the lower 
humidity. 
After entering the municipality of Santiago and crossing a large irrigation canal, but 
before reaching the Santiago River, you arrive at a crossroads. The road that branches off 
in a westerly direction leads to the southern bank of the river. This area is called 'the Left 
Bank' and harbours the irrigation module that is the topic of this study. The road takes 
us right through the irrigation system from the head to the tail-end. We shall return to 
this road. If we continue on the international highway, we cross the broad Santiago River 
over the sole concrete bridge for miles around. On the riverbanks you catch a first 
glimpse of fields growing tobacco of the Burley variety, irrigated with a pump and 
sprinklers from the river. The soil close to the river is extremely fertile, because the river 
floods during the rainy season and annually renews the soil with river sediments. Such 
soil is rated among the best in the country for the production of Burley tobacco. 
If we proceeded, the highway would take us to the most northern towns of Nayarit and 
then to Sinaloa. We pass a turning to the left, that goes through the irrigation module on 
the Right Bank of the river, and that would take us to Santiago Lxcuintla. But, let me 
return to the river that gave this town its name and that has been so very important for 
this region. 
We encounter the Great River of Santiago (Rio Grande de Santiago) in the downstream 
section of the Lerma-Chapala-Santiago river basin (see Map 3) 4 . It is the longest river in 
Mexico and has one of the highest annual discharges, serving as the major collector of 
this important river basin. Under the name Lerma, it rises in the central highlands near 
Toluca and crosses El Bajio, which comprises several states, before entering Lake 
Chapala near the city of Guadalajara. The Santiago River is a very modest river when it 
departs from there and before it crosses the Sierra Madre Occidental, where it hugely 
increases in size. When the river abandons the western mountain range, it enters and 
runs through the coastal plains that are part of the river's delta. The river flows into the 
Pacific Ocean north of the harbour town of San Bias. During the rainy season from June 
to September, along its course through the mountains it grows into a large and mighty 
river. For centuries the river violently debouched into the plains to engorge everything 
within its reach and inundate large parts of the coast. This reairring annual pattern has 
intensely shaped the agro-ecology of the riverine landscape around Santiago, its human 
settlements, and the life of its population. 
But men controlled the fancies of this river through infrastructure. During the 1970s, 
protective barriers were constructed on both sides of the river to restrict its impact and 
keep it to its course. In 1994, the prestigious hydroelectric dam of Aguamilpa was 
finished in the Sierra Mica. The Mexican president, Salinas, inaugurated one of the 
largest works completed during his sexenio (six year term of office). 
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Map 3 The course of the Great River of Santiago in Nayarit 
He was accompanied by the new governor of Nayarit, who had greatly benefited during 
his campaign as candidate for the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI: Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) from the widely publicised prospect of the completion of this huge 
94 The Success of a Policy Model 
dam that would produce electricity for several states. Both politicians proudly celebrated 
the fact that it was the third highest dam in Mexico with a curtain of 187 metres and the 
fourth dam in terms of installed capacity5. The dam of San Rafael, situated lower down, 
regulates the outflow of Aguamilpa, maintains a stable outflow for the two irrigation 
modules that depend on it, and prevents major flooding in the coastal region. 
Before flowing into the Pacific Ocean, the river meets a sub-tropical wetland ecosystem 
that it has helped to shape. It consists of marshes, lagoons and estuaries that are 
characterised by a tidal regime, brackish water and mangrove vegetation. The wetlands 
extend to the north along the coastline, where other rivers also feed it. They are home to 
a great variety of interesting wildlife and migratory birds. It is a region where many 
inhabitants live off a mixture of aquaculture (e.g. shrimp and oyster production), inshore 
fishing, agriculture, and, more recently, tourism. During the 1990s, international 
companies started large aquaculture projects here, threatening the fragile agro-ecological 
system. The irrigation and drainage canals on the left and right banks of the river 
interfere with this network of estuaries and natural drains. Some are presently used as 
collector drains, and this makes it impossible to establish whether drains are man-made 
or natural. 
The continuously changing meanderings of this river over centuries, and the annually 
recurring floods, deposited thick layers of sediment on the riverbanks. This produced 
highly fertile sandy clay soils. These soils were suitable for an inundation agriculture that 
required neither artificial fertilisation nor irrigation. The older settlers remember the 
work required to open up the land to cultivation and remove the profuse jungle-like 
vegetation. But it was worth it. For example, tobacco was a crop that thrived in these 
soils saturated with river sediment. A seedling planted after the inundations resulted in a 
heavy dark tobacco plant easily towering above an adult man6. The growing of beans 
without irrigation or fertilisation was another productive and profitable affair. Although 
the floods have gradually been controlled, and the inundation agriculture has evolved 
into an irrigated agriculture, this past still affects current irrigation practices. Many 
subsistence farmers continue to grow beans without sufficient additional irrigation and 
chemical fertilisers. Because the soil does not benefit any longer from the residual 
moisture and fertilisation from the inundations, salinisation has become a problem, 
particularly in the tail-end of the irrigation system. As a result, bean yields have dropped 
significantly. 
The construction and organisational use of public infrastructure on the coast 
On this journey through the irrigation system, my focus rests on public works, the 
different networks of communication, hydraulic and productive infrastructure in the 
landscape. These products of decades of state intervention and market penetration have 
transformed the physical as well as the political landscape. The tour leads us through 
different agro-ecological zones and different forms of land tenure. 
When we return to the international highway, a few kilometres before we branch off to 
the irrigation system, at a place called FJ Jicote, the highway, the railway, the river and 
the main irrigation canal come really close together, after which they each go their own 
way. The highway and railway continue north towards the United States, whereas both 
the river and the irrigation canal that has been diverted from it make a round curve 
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towards the southwest and the ocean. We take the road that branches off and leads us 
through the Left Bank irrigation system and roughly runs parallel to the river on its way 
to the ocean. 
Towards the river lies a sea of small tobacco fields. Close to the river you see the Burley 
variety, whilst further away Virginia dominates. In this fringe zone along the river, the 
tobacco cultivation is undertaken by small-scale ejidatarios (members of ejidos7). They 
mainly work for the major tobacco companies in the area: MODERNA and TADESA, 
which are subsidiaries of the two largest international tobacco consortia in the world. 
During these productive months, the fields are crowded with tabaqueros (tobacco 
producers) doing and coordinating the work, gangs of labourers picking and packing the 
mature tobacco, and bomberos (pump operators) mstalling their sprinkler systems. In 
whatever direction you look, there are sprinkler pipes spraying water into the air to wet 
the soil and the plants beneath. When you approach a field that is being irrigated, you 
will see that the bombero has installed a pump close to a canal or a drain with its intake 
pipe in the water source. They carry and connect aluminium pipes with sprinklers into a 
long line, which they will move every few hours so that the whole field is covered. The 
pump delivers pressure to the long pipeline laid out in the field. This produces fountains 
at a regular distance and of a similar shape. When you look towards the burning sun 
through the mist of water drops that hang in the air, you see many small fragments of 
rainbows. This most visible flow of water symbolises the feverish activity produced by 
the labour intensive tobacco crop, as well as the intense flows of human, fossil, and 
mechanical energy that feed its production. 
Near the village of Valle Lerma rises a large cluster of dozens of barns for flue-curing 
tobacco. Several such sites lie scattered throughout this tobacco region. The surrounding 
area is overgrown with weeds and the barns are left unused, falling into disrepair. 
During the 1970s and 1980s these sites were owned by the government parastatal, 
Tabamex. They used to be thriving places bustling with activity, where hundreds of 
workers received the Virginia tobacco, packed and unpacked the barns and cured the 
tobacco. Although they were mostly temporary workers, they had certain privileges and 
were organised under the government union, Confederación de Trabajadores de México 
(CTM: Confederation of Mexican Workers). For three decades this union in Nayarit was 
led by Don Emilio González, before he became governor from 1981 to 1987. The 
government-controlled clusters of barns were a political base for the CTM and its leader 
during electoral times that, not coincidentally, never overlapped with the tobacco season. 
The Tabamex workers, plus their pick-ups, printing and communication facilities and 
other state resources were commissioned and employed to support the official PRI 
candidate in his campaign (Pacheco, 1990). 
Just before El Tizate, we pass the place where the main irrigation canal bifurcates into 
two secondary canals that cover the whole irrigation system. Near this point lies the area 
office of the Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA: National Water Commission) on an old 
government compound that looks run down. A decade ago, there were still many 
technicians, extensionists, son and climate specialists, laboratory personnel, and 
secretaries working here for different federal and state agricultural agencies in support of 
96 The Success of a Policy Model 
the countryside, but in these neo-liberal times of a retreating state such effort has been 
reduced to a minimum. 
When the road diverges further from the river, we pass through the land of private 
producers. These fields look more deserted than the small and crowded ejido tobacco 
plots that we saw closer to the river. We look over large tracks of private property. 
Extensive green pastures with cattle and rice fields divided up by borders dominate the 
scene. These fields require large and constant water volumes, applied by means of 
surface irrigation rather than sprinkler irrigation. The smaller private producers irrigate, 
the larger ones employ an irrigator. They open the intake structure of the nearby canal 
and let the water flow into field ditches, after which it runs onto large tracks of pasture 
land or enters the compartmentalised rice field and infiltrates. A significant part of the 
land lies fallow, because of the low profitability of agriculture and a lack of investment 
funds on the part of producers. 
The fragmented and varying pattern of land distribution that we see in the irrigation 
landscape is the visible outcome of a remarkable regional history of agrarian reform. At 
the begirming of the 20 t h century, land in Nayarit was extremely concentrated in large 
landholdings (haciendas) that were owned in large part by an oligarchy of only a few, 
mostly foreign, trading firms and run by politically well-connected persons and families 
(Contreras Valdez, 2001). In the haciendas on the northern coast, cotton, tobacco, and 
cattle husbandry were important agricultural activities. But a lot of land also remained 
unexploited. These rural parts of the coast were scarcely populated. The existent 
population worked mostly as labourers or small-scale producers under the hacienda. 
Two decades after the Mexican Revolution, this agrarian structure was radically changed 
during a sweeping wave of land reform. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution defined 
two important forms of land tenure: small private property (pequeña propiedad) and 
ejidos. Between 1935 and 1940, the majority of private land in Nayarit was expropriated 
and granted to newly formed ejidos. Some of the land became pequeña propiedad. The 
inflow of immigrants from nearby states accelerated the distribution of land and led to a 
rapid increase in the coastal population and the establishment of many new rural 
communities8. As a result of this large-scale distribution of most of the land, Nayarit 
received the name of El Estado Ejido (The Ejido State) in Mexico. 
In the decades that followed, this transformed into the following pattern of land 
distribution on the left bank: A small group of large pequeños propietarios (private land 
owners) owns large parcels of land, a large majority of ejidatarios only a few hectares, 
and some medium producers more than the average ejidatario, sometimes both ejido 
and private land. This pattern of land distribution is further complicated by the large-
scale leasing and selling of land. The latter was illegal but widely practised before the 
reform of article 27 of the constitution in 1992. At the end of the 1990s, the government 
programme to map ejido boundaries and provide the ejidatarios with land certificates 
(PROCEDE), which made these land transfers legally possible, was largely concluded. 
Despite what some people expected, this did not immediately result in the large-scale 
sale of ejido land and the disappearance of the ejido as an important rural institution. 
We pass by another deserted cluster of barns, where the wild vegetation has taken over. 
In El Papalote we arrive at a central crossroads, where we can go in three directions and 
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to where we shall return. For the moment, we turn left and go to the village of Sauta. 
Halfway there, we find an old rice-processing plant that is closed down and left to 
proliferating vegetation. This factory was originally run by its owners from Sinaloa, but it 
was bought in 1988 by a producers' association with support from the state government 
and loans from the bank. The first years of the association were very good. Around 4,000 
hectares were planted with rice on the Left Bank, and the harvest was processed here. 
The large profits made it possible to repay the loans. In 1994, rice prices decreased due to 
cheap imports from abroad. The devastating effect that this had on the association 
revealed that it was being mismanaged. A loan to accommodate the substantial financial 
advances to producers could not be repaid, because many producers did not pay their 
debts. This meant bankruptcy for the factory. Today, the rice producers have to sell their 
produce to middlemen and purchasers from outside at much lower prices. Additional 
problems with proliferating weeds only further weakened the production of rice and 
caused a reduction in the hectarage cultivated in the region. Local politicians involved in 
the association attempted recently to counter this development by establishing a new 
rice producers' organisation and restoring the processing plant with assistance from the 
state government, but they failed. Rice producers mistrusted the new organisation and 
were unwilling to invest large sums of money in the repayment of the debt, because of 
the expectation that the factory would be politically managed again. 
When we continue on passed the village of Sauta, we are already in another 
municipality, that of San Bias. This is an area characterised today by a landscape of 
smoothly undulating hills covered with fruit trees that produce various tropical fruits, 
such as mangos, bananas, and several local fruits. We arrive at what is currently an 
agricultural experimental station but was formerly the ranch of Gilberto Mores Muñoz, 
who was state governor from 1945 to 1951, and then Minister of Agriculture from 1952 
until the 1958 elections. At this point he nearly became the presidential candidate for the 
PRI, but lost. This ended his role at national level, but his political dominance as the 
grand cacique of Nayarit lasted until the 1970s. Flores Muñoz ruled the state with 
absolute authority, repressing every possible form of dissent among the population. As 
governor, Hores Muñoz transformed Nayarit into the 'granary of the republic', boosting 
the cultivated agricultural area and the production of grains. It is most likely that this 
achievement contributed to his post as Minister of Agriculture and supported the 
construction of an irrigation system here in his home region, where he owned a ranch 
and large amounts of land. The construction of the canals started at the end of the 1940s. 
In his time, this political figure significantly transformed the region agriculturally, 
infrastructurally and politically, something that older engineers and ejidatarios can read 
from the landscape. 
When we return to the crossroads and proceed, we arrive in the tobacco village, La 
Presa, situated on the bank of the Santiago River. The La Presa ejido cultivates more 
than 1,000 hectares of tobacco, the largest area in the whole country. This high quality 
ejido land is extremely fragmented, with a multitude of tobacco producers farming 
sometimes just one or two hectares (see Chapter 5). On the other bank of the river lies 
the municipal capital, Santiago Lxcuintla9. Santiago is the political, administrative and 
commercial centre of the municipality and has a population of around 20,000 
inhabitants. People from around the valley visit Santiago for its government offices, 
businesses and shops, transport and health services, and entertainment. They come to 
the town for 'work, money and vice' (Fisher, 1953). As you approach the town, you can 
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see it from a great distance, as it is built on a solitary hill that rises steeply out of the 
plain. This characteristic hill has houses built all over it and a church on its slope. For 
centuries the spot has served as a refuge to man when the river rose and flooded the 
town. For the Spanish conquistadors who arrived here in the 16 t h century, this kind of hill 
was often a symbolic spot for a Catholic church in order to visually impose their reign 
and religion upon the resident Indian population. I am not sure whether this was the 
case here, but it triggers a lively imagination. The rainy season presents the following 
scenario: a darkening sky over Santiago unleashing continuous heavy rains and the 
solitary hill with its white edifice towering as a refuge above the inundated plain. For 
ages, the rainy season must have driven even the not-so-spmmaUy-mclined closer to 
God. 
Nowadays, the view from the top of this hill over the landscape and infrastructure of the 
river reveals the current political and electoral condition of the region. We see the 
construction of two large infrastructural works, a concrete bridge over the River Santiago 
and an expansion of the Right Bank irrigation system. Nayarit is approaching the 
election year 1999, a time in which the federal state proves not to have retreated entirely. 
Before every governorship elections, a temporary recovery in investment from the federal 
government reinforces the electoral position of the official PRI candidate (Pacheco, 
1990). These major irtffastructural projects are part of a longstanding political practice to 
bind voters to the PRI through public works that materialise and symbolise the 
government's promise to develop the region. Further, several local and regional 
politicians circle around these works, like bees around a honey pot, making claims in the 
papers about the decisive role they have played in their final effectuation. 
For many decades, a fragile and narrow palm-log bridge has connected the Left and the 
Right Bank of the municipality. In the rainy season, the river grows wild and devours the 
bridge, taking its remains to the ocean. Although a small ferry temporarily overcomes 
this problem for pedestrians and cyclists, motorised traffic has to make a thirty-kilometre 
detour via the international highway to get to the other side of the river. Only after the 
rainy season, when the water level has dropped, can the wooden bridge be rebuilt. This 
situation is an old source of discontent to many inhabitants of the municipality. For 
several decades, the construction of a permanent bridge has been discussed but has 
always been postponed, keeping the Left Bank separated from its municipal capital. In 
view of the PRI's precarious electoral situation, the plan recently re-surfaced and the 
federal government now finally intends to make it concrete. 
Another extraordinary infrastructural project to which the landscape is subjected is the 
extension of the Right Bank irrigation system in an era when construction of irrigation 
infrastructure in Mexico has radically ciiminished in comparison to the preceding 
decades. The idea is to extend the canal system and expand the command area of the 
irrigation module on the Right Bank to a similar size as the Left Bank (officially designed 
to irrigate around 20,000 hectares). Hence, what we see from this hilltop are two several-
decades-old government plans that made no progress for so long but will now finally be 
harnessed because of the build up of political momentum. Both projects are perfectly 
timed and largely finished just before the elections, enabling president Zedillo to 
officially inaugurate them, something that enlarges their symbolic and electoral 
importance for the PRI. It seems no coincidence that these works are targeted at the 
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municipality of Santiago where the left-wing opposition has always been strong and has 
proven to be capable of winning elections at the expense of the raling party. This 
municipality will prove to be a strategic turning point for winning the governorship 
elections - all the more so when, at a later stage, it happens that both the official and the 
opposition candidate for governor come from Santiago Ixcuintla10. 
After returning to the crossroads, we now turn right and drive towards Villa Hidalgo, 
formerly called El Nuevo (the new). It is the largest village on the Left Bank with around 
12,000 inhabitants and has a commercial and administrative centre of regional 
importance, considerable residential areas, and four ejidos. The ejido called Villa Hidalgo 
is the largest irrigating ejido on the Left Bank. Together, these four ejidos possess more 
than 4,000 hectares, most of which is irrigable. On the ejido land spread out around the 
village, the peasants mainly produce beans, sorghum, tobacco, bananas, and tomatoes. 
The office of the Left Bank Water Users' Association is located in Villa Hidalgo. 
We continue along the road and pass the municipal boundary, entering the municipality 
of San Bias. Here starts a newer section of the irrigation system, constructed during a 
rehabilitation of the irrigation infrastructure during the first half of the 1970s. We pass by 
Autan, a village and ejido that is famous for the political family of Gascon Mercado that 
comes from here. Their identification with the regional peasant movement against the 
monopoly of foreign tobacco companies laid the foundation for the nationalisation of the 
tobacco industry and the formation of the parastatal, Tabamex, at the beginning of the 
1970s. Julian was governor for the PRI from 1963 to 1969, whilst his younger and more 
radical brother, Alejandro, was mayor of Tepic from 1972 to 1975 and won the 
governorship elections for the popular socialist party, PPS, in 1975. However, his victory 
was not conceded by the PRI. Whilst the Gascon brothers were in government they did a 
lot for Autan and the wider region in terms of public works, such as for example 
protection around the river to prevent flooding. 
We arrive in Guadelupe Victoria, where we continue towards the tail-end of the 
irrigation system. Here, the soils start experiencing problems with salinisation, and this 
makes the production of tobacco unfeasible. As a result, there is more bean and tomato 
production in this area. The groups of women seen working in the field at harvest time 
are usually picking tomatoes. You can turn left and drive through the lagoons and 
estuaries towards San Bias. On the way, you pass along a recently constructed system of 
ponds for industrialised shrimp production for export. These are owned by international 
companies that received active support from shareholders at the highest political levels 
in the country. 
The municipal capital of San Bias is an historic harbour town on the Pacific coast. Most 
of its inhabitants make a Uving from tourism, agriculture and/or fishing. The little 
harbour was a strategic point for the Spanish empire, as part of the Pacific route along 
which Franciscan friars explored the Californias (Baja California and California, USA). 
During the 19 t h century, San Bias was one of the principal commercial and strategic 
harbours on the Pacific coast of Mexico, but it lost its importance when the American 
economy started to expand. Near San Bias, where the tail-water of the irrigation system 
flows via drains and estuaries or the river into the ocean, we end this tour. 
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The wet and the dry season 
The social life of a region manifests itself not only in space, but also through time. On 
the Northern Coast of Nayarit, a seasonal change in climate also influences the seasonal 
rhythms of economic life. In order to understand this, it is crucial to know that, in spite 
of a recession, agriculture remains the backbone of the coastal economy. Hence, the 
strong climatic contrast between the dry season {las secas) and the wet season (las lliwias) 
affects not only the calendar of irrigated agriculture, but also the tempo of economic 
circulation and the rhythm of cultural life. The seasons have brought into being a cycle of 
life and work that is central to the culture of the region. Diiring the dry season, 
agricultural and other economic activities accelerate, whereas the rainy season generally 
shows a much slower pace of life. I will illustrate this by running through the production 
cycle of tobacco. Tobacco is the motor of economic life and the axis of work and political 
organisation in the region. The crop is planted between October and January and 
harvested between February and May. From June to October, the land is left to rest and 
recover in most cases. 
Soon after the rainy season, the tobacco companies start to sow tobacco seed and raise 
the seedlings in nurseries. From October onwards, these are delivered to the producers 
who then plant them. The coastal economy then starts to roll, because the tobacco 
companies begin to advance production investments to the tobacco producers according 
to a calendar of works to finance their production activities. Agro-industrial companies, 
banks, and local middlemen also release their advances and loans for other promising 
crops around this time. This has a reinvigorating effect on the entire business and service 
industry in regional towns like Santiago and Villa Hidalgo. 
Tobacco is a labour intensive crop that provides work for many inhabitants of Nayarit. 
For flue-cured tobacco, gangs of workers are temporarily employed in the harvesting and 
collecting of tobacco leaves, the filling and emptying of tobacco bams and the packing of 
the cured tobacco. Among them are women and men from the area, but also temporary 
immigrants. Since time immemorial, indigenous groups of Huichols and Coras have been 
employed in sun-curing tobacco. During the harvest season, they migrate with entire 
families from the mountains to the lowlands, where they live and work under adverse 
conditions at the tobacco plantations. They harvest mature tobacco leaves and thread 
them on long strings. The strings of harvested tobacco are hung on wooden racks and 
then covered, so that the leaves can dry in the hot wind. Although these indigenous 
tribes are very experienced at this work, they are paid very low wages. In addition, the 
tobacco producers employ pump operators to irrigate their tobacco with sprinklers (see 
Chapter 5) and truck drivers who transport the cured tobacco to the processing and 
storage plants in Tepic. Shopkeepers also profit from the growers' need for inputs. Ln 
short, this busy time of hard work and increased investments boosts the regional flows of 
sweat and money. 
When the last leaves have been harvested and cured, tobacco production no longer 
provides work for the many producers, labourers, company employees, and other people 
economically dependent upon it. In May, the tobacco companies start to pay the tobacco 
producers for their produce and the entire cycle of work at one time. This payment leads 
to a collective release of energies. Many celebrate the end of the tobacco cycle in cantinas 
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around the region, spending a lot of the tobacco profits on beer, food, and music. In 
addition, pay-time coincides with many regional festivities, such as rodeos, bailes 
(dances), and village fiestas, for example the annual festivities of Santiago Lxcuintla. At 
such festivities, visitors are struck by the unusually large quantities of beer flowing11. 
The arrival of the rainy season announces a general slow-down of all human activity, 
somehow in contrast to the explosive natural force of the falling rains, the rising river 
and the rapidly growing vegetation. Agriculture in particular is affected because the wet 
season creates many problems with flooded fields, severe wind storms, plant diseases, 
fungi and weeds, that cause crop losses and lower productivity. Because of thriving 
weeds and winds even a crop like rice, which withstands and even benefits from the 
abundant rainfall, produces significantly less during the rainy season. Nevertheless, until 
a few years ago many small tobacco farmers rented out their land for a small amount of 
money to larger rice cultivators after harvesting the tobacco. However, because of the 
infestation with wild rice varieties that this caused, the decrease in the domestic rice 
price due to foreign imports (see Chapter 6), and the preference of the tobacco 
companies for a fallow period, this is no longer an alternative source of funds for these 
small producers. During the rainy season, a significantly smaller area is thus planted and 
irrigated than in the dry season. 
Life and work assume a slower pace when the rain starts to fall and the river rises. The 
heavy rainfall, the extremely moist heat, the mosquitoes make it comprehensible that 
this is traditionally a period of rest, during which the intensity of most activities slows 
down significantly. Agriculture thus generates little income and spending at this time. 
The income from the last harvest has been largely spent, and therefore there is not 
enough to eat and drink in the poorer households. Additional activities like fishing 
become more important. Other small-scale farmers and land labourers migrate to the 
United States in order to bridge this period and earn extra money to be able to initiate 
the new agricultural cycle. Some of them go to southern tobacco-producing states like 
Virginia and the Carolinas, where they work as land labourers in the tobacco fields. 
Many others work in the rural or urban sector of California. Most of them return home 
when the next tobacco season is about to begin. What is striking about the pattern of 
migration that tobacco generates is thus that it consists of two flows of labour, one trans-
regional between the mountains and the plains of Nayarit and the other trans-national 
between the Northern Coast and different parts of the USA. 
At this time of year you find few people in the fields; most of them are close to their 
homes in the villages. The cantinas are much emptier than at pay-time. You see people 
in front of their houses, sitting on a chair, or dozing in a hammock. In the shade of a 
tree, a man is quietly knotting a fishing net, repairing a cart or seeking refreshment in a 
cool clrink. Women sit outside their houses, sewing, whilst they discuss village affairs 
and the adventures of their family in El Norte (the US). The cultural tempo of life, the 
industriousness and circulation rate of all kinds of resources, seem to slip into a lower 
gear around this time of year on the Northern Coast of Nayarit. 
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4.3 Irrigated Agriculture 
Irrigation infrastructure and technology, water availability and field conditions 
The Left Bank of the River Santiago is a run-of-the-river system (see Map 4). The 
construction of the Left Bank irrigation system was started at the end of the 1940s by the 
Ministry of Hydraulic Resources (SRH)12. Before that time, irrigation existed on a smaller 
scale on the haciendas. The new irrigation system that started operating in the early 
1950s consisted of direct intakes from the river that let water into a system of earthen 
canals. These intakes needed frequent reconstruction. When the river was low in the dry 
season, it was also difficult to sufficiently feed the intakes and a lot of water was lost on 
the way to the field, so only part of the roughly 12,000 hectares was actually irrigated. At 
the begirming of the 1970s, the SRH rehabilitated, lined, and expanded the system to 
roughly 20,000 hectares of irrigable land. A concrete diversion weir (presa derivadora), 
called the Amado Nervo dam, constructed tWrty-five kilometres upstream of Santiago, 
improved the situation. This enabled the construction of a main canal at a higher 
topographical level and thus the extension of the irrigation system. The headworks 
consist of an adjustable inlet structure that regulates the flow into the main canal. 
Since the completion of the upstream Aguamilpa and San Rafael dams, the weir 
normally receives a constant discharge throughout the year that is more than sufficient 
for irrigation purposes. So, water availability is not a problem anymore for the Left Bank. 
Most of the river's water still continues on its way to the Pacific Ocean. Only an 
additional fraction is consumed by a pump station further downstream that provides 
water to the smaller Right Bank of the River Santiago irrigation system. The Right Bank 
of the Santiago River irrigates approximately 4,000 hectares annually13. This will increase 
significantly after the extension of the Right Bank system, but still not endanger the Left 
Bank. It is only at some future date, when the San Pedro module near Tuxpan and even 
modules in Sinaloa are connected as planned and benefit from the river's water, that this 
comfortable situation may change. 
The canal principal (main canal) on the Left Bank has a maximum capacity of 25 m3/s and 
a total length of forty-nine kilometres. It bifurcates from the river on its western bank, 
but initially follows it in a northerly direction. Before the river turns west, the canal 
makes an even sharper turn in a southwesterly direction, opens up space and determines 
the dimensions for the irrigation system. In this curve of the main canal near the village 
of El Tizate, the principal lateral has its intake at exactly 17 kilometres and 369.64 metres 
from the inception of the head canal. This lateral is often called 'the 17' but, even more 
frequently, this lateral and the main canal are referred to as 'the main canals'. According 
to the hierarchy of the canals, this is incorrect, but in practical operation they do have a 
similar function. The total flow of the main canal is often exactly divided in two and 
these canals get half each. Subsequently, the 17 largely follows the course of the river 
until the tail-end reaches the village of Guadelupe Victoria. The main canal bends in a 
more southerly direction towards the village of Reforma Agraria. The two main canals 
enclose a V-shaped command area with their tail-ends at only a few kilometres distance 
from the Pacific Ocean. The irrigated area is girded on one side by the Santiago River 
and on the other by foothills extending from the Sierra Alica. Along the river, a narrow 
strip of land is registered as 'national territory' that does not officially belong to the 
irrigation district. 

104 The Success of a Policy Model 
According to government documentation, the command area of the irrigation system is 
around 20,000 hectares, of which the main canal irrigates slightly more than half and the 
17 slightly less. However, the area actually irrigated per year by the Left Bank system has 
been limited to 12,500 hectares on average during the last decade. The main canal 
delivers water to 257 kilometres of laterales (secondary canals). Via sub-laterales (tertiary 
canals), ramales (field canals), and in some cases even sub-ramales, the water arrives at 
the fields. The majority of these canals are lined. In the fields, water is conveyed in 
regaderas (furrows). Gated cross-regulators maintain the up-stream water level in the 
canals up to the sub-laterals and in some cases the field canals, in order to achieve 
sufficient Tiead' for the intake structures and field inlets. Intake structures are manually 
operated undershot devices with a delizante (vertical plate) and an adjustable hand 
wheel. The gate opening under the plate can be adjusted by means of a screw thread that 
allows a large range of settings and flows. These structures are called the 'guiUotine-
type', by virtue of their sliding plate". 
Further, the Left Bank has 193 kilometres of drains. Many of the minor 'sub-drains' start 
at the end of a sub-lateral or field canal instead of at the field level. They come together 
in larger drains, which in turn discharge into collector drains. Several major collector 
drains carry a local name instead of a number, suggesting that they were already part of 
the familiar landscape before the introduction of bureaucratically numbered canals". 
Nevertheless, it is often difficult to distinguish between man-made or natural drains, 
because they have different and often mixed origins and are in many cases rapidly 
overgrown with lush vegetation. Some parts are clearly dug by machines, whereas other 
parts existed before the construction of canals, as part of an historically eroded complex 
of streams that drained the flood plains and was connected with the estuaries near the 
coast. 
Definitively the most striking feature of irrigation on the Northern Coast of Nayarit is the 
visible omnipresence of riego por asperción (overhead or sprinkler irrigation). Currently, it 
has become the most dominant field irrigation technology on the Northern Coast, 
applied to the economically important crops, such as tobacco, beans, chillies, tomatoes, 
and sorghum. On the Left Bank, around sixty per cent of the non-perennial crop area in 
the main irrigation season is irrigated with sprinklers, whilst only about forty per cent 
uses surface irrigation. Basin irrigation is applied to rice, both in the irrigation season and 
in the rainy season. Further, border and furrow irrigation are used in the cultivation of 
sorghum, maize, and vegetables. Although groundwater irrigation and trickle irrigation 
exist, they are not widely applied within the system, mainly because of the abundant 
water availability, the high rainfall, and high groundwater levels. This picture contrasts 
with the majority of Mexican medium and large-scale irrigation districts, which are 
usually dominated by surface irrigation, often with additional groundwater irrigation and 
occasional trickle irrigation. 
The existent complex of irrigation infrastructure and field technologies situated in the 
landscape enables as well as constrains the everyday practice of irrigation. I will first sum 
up the enabling and then the constraining factors. The following two features allow a 
certain flexibility of use: 
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First of all, an important feature of this type of irrigation system is that, like many others 
in Mexico, it does not have the systematic hierarchical order and rigidity that irrigation 
systems in, for example, the British design tradition possess. For instance, irrigated plots 
within the system receive water from all types of canals, mduding the main and lateral 
canals. The design logic and practice materialised in this infrastructure would be 
misunderstood by trying to establish either a well-defined hierarchy of canals or a dear-
cut and standardised definition of a tertiary block. In part, the network of canals is a 
response to particular topographical and landscape details of this coastal region. Van der 
Zaag points to the flexibility of this type of infrastructure which leaves farmers free in 
their crop choice and allows many variations in crops, plots, and water demand (van der 
Zaag, 1992). The large operational freedom it gives to canaleros (people in charge of 
distributing water at the field level) and farmers makes it difficult for the irrigation 
management to control the distribution of water centrally. At the same time, it demands 
more of a canalero's knowledge and competences (see the following two chapters). 
Secondly, with a sprinkler installation it is possible to pump water from water sources 
that lie below field level. As a result, the gravity-based canal system is not the only way 
for a farmer to get access to water, and therefore the physical boundaries of the irrigation 
system are not so dear-cut. For example, the network of drains is an often under-
emphasised element in the complexity and flexibility of irrigation systems. Drains gain 
extra importance because they can also be used as a source of irrigation water. The tail-
water from a canal that runs into a drain can be (re-)used outside the boundaries of the 
irrigation module. With a pump and a sprinkler system, people can also use the river, 
natural ponds and streams as water sources. In other places, the former main canal is 
still used both for drainage and the supply of water. This complex of water sources and 
the fluidity of physical boundaries greatly increase the complications for the irrigation 
management in their effort to control access to water and exdude free riders. 
The following three consfraining fartors are associated with the dominance of sprinkler 
irrigation over the last decades. Because of this dominance, institutions and farmers were 
never really pushed to invest in the field canals, field drains, and land levelling that are 
required for surface irrigation. Today, this limits the possibilities for a farmer to freely 
choose crops or an irrigation method. 
Firstly, a poorly developed system of field drainage causes huge problems with floods 
and water logging during and after the rainy season. The existing system is insufficient to 
carry off excess water from cultivated fields or maintain groundwater levels and therefore 
potentially causes crop losses. As a result, during the rainy season only a limited area is 
cultivated. 
Secondly, most of the irrigated land was never levelled. The tropical coastal plains in 
which the irrigation canals and drains are nested generally have irregular contours, 
although without great differences in altitude. Government programmes for this purpose 
had very limited impart. Only a select group of private landholders had the means to 
invest in land levelling and field drainage. Both aforementioned complications of 
irrigation and drainage are generally greater towards the tail-end of the system, closer to 
the estuary system. 
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Thirdly, although surface irrigation of crops like tobacco is technologically feasible and 
cost saving, as often demonstrated on a small scale, the existent social and material 
conditions of irrigating farmers will not easily allow sprinkler irrigation to be replaced. 
The disadvantage of sprinkler irrigation is that it is very expensive for small-scale tobacco 
producers, who have to hire the equipment. Meanwhile water is relatively cheap and 
abundant. 
Differentiation in crops and land 
The policy literature usually conceptualises water users as rather coherent and 
homogeneous groups of social actors with similar interests. Little attention is generally 
paid to differentiation among water users. However, on the Left Bank there is a wide 
variety of water users with different socio-economic, organisational, and political 
characteristics, who often have conflicting interests, for example, ejidatarios and private 
landholders; farmers of tobacco, rice, beans or sorghum; small, medium and large-scale 
cultivators; subsistence, commercial or export producers, etc. This variety will be explored 
below. 
The main irrigation cycle, referred to as 'autumn-winter' or '1997-1998', corresponds 
with the dry season from October to June. The rainy season runs from June to 
September and has a less important irrigation cycle (spring-summer 1998). During the 
1997-1998 irrigation season, a total of 12,873 hectares were cultivated, of which 8,698 
hectares were irrigated in the Left Bank irrigation system. This area of 12,873 hectares 
consisted of 3,669 hectares of beans, 2,348 hectares of tobacco, 1,665 hectares of 
sorghum, 1,367 of maize, 966 hectares of rice, 723 hectares of vegetables (such as 
tomatoes, chillies, etc.) and 560 hectares of other crops (e.g. jicama, a local root crop). In 
addition, the two most important perennial crops are fruit trees with 926 hectares and 
pasture with 649 hectares. Figure 2 is a pie chart depiction of the percentage crop 
distribution in the 1997/98 irrigation season. In the 1998 rainy season, 1,980 hectares 
were cultivated, of which only rice at 1,778 hectares is of importance. 
The Northern Coast of Nayarit is especially known in Mexico for the production of beans 
and tobacco. In particular, the black beans that are produced here are beloved in the 
centre of the country. Beans require few inputs, Httle labour and irrigation and are 
therefore widely cultivated, often by ejidatarios who produce a few hectares in addition 
to another crop, in many cases tobacco. Only a small portion of the beans sown (483 
hectares) is reported as irrigated, because the crop requires few irrigation turns. It is 
difficult to verify whether farmers do not really irrigate. This explains the difference 
between the cultivated and irrigated area. In spite of the removal of the former 
government marketing board (CONASUPO), the trade in beans is extremely regulated 
by the state government under the pretext of plant health measures. 
Because of its geographical isolation, the exit roads from the coast can be easily 
monitored to prevent individual farmers leaving the state with their produce and selling 
it to whomever they want. This is to the benefit of traders associated with state 
politicians who pay relatively low prices and are allowed to export to the states where 
there is high demand and proportional prices. 
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Figure 2 Crop distribution in the 1997/98 irrigation season 
Source: Left Bank WUA annual report (WUA, 1998) 
In Mexico, around eighty per cent of the light tobacco used for cigarettes, Burley and 
Virginia, is produced in Nayarit. Tobacco is a highly labour intensive crop, requiring a 
specific irrigation, input, and technological regime. On the Left Bank, the vast majority of 
tobacco farmers are ejidatarios and small or medium-sized producers. Since the 
privatisation of the parastatal, Tabamex, multinational tobacco companies operate under 
contract agriculture. This is commercially unfavourable to the majority of tobacco 
producers, who have few options but to stay in production because of the basic 
livelihood that they secure by producing tobacco, the debts they have incurred, and the 
lack of other more profitable crops or local forms of employment. The new institutional 
set-up for tobacco exploitation is, however, profitable for the companies and the state 
government. The federal government also benefits through taxation. Both beans and 
tobacco are thus subsistence crops for most producers and simultaneously of political 
and economic importance to the state government. 
A large proportion of the cereals, maize and sorghum, are also produced under a form of 
contract farming. Commercial seed companies pre-finance production investments to 
mostly medium-sized producers and provide them with hybrid seeds and a technological 
package. Rice and pasture are water-demanding crops that are mostly produced by 
medium and large-scale producers, among whom there are many private landholders. 
The production and export of fruits depends a lot on whether there are processing and 
packing plants available"that comply with US customs standards. Individual producers of 
vegetables depend on highly variable markets, and therefore storing and trading houses 
from major cities or other agro-industrial firms from outside are usually involved. 
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Hence, there is enormous variety in the type of crops produced by 'the water users' of 
the Left Bank irrigation system. The same kind of differentiation among water users 
occurs on the basis of landownership. As at 1998, the distribution of land among the 
officially registered water users of the irrigation module is as follows. Of roughly 20,000 
irrigable hectares, three quarters is owned by ejidatarios and only a quarter by private 
landholders. Around 3,500 ejidatarios own on average 4 hectares, whilst about 200 
private landowners have on average 22 hectares each16. 
This brings me to three reasons why I use the policy abstraction 'water user' with great 
caution. In the first place, this enormous differentiation among the water users from the 
Left Bank cautions me not to use this term undifferentiatedly. Throughout the thesis I 
therefore alternate between different terms, such as ejidatario, tobacco producer, rice 
farmer, or irrigator depending on the context. In the second place, in the field it is often 
not so clear at all who should be considered as the water user. Many landowners, who 
are officially registered as water users, rent out their land to other producers". In 
addition, the people that actually irrigate the land are frequently not the owners of the 
crop. Instead, irrigators and pump operators are hired as skilled labourers to do this 
work. Hence, the person actually using water in the field is often neither the person who 
has to pay the irrigation fee nor the registered water user. Thirdly, farmers seldom 
identify themselves as water users outside the domain of the WUA1 8. Hence, it is 
premature to assume that the policy abstraction water user has become widely accepted 
and internalised by the target population, let alone that it regulates individual behaviour 
and the practice of water distribution and fee payment. 
Throughout the rest of this thesis I do not pay attention to class formation among 
irrigating farmers on the Left Bank and their different lifeworlds, livelihoods and 
identities. This is not because it is not important, but because it is not the principal topic 
of this study. The topic is the management practice of the irrigation system by a WUA. 
4.4 The Irrigation System in a Wider Perspective 
The WUA and its overlapping domains 
The Left Bank irrigation module is a hydraulic irrigation unit with a command area of 
approximately 20,000 hectares. The WUA that was established here comprises twenty-
four ejidos. The WUA's highest organ is the assembly of delegates, which is formed 
through indirect elections. The assembly consists of twenty-five delegates: one delegate 
for each ejido and one to represent the private landholders, chosen by the constituencies 
in their respective assemblies. The assembly elects a board of directors and a control 
committee for a period of three years. The former consists of a president, a secretary, and 
a treasurer and is responsible for the daily management. The latter exercises control over 
them. 
In spite of what conventional organisational models often presume, the WUA is not an 
isolated organisational entity with clearly delimited boundaries and responsibilities 
(Reed, 1992), but overlaps with several other adrninistrative and political domains. This 
has crucial political consequences that influence the management of irrigated agriculture. 
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Often, several organisations are mtermingled, and a partial or total coincidence of 
leaders and membership exists. IXiring meetings, issues are treated and decisions taken 
that involve other organisations. The complexity increases when more organisations are 
mterlinked. This means that the organisations depend more on personalised relations 
and the face-to-face negotiations of their leaders (González, 1998). Below I will discuss 
two other types of boundaries with which the irrigation module intersects, namely 
municipal and electoral boundaries. 
Firstly, the irrigation system lies in three different municipalities that carry the name of 
their capital: Tepic, Santiago Ixcuintla and San Bias (see Map 5). Only a small fragment 
in the top belongs to Tepic, a more significant part in the tail-end to San Bias, and the 
largest and most important upper and central part of the module to Santiago Ixcuintla. 
Other organisations often follow these municipal lines. For example, like all other PRI-
affiliated organisations, the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos (CNC: National 
Peasant Confederation), has a representation in every municipality, the municipal 
peasant committee (CMC). The ejidos are organised under the CMC. For the Left Bank 
irrigation module this means that a majority of fourteen ejidos fall under the CMC in 
Santiago, a minority of nine ejidos fall under San Bias, and only one falls under Tepic. 
This is also reflected in the proportional division of the WUA's Assembly of Delegates, 
consisting of one delegate from every ejido, complemented by one for the private 
producers. Hence, the imbalance in favour of the Santiago delegates strongly affects the 
management of the Left Bank module. 
Secondly, to make it more complicated, there are also electoral districts to take into 
account. Nayarit has twenty municipalities and eighteen local electoral districts. Every 
district elects a local deputy (MP) to represent it in the state congress. The large 
municipality of Santiago consists of three electoral districts, of which district XII in the 
southeast of the municipality covers the upper and central part of the Left Bank module. 
District LX of San Bias covers the tail-end of the irrigation module mentioned earlier. The 
resultant division of the irrigation module into two political constituencies with different 
delegates deeply affects the management of the irrigation system, as we shall see in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
González describes how leaders use producer organisations as platforms to expand and 
maintain a network of institutional relations, control over different organisations, and 
access to new projects and resources. These rural leaders try to maintain their own 
position or to impose one of their own people. Some of the leaders, who start out as 
ejido commissioners, cultivate and extend their political and institutional networks of 
relations and compete for posts in other organisations. For others, the producer 
organisation forms the basis for founding new organisations often with the same 
leadership (González, 1998). 
The related phenomenon of intermediation is also a dominant theme in Mexican rural 
studies. Because rural leaders have posts in various local organisations and develop 
personal networks, they become obligatory intermediaries for access to strategic 
resources of both private and public institutions. They develop a network of institutional 
relations between government and local institutions and acquire privileged access to 
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government projects and resources. This dependence of producer groups on this relation 
with the leader nourishes clientelism. 
Map 5 Municipalities in Nayarit 
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The contemporary history of transfer 
Nayarit has one irrigation district, called The State of Nayarit (043)1 9. To it pertain four 
major irrigation units: the Left and the Right Bank of the River Santiago, the Right Bank 
of the River San Pedro and Valle de Banderas and several smaller irrigation units. All of 
these lie scattered throughout Nayarit. Before the transfer, the highest organ of the 
district was the Directive Committee, which was presided over by the governor of 
Nayarit, and consisted further of several government officials and representatives of the 
ejido sector and the private producers from every irrigation unit. Officially, the Directive 
Committee decided the annual irrigation and cropping plans and the level of irrigation 
fees, but in practice decisions were prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
Resources' (SARH) District Head in coordination with regional political and economic 
elites and then approved by the committee and superior SARH levels (Kloezen, 2002; 
vanderZaag, 1992). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the CNA started to implement the federal policy of 
transfer in the irrigation district. Federal CNA officials from the Directorate of Irrigation 
Districts (DID) arrived in Santiago to initiate talks about it. The user representatives that 
participated in these discussions were initially very hesitant about the transfer. As in 
many other irrigation districts, a major objection was the poor condition of the irrigation 
infrastructure that they would manage. Further, they feared the responsibility of taking 
over the irrigation system. In the years that followed, the DID in coordination with the 
district overcame this initial resistance. On the Left Bank, the following elements played 
a central role in achieving this and simultaneously determined the course of the local 
transfer process that will be reported below: federal government pressures and 
incentives, the CNA district officials who selected two local leaders according to their 
political constituencies, and disputed control over maintenance machines. These 
elements reflect the more general strategy of the DID as recounted in Chapter 3, but also 
provide a local background against which to understand the following chapters. 
One of the aforementioned local leaders, Antonio Carninante, appeared on the scene as 
far back as the beginning of the 1970s, when he became involved as an ejido president in 
the promotion of the 'canalisation' of the San Bias area. Before that, the canals only 
covered the Santiago area and did not reach the San Bias municipality. The SRH 
extended the existing inftastructure into San Bias during a major rehabilitation 
programme. Around 1974, the canal Guadelupe Victoria was put into use, and the land of 
many ejidatarios was serviced with irrigation (see Map 4). After that, Carrunante was 
asked to become regional representative for the peasants from the Left Bank in the 
SARH District. His personal relation at the time was with the District Head of Operation, 
Becerra, who much later became the CNA District Head. 
The maintenance of the infrastructure became a reaming concern for Caminante, as the 
SARH functioned poorly in this respect. Little of the federal maintenance budget was 
actually allocated in the field. In addition, the SARH had only three old maintenance 
machines at its disposal: a dragline, a loader, and a truck. Brigades of slashers carried out 
the rest of the work. Their joint impact was insufficient. As a result, most of the canals 
and drains at the tail-end of the system became rapidly overgrown and silted up, as the 
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vegetation grew very fast and the river still carried a lot of sediment. The state of the 
canals and outlet structures worsened. 
When the talks about the transfer started, Carninante seized the opportunity to request a 
machine from the DID Head, arguing that they had insufficient maintenance capacity. 
He was successful, and in 1990 the district received a new Caterpillar tractor. This 
coincided with the formation of the patronatos de apoyo (assistant managing boards)20, an 
initial step towards the transfer. The District Head decided that San Bias and Santiago 
were to have separate irrigation modules with organisations called patronatos that would 
have their own staff for water distribution and fee collection in their module. The 
irrigation fees were increased with the objective that the CNA and patronatos would 
both finance about half of the managerial expenses. Control over the maintenance 
machines remained with the district. 
The CNA district selected two local leaders to represent the water users in Santiago and 
San Bias. Carninante became president of the patronato of San Bias, and the District 
Representative for the private producers, a young lawyer, Gonzalo Pérez, from a 
politically connected family of Villa Hidalgo, became president for the upper Santiago 
part of the system. The following selection criteria seem to have counted: both 
represented a section of the producers in their constituency and had a network of 
political and bureaucratic contacts in the government. Both also had pre-existing and 
personal relations with CNA district officials. Their experience as leaders and 
representatives in the CNA was also important, as other user representatives initially 
feared the responsibility of these managerial positions. 
From 1990 to 1993, the patronatos functioned separately, but not to the satisfaction of 
the CNA and the patronatos. Carninante claims that in San Bias they completely 
depended on Villa Hidalgo for receiving water and getting the machines. This meant that 
the machines hardly ever reached the San Bias tail-end region and thus led to a neglect 
of maintenance. Meanwhile, the pressure from the DID in Mexico to complete the legal 
process of transfer increased. It was decided that, in order to reduce costs, conflicts, and 
complications, it was more convenient to fuse the two modules into one for the official 
transfer. In 1992, Valle de Banderas became the first module to be transferred. 
In the Assembly of Delegates of the newly merged WUA, the nine ejido delegates from 
San Bias were a minority against the delegates from Santiago. Carninante was excluded 
from elections, because he did not qualify for a position. He was not included in the 
users' register (padrón de usuarios), as he did not own land in the irrigation district. 
Consequently, it was easy for Pérez to win the elections for the presidency and select his 
own board of directors. In September 1993, the Left Bank was officially transferred, and 
around this time the WUA received a new motor grader and a hydraulic excavator from 
the CNA. Pérez subsequently did not keep to the informal agreement made with 
Carninante that the president from Santiago would be replaced after two years by one 
from San Bias. 
In retrospect, the negotiation of maintenance machines was central to the transfer and 
counted as legitimation for both patronato presidents' role in the process. Just like 
Carninante, Pérez claimed to have negotiated for two machines with the head of the DID 
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and considered this as a personal trophy that illustrated his leadership qualities21. The 
machines thus played an important role as catalyst or incentive in farmer leaders' 
acceptance of the transfer22. Chapter 7 will show the political importance for local leaders 
to control machines - an importance that will further clarify their interest in these 
resources. 
Further, the last element in the CNA strategy to overcome the initial resistance to 
transfer was that CNA officials promised the WUA to rehabilitate the irrigation 
infrastructure after the transfer. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this rehabilitation never took 
place, a problem with which the WUA is still confronted today23. But what this promise 
did do was increase the momentum of the transfer. 
In sum, the historical account of the transfer offered above confirms the idea, also raised 
in Chapter 3, that the transfer was effected under a combination of federal government 
pressure, the role of district engineers to identify and include well-disposed rural leaders 
(and exclude others) as the user representatives in the process, the selective allocation of 
government resources (e.g. machines) to these leaders and the WUAs as incentives to 
continue with the transfer, and the unfulfilled promise of rehabilitation. What will 
become clear in the following chapters is that the disputes between the San Bias and 
Santiago areas regarding the dominance of the tatter's leadership, and control over 
crucial resources such as the machines, continued to play a role in the management of 
the WUA. 
A local political group information: Presenting the cast of actors 
Perez is a local lawyer from Villa Hidalgo with political relations at the state level. During 
his youth through his politically active mother, Perez had frequently interacted with 
important political figures in the state. Nayarif s political patriarch, Don Emilio, and Felix 
Torres, current mayor of Tepic, adopted him as a protégé. Through a typical mixture of 
political, family, and business relations that overflowed into his activities in the student 
union at the university, Perez received a kind of implicit political training from these 
patrons. His younger brother started out as a bodyguard and later became one of Don 
Emilio's private secretaries. On this basis he developed activities in ACASPEN, a 
transport union for taxi and truck drivers that controlled access to working permits. Both 
Don Emilio and Felix Torres own land and villas in the region and are involved in 
commercial activities and trade of all sorts. Perez oversees part of their properties and 
commercial activities. 
Don Emilio became governor of Nayarit from 1981 to 1987, after decades of prominent 
political positions in the government union, CTM, and the dominant political PRI at the 
regional and federal level. Perez rapidly built up significant wealth in the transport and 
trade of unmentionable goods from the eastern mountains of Nayarit via the Pacific 
Ocean to further destinations. From 1988 to 1993, Don Emilio was president of the 
Senate and maintained close relations with President Salinas. From this position he 
retained influence over politics in Nayarit and supported his allies and protégés. There is 
no evidence that he directly influenced Perez' election as president of the patronato and 
later the WUA, but it is clear that it did Perez no harm and benefited him in keeping 
abreast of the latest developments in the CNA and the transfer policy at the federal level. 
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Whilst he established himself as president of the irrigation system, Pérez significantly 
expanded his area under production, partly owned and otherwise hired around the 
irrigation system. He invested his earnings in the large-scale cultivation of rice, a 
lucrative and booming crop around that time. He developed good relations with the 
CNA District Head by producing and investing in rice with him. This friendship 
facilitated Pérez' control over the WUA and its maintenance machinery. 
In the patronato, he invited his old school friend, Nunez, to return to their native village, 
Villa Hidalgo, to work with him as secretary. Until that time Nunez, who lacked a 
professional degree, had a casual career working in different trades. He owned a plot of a 
few hectares in the ejido of Solorceño, which he did not cultivate but rented out and later 
even sold. This means that he needed to live off the political positions that he acquired. 
Pérez supported him financially and politically in acquiring the position of president of 
the ejido based in Villa Hidalgo. As president of the WUA, Pérez appointed another 
schoolmate and close associate, Guttiérez. He was called from a job up north as 
agronomist in Fertimex, a parastatal providing the rural areas with fertilisers, which was 
about to be privatised in those days. Pérez nurtured the leadership qualities of his 
protégés through the WUA. Further, several of the board members together with Pérez 
were involved in the management of the local rice-processing factory discussed earlier. 
As to the rest, this group largely filled the vacancies in the staff with people related 
through friendship, family, compadrazgo (ritual co-parenthood) or patronazgo (patronage). 
This facilitated the internal control of the WUA. 
Hence, Pérez formed with others a local political sub-group24 whose self-proclaimed 
constituency is the Left Bank of the municipality of Santiago with Villa Hidalgo as its 
centre. This group in formation25 established a web of relations with, and positions in, 
local organisations in the area, such as the preparatory college26, several ejidos around 
Villa Hidalgo, the church, the union division of ACASPEN, the nearby rice-processing 
plant and the local PRI office. Through these multiple organisations, the group 
developed a loose clientele network and a support base on the Left Bank and extended 
its relations in the state government. Further, the group developed a network of political, 
commercial and friendship relations with several large farmers and ejido commissioners 
within the irrigation district. These favoured farmers mainly produce rice, sorghum, or 
pasture for cattle husbandry, like Pérez himself. Good relations with the ejido presidents 
and popular leaders in the ejidos of the Left Bank are important for the group. These 
leaders have significant influence over the rural population in elections and generally 
elect close associates as their representatives on government bodies and in organisations 
such as the WUA. This is one way in which the group also keeps control over who sits 
on the Assembly of Delegates of the WUA. 
In 1993, the governorship elections caused serious political consternation in the region. 
After the privatisation of the tobacco parastatal Tabamex in 1991, the agronomist-
businessman-poHtícian Lopéz Tirado opportunely organised a popular movement of 
rural producers on the Northern Coast that mobilised popular discontent about 
agricultural decline. Among other things, they protested against the poor compensation 
payments to producers and workers, who were officially shareholders of Tabamex. This 
movement became the base from which he attempted to reach the governorship for the 
centre-left party, Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD: Democratic Revolution 
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Party). Throughout the state, intense political unrest surrounded these elections. In the 
end, despite public protest, the authorities only acknowledged the PRD to have won 
district XII on the Left Bank of the Santiago River. The local PRI in district XII remained 
in shock and deeply divided after losing the district to a follower of Lopez Tirado. Perez 
and his group demonstrated their political pragmatism by locally supporting the 
opposition, because the PRI candidate was from an antagonistic group in Villa Hidalgo. 
In the following three years, Perez' group reorganised the local PRI and united the 
remaining groups under their leadership. They appointed new PRI section heads in the 
district, among whom several of the canaleros of the WUA in order to control the district 
politically. 
As a point of interest in the relation between irrigation and politics, it is important to 
note how Perez' political group defines its political constituency. The Left Bank 
effectively encompasses the irrigation system as it was before its expansion into the San 
Bias municipality during the early 1970s. This spatial definition thus excludes the 
expansion zone at the tail-end of the irrigation module and a small fraction that belongs 
to the municipality of Tepic. It is also interesting that the Left Bank as a territorial space 
probably received its name after the construction of the irrigation system in the 1940s. 
The introduction of irrigation thus determined both the name and the boundaries of a 
geographical space that also became a political constituency to some. 
In 1996, another leader of this political group, a doctor Hijar Juarez from a locally 
respected family, who is also identified with Felix Torres, was launched as PRI candidate 
for mayor in Santiago. He suffered a clear defeat that generated enormous discontent in 
the group. They realised that they had limited possibilities of winning municipal 
elections. In response, they publicly promoted the idea of the Left Bank as an 
independent munidpality and thus an electoral constituency with Villa Hidalgo as 
capital. There is no doubt that they would have an excellent candidate for mayor. 
Although the group was not successful at that time, the idea remained alive amongst 
them and kept recurring as a political claim during subsequent elections. 
The use of this spatial and political denomination is thus specifically used by this group 
to distinguish themselves from the Right Bank, the munidpal capital of Santiago, and 
San Bias, and particularly from the competing political groups belonging to those places. 
It is also a way of positioning themselves vis-a-vis the state government and acquiring 
popular support among the population as the legitimate leadership of the Left Bank. The 
group consistently cultivates a separate identity for people from the Left Bank. They 
claim that its population, producers, and other interest groups are misunderstood and 
not represented by politicians from the other side of the river. Politicians who have their 
popular base on the right side of the river are not at all preoccupied with establishing 
their difference in relation to people from the other side of the river. In fad, people 
hardly ever identify themselves as originating from the Right Bank. Hence, this politics of 
identity and belonging reflects a political ambition and a strategy with dear inclusionary 
as well as exdusionary effects. In the coming chapters I shall show how this also affected 
irrigation management. 
Because of internal struggles, ruptures and division in the PRD, the left-wing opposition 
arrived weakened at the 1996 local elections. With the assistance of his political patron, 
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Felix Torres, Perez became the only serious candidate as regional deputy for district XII 
on the Left Bank and won. Perez declared in the local press: 'We won, because we 
united all the forces, we smoothed conflicts and we worked on the basis of our principles 
and platforms'27. Within the PRI, Perez gained considerable prestige by 'rescuing the 
districf from the opposition. On tennination of Perez' three-year term as WUA 
president in 1996, the San Bias delegates proposed one of their number as the new 
president. This man also gained support in the Santiago municipality and threatened to 
win the elections. Yet, at a pleasant breakfast meeting before the elections, Perez bought 
the votes of several delegates for his protege and secured the victory for Nunez. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have passed several infrastructural works that materialised successive 
phases of federal government intervention and agro-industrial capital penetration and 
affected the organisation of irrigated agriculture. Without going into too much historical 
depth, this tour reveals that local and regional politics played a major role throughout 
the construction, organised use, and demise of these public works and that this again 
benefited or backfired on the actual politics in the area. This provides the background 
against which to study a new wave of restructuration policies that flooded the 
countryside from the end of the 1980s. The Left Bank irrigation system appears to be an 
mteresting area to analyse the impact of this range of new policies. Such a study enables 
us to view exactly how these policies transformed this agricultural region from one that 
was marked by a particularly high level of government intervention, through policies 
that favoured rural development and agricultural modernisation since the early 1970s, to 
one with a lower degree of such interference. The gradual retreat of the federal state has 
opened up a number of organisational spaces in which newly organised groups and 
private interests get to manage infrastracture and resources of a public nature. Whether 
this new management regime has the liberating effect predicted by neo-liberal theory is 
the broader question that motivates this study and the choice of this region. 
Notes 
1 From now I will name the organisation the 'association1, as local people refer to it, or the WUA' 
as policy makers and experts call it. 
2 A person of mixed racial ancestry (especially mixed European and Native American ancestry). 
Some sixty per cent of the Mexican population is mestizo, with thirty per cent being Indian and some 
nine per cent of European descent. 
3 For a geographical description of other regions of Nayarit see Appendix 5. The coast as a 
transition region has a most interesting cultural mix of norteño (Northern Mexico), ranchero, Indian and 
even African influences connected with the diverse cultural and geographical origins of its population. 
4 This basin is not merely a natural phenomenon, but is simultaneously constructed through a 
range of bureaucratic and research institutions, among which the CNA basin level organisation that 
incorporates all of the states in the basin. 
5 Aguamilpa was planned as one of the final pieces of a large interconnected system of dams to 
irrigate to the arid Northwest (SHINO). See Chapter 2. Although the World Bank refused to finance 
this plan, it did partially finance one of its masterpieces. 
6 See also Gascón-Mercado (1988). 
7 Land reform communities created after the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Ejido land belongs to the 
state, with a combination of community {ejido) and private (ejidatarid) usufruct, and since the 
amendment of Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992 ejidatarios can sell their land. The other category of 
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landowners in Mexico is called pequeños propietarios: private farmers with a limit on land ownership of 
100 ha. 
8 This occurred through the emergence of a young, radical, local political group that favoured land 
reform and was willing to attack the interests of the large landowners. This led to the decline of the 
political and institutional control that these powerful families had in Nayarit. The group had support 
from the Mexican president Cardenas (1934-1940), who became known as the president who gave the 
land to the ejidatarios (Contreras Valdez, 2001). 
9 The name of Santiago Ixcuintla combines its Spanish and indigenous origins: Ixcuintla can be 
translated from Náhuatl as 'place of dogs', after a special type of hairless dog that the Huichol Indians 
keep in the mountainous region where they live. The name is usually shortened to Santiago. 
1 0 Lucas Vallaría for the PRI and Antonio Echeverría for the alliance of opposition parties PAN 
(Partido de Acción Nacional), PRD (Partido de Revolución Democrática), FT (Partido de Trabajo), etc. 
" A representative of a large beer company, called MODERNA once told me that besides some 
parts of Sinaloa, this area has in fact the highest consumption per capita of the whole Republic. 
1 2 SRH documents and other literature mention different dates, from 1946 to 1949, as starting dates. 
1 3 New extensions, which are promised to irrigate about 20,000 hectares, will consume much more 
of the river's waters. 
14 Some of the data above were derived from the following sources: (CNA, 1992; Juarez Guitron, 
1991; Nava Salcedo, 1997; SARH, 1985; SRH, 1948; SRH, 1971; SRH, n.d.). 
1 5 Relación de Drenes, Distrito de Riego no. 043 (Report), CNA, Subdirección General de 
Infrastructura Hidroagricola, Gerencia de Distritos de Riego, 1993. 
1 6 Based on data from the Segundo Informe de Actimdades, Asoaaríón de Usmrios de k Unidad de Riego 
de la Margen Izquierda del Río Santiago, AC, Modulo 2,1997-1998. 
1 7 The padrón de usuarios is the list of registered users compiled by the CNA and included in the 
Concession Title. 
1 8 On different occasions, farmers define themselves in various ways, but almost never as usuarios, 
which is the term that the policy literature and WUAs generally use for them. The following anecdote 
illustrates this point. I was talking to a small tobacco producer on his plot that lay near to a canal. I 
could see that it had been recently irrigated by some pump operator with a sprinkler installation. I 
asked him what a usuario needed to do in order to irrigate. To me this was a most obvious question. He 
returned my question by asking '¿usuario de que?' (user of what?). Without knowing it, he had drawn 
my attention to the fact that he was much more than just a user of water and that this concept 
therefore did not necessarily determine his behaviour. The interaction of many small-scale farmers with 
the WUA and its policy discourse is fairly limited; so is their knowledge of how the WUA exactly 
functions and what is the distinction with the CNA district. 
1 9 Since 1985, it has been part of the Rural Development District of the SARH (see also Chapter 3). 
2 0 Mexican legal entity: board, trust, council. 
2 1 Pérez' information on this, however, appears inconsistent. 
2 2 CNA officials claim that the new machines that were bought and transferred to the boards of 
newly established associations were never a means of convincing local farmer leaders to accept the 
transfer (interview ex-CNA official, 09-02-2002). However, the dates of these transfers and the 
impressions of many local leaders in irrigation systems around Jalisco, Michoacán, Guerrero, Colima 
and Nayarit suggest the opposite (see also Kloezen, 2000:83; World Bank, 2001:7). 
2 3 Ex-officials of the DID explicitly deny that this promise was ever made to convince the users to 
accept the transfer. However, in different districts of Mexico, WUA leaders keep re-invoking this 
promise that was made to them. It remains a point of controversy between them and the CNA 
4 Using Hernández Rodríquez' definition, I consider the local political group from Villa Hidalgo on 
which I focus to consist of Pérez, Nuñez, Guttiérez, and several field workers who are all based in the 
association, together with the young brother of Pérez and Hijar Juárez, a local doctor, who are based in 
other local institutions. This local sub-group is again part of a larger political group that played a major 
role in Nayarit politics (Hernández Rodríquez, 1997), 
2 5 I am presenting a rather mechanical picture of the development and coherence of a political 
group, for the sake of the argument. The hierarchy and coherence of such a group are fluctuating 
variables, depending on various factors. Its members can be involved in different groups and have 
contradictory interests to the leadership. Also, the leadership can change in relation to the positions 
that they occupy in political or other organisations. 
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24 Preparatoria is a sort of tertiary college after secondary education, preparing students for the 
university. These local colleges are part of the university based in the capital, Tepic. 
27 Realidades de Nayarit (local newspaper), 9 July 1996. 'Villa Hidalgo: PR1 recupera sin problema el XH 
Distrito Federal'. 
Photo 6 A sprinkler pump 
Photo 7 A pipeline with sprinklers 
Photo 8 A bombero carrying pipes 
Photo 9 A tabaquero and his horse working the land 
5 
Following the Current: 
A situated case study of a canalero 
Mejor que sigues el corriente 
(It is better to follow the current) 
A former canalero's statement on the pressures that canaleros deal with and the 
problems they have to resolve in their daily work1 
DRAMATIS PERSONAE: 
Laguna canalero, engineer from Villa Hidalgo 
Tabaqueros tobacco producers 
Gutnerez manager of the WUA, Laguna's superior 
Bomberos operators of sprinkler installations 
Pérez former president of the WUA, local deputy and large producer and leader of a 
political group 
Diego Gutnerez canalero, downstream colleague of Laguna 
Icazar canalero, engineer, friend of Laguna 
Ejidatarios members of ejidos 
Domínguez supervising canalero and upstream colleague 
Quiroz canalero, engineer, and compadre 
Darío canalero, tail end colleague 
Nunez president of the WUA 
Becerra CNA district head and former head of operation 
PROPS: 
Rules 
Irrigation infrastructure 
Canal structures 
Sprinkler installations 
Crop 
Ejido fields 
Irrigation water 
Irrigation fees 
List with signatures 
Planning and reporting sheets 
Information flows 
Motor bike 
Radio 
network of connected canals and drains of distinct levels 
cross-regulators, sluices, intake structures 
systems used for sprinkler irrigation: pipes, sprinklers, pump, intake pipe 
tobacco 
plots of ejidatarios within an ejido 
flows of H20 used for irrigation 
fees paid by farmers to me WUA for irrigation, maintenance, and 
administrative services 
a list of registered tobacco producers that needs to be signed by their group 
leaders so mat tobacco companies advance their irrigation fees to the WUA 
standard forms that canaleros use to plan and report water use 
flows of information co-ordinated by the canalero 
means of transport 
means of communication 
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5.1 Introduction 
Operational rules of water distribution 
Recent literature on irrigation management has been heavily influenced by ideas from 
institutional economics. Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et aL, 1993) analyses irrigation 
associations as a set of rules in use, generated by a community cooperative ethic and 
expressing a consensual equilibrium outcome of self-interested actors (Mosse, 1997). 
These rules produce behavioural incentives that reward and constrain the benefits and 
costs of irrigation officials and water users in the operation and maintenance of an 
irrigation system. So, rules and incentives are considered to provide the basic direction 
and energy for organisations to meet their stated performance objectives (Vermillion, 
1991). This type of neo-institutional analysis suggests that individual and collective 
organisational practices strictly emanate from a rational response to coherent sets of 
institutional rules and incentives. The analytical weakness of this assumption lies in 
disregarding the considerable room for manoeuvre and agency that different social 
actors have in dealing with these situations (Clay and Schaffer, 1984; Lipsky, 1980; Long, 
2001). Consequently, such analysis fails to appreciate and analyse a diversity of existing 
and emerging forms of organisational practice. 
Current managerial models of Water Users' Associations (WUAs) based on this set of 
neo-institutional ideas presume that a set of agreed rules ensures co-operative behaviour 
among a circumscribed community of rational actors. These actors assume different 
organisational positions and roles. The WUA employs managers and field personnel to 
provide services to the water users, who are the client constituency. An established set of 
operational rules distributes authorities, competencies and responsibilities among these 
actors2. On the Left Bank of the River Santiago, where we examine these ideas 
empirically, two operational rules are crucial for orderly water distribution and timely 
irrigation fee payment. The first rule stipulates that a water user must request an 
irrigation turn a fixed number of days in advance; the second rule requires water users to 
pay their irrigation fee before receiving the first irrigation turn. 
The train of thought initiated by these rules leads to an ideal organisational picture of 
orderly water distribution and timely fee payment. It runs like this: a WUA manager 
centrally compiles the water users' irrigation requests and on this basis programmes the 
required water supply for a period of a week in agreement with the annual irrigation 
programme. On a daily basis his field workers, called canaleros in Mexico, put this 
planning into practice. They secure adequate and timely water provision by coordinating 
the supply of water entering the canal network with the demand of the water users in 
the field. Water users are eligible to receive water in exchange for a timely fee payment 
and irrigation request. Sanctions apply that prevent water users from free-riding 
behaviour. As farmers receive their water turns on time, they are in the position to 
stimulate optimal plant growth. As a result, satisfied farmers with good productivity are 
increasingly willing to pay their irrigation fees on time. This enables the WUA to fully 
finance the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system so that it becomes self-
sufficient. 
In contrast to this rule-based approach, I will argue that water distribution and use 
practices are not governed by a system of agreed rules and therefore falsify this idealised 
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and harmonious picture of organisational practices. In addition, they are not practices 
that are centrally controlled by a manager from an office, who is able to coordinate the 
planning and execution of irrigation through a set of rules and procedures. Furthermore, 
an analysis of operational rules erroneously suggests that they are applied evenly in a 
homogeneous irrigation setting and that water distribution practices are thus in principle 
the same everywhere. The above arguments point to a more de-centred understanding 
of the distribution and use of water in a heterogeneous irrigation setting. 
Van der Zaag (van der Zaag, 1992) contributes an important improvement upon the 
rule-based approach and steers us towards a more de-centred understanding. He 
demonstrates that in practice it is not a set of allocation rules but, rather, the canaleros 
that mediate the service relation between the irrigation institution and the irrigating 
constituency. From their intermediary position, they obtain a certain autonomy in 
decision making and derive a professional competence from their experience with the 
irrigation system and the day-to-day water distribution in the field (van der Zaag, 1992). 
I will try to complement van der Zaag's analysis by enriching it with new insights 
through the detailed study of the canalero's practice in water distribution and fee 
actministration. In the first place, this chapter shows that rules are regularly subverted, 
whilst the canalero has insufficient authority and sanctions to control fee default and the 
uncoordinated access to water. This means that the canalero's professional competence 
and authority are not uncontested. In the second place, we have to understand different 
patterns of water distribution and fee adnünistration, as well as the mediating role that 
the canaleros play in this, resulting from the concrete social, material and spatial 
relations which constitute the workspace in which the canaleros operate. This requires a 
situated case study, as the title of this chapter indicates. 
To this purpose, we need to analyse an irrigation system as a spatial arrangement of 
social and material elements. In different operational sections of the irrigation system, 
diverging combinations of such elements make up the workspace of the canalero. 
Because such heterogeneous workspaces vary from each other, the patterns of water 
distribution and fee administration become rather different and therefore create a 
distinct role for the canalero. 
I will present two contrasting case studies of canaleros, one in this chapter and one in 
the next. These cases most clearly differ in two aspects: firstly, the operational 
arrangements mobilised in the irrigation of a farmer's crop; secondly, the social position 
of the canalero relative to the political group conttolling water distribution. This chapter 
considers sprinkler irrigation in small-scale tobacco production, whereas the next focuses 
on surface irrigation in large-scale rice production. The intermediary role of the canalero 
varies according to which operational arrangements dominate his sections. But it is not 
just the spatial and material differences emphasised in this chapter that matter here: the 
canaleros' social position vis-a-vis the political group that controls the management of 
the WUA is also important. This chapter presents the case of canalero Laguna, who has a 
much more distant relation to his superiors than canalero Diego, who figures as the 
protagonist of the next chapter. He is identified as part of the group that is in control of 
the WUA, and he performs an important role in a network of favoured rice producers. 
The position of this canalero is thus very different from Laguna's. 
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A canalero's competence in water distribution 
In his study of the Autlan-FJ Grullo irrigation district in Jalisco, van der Zaag (van der 
Zaag, 1992) emphasises the crucial role of the canaleros in the operation of this 
government managed irrigation system. As already stated, the canaleros are the field 
personnel that carry out water distribution and the registration of water fees on a daily 
basis. Through a particular interpretation of his tasks and a professional competence, the 
canalero produces a linkage between an irrigation institution and the water users. 
According to van der Zaag, the canalero faces the 'canalero's dilemma': a situation in 
which he has to make constant choices between demands of his superiors in the district 
and farmers in the field, which are often mutually incompatible. He shows how a 
canalero solves this dilemma by acting and consciously shaping his working 
arrangements. Although, the canaleros can be victims of their situation, they also have 
the possibility to counteract to the pressures from both sides. In this manner, they create 
their own autonomous field of action, which they have preserved over more than a 
decade in spite of several administrative reorganisations, van der Zaag contends (van der 
Zaag, 1992). 
The canaleros distribute water from the main canal, via the lateral and sub-lateral canals, 
to the intake of mdfvidual farm plots. They operate the cross-regulators, sluices, and 
gates and are responsible for the weekly prograrruriing of water volumes that their 
sections require. At field level they are also responsible for scheduling and supervising 
irrigation turns for the farmers who irrigate their crops. Van der Zaag offers a lively 
description of how the canaleros move around their area on motor bikes, ride along the 
canals, cross the fields and speed on the dirt roads. Although they are field workers, they 
do not simply execute guidelines received from above, but adapt them to the varying 
needs, constraints and demands experienced at field level. 
In describing the daily routines of the canaleros, van der Zaag emphasises their 
proficient and situation-specific knowledge of the physical infrastructure, canals, water 
flows, fields, crops, farmers and irrigators in the section where they are working. The 
canalero derives his professional competence and a degree of authority in decision 
making from his experience and knowledge of programming, adjusting gates and 
estimating water flows. This relative freedom can be applied with different professional 
and personal benefits as a result. A canalero's normal field encounters illustrate the 
shared experience and mutual respect between the canalero and the farmers. The 
canaleros sometimes grant users favours in water distribution, in exchange for small 
bribes, presents, or access to resources such as credit. 
In spite of the fact that this type of field worker represents the frontline of many 
irrigation organisations around the world, the irrigation literature has traditionally given 
little attention to these actors and rather tends to focus on the role of irrigation 
engineers, bureaucrats and managers in their hydraulic institutions (Chambers, 1988; 
Uphoff et al., 1991; Wade, 1988) 3. The conventional irrigation engineering literature is 
especially geared to reducing 'the human element', which causes incompetent 
management of irrigation systems and hampers the achievement of efficient and 
equitable irrigation, by introducing fixed distribution works (Horst, 1990) or automated 
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water control (Plusquellec et al., 1994). Such engineering perspectives very much 
embody the idea of an ideal technical order and formal policy objectives. 
As a reaction to such approaches, van der Zaag shows the strength of human 
competence in the actual practice of water distribution at field level 4. The canal 
infrastructure of the Autlán-El Grullo system with its adjustable gates and intakes 
appears a complex system to manage. This inffastructural flexibility is not a weakness, 
because it allows the canalera to competently use it and respond to diversity in crops, 
plots and water demand. The particular form of the technical infrastructure influences 
the water distribution but does not completely determine it, because the canalera has 
'internalised' the physical properties of the system. We learn that if canaleras receive 
adequate financial, social and material rewards and sufficient responsibility, they are able 
to contribute substantially to 'the performance' of an irrigation system by 'making it 
work'. 
In a heterogeneous working space 
In irrigation studies, there is increasing recognition that irrigation systems are sodo-
technical systems (Huppert, 1989; Mollinga, 1998; Uphoff, 1986; van der Zaag, 1992; 
Vincent, 1997). In an irrigation system, access to water is mediated by a spatial network 
of social and material actors, elements and relations. To organise the distribution of 
water you not only require human actors such as managers, field workers and farmers to 
follow operational rules, but you also need to mobilise non-human elements such as a 
spatially distributed network of canals, drains and fields, irrigation technologies, as well 
as other material resource flows such as planning sheets, documents, money, 
information, etc. In the actual practice of irrigation, we are never faced with just either 
material objects or social relations; rather, the non-human and human are assembled 
into a heterogeneous actor-network (Latour, 1987; Law, 1994). An irrigation system is 
thus operated and accessed by a heterogeneous association made up of human and non-
human elements (Kortelainen, 1999). In sum, an irrigation system is a socio-material 
arrangement. The heterogeneous elements that make up this arrangement are usually 
not homogeneously distributed over space. 
Conventional sociological approaches are then flawed when applied to the complex 
working arrangement of canaleras, because they assume a centrally located official in a 
homogeneous and spatially bounded workplace, who aciministers ordered flows of 
resources, files or cases. Studies of lower level bureaucrats, front line workers, or field 
workers of large bureaucratic agencies have traditionally focused on the 'modern', 
institutionalised and spatially circumscribed workplaces that are typical of urban 
bureaucracies, factories, or laboratories (Law and Akrich, 1994; Lipsky, 1980; Sternberg 
and Horvath, 1999). Such workspaces are characterised by a high degree of social, 
material and spatial standardisation and therefore require a relatively standard set of 
competencies from the worker. The homogenised and ordered nature of the work 
environment and of the incoming and outgoing flows of clients, files and resources is too 
easily taken for granted. All conditions are engineered so that a front line worker is 
placed at the centre and functions as an 'obligatory passage point' in his workspace 
(Latour, 1987). 
126 The Success of a Policy Model 
Analytically, the situation of a canalero is much more complex. The central activities of a 
canalero are water distribution, fee administration and information brokerage. In these 
activities, the canalero mediates between the organisational levels of the WUA 
management and water users. This mediation occurs through the canalero's control over 
a spatially delimited part of the technological infrastructure and over different sets of 
resource flows: water, irrigation fees, documents, information, etc. When we compare 
the canalero with the lower level official described above, we notice the following 
differences: Firstly, canaleras are actors that operate in heterogeneous workspaces in 
which they require and learn specific competencies but not others, something that 
cannot be circumscribed by a standard set of operational rules. Secondly, canaleras are 
engaged in a de-centred practice of 'ordering' flows, which means that they do not 
occupy a sole centre from which they exercise control. The canaleras' success in 
positioning themselves as an obligatory passage point in these networks and flows 
consequently differs. Thirdly, canaleras on their motor bikes are mobile actors, who are 
constantly moving about in order to mediate between different spatially distributed 
arrangements of social actors, physical structures and resource flows. 
A socio-material arrangement embodies a certain distribution of competencies and 
performances between humans and non-humans (Latour, 1992). A canalero's 
competence to control water flows is thus embedded in the specific set of social, material 
and spatial relations that are mobilised in water use practices (Jiutchins, 1995); but so is 
his inability to make these relations work in another manner (Roep, 2000). This requires 
a meticulous study of the social, material and spatial arrangements within which 
canaleras operate. In this chapter and the next, I therefore concentrate on two different 
operational arrangements that are financially and politically important to the WUA and 
examine how they affect the competences of the canalero in question. I define 
'operational arrangements' as the host of physical devices, monetary resources, legal 
documents and human actors that a farmer would have to enrol to obtain access to water 
from the main system level for his crop (van der Zaag, et al., 2001) 5. 
In the next section I focus on the theory and practice of the tasks the canalero fulfils on 
the Left Bank. Then I describe the formation of the Left Bank canaleras. Section 5.3 
presents the case study of canalero Laguna. His life history is followed by a short 
description of the two sections of the irrigation system for which he is responsible. This 
description ends by signalling the most labour-demanding characteristic of these 
sections, namely the operational arrangement involved in sprinkler irrigation and small-
scale tobacco production. When we follow Laguna along one of the busiest canals in his 
sections, we encounter the problems of control with which he deals in his work and 
observe how he responds to them. These experiences are compared with those of an ex-
colleague and his successor. Further, they lead to Laguna's opinions about his superiors 
and their policies. Finally, Section 5.4 draws the conclusions of this chapter. 
5.2 The Left Bank Canaleras 
Both the Left Bank and Autlán-El Grullo are in the fortunate situation of having no 
absolute water scarcity. If everybody stuck to the rules, they would all receive sufficient 
water on time. Water availability here is thus not the kind of problem that it is in most 
other irrigated parts of Mexico. Hence, the volumetric water price and the irrigation fees 
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are relatively low. In addition, the Left Bank irrigation infrastructure is equally flexible as 
described above for Autlan-FJ Grullo (see also Chapter 4). This would appear an ideal 
point of departure for a Water Users' Association to establish an orderly water 
distribution and financial self-sufficiency in line with the established operational rules. 
Instead, we encounter a slightly chaotic and sub-optimal situation in which water 
distribution is far from efficient, plots are flooded, 'free riders' take water without paying 
fees or requesting an irrigation turn, and farmers do not receive their irrigation turns on 
time. In addition, a group of well-connected large producers enjoys privileged access to 
water. These 'problems of control' in the distribution of water introduce a relative 
scarcity of water. As a result the equality, convenience, reliability (predictability) and 
timeliness of water distribution to individual farmers is problematic (Chambers, 1988), 
particularly towards the tail-end of the system. In addition, the collection of irrigation 
fees is not a straightforward task. However, the situation could be more dramatic if it 
were not for the competent role that the canaleros play in partly resolving these 
problems. 
Operational sections and task distribution: theory and practice 
A map of the Left Bank irrigation system shows that it is divided into thirteen sections 
for purposes of system operation (see Map 6). A section consists of a part of the main 
canal and various minor canals, and its boundaries generally are larger collector drains. 
On the map, it is basically a geographically bounded spatial arrangement of irrigation 
canals, drains, and fields. As was emphasised in the introduction, the individual sections 
are heterogeneous spaces. Besides the similarities, the sections contain diverging 
collections of farmers, crops, plots and field irrigation technologies (see for example 
Table 3), i.e. the specific social and material aspects of irrigation and agriculture in each 
section. The differences between these workspaces generate distinct patterns of water 
demand and distribution and therefore change the work of a canalera and the 
competencies that he requires. To illustrate this, I will mention just a few obvious 
contrasts between the sections that have implications for water distribution: head-end 
vs. tail-end location (high vs lower water availability and reliability), smaller ejido6 plots 
vs. larger private landholdings (small vs. large volumes), tobacco vs. rice production 
(small volumes but unpredictable in timing vs. standard water allocation per time unit), 
and the operational arrangements involved in sprinkler and surface irrigation. 
An organisational chart of the association indicates that the general manager is 
responsible for the operation and administration of the irrigation system. The actual 
water distribution and the registration of water fees in the field are undertaken by a team 
of seven canaleros. Although the manager is formally responsible, in practice he is hardly 
involved and leaves the daily distribution to his subordinate, the supervising canalera. 
This experienced canalera supervises the work of the other six canaleros, who are each 
responsible for two sections. Further, he operates the most upstream section of the 
irrigation system. From there he can also monitor the mcoming discharge into the main 
canal and co-ordinate adjustments with the Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA: National 
Water Commission) at the dam. He stays in contact with the CNA district on a regular 
basis for the daily water requests, weekly programming, and monthly reporting. 
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Even the annual irrigation planning, which has a limited influence over daily water 
distribution, is not carried out by the general manager, but by the local CNA supervisor. 
The manager appears to have limited experience and interest in the field of water 
distribution. The supervision of the supervising canalero is also limited, which means 
that the canaleros have a degree of autonomy in distabuting water in their sections. 
Occasionally, the manager, Guttierez, organises a meeting with all canaleros to discuss 
operational issues and the progress in fee collection matters. 
The canalero's central activities are water distribution, fee aclministration and 
information brokerage. An examination of the relevant official rules of conduct 
concerning these activities starts in the by-laws of the Left Bank WUA. The Concession 
Title7 establishes the legal terms for the concession of the infrastructure by the 
government to the WUA. It is a formal document produced by the Directorate of 
Irrigation Districts (DID) from the federal office of the CNA and signed at the time of 
official transfer. This document includes the operational instructions for the association. 
According to these instructions, water distribution is carried out on the basis of 'weekly 
demand'. The instructions state that a water user has to request an irrigation turn before 
the end of the week from his canalero in order to be able to irrigate during the next 
week. The canalero collects all these irrigation requests and passes them on. On this 
basis, the manager is able to programme the water need for the thirteen sections for the 
period of a week. 
The canalero releases the programmed discharge from the main canal or main lateral 
into the sub-laterals and lower level field canals. He does this by backing up the water in 
the main lateral to an adequate level by means of adjusting the radial gates and the 
intake structures. Subsequently, he monitors whether sufficient water is flowing through 
for the number of irrigation turns programmed along a particular canal. When the 
canalero has opened a field intake or authorised a farmer to take a turn, his responsibility 
ends. The farmer is expected to take over from here at the agreed time and to irrigate his 
field for an agreed number of hours or days. The canalero carries a field notebook in 
which he registers the dates of the delivered irrigation turns. This booklet allows him to 
check the number of irrigation turns that a producer has had, to programme and to make 
up a report of all the irrigation turns and water volumes allocated. These reports are 
gathered on a monthly basis and submitted as a report by the supervising canalero to the 
CNA. 
In actual field practice, the canaleros themselves instead refer to a period of three days' 
notice*. However, it often happens that water users do not request an irrigation turn 
from their canalero. The canaleros are confronted with the practical difficulties of 
refusing irrigation turns to those water users who bypass them. This makes the actual 
water demand an unpredictable factor, as it is only partly expressed via centred 
admirustrative planning procedures. It also in part responds to a de-centred field 
dynamic that is difficult for the canalero to control. During the week, the canalero 
therefore occasionally has to adapt his weekly planning and demand less or more water 
for his sections. When this is the case for several sections, the WUA sends a request to 
the CNA to alter the total discharge from the dam. 
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Before starting to irrigate, water users have to pay a user fee per hectare of land to be 
irrigated. Formally, they require an irrigation request form from the canalero stating the 
crop and the number of hectares that the user wants to irrigate on a plot. With this form, 
the user has to go to the WUA office and pay the respective irrigation fee, which is a 
fixed rate per crop for every irrigated hectare. In return he receives an irrigation permit. 
These receipts again have to be shown to the canalero in order to irrigate for the first 
time. According to the Concession Title, the WUA is not allowed to allocate water to a 
user who has not paid his fee9. The WUA depends on the canalero to correctly register 
the irrigated area and to motivate water users to pay their fees. 
In spite of these rules, fee default remains a major problem for the WUA. The WUA does 
not have effective sanctions to discipline free riders who take irrigation turns before or 
without paying their fees, or to exclude them from access to water. The most effective 
means to counter fee default are two financial agreements with a major federal subsidy 
provider and multinational tobacco enterprises involved in irrigated production. These 
agreements are explained in more detail in Chapter 9. For this chapter it is important to 
know the following. The tobacco companies advance the irrigation fees of their tobacco 
producers to the WUA and deduct these expenses before the final disbursement of these 
farmers' profits. This secures a significant part of the WUA's annual fee collection. 
Besides their formally prescribed tasks, the Left Bank canaleros perform other activities 
and roles in line with their intermediary position. For a majority of users, the canalero is 
the only representative with whom they entertain some land of relation and encounter 
with some frequency whilst in the field. Many ejidatarios (members of ejidos) only go to 
the office of the association in Villa Hidalgo when they have to pay their fees. They have 
no relation with the association's board or management, or their ejido delegate. The 
canalero is an important source of information for them regarding, for instance, 
irrigation fees or crop subsidies. When the canalero is driving through the fields, he is 
easily approachable with regard to questions and complaints that users want to direct at 
the association. In addition, the canalero sometimes acts as a sort of agricultural 
extensionist or technical advisor for some producers. 
For the board and the group that controls the management of the WUA, the canaleros 
also fulfil activities that by-laws do not define. The canaleros are their 'eyes and hands in 
the field' (van der Zaag, 1992), a means through which they are able to 'act at a distance' 
(Latour, 1987; van der Zaag, 1992). Their usability and mobility in the field and 
accessibility from the office are greatly enhanced by the canaleros' radios and motor 
bikes. They are put into action for a variety of purposes, which occasionally have little to 
do with their job. For example, the canaleros have to assist with organising public 
meetings for the association or political meetings for the group that controls the WUA. 
They help to arrange the chairs and distribute food or drinks. 
The formation of a group of canaleros 
When the CNA officially handed over the Left Bank module to the association in 1993, 
the majority of the fifteen canaleros retired on a pension in the years that followed. Only 
two of them continued to work for the association. Both Dominguez and Dario were in 
their forties, had lower technical qualifications, and approximately fifteen years' 
experience as canaleros. Dominguez became the supervising canalero because he had 
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more experience and his patron was the then Head of the Operation Department and 
later the District Head of the CNA, Becerra. Both of them developed relations of mutual 
respect with their superior, Guttierez. Besides Guttierez' cousin, Diego, who had only a 
lower technical degree, the association employed a group of young agronomy graduates 
in their thirties as canaleros. They graduated from the agricultural college of Tepic, had a 
few years' working experience and participated with success in a course organised by the 
CNA. All canaleros originate from the area. 
After the transfer, work pressure increased considerably for the canaleros. During the era 
of government management (Ministry of Hydraulic Resources [SRH], Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources' [SARH], CNA), each canalero operated the 
infrastructure in one of the thirteen sections in the irrigation system. Today, six canaleros 
are each responsible for two neighbouring sections. In addition, the adrninistration of fee 
payment has become a much more demanding task under the WUA. In line with the 
increased workload, the canaleros' working conditions improved after the transfer, but 
this turned out not to be a structural change. Imnally, their wage increased significantly 
and, unlike before, their motor bikes were paid for and maintained by the association, 
and they received radios through which they could communicate with the main station. 
However, in the years that followed, their wage was not adjusted for inflation and 
therefore decreased in real terms, and their working conditions gradually deteriorated. 
Under the WUA, they lost their secure appointment, automatic membership of the 
influential government unions, reliable payment of salaries, occasional bonuses, rights to 
a pension, and further teaming. After two years their medical insurance was also 
annulled. As a consequence, the canaleros became much more dependent on the 
management of the association than they had been before under government 
management and lost some of the autonomy that they had had in their work and 
remuneration. Several canaleros were fired or replaced under conditions that remained 
unspecified. A number of them were accused of taking bribes from farmers, whereas 
other people suggest that a lack of loyally to their superiors played a role. This served as 
a threat to the other canaleros. 
The formation history of the canaleros determines their loyalty to the political group, led 
by Perez, in control of the management of the WUA. Diego, the cousin of the manager 
Guttierez, is most clearly absorbed in the dynamics of the aforementioned group, as will 
be illustrated in the next chapter. The four agronomy graduates are less closely related to 
Perez' political group. They developed a mutual friendship bond on the basis of their 
shared educational background and working relations, and a secretly critical stance 
towards the management of the association. During my fieldwork, several conflicts 
emerged between the canaleros and the management. Laguna, who serves as the case 
example in this chapter, is the most outspoken of the canaleros concerning their 
deteriorating working conditions. The two more experienced canaleros have a different 
position. Dominguez plays an important role for Guttierez as a field representative and 
supervisor of the canaleros. He co-ordinates the actions of canaleros both in the field 
and when they are needed to arrange a meeting, for example an assembly of delegates or 
a more public meeting. Dario, the other older canalero, maintains more distant relations 
with the other canaleros and with Guttierez, and plans to resign within a few years. 
The group of canaleros is fragmented along the lines of their different loyalties and 
commitments, trajectories. The fact that they are divided during negotiations on their 
132 The Success of a Policy Model 
working conditions frustrates most of them. In private, these mutual differences become 
very clear. Although they often sit or cirink together on public occasions, the group of 
engineers socialises separately from Guttierez, Diego, Dominguez and other personnel. 
During such private encounters, for instance at birthday parties or in a cantina, they tend 
to criticise and make jokes about each other. Frequently, these jokes concern their 
manhood, clrinking behaviour or their dealings with women, but they also contain 
criticism of their social, economic and professional commitments. 
The majority of the canaleros have spent most of their careers with the association 
working in two fixed sections, yet on several occasions the management have attempted 
to switch them between different sections, though never with much success. As a 
consequence, they have experience of working other sections of the Left Bank system 
usually only for a short period, because of the reversal of the managerial decision. For 
example, during the '97-98 season Diego started in sections 4 and 8, but in February, 
halfway through the season, he was changed back to sections 6 and 11. Three other 
canaleros, amongst whom was Laguna, were also changed back to their former sections. 
Perez and Nunez (president and secretary, respectively, of the Left Bank WUA) make 
those decisions. Diego states that they aim to prevent the canaleros developing too great 
a friendship with users and committing fraud, i.e. accepting bribes. Nevertheless, he 
finds it peculiar to do this halfway through the irrigation season when water distribution 
is still very intensive. He explains that, when a canalero starts to work in a new section, 
he can never get to know the users, canals, and water levels rapidly. To learn this you 
need at least six months, Diego argues. A colleague of his calls Perez capricious for 
moving the canaleros about and suggests that there are also other interests at work apart 
from preventing the canaleros from accepting bribes. He refers to the production 
interests of Perez and a group of favoured large-scale rice and sorghum producers (see 
Chapter 6). The way in which the canaleros are dispersed over the system thus takes into 
account the spatial distribution of these producers' land in the irrigation system and the 
relationship they have with particular canaleros. At the beginning of the '98-99 season, 
several canaleros changed sections. 
During the rainy season, the canaleros' work pressure in terms of water distribution and 
fee administration significantly decreases. The management argues that, because of the 
lack of irrigation and fee payment, there are not sufficient revenues corning in to keep 
the full body of staff employed. To cut down on salaries, three canaleros, a mechanic and 
some secretarial help are temporarily relieved of their duties. This is possible because of 
the nature of their temporary contracts. Although generally the canaleros with other 
sources of income are the ones sent home, there is always an immanent threat that they 
will have no income during those months. This creates dependency and discourages 
them from being very critical of their superiors. 
5.3 Case Study Laguna 
Life history and professional experience 
Laguna is a relatively young canalero of 32 years of age from the village of Villa Hidalgo. 
He recently married Dinora, aged 23, who is also working for the association, as a 
secretary. They are living just a few blocks from the office. A few months after I get to 
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know them, Dinora shows signs of pregnancy. Both are well-educated and have studied 
in the state capital of Tepic. Dinora completed a degree in business studies at the 
university. Privately she admits that this secretarial job is below her level and that she 
aspires to a more responsible job, more in line with her degree. However, given her 
circumstances it is difficult to find such a job in the rural village of Villa Hidalgo. Married 
relatively old in Mexican terms and already expecting his first child, Laguna is 
determined to make his marriage work. He takes his work very seriously and actively 
considers the prospects that he has within the association as a canalero with an 
agronomist's degree. Although he likes a beer, he refrains from drinking and going to 
the local cantinas. This is perhaps why he is still relatively lean compared with some 
other canaleros. 
Unlike most families in Villa Hidalgo, Laguna's family is not engaged in agriculture and 
owns no land. His parents and some of his sisters work as schoolteachers in different 
parts of the state. Laguna instead decided to study agronomy. After his studies, he 
worked together with Quiroz for Pacifico, one of the four tobacco companies active in 
the region. During that period, they promised to become each other's compadres (co-
parents) when one of them became a father. After two years, Pacifico laid off a large 
group of its field inspectors. Both Laguna and Quiroz became jobless. After the 
privatisation of Tabamex at the beginning of the 1990s, heralding the onset of a wider 
economic decline in the region, the demand for agronomists reduced significantly. Many 
of them started working as taxi drivers, or engaged in petty trade; others depended on 
their family plot for income, or migrated to the United States. None of these were 
options for Laguna, and it was difficult for him to find a job. 
He worked for some time in Tepic, until he participated in the aforementioned course 
organised by the CNA in November of 1993. The idea behind such courses was the 
framing and selection of new canaleros, who would work for the three newly established 
Water Users' Associations in the region: the Left and Right Bank of the Santiago River 
and the Right Bank of the Tuxpan River. According to Laguna, the participants were 
promised that the manager of the new associations would be picked from the group of 
trainees. A group of around fifty people participated, which indicates the amount of 
interest in these jobs. Although the nunimum qualification for the job was a diploma 
from an agricultural college, many agronomic engineers with a university degree 
participated. The framing part of the course was very general, according to Laguna. The 
CNA District Head and former Chief of Operation, Becerra, presented topics on the 
calculation of water volumes and irrigation depths required for particular crop areas. 
Laguna found it really simple, because it had all been part of his study as an agronomist. 
The course concluded with an exam. Both Laguna and Quiroz scored well. Together with 
Diego and another ex-colleague, they were selected to work for the association on the 
Left Bank of the Santiago River. Unlike Diego, Laguna did not have prior relations with 
persons from the board of the association10. As promised, the two nearby associations 
appointed managers from the group of course participants. However, the Left Bank 
appointed Guttierez, a close associate and compadre of that association's president, 
although he had not participated in the course. 
In 1993, Laguna started working as a canalero. The first period he experienced as very 
difficult. Originally, Laguna was supposed to be trained by one of the CNA's ex-
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canaleros, Juan, from the village of La Presa. However, when he arrived it appeared that 
all the old canaleros had already moved to the CNA offices in El Tizate for reasons that 
were not clear to him. As mentioned above, only two CNA canaleros with more than a 
decade of experience continued to work for the association, Dario and Dominguez, who 
became the supervising canalero. However, they did not have a clear role in Laguna's 
Ixaining either. Laguna recalls that he went to the field for the first time with another 
canalero who was fairly inexperienced himself. He remembers that that same day he was 
sent by this man along a lateral canal with the instruction to go and watch, without any 
further guidance. As he was driving along the canal on his motor bike, farmers came up 
to him asking him for water. He did not know anything and had no idea of what to do. 
The only thing was to start giving water out to these farmers and adjusting the control 
structures. It was very stressful and created many tensions for him and his young 
colleagues, some of whom could not handle the pressure. 
During his first weeks he made many mistakes, because he had nobody to show him 
what to do or how to solve a particular problem. On several occasions, this resulted in 
angry farmers demanding water, or accusations from his colleague canaleros that he was 
using too much water. "Theory is not like practice', he states, indicating that the techniques 
and concepts that he learned during his formal education and the CNA course were 
hardly useful for doing the work of a canalero. He learned slowly by actually distributing 
the water, by trying out different things and also by observing and interacting with his 
colleagues and irrigating farmers. 
Laguna's education as an engineer over-qualifies him, because he does not really require 
this degree for the job. What it does do is determine his critical outlook on his work and 
working conditions, as will become clear in the course of the chapter, and his aspirations 
to move on and find a job as a teacher or engineer. Further, together with his engineer-
colleagues he manifests a clistinction towards their less educated colleagues and 
experiences an injustice in the better salary conditions of their superior, who has a 
similar education. 
Sections as a work space 
Laguna is working for the third year in the relatively upstream sections 3 and 5 of the 
irrigation system (see Map 4). These are contrasting sections in terms not only of the 
type of land ownership, farmers", cropping patterns and field irrigation technologies, but 
also of plot size and the number of farmers to whom he has to distribute water (see 
Table 3). I shall mainly focus on section 5 (see Map 7), which is one of the largest and 
most demanding workspaces for a canalero, as it is dominated by small-scale tobacco 
production and sprinkler irrigation. I will concentrate on the problems, demands, and 
complexities that the specific operational arrangements involved in irrigation create in 
terms of the canalero's central activities. 
Both sections are located next to each other and depend on the main lateral 'the 17' that 
branches off from the main canal, on the spot where section 3 begins. Because of the 
relatively head-end location of these sections, they are generally never short of water. 
The two sections cover an area of about 3,400 hectares for potential irrigation. Around 
1,900 hectares are actually irrigated, roughly divided over 500 fields cultivated by several 
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hundred farmers. Laguna controls a sixteen-kilometre stretch of main canal and 
approximately thirty kilometres of lined lateral, sub-lateral and lower level canals. In 
addition, his sections are confined by a set of major drains and intersected by many 
minor drains. 
Laguna's sections are located on the riverbank just opposite Santiago Lxcuintla, the 
municipal capital. The sections comprise several smaller villages, each with a few 
hundred or a thousand inhabitants. The fact that the ejido lies at the centre of the public 
life in these villages indicates their rural character. Because Laguna is from Villa Hidalgo, 
he did not really know the farmers when he started to work here. Getting to know the 
many people involved in irrigation has taken Laguna several years. After three years, he 
knows hundreds of producers, bomberos (pump operators), irrigators and other villagers 
who are involved in the production of tobacco. Because of his young age and despite his 
degree as agronomist, Laguna does not have an authoritarian attitude towards the 
ejidatarios with whom he engages. He is friendly and respectful towards most of the 
irrigating farmers and bomberos that he encounters in the field and tries to prevent or 
mediate conflicts with them. Occasionally, he advises farmers about how to deal with the 
association's management, because he is very critical of their approach towards the 
users. Yet, Laguna does not seem to have a large intimate network of personal contacts, 
and his relations with the multitude of people in the field remain a bit detached. 
Section 5 consists of more than 1,000 hectares of land actually irrigated. Most of the land 
belongs to the ejido of La Presa, which is the largest tobacco producing ejido in the 
region, with over 1,000 hectares of tobacco. The tobacco cultivation is undertaken by 
hundreds of small-scale producers. The extremely fragmented pattern of land 
distribution and ownership is even further complicated by the large-scale leasing of land 
for the production of tobacco. On average, the irrigated tobacco plots are three hectares. 
This contrasts sharply with, for example, section 3 that typically contains much larger 
irrigated holdings of approximately eight hectares. In other sections the ejido plots also 
tend to be larger (on average four hectares). For the canalero, the daily water distribution 
and fee adrrunistration in a big section with a large number of plots and producers 
involves a huge workload. 
Section 5 is a politically important space for the association's management, because of 
the political and institutional importance of tobacco and the fact that some leaders and 
some of their clientele, allies and friends are based here, particularly among the ejido 
commissioners and delegates of the association's assembly. For the association, the 
financial importance of section 5 exceeds that of many other sections, because its fee 
collection potential is much higher (see Table 3 and Chapter 9). 
In order to bank these revenues, Laguna needs to connect the WUA's aclministration 
with that of the tobacco companies. This involves the complicated task of linking an 
official, but outdated, CNA list of water users and plots with a list of registered tobacco 
producers that often do not coincide. The companies transfer the irrigation fee for 
individual tobacco producers, who are organised in groups, only when they receive a 
group leader's signature to confirm that they are receiving water. To get this signature 
and find out which plots a tobacco producer is using and to which water user this 
corresponds, the canalero needs to visit all group leaders in his section. This is a very 
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labour intensive task and requires an mtimate knowledge of the multitude of plots, 
ejidatarios and tobacco producers in section 5. The association receives a periodic 
payment in respect of lists completed by the canalero. The management thus pressures 
the canaleros in tobacco sections to make haste with this activity. The canaleros in their 
turn complain about the various demanding tasks that they have to fulfil. In addition, 
these administrative procedures leave very little room for presents or bribes from tobacco 
farmers to the canaleros in exchange for water. 
Table 3 Sections 3 and 5 in Autumn-Winter 1999 
Section 3 Section 5 
Landholding pattern 1,440 1,821 
(hectare) 38 4 
Private land (%) 62 96 
Ejidos (%) 
Number of producers 224 541 
Private land holders (%) 5 1 
Ejidatarios (%) 95 99 
Cropping pattern (ha) 
1. Pasture 277 Tobacco 900 
2. Rice 132 Beans 75 
3. Sorghum 99 Sorghum 37 
4. Tobacco 55 Jicama 33 
5. Beans 28 Tomatoes 26 
6. Other crops 30 Perennials 23 
Irrigated area (ha) 621 1,094 
Number of irrigated plots 75 421 
Average irrigated plot size 8.3 3.1 
(ha) 
Irrigation technology 
(Percentage of area): 
Sprinkler irrigation 16 95 
Surface irrigation 84 5 
Irrigation fee agreements 
potential* (%) 51 93 
Source: Overview irrigated crops, Association, 1998-1999 (WUA, 1999); 
Irrigation plan 1989-1999 (CNA1999) 
* This is the percentage of hectares of a section that potentially falls under the agreements with 
PROCAMPO, the tobacco or sorghum companies. In the case of PROCAMPO, this includes the area 
under the eligible food crops, although it is not clear how much of this is actually registered for 
PROCAMPO. Thus, it gives a good but rough indication of how much of the fees can be collected through 
these financial agreements. 
The operational arrangement of sprinkler irrigation for tobacco 
The prevailing irrigation method in section 5 is sprinkler irrigation. Like in other parts of 
the Northern Coast, it is considered the traditional form of irrigation. Initially, tobacco 
companies introduced the first pumps and mobile sprinkler systems to the region in 
order to irrigate the lighter tobacco varieties they had started to produce. After the 
nationalisation of the tobacco market at the beginning of the 1970s, the parastatal, 
Tabamex, started to intervene in almost every phase of the tobacco production cycle 
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(Jauregui et al, 1980). Amongst other things, it arranged the irrigation of tobacco plots 
for thousands of tobacco producers in the region according to a complex scheme. This 
further increased the use and the number of sprinkler systems. Special staff, sprinkler 
installations, and other means and resources were allocated for this purpose. Most 
tobacco producers thus never experienced the need to buy a system for themselves, in 
spite of their sometimes-significant profits. In addition, they gained little experience with 
the actual irrigation themselves. Tabamex staff and the additional private owners who 
rented out their installations determined the timing of irrigation turns. 
Within this institutionalised distribution of assets, competences and labour, individual 
tobacco producers had no need to request an irrigation turn and therefore failed to 
develop a routine. This situation remained largely the same after the clismantling of 
Tabamex in 1991. The tobacco companies who became active in the area decided to 
decentralise the costly and labour intensive task of irrigation to their tobacco producers. 
They started giving out loans to the producers to buy a sprinkler system. However, most 
small-scale tobacco producers were not sufficiently profitable to qualify for such loans. 
Therefore, these farmers hired sprinkler systems from more well-to-do farmers, and the 
companies started pre-financing this for five irrigation turns per cycle. The high cost of 
this is paid for by these farmers at the end of the season. In addition, the companies 
started advancing the irrigation fees of their tobacco producers to the WUA. As a result, 
these producers developed no need to interact with either the WUA or the canalero to 
get permission for irrigation and learn about their operational rules. 
This institutional history clarifies the particular distribution of assets, competences and 
costs that determines the current irrigation practice. Most tobacco producers thus have to 
look for a fellow farmer willing to rent out a sprinkler installation to them every time 
they want to irrigate. Often they try to find somebody close to their plot, or from their 
own village. These scarce installations have thus become the critical link around which 
irrigating farmers organise their access to water. 
The owners of a sprinkler installation normally employ a bombero and, sometimes, 
additional regadores (irrigators) as labourers. The sprinkler systems used in this area can 
be characterised as periodic-move systems or, more precisely, hand-moved lateral 
systems (Cornish, 1998; Keller and Bliesner, 1990). The (non-human) components of 
these systems consist of a diesel pump with a capacity of forty litres per second, a 
temporarily fixed main line and hand-moved laterals, which transport the water under a 
certain pressure to the connected sprinklers. The bombero is responsible for installing, 
operating and mamtaining the pump. Together with the other irrigators, he connects the 
pipes to form a main line and a lateral. After a few hours, when a track of land has been 
irrigated, they move the lateral a few metres to irrigate the next bit. 
The owner of the pump, and also the bombero and his irrigators, are paid per hectare. 
This encourages them to irrigate rapidly and not to lose time in order to cover a greater 
area in a week. Particularly at the height of the irrigation season from November to 
March, a bombero earns a salary that is significantly higher than that of an ordinary land 
labourer. Many plots need to be irrigated, and the pumps, sprinkler systems and their 
operators are in high demand and are moving from one field to another. The owner of 
the pump can basically rent it out to anyone he wants. In order to bring the necessary 
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components together to get his land irrigated, a tabaquero (tobacco producer) is thus very 
dependent on the timing, quality and financing of work by others. Many small-scale 
tobacco producers thus play a limited role in the actual irrigation of their crops. They 
only have a rough idea when the bombero and the sprinkler system will arrive to irrigate 
their field, and all they can do is wait for that moment. It has never been an established 
practice among these tobacco producers to request an irrigation turn from the canalero, 
and it is also difficult in practice for them to request it three days in advance, because the 
timing of their irrigation turn is dependent on the availability of a sprinkler system. 
In practice, when the bombero arrives with the whole installation at a field, he 
immediately starts installing the pump and throws in the 'pkhancha' (intake pipe), if 
there is sufficient level in the canal or drain from which he intends to draw the water. 
The latter is usually not a problem in this section, especially at the head-end of canals. 
The bombero does not await the consent of the canalero or the tabaquero, neither of 
whom in most cases is present at that moment. A bombero basically does not need the 
canalero to give him access to water, because he can easily physically bypass him with a 
pump and an intake pipe. For them, this is simply the shortest and most time saving link 
to water. The canalero is in this case therefore not the most essential intermediary; what 
is more, his capacity to monitor pumps along a canal is limited. Inigating farmers whose 
fields are located towards the tail-end or near a drain, where the delivery of water is 
more irregular or insecure, are more likely to inform the canalero. When there is no 
water available, it sometimes happens that angry farmers or bomberos blame the 
canalero for not allocating sufficient water. 
The following focuses on Laguna's work of distributing water under this kind of 
operational arrangement, bringing to the fore the particular problems of control, 
contradictions, and complexities that he has to resolve in his daily practice. 
In the field: Driving along 'the 10' 
In spite of the overall abundance of water, the canaleros unanimously agree that the 
head-end of section 5 is one of the most difficult and demanding sections. They measure 
the difficulty and the workload of this section by the number of sheets Laguna requires 
for the programming and reporting of irrigation. When I ask him about section 5, he 
demonstratively waves in the air six or seven reporting sheets that he has painstakingly 
filled out. He stresses that some of his colleagues can suffice with only one or two pages 
per section. His weekly programmes and monthly reports require a lot of work, because 
of the large area, the large numbers of irrigating tobacco producers and their plots that 
have to be registered. This gives an indication of the amount and intensity of his work, 
and his long working days. It requires enormous flexibility on the part of a canalero to 
ensure that the available water supply in the main canals satisfies real demand in the 
field. 
When I join Laguna in his work in February 1998, still at the height of the main irrigation 
season, he departs from his house on his motor bike in the early morning. He works 
until the late afternoon, with an interruption at lunchtime. Most of the day he can be 
found in the field, but in the afternoon he sometimes needs to check an aarninistrative 
matter with one of the secretaries or is called to the office via the radio by Guttierez. 
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Having followed Laguna for several days, I find it difficult to derive a fixed daily routine, 
because his activity is determined by many factors: the route that he takes along the 
canals, the priorities he has on that day, and the things that unexpectedly come up in the 
field or the office. Laguna has considerable autonomy in detenriining his own working 
schedule and how he solves problems in the field. In these months of feverish activity in 
the field and at the office, his days are usually organised around the distribution of water 
and the administrative operations associated with fee collection, mostly from the tobacco 
producers in his sections. 
At this time of year when many farmers are irrigating, Laguna needs to make frequent 
adjustments to gates and intakes in the main canals, laterals, sub-laterals, and lower 
level canals. This often determines his route through the sections. He has to return two 
to three times a day to check the level in the canals. Especially when an additional 
amount of water for the tail-end sections has been let into the main canal, he has to 
ensure that the radial gates in the main lateral are adjusted so that this extra volume 
arrives in the downstream sections. As an upstream canalero, he can be easily accused by 
his downstream colleagues of using the water that they requested for his own sections 
when he is in need for water. From the main lateral, Laguna normally drives 
downstream along the sub-laterals and minor canals, where he checks the running 
irrigation turns and the water levels in the canals, whilst adjusting some gates. 
Meanwhile, he observes and talks to farmers, pump operators and irrigators, and other 
people that he encounters or seeks out in the field. Laguna alternates easily between 
opening gates and searching for particular tobacco producers who need to sign an 
agreement for him. 
The sub-lateral 10+539.77 of the lateral 17, called 'the 10' by the canaleros, is about five 
kilometres long and has three sub-laterals (see Maps 4 and 7). It is equipped with nine 
cross-regulators and thirteen direct field intakes. This canal presents several of the 
control problems that Laguna is experiencing in distributing water in this section, but in 
an even more intense way. The reason for this is that the canal is entirely dominated by 
small-scale tobacco production and sprinkler irrigation of many small plots. A rough 
calculation shows us that this canaL its laterals, and the drains connected to it irrigate 
more than 100 small plots, owned by a similar number of ejidatarios. On several 
occasions, Laguna emphasises the complexities and unexpected situations he encounters 
on this canal. 
Early one February morning, Laguna and I drive towards the inception of the 10 on the 
main lateral, near a crossroads just outside the village of La Presa. Arriving there, we 
meet the local CNA supervisor. We stand close to a cross-regulator in the main lateral, 
which backs up the water level to a height that ensures that sufficient discharge flows 
into the 10. The CNA supervisor comments to Laguna about the water in the main 
lateral being backed up to a very high level. The water is even flowing over the spillway 
of the cross-regulator, which is meant only for an excessive flow, such as occurs, for 
example, during a rainstorm. The supervisor is worried that, as a result, the downstream 
canaleros will not receive their requested volumes on time. Laguna responds that the 
situation is more complicated than the supervisor thinks. His aim is to maintain the 
water level exactly at the height of the spillway. He has to do this in order to cover the 
whole of the 10. 
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Map 7 Section 5 
According to Laguna, the canal is badly constructed. It runs 'in reverse'. The intake of the 
canal is much too high and the canal does not have a gradient. Moreover, the end reach 
of the canal even goes up slightly. If he lowered the water level in the main lateral by just 
twenty centimetres, this would mean that the water flow would not reach the end of the 
10. He would come into serious conflict with the tail-enders of the canal and those who 
use the tail water from the drain connected to it. His solution anticipates the water 
demand of these tail-enders, although some of them irrigate land that lies far away from 
a canal and several have not requested an irrigation turn. Damming up the water level at 
this point of the main lateral is a tricky business for Laguna, not least because it also 
affects the downstream water distribution of other colleagues, because they may receive 
their water later than requested. Laguna claims to have learned to deal with this 
infrastructural defect in this way through his experience of experimenting with water 
levels, adjusting the cross-regulator, and distributing water among these tobacco 
producers. The canaleros face similar problems with other sub-laterals. 
When we arrive at the 2+466 (a sub-lateral of the 10), Laguna points to two pumps 
placed on the road next to the 10. According to Laguna, he found these pumps working 
this morning without being apprised of the fact that these tobacco producers were 
plarming to irrigate. In addition, two other pumps were placed on the drain connected to 
the 10 into which water is released. As we drive along the 2 we encounter another two 
pumps that are irrigating. Although several of these pumps were not specifically 
programmed by Laguna, he estimates that the present flow in the 10 will be sufficient for 
the six pumps that he has observed. In his programme of last week and in determining 
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the actual inflow for the 10 this morning, he deliberately took into account the fact that 
some pumps would unexpectedly appear on the canal and consume an extra flow. He 
programmed and allocated water for a few additional pumps. However, sometimes this 
precautionary measure is not enough. Then he requests an additional amount of water 
for his section. The supervising canalero coordinates these mid-weekly requests with the 
dam. 
The total number of pumps on a canal thus detenrunes the actual water demand. But 
Laguna never has an exact idea of how many pumps will be placed along the canal 
during a weekday. Admittedly, the pumps only consume a limited and predictable water 
flow (40 1/s). However, it is not the individual water demand but the unpredictability of 
the number of working pumps that creates problems for him. It can happen that from 
one moment to the next suddenly around ten pumps are placed on the canal whereas 
only three or four farmers have forewarned him. The over-consumption causes the water 
level to drop rapidly, as a result of which the more downstream tobacco producers 
cannot irrigate. Meeting the rapidly increased demand immediately with the available 
supply of water becomes problematic. As a consequence, Laguna is confronted with 
angry downstream farmers who want to irrigate at once, because they have hired a 
sprinkler system and risk the bombero going somewhere else first, when they cannot 
irrigate right away. In spite of the fact that most tobacco producers along this canal come 
from the ejido of La Presa, there exists limited mutual social control on having the 
permission of the canalero to irrigate. This is caused partly because the actual irrigation is 
carried out by bomberos, who can easily dodge agreements, operational rules and the 
canaleros' authority. Getting the canaleros' permission is simply not their concern. The 
following day it can just as easily happen that Laguna finds only a few bomberos 
irrigating at the canal, with the result that the allocated water flow runs idly towards the 
ocean. 
Recently, Laguna was attending a meeting when he was warned via his radio that the 
placing of four pumps on the 2 was creating conflicts over the available water. He had to 
speed to the place and found that the pumps were indeed working without his consent. 
Because the canal did not contain sufficient water, the bomberos and tobacco producers 
started to quarrel. In the end they blamed him because there was not enough water, 
although none of them had requested a water turn. He had to go down to settle the 
conflict and let more water into the 10 and the 2 in order to allow them to irrigate. 
Although he might not have programmed this extra quantity, he prefers to prevent 
conflicts with the tobacco producers and bomberos awaiting or taking a turn. Laguna is 
blamed regularly for not supplying sufficient water, in spite of the fact that few farmers 
actually inform him of their requirements. 
According to Laguna, the unpredictability of the water demand requires him to regularly 
monitor the number of pumps along the whole length of the canal. To review the 
situation in the event of problems, he needs to check the whole sub-lateral and not just 
the field intakes, because the bomberos can basically start irrigating wherever and 
whenever they want to. At the height of the tobacco season, he passes along the 10 at 
least twice a day and sometimes even more often in order to check on the water level 
and make revisions when necessary. These decisions are largely tacit, based on Laguna's 
implicit knowledge and experience with this canal and its dynamic water demand. It is 
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also not in his interest to make such decisions explicit, as they can be very conflictive. He 
is well aware of the impact they might have downstream, i.e. the lack of water for his 
downstream colleagues, but that is not his direct concern. He is not directly confronted 
with the angry farmers who have planned an irrigation turn but do not receive it on time. 
The only Ihing to bother about is his downstream colleagues who are accusing him of 
taking too much water. His response to that is generally evasive. 
Laguna does not penalise this constant infringement upon the rules that he is supposed 
to monitor. As we drive along the 2, Laguna takes active notice of which fields are being 
irrigated without his permission, but does not get off his motor bike to intervene. If we 
stop to talk to tobacco producers or bomberos, it is usually about other business, such as 
the payment of the fee for this tobacco plot, or the name of a plot owner that Laguna is 
looking for. For instance, when Laguna sees two pumps working at the other side of the 
main lateral, we go to the field and see three men walking around with tubes. They are 
irrigating a field oijicama (a Mexican turnip crop). Laguna tells me that this is already the 
plofs second irrigation but that the irrigation fee has not been paid yet, in spite of the 
fact that he has already informed the owner of the plot once. The man lives in Tepic, the 
state capital, and is not usually around. Laguna asks one of the bomberos in charge 
whether the owner has already paid the fee. The bombero confirms this, but he fails to 
come up with a receipt. Laguna tells him to bring the receipt the next time he is 
irrigating. He does not make mention of the fact that neither the owner nor the bombero 
informed him about this irrigation turn, let alone apply a sanction. It appears he can do 
little to sanction these people. 
I ask Laguna what he does with farmers who do not inform him on time before starting 
to irrigate. According to Laguna, he tells them that the next time they should inform 
him. However, being in the field with him, I witness nothing of the sort. Moreover, in 
the days I spent with Laguna I have never seen him reprimanding a farmer about an 
irrigation turn that was not requested or not on time, in spite of the fact that he 
frequently complains about the difficulties that this presents to him. His busy daily 
schedule keeps him from reprimanding tobacco producers and bomberos for breaking 
this operational rule. In addition, applying a sanction is not really an effective option for 
Laguna. He claims to have told people over and over again to inform him if they want to 
irrigate, but that it has had little result. The same farmers continue to irrigate without his 
permission. Reprimanding has only produced conflicts with farmers and bomberos, 
which he prefers to avoid. Laguna seems to have reconciled himself with the situation 
that he is often bypassed and does not have effective control over the actual water 
distribution. 
But why does Laguna not use sanctions such as imposing a fine or sending for the 
hydraulic police, which is a special police department in Tepic for these matters? He 
responds that if he took such a measure the manager would immediately rescind it. Last 
year the hydraulic police finally visited the system. This visit was one of the few times 
that they came to the Left Bank. They removed an intake pipe (quitar la pichancha) of a 
farmer who had not yet paid his irrigation fee. Removing an intake pipe from a canal is 
something that the management often talks about and that the canaleros threaten, but in 
practice it hardly ever happens. In this case, the only thing the manager did the next day 
when the police had left was to give this man his pipe back without any reprimand. This 
example backs up Laguna's argument that the canaleros do not feel supported by the 
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management. On several occasions, his superior has undone his decisions or simply 
bypassed him. Such actions demotivate him from enforcing this particular operational 
ride. 
Near a cross-regulator in the 2,1 notice that the water is backed up close to the rim of 
the canal. I ask him why. Laguna responds that he did not cause this. Some farmers 
must have let the gate down during the night because they wanted more water. Laguna 
has not given them permission to do this. He rectifies the situation by bringing the gate 
up. Although he acknowledges that people have transgressed the operational rule that 
they should receive his permission, he does not take any further action. He seems used 
to people contesting his authority by moving structures without his permission. On other 
occasions, it seems that somebody moved a gate without an obvious motive, perhaps 
some boys who crossed the structure to get to the other side of the canal. When Laguna 
finds that people have moved a gate, he responds by returning it. In the case of 
repetition or when he suspects a notorious farmer, he may use a lock or make a remark 
to bystanders or particular farmers. However, it is often climcult to prove who moved the 
gate, and Laguna argues that it is not in his interest to create conflicts by accusing 
people, falsely or otherwise. Earlier on the day near the main lateral, we passed a cross-
regulator. He puts a lock on the only gate that is functioning. When I ask him why he 
does this, he claims that the user of the upstream intake in the past dropped the gate 
several times, so that he would get more water. He knows this person by now and 
therefore takes precautions. IXiring the field trips, I observe that Laguna has several 
locks (about five to six in his sections) attached to gates of check and intake structures, 
especially at locations where he knows from experience that gates are often moved with 
the risk of no water arriving or flooding being caused at the tail-end of a canal. In some 
cases, he suspects a particular farmer who has a personal record of such malpractice, or 
he is informed about a group of women doing their laundry in the canal who have 
moved the gate because they need more water. 
Two experiences to compare: A former and a new canalero on the scene 
In the shadow of an old guamuchil tree, close to the 10, Laguna discusses some of his 
work-related problems with an ex-canalero. Juan worked for the SARH and the CNA for 
twenty years and retired soon after the transfer of the irrigation system. When I ask him 
what has changed in the work of the canalero, he responds that very little has changed. 
It is true that the canaleros are more technologically advanced nowadays, being 
equipped with radios and motor bikes by the association. Laguna adds that the canaleros 
presently manage two sections and therefore a larger irrigated area. Juan, however, 
continues. He explains that the other day he witnessed the flooding of a plot, which was 
caused by farmers who had moved a gate without the canalero's permission. This also 
frequently happened in his day. Another thing that remains the same is that they also 
told producers again and again to request water on time, but this did not change a thing. 
Laguna seems to agree with the elder, experienced man. He argues that when he tells 
users to wait for their turn, somewhat later he receives an order from the office to give 
them water. 'They take away my authority', Laguna states. When he tells farmers that they 
have to wait before they can irrigate, they go to the association and ask if they can get 
water directly. Nunez and Guttierez give in to such requests because they have 
commitments with these farmers, or because they are engaged in a political campaign 
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and in need for support. Therefore, as canaleros they do not feel that the manager 
supports them. He claims not to be able to do anything, because the next time these 
farmers laugh in his face. 
'Mejor que sigues el corriente' (ft is better to follow the current), the ex-canalero concludes. 
For a canalero it is better to give in to certain pressures that he faces, rather than resist 
them. Some producers develop special relations with the office, the former canalero 
confides in me. The canalero cannot prevent that, he opines. This did not change in the 
past and will not change in the future. Following the current means that the canalero 
cannot always regulate the flow and control access to it. However, it does not imply 
mere passivity. 
The following experience will illustrate how a canalero acquires competence in dealing 
with particular social, material and spatial complexities through 'on-me-job-learning'. 
As a result of a managerial decision, Laguna switched sections with his colleague, Icazar, 
during the 1998-1999 season. These switches often occurred, although usually not for a 
long period. It was different this time. Before, Icazar had mainly worked in sections 4 
and 8, which are located close to his native village, San Isidro. Those sections are 
characterised more by the surface irrigation of food crops, such as rice, sorghum, and 
maize. This is the first year Icazar has worked in tobacco section 5. 
During his first month, I meet Icazar in the field. From his sweaty face and the desperate 
look in his eyes, I can tell that he is having a hard time. When I ask him about it he 
complains that, unlike Laguna, he does not know this section. A major problem is that 
there are so many different producers, whom he does not yet know. The difference, he 
argues, is that Laguna has already had several years of experience and consequently 
could drive around in a more relaxed fashion. He thinks that the people are 'más cabrón', 
which translates best as 'more difficult' here, whereas people in other sections are more 
easygoing. He goes on to explain that when he passes the 10 in the morning he only 
sees one pump, but when he returns at midday there are suddenly five more sprinkler 
installations pumping from the canal. "The people just place their pump and start to irrigate. 
As a result, the water does not reach the end of the canal so the farmers there start rebuking 
you'. Initially, he became angry and told them that they should inform him when they 
want to irrigate. In the section where he previously worked, he was not used to such a 
majority of producers not informing him of their intention to irrigate. After some time in 
section 5, he realised that it was no use, because there was slim chance that the tobacco 
producers would start irubrming him. According to Icazar, most producers do not 
understand the need to inform him and just take water, because they are unaware of the 
consequences further downstream, where there can be a lack of water. 
Another example shows that Icazar is also acquiring a competence in making use of the 
important task that he fulfils in aclministrating the financial agreement with the tobacco 
companies. After a few months in section 5, he realises that the significant revenue flow 
that he generates through his administrative efforts dries up too quickly when they pass 
through the hands of the management. He fears that in the coming months their salary 
payment will suffer because of that. Hence, Icazar resists pressures from his superiors to 
speed up this work and deliberately delays collecting the signatures that the WUA needs 
for the effectuation of the payments. He attempts to spread the revenues over the season 
so that there is sufficient money for the salaries. 
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Managerial control and labour relations 
The direct involvement of Laguna's superior, Guttiérez, with his work as a canalero is 
limited, and Laguna interprets this as a lack of commitment and support. In contrast to 
this, Guttiérez' expectations are high and his occasional instructions very forceful, 
according to Laguna. He expects a quick response when he instructs him to immediately 
give water to a particular farmer, or pushes him to finish seeking out a list of tobacco 
producers that he wants to submit to a tobacco company for their fee payment. Laguna 
is dissatisfied with the fact that, in exchange, his superior does not support the canaleros 
when they are pushing for higher wages or when they have a conflict with farmers. It is a 
general complaint among canaleros that Guttiérez easily gives in to the producers that 
come to him with complaints or requests and authorises them to take water or overrules 
the canaleras' decisions. This, they feel, undermines the canaleras' authority vis-á-vis 
these farmers. 
In addition, the manager's political group has certain commitments with a group of 
favoured large producers who have effectively been given privileged access to irrigation 
water for the rice, maize, sorghum and pasture that they produce. The canaleros are 
expected to take this into account. Some of these large producers can contact Guttiérez 
and the canaleros directly, because they have access to the same radio frequency. This 
makes it possible for them to quickly request an irrigation turn, demand more water 
from the canaleros, eavesdrop on their conversations and communicate with the 
manager. In effecting water distribution, Laguna is well aware of the commitments that 
the board and the management of the association have with particular, powerful 
producers in his zone. Although he does not always respond to their wishes for a quick 
irrigation turn or more water, Laguna complains about the fact that the management 
undermines his authority, because they often support the claims of farmers, because they 
have commitments or are engaged in a political campaign. As canalero he has to deal 
with such contradictions. The problem remains the same with these producers. 
Guttiérez' position is ambiguous in this matter. When they complain about it, he tells 
the canaleros not to give any of the favoured producers more water, but at the same time 
he does nothing to prevent them from demanding it. 
Laguna starts to spout out his criticism of the board and management of the association, 
and how the canaleras' difficult position results from their activities. He warns me not to 
get the wrong impression from the stories and behaviour of the manager, who creates 
the impression that he is dynamic and hard working. He criticises the fact that the 
current group of the ex-president and local diputado Pérez, the president Nunez, and the 
manager Guttiérez form a closed group that decides on everything that happens in the 
association. Neither the association delegates nor the CNA are able to control this group. 
He berates the 'corruption' that the group practices, the resources that they extract from 
the association, the privileged access to water they give to a select group of favoured 
producers and the machines that they use for trabajos particulares (private jobs) outside of 
the irrigation district. 
Laguna is especially critical of his own superior, Guttiérez, who lacks the expertise for his 
job, he says. He simply obeys his patron, Pérez. Laguna argues that Guttiérez does not 
do his job well and that what he does is not very difficult. He illustrates this with some 
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examples. Once, for instance, Laguna took over Guttierez' job for a short time and came 
to that conclusion. In addition, Guttierez does not really know what the work of the 
canalero entails. On one occasion, when Laguna was on a short vacation, Guttierez 
permitted a farmer to open an inlet structure with a very steep slope, in spite of the lock 
that he had connected to it. On this site it often happened that women opened up the 
inlet in order to wash, without knowing what they caused at the tail-end, so he kept it 
locked. Guttierez gave permission to remove the lock by force and ordered the opening 
of the inlet with twenty turns of the hand wheel, on the assumption that it would deliver 
a flow of forty litres per second. In reality, it turned out to be ten-fold that amount and 
this led to large-scale flooding at the bottom of the canal. According to Laguna, 
Guttierez not only failed to see the consequences of his actions, but also undermined the 
authority of the canalero, by giving permission to remove a lock. 
A major underlying source of frustration for Laguna is the canaleros' poor working 
conditions, for example their low salary, just a third of what their superior earns. In spite 
of this, their superiors are still very demanding. In addition, the payment of their salaries 
is erratic, their contracts are temporary and they have no medical insurance. It happened 
on several occasions that, when the association was out of money, Perez pre-financed all 
the salaries of the personnel. The management presented this as an act of benevolence 
and commitment on the part of Perez, strengthening the sense of personal obligation 
and dependency. Laguna has pleaded for a salary increase or insurance, but to no avail. 
He deplores the division amongst the canaleros and the fact that they do not have a 
union. Because the WUA management directly controls the working conditions of the 
canaleros, they are able to practice a sort of 'divide and rule' over them. 
Although in private Laguna is very cynical about the association's management and his 
own working conditions, he usually does not express his criticism of his superior in 
public. He only trusts a limited group of confidants in these matters, such as his engineer 
colleagues. Only occasionally has he open confrontations with Guttierez. These conflicts 
emerge especially in times of high work pressure and when the salaries are not paid. 
Several times they resulted in Guttierez threatening to fire him. Laguna is really 
concerned about the risk of losing his job, because with a young pregnant wife and a 
new house he needs a steady salary.' They can make your life and work very difficult, so that 
you have to resign yourself, he explains. In the past, several of his colleagues did not get 
their contracts renewed, because they were accused of taking bribes. Laguna suspects 
that they were actually too critical for the management. At the same time, Laguna knows 
that Guttierez will not carry out his threats, certainly not during the irrigation season. He 
needs Laguna, because he does his job well. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The observed water use practices demonstrate that self-interest amongst farmers leads 
them to break operational rules, and this generates not a consensual equilibrium 
outcome but a conflict of interest. Head-end farmers who do not request an irrigation 
turn are not confronted with the consequences of their behaviour in the way that tail-
end farmers are. The canalero's role here is to mediate and curtail the effects of these 
patterns of behaviour. 
Following the Current 147 
A canalero does not acquire a competence in dealing with such control problems 
through a formal education, courses, or operational rules. The role of more experienced 
canaleros is also limited. Rather, Laguna acquired a detailed knowledge of the 
idiosyncrasies of his section and the complexities involved in water distribution mainly 
through learning in the course of his work. Over time, this experience taught him skills, 
such as how to maintain a water level in a canal, anticipate and respond to the 
unpredictable patterns of water demand, and negotiate between the demands of 
different groups of irrigators and his superiors concerning water distribution. 
Much of the embodied cognition and competence that canaleros use on the job is 
acquired implicitly without the intention to learn or awareness of having learned 
(Spaeth, 1999). Therefore, to understand it we should address the tacit, implicit or sub-
conscious dimension of such cognition (Baumard, 1999; Sparrow, 1998; Sternberg and 
Horvath, 1999). The tacit knowing which shows itself in the intelligent action of a 
practitioner' is called 'knowing in action', by Schon (Schon, 1983). It concerns the skills, 
tacit feel (Sparrow, 1998), or know how of a practitioner. I refer to a kind of cognition 
that is implicit in the competent performance of a practitioner and that is not necessarily 
readily accessible as conscious rules. Laguna demonstrates in his water distribution 
practices a tacit knowing or feel, which he acquired largely by 'learning by doing' and 
on-me-job-training. 
These competent practices of a canalero are not a commodity that can be transferred 
from place to place and cannot be expressed in terms of official rules of conduct. Rules 
are so variously interpreted and so loosely enforced that one cannot define a uniform 
standard of competent practice. If one is to understand people's behaviour at work, one 
needs to recognise their expertise, regardless of the degree of formality in its 
development. One needs to recognise its multiplicity, rather than seek the single set of 
rules that best characterise it (Sparrow, 1998). 
Hence, it is not a set of allocation rules that detenriines water distribution, but rather a 
service relation that has persisted despite several bureaucratic reorganisations, in which 
the canalero mediates between officials and farmers (Mosse, 1997). This corresponds 
with van der Zaag's observation that a professional group of canaleros assumes an 
intermediary position and derives a competence from their experience with the irrigation 
system and day-to-day water distribution (van der Zaag, 1992). The case study presented 
in this chapter contributes in two ways to these insights. 
Firstly, the canalero's authority and competence over water distribution are contested on 
a regular basis12. In section 5 of the irrigation system, Laguna's authority and competence 
are frequently subverted by tobacco producers and bomberos. They bypass the canalero 
by irrigating without getting his permission or paying fees. But his superior also 
circumvents him occasionally, by giving producers permission to take water or break a 
lock. Operational rules do not provide straightforward solutions to the many problems of 
control, and lack of it, that canaleros experience. In actual water distribution, canaleros 
have to anticipate, adapt and respond to the immediate material and social demands 
they are posed. Their success in positioning themselves as obligatory passage points 
(Latour, 1987) or effective mediators differs. Laguna's experiences on the 10 in this 
respect are slightly more extreme than in other parts of his sections. However, the 
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conclusion that operational rules do not necessarily determine actual distribution 
practices applies to the system as a whole and beyond. 
Secondly, the canalero's competence is contested and embedded in concrete social, 
material and spatial relations (Hutdiins, 1995). Laguna's experience became evident in 
his dealing with the specific combinations of sprinkler irrigation and small-scale tobacco 
production. This point came across even more clearly through Laguna's colleague who 
succeeded him in section 5. First he experienced, and then had to learn how to deal with, 
its complexities. Even so, this does not imply that this type of cognition or the learning 
process is purely personal and that it cannot at all be exchanged or transferred. Of 
course, there is significant overlap in the canaleros' experiences with crops, irrigation 
technologies, farmers on the Left Bank; and most canaleros have worked for some time 
in other sections. Yet, they have developed a greater degree of competence and 
experience in the sections of the irrigation system where they have worked for the 
longest period. 
Tollowing the current' as a statement perfectly reflects the canalero's predicament. From 
his position, it is sometimes difficult to regulate water demand, exclude farmers from 
access to water, and impose sanctions when necessary. Therefore, he is unable to resist 
particular pressures and has to 'follow the currenf. However, this does not mean that 
the canalero is completely at the mercy of what irrigators decide to do. He responds 
actively, and his actions have important effects. Laguna's competence lies precisely in 
dealing with such 'problems of control' and in curtailing their negative consequences. He 
has learned to anticipate the unpredictable water demand and respond to the social and 
technical difficulties of cfctfbuting water and controlling its use. For instance, he 
monitors the water levels in the canals, adjusts structures and water flows accordingly, 
divides water on the spot, settles conflicts, negotiates with farmers, sometimes tells them 
to await their turns, or he requests more water from the dam. In addition, he anticipates 
particular problems by programming more irrigation turns than strictly required, in order 
to have sufficient water in case of unannounced irrigators. By putting locks on inlet 
structures, he prevents farmers from taking water or causing floods. He also avoids 
conflicts over water and takes care that the water requested by tail-enders really reaches 
the tail-end. The canalero's participation in water distribution is much more a de-centred 
and adaptive performance (Richards, 1985) than a centrally regulated one. 
My conclusion is not that operational rules have no relation whatsoever to the 
distribution and use of water. Operational rules are not just bureaucratically imposed 
and completely meaningless to the daily practice of the canalero, even when they are not 
supported by effective incentives or sanctions. Admittedly, the three-day rule seems to 
originate from old bureaucratic management prescriptions, which did not take into 
account local irrigation practices and seem to apply more to surface irrigation. However, 
Laguna especially employs it discursively when he explains why water distribution is 
such a complex undertaking and why he is not to blame for the negative impacts of 
mismanagement. The three-day rule seems to embody an idea of the ideal and orderly 
practice of water distribution that canaleros have. Referring to the rule serves the 
symbolic purpose of demonstrating that they, as canaleros, are not responsible when, for 
instance, they cannot deliver an irrigation turn on time. It legitimises their role and 
performance as canaleros, whilst extending the blame or urtieashing their frustrations 
towards the users, or in other cases the management. It is striking that the canaleros 
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especially are starting to use the term tos usuarios (the users) instead of producers, 
ejidatarios, or tabaqueros, in association with this rule. It hints to a concept of a 'good 
user' and a normative idea of conduct (Law and Akrich, 1994). 
Operational rules define a proper and rational conduct and ascribe a certain identity or 
label to real life actors (Wood, 1985). They prescribe a normative idea of conduct for 
organisational actors with fixed identities and rationalities. The rules posit an image of 
'the good water user', a rational and disciplined user who is willing to pay a certain fee 
on time in exchange for a specified service, namely timely and adequate water 
allocations (Law and Akrich, 1994). At the same time, the image of a 'competent 
manager' is constructed. WUA managers are assumed to be the centre of decision 
making, competent and authoritative individuals (Meinzen-Dick et al., 1995) and agents 
with a circumscribed area of authority or competence. They ought to be capable of 
prograrnming and controlling water distribution from a distance by means of rationalised 
and centred procedures of water distribution planning. Proper sanctions enable them to 
discipline the conduct of rent-seeking subordinates and free riding water users in 
operating infrastructure and regulating access to resources such as water. Operational 
rules are often used more as a standard, norm or ideal of orderly and rational irrigation 
management. Neo-institutional models of organisation that presume that sets of agreed 
rules and incentives determine irrigation management are often better at projecting a 
normative image of what should be done than at describing what is actually done in 
practice. 
Notes 
1 Held notes, February 1998. 
2 According to Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990), such operational rules are nested in collective choice rules 
and constitutional rules which govern the process of rule making and the eligibility or legitimacy of the 
governing authority. They prescribe when, where and how to withdraw water, how to monitor the 
actions of users, what information must be exchanged or withheld, and what rewards and sanctions 
will be assigned to actions and outcomes (Ostrom, 1990:52). 
3 It is only recently that studies on field workers in irrigation have filled this gap: e.g. the bailiff in 
Zimbabwe (Manzungu, 1999) and canal operators in Peru (Vos, 2002). 
4 I thank Alex Bolding for some of these observations made above. 
5 Bolding and van der Zaag (2001) use a similar concept which they call 'water networks'. I prefer 
not to use that term here, because I want to keep the possibility open that resources other than water 
can come to dominate such a network. 
s Land reform communities created after the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Before the revision of 
Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992, ejido land belonged to the state, with a combination of 
community (ejido) and private (ejidatorió) usufruct. Ejido members are called ejidatarios. 
7 Annex 5 of the 'Titubde Concesión' (CNA1993). 
8 Old District documents from the 1970s already mention this term of three days. 
9 If, for some reason, a crop has been established before fee payment, it is legally impossible to 
refuse water to this crop. 
™ At a later date, the current president of the association asked him if he would be his compadre at 
the baptism of his daughter, as both were working closely together with him. 
" I will use the term 'water user' only when it is explicitly mentioned by documents or interviewees. 
1 2 Although van der Zaag gives several examples of this, it is not made part of his conceptual 
deliberations in a satisfactory manner. 
Photo 10 The canalero and an irrigator closing an inlet 
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Photo 11 A rice field with bunds 
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Photo 12 An irrigator working on an irrigation furrow 
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Photo 13 Canaleros distributing food 
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The Client in a Political Group: 
The case and place of a canalero 
For a Mexican, life offers the possibility to 'chingar' or to be 'chingado '. That is 
to humiliate, punish and offend. Or the converse. This concept of social life as 
struggle fatally engenders the division of society into strong and weak. The 
strong - los chingones, without scruples, hard and inexorable - surround 
themselves with keen and interested faithful followers. Subservience towards the 
powerful - especially among the class of the 'poUticos1, that is of the professionals 
of public affairs -is one of the deplorable consequences of this situation. Another, 
no less degrading, is the adhesion to persons and not to principles. Frequently, 
our politicians mix public with personal affairs. 
i Octavio Paz, my translation (Paz, 1994). 
DRAMATIS PERSONAE: 
Diego Guttiéreí 
Guttiérez 
Pérez 
Nuñez 
Laguna ¡ 
Icazar 
Ejidatarios 
Domínguez 
Quiroz 
Darío 
Becerra 
Network of favoured producers 
canalero and client 
manager of the WUA Diego's cousin, superior and compadre 
Diego's patron, former president of the WUA local deputy and large producer 
and leader of a political group 
president of the WUA 
canalero, engineer and Diego's upstream colleague 
canalero, engineer 
members ofejidos 
private producers 
supervising canalero and upstream colleague 
canalero, engineer 
canalero, tail end colleague 
CNA district head and former head of operation 
Frederico Haro, Norberto, Aguirre, Bernardo Ulloa 
PROPS: 
Irrigation infrastructure 
Canal structures 
Crop 
Weeds 
Rice fields 1 
Bunds 
Constant water flows 
Drink 
Food 
Albures 
Music 
Irrigation fees ; 
Information flows 
Motor bike 
Radio 
Maintenance machines 
network of connected canals and drains of distinct levels 
cross-regulatros, sluices, intake structures 
rice, sorghum, maize 
wild rice 
rice plots with bunds and irrigation furrows 
borders that divide up the rice fields in blocks 
Pacífico beer 
seafood, meat, tortillas 
jokes with a double meaning and a sexual undertone 
machinery to carry out maintenance of irrigation works 
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6.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I have analysed the group of canaleros (people in charge of the 
distribution of water at field level) of the Left Bank irrigation system, like Van der Zaag 
(1992), as an occupational community with a shared body of practices, a culture, and an 
understanding of irrigation management that is rooted in past practice. Under the Water 
Users' Association (WUA), this group has become fragmented and divided in contrast to 
the close group that van der Zaag depicted under public management. The transfer of 
the irrigation system and the formation of a political group within its boundaries have 
reinforced this fragmentation. There are several reasons for this: 
Firstly, the WUA employed canaleros with distinct professional and educational 
backgrounds and qualifications. Secondly, the transfer of the irrigation system to the 
WUA has eradicated a generation of experienced canaleros. This rupture with the past 
has altered their process of initiation, socialisation, learning and group formation. Under 
the former bureaucratic management, new canaleros were supervised, trained and 
initiated by the older canaleros, who passed on a body of knowledge, practices, 
understandings on how to cope with particular complexities and conflicts in their work 
situation, as well as rules and norms of group behaviour and loyalty. Sharing this base 
was important in engendering a group culture. This was reflected in their respect for a 
retired canalera who initiated more than half of the group and acted as a sort of father 
figure to them. Such a process can be instrumental in the formation of hierarchical group 
relations embedded in a certain mutual respect and loyalty and in producing a practical 
distribution of tasks and cognition (Hutchins, 1995). This process of group formation was 
interrupted when the association took over the operation of the infrastructure. After 
transfer, canaleros were hired and fired more erratically. Thirdly, political and patron-
client relations mtermingle with employment relations among the WUA staff and in the 
canaleras' group. The political group that has established itself in the WUA privileges its 
clients, and these clients are expected to be loyal to the group in return. The canaleros 
who are not clearly identified with the political group are to a lesser extent subject to 
similar clientelist expectations. Under the new management regime, labour relations and 
working conditions have significantly deteriorated for the canaleros. As they are no 
longer protected by unions and fixed contracts, they are subject to increased job 
insecurity and financial dependency on the management. This has created the possibility 
for the management to 'divide and rule' over the group of canaleros, playing on their 
differences and dependencies and securing their divided loyalty. 
These de facto changes that irrigation management transfer (LMT) has generated 
demonstrate the importance of something that is often taken for granted in policy 
approaches that consider irrigation management reform as merely a technical matter: 
resource allocation cannot be culturally disconnected from political and patron-client 
relations. In the case of the canaleros, it becomes clear that their work is not just 
evaluated on professional or technical criteria, but also in terms of cultural expectations 
associated with the clientelist relations in which they are engaged. To further elaborate 
this point, I will present the case study of the canalera, Diego, who is a client of the 
political group that controls the WUA on the Left Bank of the River Santiago. Because 
Diego is part of this group, he has a privileged position and does his work differently 
than the rest of his colleagues. This case will address the need to revise conventional 
! 
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sociological pnodels that take patron-client relations to be straightforward, unilateral and 
vertical, in \Vhich the patron monopolises the power and resources on which his clients 
depend. These top-down models fail to explore the actual operation of clientelism at the 
everyday leyel. By focusing on the role that the client in this case plays in the distribution 
of various njaterial and cultural resource flows, which are essential in the reproduction of 
the political jgroup, I will refine the analysis of patron-client relations. 
Political groups and clientelism 
Political groups are made up of patron-client relations. In existing analyses, clientelism 
presupposes strong economic and power inequalities in which a patron monopolises the 
resources that are vital for his clients. According to such a perspective, political groups 
are manifestations of personal links motivated exclusively by material interest, and held 
together by fear of their leader, who obliges the members to act in conformity with his 
objectives (Hernández Rodríquez, 1997). This reduces the clients of a political group to 
mere subjecfts of the patron's power and dependent upon his control over resources. 
Such a unilateral image of patron-client relations witlún a political group is problematic. 
This case will show that a leader does not monopolise all the power and resources of his 
group and tjiat group members and clients play a culturally competent role in organising 
access to the resources that are important to the group and its leader. 
As Larissa ¡Lomnitz points out, the prolonged nature of patron-client relations is 
associated with cultural variables and moral principles such as confianza (trust)1, 
compadrazgo] (ritual kinship), loyalty, and friendship (Adler Lomnitz, 1994; Lomnitz, 
1977). In spite of the dimension of subordination in the (patron-client) relationship, it is 
perceived, tj>oth publicly and privately, as evolving from friendship or kinship bonds 
(Enge and Whiteford, 1989: 171). The durability of these networks is derived from the 
identíficatioh with shared cultural and normative values, ideas and aspirations that 
develop becjause of a daily working relationship. In Mexico, political groups often share 
specific cultural values. Confianza is the cultural base of existence of an equipo (team or 
group), notj only in personal loyalty but also in work performance. A relationship of 
personal trijst is important, but not in a manner that is blind to the competences and 
experience pi a co-operator (Greenberg, 1970; Grindle, 1977; Hernández Rodríquez, 
1997). Anotjher related cultural element underlying the functioning of political groups is 
cuatismo. Lcjmnitz defines it as the Mexican form of male friendship. She emphasises the 
role of alcdhol in such friendships (Adler Lomnitz, 1994). Family and compadrazgo 
relations aré also elements that strengthen the bonds of political groups. 
The power pi a patron is often based on his influence, which enables him to place close 
associates im different jobs to which he can delegate functions (Adler Lomnitz, 1994). In 
the politicsj of appointments, at times administrative spaces are shared with other 
groups, but! a politician delegates the most important functions to those he sees as 
talented an<ji competent people. This creates the need for both capacity and confianza, or 
better: reliajjility (Hernández Rodríquez, 1997). This is associated with the interrelation 
between political groups and the bureaucracy in Mexico and the way in which the 
political calendar dictates the replacement of politicians and high officials after every 
sexenio (the six-year presidential term) (Camp, 1993; Grindle, 1977). During the sexenio, 
a patron needs not only to improve his own position, but also to prepare the way for his 
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close associates as potential successors and place them in strategic political or 
bureaucratic positions. In addition, the group needs to free the resources and build the 
support necessary to fulfil its shared aspirations to ascend. A political group thus 
assumes a distribution of organisational positions and tasks, and professional as well as 
cultural competences that are employed in the distribution of resource flows and the 
reproduction and advancement of the group. 
In order to analyse the political group that controls the management of the Left Bank 
WUA, I make flexible use of existing definitions of social networks (Auyero, 2000; 
Hernandez Rodriquez, 1997; Long, 2001). A political group is a social network with an 
inner and an outer circle of relations. The inner circle of a political group is composed of 
the closest followers of a leader, with whom he shares political and adrninistrative 
experience, professional trajectory, and aspirations of power and career buuding. They 
are people who work directly and intensely with each other and develop strong ties of 
long-lasting friendship, parentage, or fictive kinship, and a mutual sense of loyalty. This 
inner circle helps the leader with the distribution of goods, problem solving and 
information gathering (Auyero, 2000). The outer circle is composed of a more extended, 
loosely-knit network of weak ties with friends or acquaintances of the leaders of the 
group (Long, 2001). This outer circle of a political group is maintained or extended 
through its capacity to deliver special favours, goods, services, or information. Hence, 
these are affinities and commitments of a different duration (Hernandez Rodriquez, 
1997). It is important not to view a political group as a static whole. Throughout its 
development, new leaders emerge, whereas older ones lose ground, just as the network 
gains and loses members, and changes in composition and in the range of organisational 
domains and positions that it encompasses. 
Diego 
The inner circle of the political group that controls the Left Bank association consists of 
the patron, Perez, the up and coming leader, Nunez, their subordinate, Guttierez, and 
several of their clients among the personnel. This hierarchically arranged group is again 
part of a large political network dominating politics in the state of Nayarit. The outer 
circle of the group is extensive, but in part consists of a network of several favoured large 
producers who are favoured clients and enjoy privileged support and access to the 
association's resources. 
Diego belongs to Perez' equipo. In 1993, Diego participated in the CNA course and 
examination organised to select personnel for the newly established associations. On 
completion of the course he was employed by the association, after Perez had become 
president and his cousin and compadre (co-parent), Guttierez, its manager. Because the 
patron Perez, first president of the association and current president of the control 
committee, provided him with a secure job and other privileges, Diego can be considered 
as his client. Specifically, Diego's colleagues see him as part of Perez' group. He never 
expresses it rumself as such, but his behaviour and statements make it obvious. 
Diego has known Perez from as early as his preparatoria (high school) days in Villa 
Hidalgo. Over the years, the Guttierez and Perez' families maintained close relations, 
not only at social events, but also by sharing political preferences, relations and posts in 
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local producer and political organisations, usually related to the Partido Revoludonario 
Institutional |(PRI). Diego harbours an ambivalent mixture of feelings for his patron: 
admiration, friendship, deference, disapproval, loyalty and fear. He usually respectfully 
calls him el \licentiaao (referring to Perez' university education as a lawyer) and only 
occasionally uses his first name, Gonzalo. Being part of Perez' group creates particular 
expectationsj obligations and responsibilities regarding his work as a canalero. At times 
he is critical of his superiors because of that, but usually he complies. 
That Diego js a client of Perez has influenced the choice of the sections in which he 
works. Sincc+ 1993, he has worked most of the time in sections 6 and 11, which are 
located in trie middle stretch of the Left Bank system and receive water from the main 
lateral 19 (seie Map 6). This area mainly covers the ejido2 land of the four ejidos based in 
Villa Hidalgo and several smaller ejidos in its environs. Diego knows the area in which 
he works likfc the back of his hand, because he was born and grew up here. Among the 
farmers from Villa Hidalgo, both ejidatarios and private landholders, he has many 
friends, neighbours, and acquaintances. For him it is a good place to work. It is close to 
Villa, where pie lives, and he knows all the canals and the producers there. Diego points 
out that the experience that a canalero has in certain sections is very much related to the 
canal lay oulf, the people, the crops, the water availability, etc. in those particular spatial 
settings. As \ have argued in Chapter 5, a canalero's competence cannot automatically be 
transferred to other sections because of the idiosyncratic social, material and spatial 
arrangements in which it is embedded. 
! 
6.2 Diego asj a Cultural Agent 
A pleasant acquaintance 
Diego always made a big impression on me. The image of his corporeal magnitude 
planted on aj motor bike remains forever imprinted on my retina. On the Northern Coast 
of Nayarit there are many people who are as big as Diego, but he was my first real 
acquaintance with someone so extremely heavy. He manifests an amusing awareness of 
his bodily presence. On one occasion, I give him a photo of himself portrayed in full 
glory. With! a smile he points at the photo and proudly refers to his personalidad 
(personality)!. 
On one of the first days that I spend at the association's office, I get to meet many new 
people, amojngst them Diego Guttierez. I am not the most important visitor today. The 
CNA District Head and some of his subordinates from Tepic are also in the office. He 
has come to! check a financial agreement concerning rehabilitation measures with the 
association's manager, Guttierez, Diego's cousin and superior. After Guttierez has made 
some promises concerning the allocation of financial resources to a maintenance 
programme isupported by the federal government via the CNA, the District Head is 
satisfied. Th^n, the association president, Nunez, and Guttierez invite the visitors to eat 
with them. jVe go by car to a seafood restaurant just outside Villa Hidalgo. With the 
CNA personnel and some association personnel we sit around a table for an extremely 
lively lunch |n the open-air restaurant. A thatched roof protects us from the sun, and a 
light breeze pleasantly tempers the humid heat. 
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I am seated next to Diego and I immediately like him because he cracks a lot of jokes and 
keeps putting cold Padfico beers in front of me. This is the brand of beer that, as the 
name suggests, people drink along the Pacific Coast of Mexico. He takes them from a 
bucket of ice that the waitress has placed next to him. He ensures that the bottles arrive 
shortly before I manage to finish the current one. Diego looks after the visitors and the 
other important people at the table in this way. A large variety of seafood appears on the 
table, fresh from the Pacific Ocean or the local estuaries and nearby lakes. Diego explains 
to me how to peal the shrimps, and eat the ceviche (raw seafood with lemon, salt and 
chilli), and the smoked fish with a tortilla, Huichol sauce and a squeeze of lemon. All this 
seafood is so typical of this coastal region. Apart from looking after others, he takes care 
of himself and enjoys the beer and the food in considerable quantities and with an 
admirable tempo. The other canaleros also feast upon the good food and the beer, but in 
more moderate quantities that match with their slimmer physiques. They remain silent 
and in the background. 
The conversation is cheerful not least because of Diego's clown-like behaviour, one hand 
resting on his belly. Several jokes around the table refer to Diego's physical condition. 
The men start to exchange albures, jokes with a double meaning and a sexual undertone, 
which produce a hilarious atmosphere in the group. I exaggerate my amazement about 
the frequent humorous allusions of the men to sex among males. I tell them that this is 
something I experienced for the first time here on the Northern Coast of Nayarit. In the 
much more conservative states of Jalisco and Michoacan, I was never informed about the 
existence of anything of the sort. The men die of laughter when I claim that such a thing 
can only be witnessed here and that we do not have anything of the sort in my country. 
The humour of these men is full of corporeal abundance and pleasure, sexual 
depravation and alcoholic enjoyment. Diego plays a key role in this, and not only by his 
voluminous presence and the way he casually hangs in his chair: his jokes also become 
ever more daring, by offending the political enemies of this group. Spirits rise and more 
bottles appear on the table. With his rough language and decreasing respect for absent 
moral and political authorities, he shows that he does not care much anymore about 
standards of correct behaviour, something that only adds to the fun of his audience. He 
is like a jester who creates atmosphere in the group. 
Because of the good mood, it is decided to hire a group of musicians to play some 
ranchero songs for us. Diego negotiates with the musicians over the price we are to pay 
them per song. Guttierez asks the visitors in our company, the District Head and myself, 
to choose a song we would like to hear. The blaring jukebox is silenced and the 
musicians start to play. The requested songs put us visitors in the spotlight. The District 
Head appears to enjoy the respect that he is paid as an important person in this manner. 
After these two songs, Guttierez requests a song. On his cue, the musicians start to play. 
With a deep, dark and resounding voice Guttierez himself sings the song that glorifies 
the beauty of Nayarit. He demonstrates his vocal skills with the dramatic long notes that 
he draws at the end of a strophe. We all drink more. When darkness has already fallen, 
the District Head suddenly decides that he is returning to Tepic. He thanks his hosts, 
Nunez and Guttierez. The CNA staff rise, say their goodbyes to the WUA personnel and 
get into their pick-ups with a satisfied look on their faces. I say farewell to Diego and 
watch him make his weaving way to his motor bike, then ride straight home. 
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some additional income, in practice he is not very successful and barely earns a profit, 
because of the low quality of land and seeds that he is given, or because of lengthy 
flooding of his plot. 
Occasionally, Diego has marital problems - not incomprehensible - regarding his 
drinking behaviour. However, he never talks about it. In spite of my asking him to 
introduce me to his family, he never complies with this request, as if he is somehow 
ashamed to invite me to his modest house. It remains a mystery to me exactly why. 
Once, when we are chinking, he says that he wants to enjoy his life now. Totally 
unexpectedly, he confides in me that he does not want to live to be fifty years of age. 
Surprised, I ask him why, but he shrugs his shoulders. 
A family birthday 
On Guttierez's father birthday, I get to meet Diego's uncles. Only Diego's father is 
absent. As on most other occasions, Diego does not bring his wife or daughter. A brother 
of Guttierez's mother and his son are visiting especially for the occasion from San Pedro 
I^gunillas, the village in southeastern Nayarit from which Guttierez's mother originates. 
This village lies towards the state of Jalisco. I am in the company of Diego, Guttierez and 
their visiting cousin drinking beer. We stand around a brass tub in which the meat of an 
entire pig is being prepared in its own fat, as is the custom at such parties. Whilst Diego 
is fishing the chicharrones (fried pieces of pork skin) out of the boiling fat, we are 
discussing their cousin's region of descent, which lies in the southeastern part of Nayarit 
and borders the state of Jalisco. To go there from the coast, you have to cross a large 
mountain range and foothills that are connected to the Sierra Madre. It is a region where 
traditionally a lot of sugarcane is produced for the sugarcane refineries in Iztlan del Rio 
and Tepic. The climate is much more temperate than the sub-tropical coastal regions. 
Many people from Nayarit have pointed out to me that the Northern Coast of Nayarit is 
not only geographically separated but also culturally distinct from other parts of Nayarit. 
For instance, culturally the southeastern region of Nayarit that we are talking about is 
closer to the ranchero and mestizo rural groups of Jalisco. The northern coast of the state is 
culturally thought to be closer to las nortehos from the northern states of Sinaloa and 
Sonora, in custom, people, food and beverages. 
Guttierez states that in his cousin's village the people live much closer to their rural roots 
than here on the coast. They still ride horses, something that is rarely seen around here. 
Guttierez and Diego recount their visit to the village when they were boys. They recall 
the time that Diego climbed on a horse and was thrown off again just as quickly. Since 
that day, he has never mounted a horse again, he solemnly swears. The story is even 
funnier when I imagine Diego's corpulent body flying through the air. Then it strikes me 
that both Diego and Guttierez are relatively heavy compared to their rather lean and fit-
looking cousin. We continue talking about the difference between the two regions. The 
visiting cousin tells us that a problem that they have in their ejido is that there is no 
irrigation, unlike here where they have a lot of water. Diego who is already quite under 
the influence, merrily calls out 'Yd regalo el agua a todos' (I give away the water for free to 
everyone). The men roar with laughter. 
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When the 1 setter quality meat is ready, we have to sit down with a plate and join the 
table where the older folks are seated. I sit in front of a row of three older men, including 
the visiting one. Whilst we are enjoying the good meat, I am again struck by the 
divergence in physical appearance. Guttierez's father and his brother from the coast are 
both heavy and cheerful men, with voluminous bellies, fleshy chins, sweaty faces and a 
sombrero tiat only just fits and is placed slightly upwards as a protection against the 
heat. This i; in sharp contrast to the visitor, who is a more grim looking slim man, with 
the wrinkled leather skin which one sees in older rancheros, who have spent a life time 
working under the blazing sun. The sombrero adds to this image by being firmly placed 
on his head, torn just above his eyes. It has a small cord connected to it, which horsemen 
hang in front of their face in order not to lose their sombrero. Then, it suddenly occurs to 
me that this family scene, this happy collection of spirited bodies, reveals their diverging 
life histories in culturally and climatologically very distinct parts of Nayarit. The bodily 
dissimilarities now seem to represent an historical accumulation of contrasting ways of 
life. The social life of tobacco and sugarcane is reflected in a cultural preference for either 
Pacifico bee: or tequila. I have to admit that at this point I myself am slightly intoxicated 
and consequently may have lost some of my sdentific distance. However, I find it a nice 
metaphor for something that has struck me so many times since I came to the Northern 
Coast of Nciyarit and followed engineers, producers and politicians. I have been amazed 
about the extremely popular pastime of people that characterises so much of the social 
life and manifests a great passion for drinking beer and a developed taste for local meat 
and seafood dishes. The bodies of the Guttierez brothers appear to be the 
materialisation, or perhaps the symbol, of those particular cultural likings. In other 
words, the body is the living evidence of a specific trajectory of cultural preferences. The 
Guttierez family shows how such preferences become embodied. 
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frequently called in and made responsible for organising the food. In his 
as a butcher's assistant, he gained extensive knowledge about different 
meat and their preparation for diverse popular foods, such as tacos or birria, a 
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regional goat meat dish, particularly served during special celebrations and public 
gatherings. Hence, Guttierez leaves Diego to choose the type and amount of meat, the 
responsibility for buying the food and organising its preparation. On one occasion, 
Guttierez is asked to organise a presentation for a fertiliser company that wants to 
introduce organic fertilisers for interested rice, sorghum and maize producers. He 
instructs Diego: 'Diego, I want you to look for a pig of around hundred kilos at Aguirre's 
place'. Aguirre is a favoured large producer, who provides the pig because he has an 
interest in the company. Guttierez says that he expects around fifty people. After 
arranging the pig, Diego also organises the slaughtering and the preparation of the meat 
and is present during the event, as are the other canaleros. They help with setting up the 
chairs and preparing the food. When they bring around the plates of food to the 
attendees, particularly after a long and serious presentation, the mood of the meeting 
changes. It is naturally accompanied with some beers, which further animates the 
atmosphere. This celebration of the introduction of an agricultural innovation is not 
unlike how a political candidate would be promoted on the Northern Coast. 
On another occasion, Guttierez asks Diego to arrange a came asada (a dish of roasted 
meat prepared at a barbecue). We go to the local market and order the veal, and at 
another stall we buy a large number of tortillas. Then we go in search of a barbecue. I ask 
Diego what the occasion is. He complains that Guttierez often does not even tell him 
what exactly the meeting is for. 
Diego in the group of canaleros 
Diego's position is different from other canaleros because he is part of the group of their 
patron, Perez, and superiors, Nunez and Guttierez. As a client, a stronger bond of loyalty 
and moral obligation binds him. His relation with the rest of the canaleros is therefore 
rather distant, especially with the group of three engineers, Laguna, Icazar and Quiroz. 
They basically share the idea that Diego belongs to 'them', implying Perez' group. 
In Laguna's opinion, Diego is privileged: 'He drinks a lot, drives around on his motor bike 
and neglects his work and this is tolerated by the management. Laguna explains that Diego is 
often invited by producers to drink with them in a cantina or elsewhere. That is why 
Diego can afford to be drinking so often, whereas his salary is just as meagre as his. He 
claims that if you agree to such invitations you have a compromiso (commitment or 
understanding) with these producers to be at their service, for instance when they ask for 
water. Accepting beer and food from farmers thus premeditates special favours in water 
distribution. This is the case to a different extent for all canaleros, who occasionally 
accept such gifts, but Diego is particularly known for it. He accepts invitations quite 
openly, and his superiors do not reprimand him for it. 
Laguna understands that Diego also drinks a lot because of the pressure of his work as a 
canalero. Particularly during the busiest period of the irrigation cycle, everybody comes 
asking for water and you are constantly bothered via the radio, in the field, at the office, 
and even at home. Sometimes the canaleros switch off their radio so as not to be 
bothered when they are drinking. Later, they act as if their reception was bad, because 
they were working in the field far away from the office. Amongst the canaleros they have 
a joke that refers to such occasions. When somebody asks where a canalero is, they say 
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that he is ethando agua, which means putting water in a canal, but they simultaneously 
make a gesture that clarifies that they are rather referring to its second meaning: 
throwing back beers. Nevertheless, Laguna disapproves of Diego's excessive drinking, 
although he does not express this view in public. The canaleros are often together as a 
group at me etings or in the office and have to collaborate in the field and thus they have 
to be on manageable terms. 
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the engineer-canaleros do not socialise much with Diego outside their work, 
at the festivities that they visit. During the annual fiesta of his ejido, Icazar 
small dinner party at his house and invites all association staff. Laguna, 
myself have come to enjoy the birria and beer, as people are accustomed to 
friends and relations for food before the rodeo. We are in the backyard, 
off from other nearby gardens. Behind the fence I see Diego, who is one 
guests at a party of a farmer and a neighbour of Icazar. When I approach to 
asks me what I am doing there. He tacitly disapproves of the company I 
that he has already eaten and drunk. On my return to his colleagues, they 
unconscious observation that Diego is quite drunk already. They suppose 
have been drinking the whole day. In a little while, he will not be able to 
again and tomorrow he will not remember where he has left his motor bike 
•, they speculate with a grin. Icazar expects that Diego will be complaining 
not invited, although in reality Icazar invited everybody from the office, 
the rodeo, I encounter Diego who gets very sentimental about the fact that 
invited to Icazar' place. When I specifically ask him about it, he admits that 
but indicates that he did not feel invited, because Icazar emphasised that 
very simple and only a meal. 
attitude of the canaleros mostly shines through in the observations and jokes 
about each other. The jokes about Diego invariably involve his weight and 
behaviour. For example, on one occasion I join Quiroz in the field. The motor 
borrowed from the association breaks down, because of a loosened welded 
intended to mend the frame. Quiroz jokingly tells me not to worry about 
fault, because it was a motor bike used by Diego. Diego overhears the 
and is forced to smile, but he tells Quiroz not to talk like that. Later, Quiroz 
all the broken carcasses of motor bikes in the association yard were once 
from his weight, Diego does not take care of his motor bike, Quiroz states 
disapprovin|gly. He drives around drunk on it and falls down or smashes it. 
dislikes the jokes that are made about his drinking behaviour, but there is 
do about it. He hates it when I tell him that people have informed me about 
ilcoholic escapades. He even suspects his own cousin of spreading such 
m he is sober he is not proud of them; when he has been drinking he does 
counters the stories about him with other stories. He launches bitter attacks 
colleagues, especially by reproaching them or making fun of their lack of 
accusing them of not wanting to sleep with prostitutes and that they are 
mayate (homosexual)4. 
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Intermediate analysis 
In what I have described so far, I have illustrated the importance of a cultural 
competence rather than a merely technical competence in irrigation management. This 
goes beyond, and sometimes conflicts with, Diego's official position as a canalero. As the 
client of a political group, Diego displays this cultural competence in the organisation, 
performance and enjoyment of festive events. For these pleasurable occasions, the 
preparation and consumption of food and beer is central to bunding and mamlaining 
organisational and political relations on the Northern Coast. Diego demonstrates a set of 
locally valued artistic skills and cultural preferences, such as telling jokes, a popular taste 
for food and beer, and ordering music. These contribute to an atmosphere of male 
conviviality, complicity and trust that affirm relations of social and political commitment, 
such as for example with the CNA District Head. Hence, Diego's clientship has required 
him to develop this cultural competence. Even his body manifests this role as a cultural 
agent, if not the trajectory of cultural preferences that he has followed. Indeed, Diego's 
body is subject to, as well as the subject of, the ctrinldng, eating and hilarious humour 
that he displays. 
Besides distributing water, Diego plays a role in the distribution of another wet, 
alcoholic, resource flow. The connection between these two activities is recapitulated in 
the canaleros' joke about echando agua, which refers to managing both the flows of 
irrigation water and of beer. The connection becomes further evident from the fact that 
Diego seems particularly inclined to accept beer as a gift in exchange for immediate 
access to water. 
6.3 Privileged Support to Large Producers 
A favoured clientele of around seven major producers of rice, sorghum and maize belong 
to the outer circle of Perez' political group. They are connected because most of them 
work from Villa Hidalgo and maintain friendship, commercial and political relations with 
this group, which is itself heavily involved in rice and sorghum production and the 
organisation and representation of its producers vis-a-vis the state government and 
agro-industrial enterprises. By different means, the group receives financial as well as 
political support from these influential producers. Although this outer circle of large 
producers is not necessarily a close network and might at times have contradictory 
interests, for Perez' political group they are interesting partners, as they are generally 
well organised and represent their interests both at the state and national level. They 
have a network of connections with the government, agro-industrial companies, and rice 
and sorghum producers, and they fulfil different functions in local producers' 
organisations and ejidos. Some of them are moneylenders. In addition, they are large 
employers in the region, who use their influence in the government to pressure for low 
rrunimum salaries for agricultural labourers. 
Since the local rice-processing factory went broke, factories from outside the region have 
penetrated the regional market. They pre-finance medium-sized producers who lack the 
capital, inputs and machines to produce. The most important processing factory lies in 
bctlan del Rio in the southeast of Nayarit. It distributes inputs and coordinates the 
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production and harvesting via a local representative, Frederico Gonzalez, who is at the 
same time a large rice producer from Villa Hidalgo. This factory is able to set low prices 
and deduct high input expenses at the end of the season. This makes rice production a 
commercially unattractive enterprise for such producers, and causes many of them to 
drop out of it. 
Hence, rice production is nowadays only profitable for vroductores fuertes (powerful 
producers), Diego argues. These aforementioned seven producers account for most of 
the area under production, among whom are Perez (ex-president of the association), 
Frederico Haro (local representative of the processing factory), Norberto (treasurer of the 
association), Aguirre, and Bernardo Ulloa (ex-CNA employee). They are both ejidatarios 
and private producers and own and rent land in both categories. Although the fields they 
rent are distributed over the whole irrigation system, they are mainly concentrated 
around the four ejidos of Villa Hidalgo. Another production zone lies closer to San Isidro 
and FJ Tizate. Besides producing rice during the irrigation and rainy season, they also 
produce sorghum and maize during the main irrigation cycle. 
The WUA plays an important role in the mutual exchange of benefits between the 
political group and its outer circle of large producers. Some of the benefits and services 
that these producers receive from the association are the following: Several of them have 
reached financial agreements with the management that allow them to postpone or 
reduce their fee payment until after the harvest. This creates non-transparent revenue 
flows that the political group in the WUA can use for personal, political and electoral 
purposes, as Chapter 8 will show. In addition, the irrigation fee for rice is kept artificially 
low compared to other irrigated crops that consume much less water, like beans or 
tobacco. These producers also get privileged access to the association's maintenance 
machines (see also Chapter 7). Further, the management supports field experiments on 
rice conducted by the agricultural research institution, INIFAP, in Santiago. Furthermore, 
these producers have a major interest in receiving privileged access to irrigation water. 
Several of them were given direct access to the canaleros via their radio system, to 
enhance this. Finally, the association and the canaleros are a useful source of information 
about where plots are available to rent. More than any other canalero, Diego plays a 
central role in their access to ample irrigation water and crucial information and in the 
production of rice in general. He maintains a friendly relationship with several of these 
producers. 
Access to irrigation water 
During the main irrigation cycle, as a result of farmers taking water without requesting 
an irrigation turn, it happens that Diego cannot deliver the water that he promised to 
other downstream farmers on time. When he discusses the difficulty of solving this 
problem, he takes the case of a large producer, who has hired fifty people as labourers 
and pays them a daily salary. Diego emphasises how grave the problems are when this 
man does not receive water on time. This remark of Diego's reflects a concern with 
larger producers, such as Perez, and accounts for his inclination to immediately respond 
to the requests of such producers, although this might again affect other producers 
further downstream. 
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In the rainy season, only rice is planted and irrigated on a large scale. Although rice 
cultivation is a lot less productive during the rainy season, for several agronomic and 
climatic reasons it is the only crop that is not so vulnerable to the heavy rainfall, 
windstorms, and water logging which normally occur at this time of the year. The 
production of rice experienced its peak in the area at the beginning of the 1990s. The Left 
Bank became the most important rice producing area in Nayarit, and possibly in 
surrounding states, thanks to its ample water and favourable productive and institutional 
conditions. Particularly during the last five years, the area under rice in the rainy season 
has significantly decreased from more than 4,000 to just 1,000 hectares. Reasons vary 
from the spreading of wild rice varieties that are detrimental to commercial hybrid rice 
production, the decreasing price of rice as an impact of the NAFTA agreement, problems 
in local rice producers' organisations and the bankruptcy of the local processing factory 
in FJ Tizate. 
Because the area actually irrigated on the Left Bank decreases significantly during this 
season, the workload and revenues also reduce. As a result, the thirteen sections were 
split up between four rather than seven canaleros during the last two rainy seasons. 
Diego's position, however, is not under threat like that of other canaleros. This indicates 
his privileged position as a client of the political group. Additional reasons for keeping 
Diego on his job are that his two sections are especially important in terms of rice 
production and that he fulfils a central role in the water distribution to rice producers. 
During the 1998 rainy season, apart from his own sections 6 and 11, Diego operated 12 
and 13 also, which are located towards the tail-end. Despite this, Diego's work is much 
less demanding at this time in comparison with the main irrigation cycle. There are 
various reasons for this. The first is that he controls a much smaller and more compact 
area of a few hundred hectares of rice and less than a hundred hectares of maize and 
sorghum. The second reason is that he manages relatively stable discharges. The 
irrigation and cultivation of rice involves large but constant volumes of water that are 
applied by means of surface irrigation. The constant flows used to maintain a certain 
level in the basins make the water distribution a relatively orderly and predictable affair 
for the canalero. The canals consequently also have relatively constant levels, and this 
requires limited supervision. The third reason is that Diego has to co-ordinate the water 
distribution to a limited number of rice producers with medium-sized or large connected 
parcels of land5. This takes place in most cases through their field irrigators or regadores 
who are in the field a lot of the time and thus can easily be reached by him. He co-
ordinates the water demands, arranges the distribution of the available flows with them, 
and in many cases he grants them the right to close or open an intake, which saves him 
work. Finally, the larger degree of homogeneity of operational arrangements involved in 
rice cultivation and surface irrigation reduces the number of control problems for the 
canalero. 
In the field, Diego indicates a problem that he experiences with these rice producers. He 
shows me that in reality in rice plots much more water is used than the official and 
required water allocation. Engineers explained to him that rice only requires a stable flow 
of four to five litres per second per hectare after an initial phase in which the crop 
becomes established. He points to a nearby rice field that is receiving more than double 
that. Still this is not to the satisfaction of the farmer. He elaborates that rice producers 
want as much water as they can get for combating weeds, so that they can minimise the 
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expenses of labour, mechanical or chemical means. "The bad habit of the user', according 
to Diego, 'is to always want more water". Later, he tells me about the case of Aguirre, a 
large rice producer who has a rice plot of ten hectares in his section. This plot would 
roughly require a constant flow of fifty litres per second. Instead Aguirre, who maintains 
close relations with Nunez and Guttierez, easily demands a flow as large as 200 litres per 
second. Diego says that he could explain the officially required water layers to Aguirre, 
but that he would not want to understand. 
During the 1998 rainy season, I also witness some cases of serious over-irrigation. I join 
Diego when he is about to stop the irrigation to several rice fields in consultation with 
the producers and the field irrigators. Standing in a rice field along the 24 in section 12, 
Diego shows me the grain and the physique of the rice plant. It has matured, and it is 
consequently time to cut off the water. We stand close to a field inlet, through which a 
lot of water is flowing into the field. I ask him how much water is entering the field. He 
estimates around 150 litres per second for the ten-hectare plot. He adds that this is 
actually too much, three times as much as the fifty litres really required. He claims to give 
so much because otherwise the producer would come and demand more water. The 
producer wants a lot of water in this period so the grain will gain weight just before 
stopping the irrigation. This makes a difference to the final yield and profit. Near a much 
larger field of around fifty hectares of rice we see the water flowing through two intakes 
into field canals. Diego estimates that around 350 litres is actually entering the rice field, 
whereas 250 litres would be sufficient in his opinion. Diego claims that he gives more 
water than required only to those who ask him for it. He says that he does it to get rid of 
them or because he does not want to get into trouble with producers who push him to 
give more water. 
Diego confirms that over-irrigation by rice producers during the main irrigation cycle can 
cause problems in sections further downstream. He claims to deal with this problem by 
now and then measuring the water flow in the presence of the producer. Diego 
demonstrates the provisional method that the canaleros use for this: They measure the 
water velocity over a distance of a few meters with a little straw and estimate the cross-
section of the field ditch. In this manner he shows the producer that he is receiving too 
much water. Unfortunately, farmers are not content in most cases and demand more 
water or open the intake themselves after some time. Laguna recounts that Diego 
recently measured the inflow at Perez' intakes and found that he received more than 
double the prescribed four litres. When Perez saw this, he responded theatrically, 'auita 
me el agua' (take the water away from me). Nevertheless, it is Laguna's experience that 
the next time Perez will do the same again and demand more water. The problem 
remains the same: 'All vroductores fuertes (powerful producers) always want more water". 
Information on suitable land to rent 
Because of the widespread infestation of land on the Left Bank with wild rice, there is an 
increasing shortage of land that has not been used before for rice production. All major 
producers are diligently looking for the remaining uninfested land to rent for rice 
production. 
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The infestation of rice fields with wild rice occurs through polluted seed material, cross-
fertilisation and the wild rice seeds that remain in the soil after harvesting. It has taken 
many former rice lands out of production. For example, in the La Presa ejido until 
recently a lot of tobacco fields were rented out by ejidatarios during the rainy season to 
produce rice. The large rice producers who rent a lot of land generally have little interest 
in taking effective counter measures. They leave the land after a few years when the 
infestation rate is too high and transfer to other plots. They are now confronted with the 
backlash of this strategy. 
In the field, Diego displays a detailed and practical knowledge of the rice crop and the 
problematic features of its production. He shows me that the degree of infestation with 
weeds like arroz negro, arroz rojo and arrozon is not yet as serious as in other parts of the 
system. Then, he demonstrates how to distinguish these wild rice varieties and recounts 
how their similarity to commercial rice is a problem in combating them. Although the 
infestation generally occurs through the soil and contaminated seed material, few 
producers use certified seed and take the necessary measures to prevent further 
infestation. Pointing to the mature crop, he argues that he will be shutting off the water, 
because the grain is already full-grown and the plot needs to dry up in order to be in a 
condition to harvest. The irrigator of this plot has just arrived and they discuss shutting 
off the water now. They agree, and the irrigator helps Diego to close down the intake, 
because Diego does not succeed in turning the rusty wheel of the structure on his own. 
It is preferable to plant rice on land that has not been used before for rice production 
because there is a smaller chance of infestation with wild rice. Consequently, the 
harvested rice is purer and of a higher quality and qualifies for a higher price. I ask him if 
there is any virgin land left. Although there is not a lot, he knows of some locations and 
where they are situated. He tells me that large rice producers such as Bernardo and 
Frederico ask him where they can find such land to rent. He claims that he helps them to 
find and rent it. He also finds a plot for himself. 
The canalero and large producers 
In a conversation about water distribution, Diego claims that there is a lot of favouritism 
in the association. The powerful producers are generally given a lot of water and do not 
have to wait their turn when they request it. The three-days' notice rule does not apply 
to them, and they often get rapid access. In addition, he is critical of the fact that several 
of these rich producers have large debts in irrigation fees with the association and keep 
postponing their payment. Diego is well aware of their close contacts with Perez, Nunez 
and his own cousin. He is reminded of it by their access to the association's radio system. 
Diego on occasions indicates that he feels ambivalent about the privileged access he is 
granting to these producers. 'We should give a producer of two hectares the same service as a 
productor fuerte', he opines. However, this is not the case. The small farmers are 
instructed by the canalero to request an irrigation turn in advance and they are 
reprimanded when they just take water, whereas this does not count for people like 
Perez, Diego states. He also frequently points to the difference between these large 
producers and the many ejidatarios who barely have sufficient resources to keep 
cultivating their land. For example, on a field trip we encounter an old, tired man with a 
sunburned face coming back from his field with his horse and a plough. Diego points out 
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that this is what the situation is like here. This old man works himself into a sweat the 
whole day long, making furrows one by one, whereas people like Frederico and Aguirre 
have a machine that makes four to five furrows at a time. 
At the same time, Diego has a lot of admiration and respect for these producers. This is 
especially clear when he refers to them as los productores chingones, which is a stronger 
version of productores fuertes. Chingon expresses in a typical Mexican way their size, 
success and superiority as agricultural producers6. For example, Diego tells me about 
Bernardo Ulloa, who started producing rice when he was still working as a local CNA 
representative for the association. We see some of his extensive rice fields, and Diego 
says that he has a lot capital para mover (capital to mobilise), indicating with a gesture of 
his right hand an imaginary pile of money. I ask him what he mobilises, to which Diego 
responds: fumigants, herbicides, people, etc. This makes his agriculture more profitable 
than that of smaller farmers, he explains. About another productor chingon he remarks 
that the man is a capitalist and has a lot of land and produces several hundreds of 
hectares. 'El mueva mucha gente' (he mobilises a lot of people) and a bit later 'el mueva 
camionetas y muchas maquinas' (he mobilises trucks and a lot of machines). Diego regards 
this as a great responsibility that should not be taken lightly. His acimiration appears 
when he sums up the nature and number of activities in which these producers are 
involved. He empathises with people like Perez and Frederico when he is explaining to 
me that it is very difficult to do so many things at the same time and that it results in a 
lot of pressure. 'Some people have problems managing only two hectares. Imagine managing 
several hundreds of hectares. You constantly have things on your mind, what to do when a 
pump or a truck breaks down?' 
It strikes me how easily Diego mentions such heterogeneous matters as herbicides, 
people and machines in expressing how powerful and capable these producers are. Also, 
his emphasis on the movement and mobilisation of people, machines and other 
resources in representing the dynamic qualities of these producers and the complexity of 
their work is noteworthy. He measures the potency of these agricultural producers by 
the amount of land and assets they own and the number of people working for him. 
Diego starts to list the other types of businesses in which they engage and sketches their 
personal history, the origin of their fortune, the organisations in which they are 
influential and the nature of their political relations in the state government. It all 
contributes to his admiration. 
Diego is part of a wider network of mutual exchange of favours, goods and services 
between the association and these large rice producers. He provides them with access to 
water and information about uninfested land. More than the other canaleros, Diego is 
influenced by this relationship with the favoured clientele. Although it is clearly an 
unequal exchange of benefits, it is not a one-sided relation. Diego has an interest in 
these exchanges. In return, he receives support from some of the rice producers to 
cultivate rice in terms of land, seed and other resources and services. Usually he 
produces around two hectares in his own section. This is practical for him, because he 
can irrigate the crop whilst he is in the field for his work. He has easy access to ample 
water. Because Diego possesses neither land nor capital, and taking into account all the 
other required inputs and the low price of rice, I ask him if it is really profitable for him to 
produce rice. He assures me that it is. He can gain something, because people lend him 
the land. If he had to hire land, it would be a different case. In most cases, he arranges to 
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use a small plot belonging to Perez, Frederico Haro, or some other favoured large 
producer. In addition, they pass on some seed to him, cultivate his plot with large 
machinery7, or clear it of wild rice with a group of their labourers when they are in the 
neighbourhood. Frederico finances the fertilisers for him, settles his earlier debts, and 
gives him an extra amount of money to finance the rest, in his role as a representative of 
the processing factory from Iztlan in the region. These are just small expenses compared 
to their bulk operations. Despite all the support that Diego succeeds in mobilising, he is 
not particularly successful with his rice harvests. During the 1998 rainy season his crop 
failed because his field could not be drained on time and he ended up with a negative 
result. 
Nevertheless, during the next irrigation cycle to my surprise he has found another plot 
on which to produce rice. He explains this renewed attempt by stating 'let's see whether it 
is business in the irrigation season'. This strikes me as an expression of the large 
entrepreneurs with whom he socialises and who produce rice commercially, rather than 
the small landless producer that he is. I ask Diego why he does not try an easier and less 
risky crop, for example beans. He answers that beans requires cultivation at different 
times in their life cycle. This would cost him money for every job (around $US 50 each 
time), whereas in rice fewer jobs are required and they are easier to have done by large 
producers. Again he sounds like an entrepreneur when he talks about arranging such 
jobs for free. Standing near his plot, Diego proudly shows me the recently sown plot and 
confides in me that he is producing here together with his cousin Guttierez. They are 
sharing the expenses. The plot belongs to his compadre who lent it to him. Guttierez 
arranged the certified seed. The levelled basins with bunds around them were 
constructed using equipment and personnel belonging to the association. 
Diego's field encounters with producers such as Frederico or Aguirre, or at the office, 
reveal an element of friendship. They are always very amicable towards him and take 
care never to demand their water. They rather make him part of their problems and 
anxieties and let him feel responsible in that way. Diego very much values the personal 
interest that is taken in him - the greetings when he passes by on his motor bike, or a 
little chat at the roadside. Further, friendship relations with the canaleros are reified by 
inviting them for celebrations, rodeos and drinks. People like Frederico and Norberto 
attend small parties for association staff to which they are invited. They mingle with the 
group of canaleros and drink with them. Just as they casually gossip, joke and exchange 
anecdotes, they also discuss their irrigation plans with them. This is important in 
mamtaining a sphere of male complicity and friendship (cuatismo) with the canaleros. 
More than the others, Diego is sensitive to such attention. 
6.4 Privileged Access Perez 
Perez is the largest rice producer in the region. At the beginning of the 1990s, he 
cultivated nearly a thousand hectares, which subsequently curninished to a few hundred 
hectares. Recently, he is increasing his production of sorghum and produces some maize 
and beans on the side. Through his continuing influence in the association, he has 
placed Diego in sections 6 and 11 for the irrigation season, where he owns and rents 
large tracks of land. Perez is different from the other entrepreneurs, because he generally 
maintains more distance from the canaleros, is less friendly, and assumes a more 
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superior position. In addition, Perez is very demanding regarding his access to irrigation 
water. He does not appreciate canaleros who tell him to wait for his irrigation turns 
when he intends to irrigate. He expects immediate and full access to irrigation water and 
an instantaneous response to his instructions. Unlike Dario who has long experience as a 
canalero and might tell Perez to wait, Diego responds immediately to his requests. 
Another canalero, Quiroz, therefore calls Diego not very responsible in his work. 'He does 
not care at all. If "they" ask him for water, he immediately gives it to them. He uses the water 
that other canaleros have requested'. Diego's extra sections for the rainy season, 12 and 13, 
are located above those of Dario8. As a result, the latter occasionally does not receive the 
planned discharge in his sections. 
Within Perez' political group there exists a certain implicit delegation of responsibilities. 
Within it, Diego acts as a sort of field representative for Perez. He sees to it that Perez7 
productive interests are met. He is well informed about these activities within the 
irrigation system and knows the exact locations of the plots on which Perez is producing. 
During the 97/98 season, Perez owns around 600 hectares and rents another 300 
hectares. 
According to Diego, when Perez asks him for water there is no way he can refuse it or let 
him wait, even if he has not requested an irrigation turn on time. This could mean that 
other farmers remain without water. 'Hay confianza' is the explanation he offers, 
indicating that he has relations of trust and friendship with Perez within which the 
mutual exchange of favours and services is expected. I ask Diego what Perez could do if 
he refused him water or gave him less. He answers that Perez could not directly force 
him to give water. As a canalero, he would act according to the rules. Yet, Perez would 
call Guttierez on his radio to complain. Guttierez would then call up Diego and instruct 
him to give the water immediately. He explains that Perez is very powerful, against 
which he as a canalero can do very little: 
Economically, relationally and politically he is very strong. At the moment he is 
deputy of this region and he has connected himself with Emilio Gonzalez, who is 
a powerful ex-governor of Nayarit. Apart from that he has many sprinkler 
installations and machines... 
It happens that Perez7 personnel starts irrigating with a pump without even asking his 
permission. Although he is critical about this, Diego feels that he can do very little about 
it. Perez contacts him on the radio to tell him when and where he wants water. Diego 
has to comply with such a demand. 
Perez owns large properties at the tail-end of two sub-lateral canals in Diego's sections. 
These lands are situated far from the easily reachable main canals. In the middle of the 
main irrigation season in 1998, I drive with Diego down one of these sub-laterals in 
section 11. Diego is in a hurry to check whether sufficient water is reaching the end of 
the canal. "This is worrying me at the momenf, he explains nervously. As we are driving, 
Diego tells me that we are approaching a large plot of around 140 hectares belonging to 
el licenciado. The previous afternoon, Perez had informed him via his radio that he 
wanted water the next day, so this morning he got up at five o'clock to open the intake 
of the sub-lateral. This is why he is so concerned now to see how much the water has 
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advanced and whether it is already reaching Perez' plot at the tail-end. Diego remarks 
that Perez7 land lies officially outside the irrigation district. The association is thus not 
obliged to give him servicio there...(yet it does). 
Halfway down the canal, Diego suddenly decides to go back to open a cross-regulator 
further. Apparently he has reckoned that not enough water is reaching this point and 
that it is advancing too slowly. Whilst he goes back, I proceed along the canal to Perez' 
property. Reaching the tail, a vast terrain lies open to me. At some distance, I see some 
workers who are irrigating young sorghum with sprinklers9. At the end of the lined 
canal, a reasonably new intake structure lets the water from the canal into what looks 
like an earthen drain. However, the workers are using this 'drainage water' to irrigate the 
sorghum. Further up, a machine operator working for the association is cleaning the 
drain on a machine. Near the outlet I encounter a bombero (pump operator) who is 
working on a nearby chilli field. He is coming to see if he can get water. All the water is 
going to Perez' field now, and he thinks it should be distributed. The man tells me that 
the structure and the drains were constructed only three years ago. Perez started 
producing rice and sorghum two years ago. Before, that the land belonged to a nearby 
ejido. At that time, it was mostly left uncultivated because it did not have access to 
irrigation water from the canal and it was not levelled. Perez, who was then the 
president of the association, bought the land and opened it up for cultivation and 
irrigation10. The man returns to his field. 
When Diego arrives, he establishes that the water is arriving at the tail. With his arm he 
removes the sweat from his forehead. He seems to be relieved, and the stress disappears 
from his face. For a moment I forget about machismo and ask him if he was afraid. He 
denies this, but accounts for his behaviour by stating that Perez would otherwise be 
bothering him over the radio all the time". I ask him whether Perez would not leave the 
communication with the canaleros to his acting manager in view of his job as diputado. 
This is not the case, 'that's the way he is", he responds. Diego depicts Perez in a critical 
undertone as always wanting to know what is happening and interfering personally in 
his affairs. 
We walk onto Perez' fields. Diego greets the bomberos who are busy irrigating. The 
machine operator is happy to see us and we have a chat. We discuss the fact that the 
drains are not constructed correctly, as they do not have a gradient and the water has no 
way out. Because in practice they are used as canals, they convey a lot of water and silt. 
As a consequence, they fill up with sediment rapidly and have to be cleaned now. The 
men talk over the recent agricultural and political operations of el licenciado and laugh 
about his ability to get what he wants. Then the operator asks Diego about the recent 
election meeting of the association's president, Nunez, at the regional peasant 
committee (CMC) in Santiago. Diego recounts the events and the good food that they 
served and enjoyed. He warns that next Sunday the elections for the CMC will take place 
in Santiago and that there will be plenty of birria. The operator then says he will try to 
attend, because it has been a long time since he had a good plate of birria. 
When we visit other sorghum fields belonging to Perez later that day, Diego points to 
the huge amount of water entering the fields. He claims that Perez always wants to see 
his canals lleno, lleno (full, full). An amount of water that is sufficient for twenty hectares 
is entering a plot of ten hectares. Perez wants the field irrigator to finish irrigating this 
The Client in a Political Group 173 
plot as rapidly as possible within four to five hours, to pay him only the daily salary of 
fifty pesos. But this is a bad irrigation method according to Diego, because a lot of water 
is lost this way to the groundwater and the crop does not sufficiently absorb it. From a 
bent position he lifts himself up, straightens his back, pushes his chest forward to 
impersonate the sorghum. Perez prefers to irrigate as much land as possible with a 
restricted amount of labour and time. It saves him labour expenses, among others, and it 
is possible because he gets ample access to irrigation water. 
A few days later I am out and about with Diego again and we check another of Perez' 
sorghum fields, where a significant water flow is entering. Yesterday, Diego was 
informed that Perez' workers would start irrigating here early in the morning with 
sprinklers. Unfortunately nobody is present, no pump is installed and the water streams 
idly to the drain. Diego calls Guttierez on the radio and asks him to call Perez' office and 
ask what their plan is. In the event of their not irrigating he will close the intake. Diego 
explains that he could easily also close the intake at once, but that probably Perez would 
call him in one hour to let him know that he wants water. It strikes me that Diego acts 
here like a field manager for Perez, taking into account his interests to the fullest extent. 
At such moments his work as a canalero is not separated from his clientship of Perez' 
equipo. In fact his performance under these circumstances embodies this relationship. 
He works for his patron Perez, rather than for the association, or the water users. On 
other occasions also this is apparent, for instance when he coordinates irrigation turns 
with Perez' workers or in accordance with what he thinks is Perez' interest. 
During Perez' three-year period as deputy for the PRI in the state parliament, the 
canaleros at some point were all assigned to function as local party representatives with 
the aim of removing unfavourable elements from the local PRI departments. However, 
Diego's loyalty also has limits. When Perez, Nunez and Guttierez again try to assign him 
to a job as local representative of the PRI, he refuses. This results in a row. He is clearly 
frustrated by this and states that he never liked politics. 'What they want is to mix work 
with politics and that is not good', he clarifies his moral objections. He does not want a 
political post. As a sectional he would have to organise things, keep lists of PRI members 
and mover la gente (mobilise the people). He would earn very little but would expect to 
get another position from there with which he would earn more. However, he dislikes 
politicians, because when they get a position they forget about their supporters. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that the position, tasks and competences of a canalero 
depend on how patron-client relations are articulated through a WUA and mtertwined 
with resource allocation. 
Diego is a loyal client of a political group. He has a privileged position in the group of 
canaleros in terms of job security, the allocation of benefits and the liberties that he 
enjoys. The other side of the equation is that he assumes a central position in the 
distribution of at least three sets of resource flows: the flow of cultural materials such as 
food and alcoholic items; the flow of water; and the flow of information. Following the 
first flow presents Diego as an agent with particular cultural competences in the 
organisation of public events. The second and third flows indicate that Diego is 
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strategically positioned as a canalero to work in particular sections of the irrigation 
system that are of special interest to the group. He provides the group's patron and an 
outer circle and clientele of favoured producers with privileged access to water and 
information. The distribution of positions and workspaces in the association thus 
anticipates the allocation of resources. Clients like Diego thus have a delegated role in 
organising the access to multiple resource flows that underlie the reproduction and the 
advancement of the group. The positioning and competences of clients in terms of 
resource distribution thus should also be understood in terms of their contribution to the 
development of a political group as a whole. This is not only motivated by material 
interest, but also manifests cultural variables and moral principles of trust, friendship, 
obligation, complicity, and a sense of belonging. 
Therefore, patron-client relationships are not the unilateral relations that they are often 
portrayed to be, in which the patron monopolises all power and resources and has 
complete central control over an organisational or territorial space, its people and 
resources. A political group assumes the distribution of positions, tasks, and professional 
as well as cultural competences. It is a dispersed and heterogeneous network, in terms of 
the power, competence, and resource flows that it circulates and distributes and that 
maintain group relations. 
Being a client and a canalero at the same time is hardly a comfortable position. Diego is 
deeply divided between confHcting sets of professional and cultural expectations and 
demands concerning his conduct as a canalero and as a client. Competence is important 
for both the client and the canalero, but may be defined differently according to these 
distinct frames of reference. From the professional viewpoint of other canaleros, the 
expectations of his patrons conflict with professional standards of behaviour and 
occasionally lead to incompetent conduct. However, the canaleros who criticise him for 
his behaviour have a different position, because they are not in the same way clients of 
the political group. Therefore they are confronted to a lesser extent with the expectations 
and obligations, but also the benefits, that this implies. It is a question of degree rather 
than an absolute matter, because all canaleros in some way have to deal with the 
clientelist expectations of their supervisors and are subject to their demands. For several 
colleagues, this is their reason for socially excluding Diego from their circle and making 
him the focus of their suppressed anger, envy, contempt, and humour. It is not my 
intention to conclude that Diego is an apathetic victim corrupted by the pressures of his 
patrons. He identifies with the professional standards and service ethic of the canaleros 
and tries to act upon them, and it frustrates him when this is not possible, given the 
forces that he faces and to which he belongs. This frustration about his contradictory 
situation seems to find a release through his tragic flight into alcohol, coarse language 
and rough humour, and the tendency to break things - his own sometimes rather self-
destructive way to 'chingar'. 
Diego displays a deeply ambivalent attitude and mixture of sentiments towards both his 
patrons and his colleagues. He does not approve of the favouritism in the association 
and the way in which it provides privileged access to water and other services, especially 
when he finds out that several of the favoured producers are behind with their fee 
payment. However, at the same time he admires how these vroductores chingones get 
things done and is instrumental in making this happen. The ambiguity can also be noted 
in how he sympathises with different classes of producers. On the one hand, he feels 
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sorry for the poor peasant who works himself into a sweat with his plough, whom he 
considers as a user of the WUA's services with equal rights, although he knows that that 
is not the reality. On the other hand, Diego really empathises with the large producers. 
This is shown, for example, by the way in which he visualises the nature of their 
problems if they have to wait for water whilst having fifty people ready to work. He even 
talks their language and shares their ideology about what it is to be chingon as a 
producer. In addition, he presents his own situation as a marginal rice producer in terms 
of an entrepreneur assessing his business opportunities and skilfully arranging profitable 
deals. This shows the importance for him of a sense of belonging, particularly because he 
is excluded from the social circle of some of his colleagues. 
The concept of productores chingones that Diego uses shows all-powerful actors that 
control a variety of people, machines, resource flows, land, and have connections with 
influential politicians. I find two Ihings interesting about this. Firstly, he sees the 
heterogeneous networks that these producers manage as a source and manifestation of 
their power. Hence, he locates their powerfulness not only in their social and political 
relations, but also in the material artefacts, relations and resources involved. Secondly, in 
some way it echoes the quote of Octavio Paz at the beginning of this chapter. The 
distinction between the strong and the weak, besides reflecting Mexican social life, also 
presents an ideology that justifies and obscures individual and group behaviour. This 
presents Diego as completely powerless and his patrons as all-powerful, which is a 
simplification of the client-patron relations and the distribution of resource flows 
described in this chapter. 
Limon (1989) rightly maintains against Paz that the sexually charged language and 
humour - full of word games, obscene allusions and double meanings - that uses chingar 
in its different forms to express social differences is not just about humiliation and 
violation, as its aggressive literal meaning suggests, but paradoxically contributes to the 
interactional production of friendship, trust and respect. Although one does not speak of 
friendship, community or belonging, one practices it in the symbolic action of meat, 
body, language, and, I might add, liquor (Limon, 1989:480). In my opinion, Diego's case 
shows that, by engaging in this type of discursive practice, a client is capable of 
expressing a deep ambiguity towards those for and with whom he works, revealing both 
the violent and the friendship aspects of the patron-client relation in which he is 
involved. 
Recalling the former chapter, which argued that everyday irrigation practices are not 
governed by straightforward sets of rules, this chapter illustrates an additional point that 
David Mosse has made (Mosse, 1997). Some people, like for example Perez and the 
group of large rice producers, possess the capital or authority to deviate from rules 
without sanctions or public notice, or to regularise action which does not conform to the 
rules (Bourdieu, 1977). Rules are publicly evoked as much to justify mdividual behaviour 
as to order collective behaviour. Individuals vary in their capacity to strategically 
manipulate the rules according to individual needs, to put him/herself in the right or 
claim water. Rules are often used to establish relations of dominance and control. They 
are publicly accepted or official norms and encode the interests of some people better 
than others. They can be part of the ideologies through which institutions obscure and 
protect certain sectional interests and values rather than others (Reed, 1992). Or they 
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reveal managerial talk that conceals political action behind the apparent neutral 
invocation of good practices (Strathem, 2000). 
Notes 
1 Confiama refers to reciprocal networks of familiarity, closeness, trust, confidence and friendship in 
which exchange of all lands of favours is common (Lomnitz, 1977). 
2 Land reform communities created after the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Ejido land belongs to the 
state, with a combination of community (ejido) and private (ejidatarid) usufruct, and since the 
amendment of Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992 ejidatarios can sell their land. The other category of 
landowners in Mexico is called peqaenos propietarios: private farmers with a limit on land ownership of 
100 ha. 
3 In fact, more ejidatarios are planting beans around Villa. However, this seems to be a less 
demanding crop for Diego, amongst other things because it needs very few irrigation turns. 
These words are not meant to be friendly. Joto means homosexual and is virtually always a 
negative qualification, although not necessarily to be taken literally. Mm/ate, which is also a large noisy 
insect with tentacles, is a frequently used term for the male on the receiving end. It is employed in both 
a disdainful and a humorous sense, and often symbolises relations of power inequality, or ridicules 
male intimacy. 
5 Rice plots are usually over ten hectares, because of the low profitability and high capital 
investment. 
6 According to Octavio Paz, this typical Mexican word epitomises the male aggressiveness, 
invulnerability, violent nature and other attributes of (arbitrary) power. It is possible to be un chingon in 
business, politics, in crime and with women. The verb chingar indicates the triumph of the closed, the 
macho, the strong, over the open (Paz, 1994). 
7 The majority of farmers in the region do not have the large machines that are needed for a 
particular cultivation of the land and need to rent a machine from a larger producer. 
8 This means that his sections are located upstream along the main lateral of Dario's sections. 
9 Young sorghum receives around three irrigation turns by means of sprinklers. For the last three 
turns, the irrigation method changes to surface irrigation. 
1 0 The land could be bought at a low price for this reason and through his good contacts with the 
ejido committee. It was levelled and made ready for irrigation with machinery belonging to the 
association. Estimates of its size vary from 140 to 200 hectares. 
" Chingando, politely translated. 
Photo 15 A new cxoss-regulator 
Photo 16 The podium at the annual assemblee of the WUA 
Photo 17 The water user delegates facing the podium 
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The Multiple Performances of Maintenance Machinery 
DRAMATIS PERSONAE: 
Machine operators 
Gutnerez 
Nunez 
Jimenez 
Leopoldo 
Delegates 
Network of favoured producers 
Perez 
Becerra 
Minister of Agriculture 
Governor 
nine workers operating the machinery 
manager of the WUA, Diego's cousin, superior and compadre 
president of the WUA 
head of maintenance 
distributes diesel and oil among the machines and the trucks 
twenty-five representatives of ejidatarios and private producers in the general 
assembly of the WUA 
large producers who get privileged access to maintenance services: Frederico 
Haro, Norberto, Aguirre, Bernardo Ulloa 
Diego's patron, former president of the WUA, local deputy and large producer 
and leader of a political group 
CNA district head 
ofNayarit 
ofNayarit 
PROPS: 
Maintenance machines machinery to carry out maintenance of irrigation works: dragline, motor 
grader, backhoe loader, hydraulic excavator, tractor, loader, light machine and 
three trucks 
Maintenance programme annual plan of maintenance activities 
Maintenance reports monthly and annual reports of maintenance activities 
Concession Title establishes the legal terms for the concession of the infrastructure by the 
government to the WUA 
Organisational chart representation of organisational hierarchy and task division 
Infrastructure network of connected canals, drains and roads of distinct levels 
Canal structures cross-regulators and intake structures consisting of individual parts, such as 
plates, bolts, cables 
Spare parts machine parts 
Vegetation weeds, shrubs, trees, water plants, etc. 
Boundaries limits of irrigation module, electoral districts and municipalities 
Public works enabled by machinery: e.g. roads, bridges, village squares, sports fields, 
drainage and sewage systems 
Drink beer 
Food birria: a local goat meat dish 
Banda music music played by a brass orchestra 
Pick-ups means of transport 
Radios, telephones means of communication 
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7.1 Introduction 
Recent studies of irrigation management performance are flawed in their understanding 
of actual irrigation management practices. In their analyses, these studies have as their 
point of departure a coherent but incorrect set of assumptions. The first is that irrigation 
schemes are functional systems with clear-cut boundaries and outputs. The second is 
that modern irrigation institutions such as Water Users' Associations (WUAs) strictly 
mobilise the inputs that they manage - people, machines and other resources -
according to a pre-defined set of service provision objectives. In other chapters (5 and 8) 
I discuss the associated idea that WUAs have an inherently better structure of rules and 
incentives than state bureaucracies to accomplish this. These studies define what I call 
operational performance as the degree to which the objectives are realised. They limit 
their analysis to those managerial practices that correspond with technological 
prescriptions, system boundaries and annual programmes, and that can be evaluated 
using quantifiable performance criteria1. In addition, performance studies explain the 
measured outputs and postulate improvements accordingly. This chapter illustrates how 
these two aforementioned analytical assumptions are problematic by examining the 
practice of maintenance in the Left Bank irrigation system. 
The problem with performance analysis is that it de-politicises irrigation management by 
omiting certain social, material and political practices and performances that constitute 
irrigation management and influence its wider impact. In the next chapter I will argue 
that culture and politics are pictured as external to everyday managerial practices and 
performances of irrigation organisations. This type of analysis inadequately represents 
irrigation organisations as purposive functional systems geared to the fulfilment of a 
clear set of performance objectives (Reed, 1992). It models managerial practices and 
performances as instrumental action. In this manner, a predetermined desired outcome 
follows from the execution of programmes and rational responses to rules and 
incentives. Service provision objectives for irrigation institutions are generally externally 
framed in broad technical, financial and a-political terms: efficiency, equity, 
accountability and adaptability (Ostrom, 1992). Through a set of performance criteria we 
are able to measure the extent to which actual water distribution is efficient, adequate or 
convenient in relation to a set of stated objectives. However, we are clearly not able to 
measure the extent to which it enhances a manager's prestige, patronage, or power 
through control of a water supply (Chambers, 1988: 123). But the infeasibility of 
measuring these phenomena does not preclude their importance to actual irrigation 
management. 
This chapter argues for the analysis of irrigation maintenance as a socio-material 
practice. Such an approach facilitates the elucidation of how managerial groups through 
their connection with maintenance machinery engage in multiple performances. 
Machine use contributes not only to operational performance, but also to other social, 
material and political practices and performances that transcend and change what are 
conceived to be the boundaries and objectives of an irrigation system. For this purpose, 
the chapter presents an account of the mobilisation of machine-operators, which are the 
composite entities of maintenance machines and operators executing maintenance work. 
It is useful to consider the machines with their operators (machine-operators) as 
co(a)gents (Michael, 2000) or composite entities, consisting of human and material parts 
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interacting. The hyphen between machine and operator is meant to remind the reader of 
the constant interaction between both parts. By documenting the actual use of machine-
operators beyond operational performances, this chapter shows that these entities 
enable and constrain various other modes of social, material and political comportment. 
From the analysis it emerges that maintenance machines are an appreciated source of 
revenue and political support for politicians and WUA managers, who seek to improve 
their position and that of their more extended social network. 
Maintenance is a particularly useful entry point to analyse the functioning of irrigation 
systems. Maintenance resources can be just as scarce or even scarcer than water. The 
maintenance machinery that WUAs have been controlling since the transfer is a scarce 
and highly strategic asset for which there is high demand and a variety of uses in and 
around irrigation systems. This is more widely recognised in the study of small-scale and 
farmer-managed irrigation systems, where the mobilisation of human labour and 
resources for maintenance is considered crucial, than in the case of larger irrigation 
systems, which tend to focus on the contested use of irrigation water or financial self-
sufficiency and rent-seeking2. Recently, however, there has been more recognition of this 
point (Sijbrandij and van der Zaag, 1993; Wester et al., 2000; Huppert et al., 2001; 
Kloezen, 2002). 
72 Maintenance on the Left Bank 
Operational performance 
In many irrigation organisations, the services provided or the validity of decisions made 
are difficult to assess because performance objectives are not stipulated, criteria are not 
specified and the standards of quality have not been internally agreed upon (Brewer et 
al, 1997; Kloezen 2002). For example, in Mexico the Concession Title 3 written by the 
Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA: National Water Commission) on the transfer of 
irrigation management to a WUA contains a standard operation and maintenance 
(O&M) manual for all WUAs and thus no specific management targets. Federal 
government institutions and international agencies that fund most research posit 
performance objectives and indicators from externally derived, internationally agreed 
and standardised approaches and review how different irrigation organisations score 
comparatively4. Such approaches frame everyday managerial practices and performances 
in terms of operational objectives, i.e. services delivered (work achieved) in accordance 
with the quantity, time or location of a programmed set of activities and revenues 
collected in accordance with the annual budget. This overlooks the existence of practices 
and performances that are not programmed or budgeted, or that cannot be evaluated in 
terms of performance indicators. 
Operational performance in maintenance is an outcome of the heterogeneous and 
distributed network of mobile machine-operators that the association uses to carry out 
maintenance. In this chapter I want to look at the mobilisation of machine-operators, 
defined above as composite entities of maintenance machines and operators that execute 
maintenance work, in support of the political group in control of the WUA. The scope of 
action and capacity of a machine in terms of the quantity and quality of work done5 in 
spatially distributed places emerges from both the social and material characteristics of 
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this mobile entity and the wider support network in which it is embedded. Both the 
material condition and properties of the machines: fuel consumption, maintenance and 
reparation requirements, availability of spare parts, and the social aspects of their use: 
the operators, their skills, employment relations, working hours, and remuneration, 
determine the capacity and mobility of these machine-operators. This is crucial to the 
variety of performances that these machine-operators enable and for which the political 
group in charge chooses to allocate them. 
The need to focus on the maintenance of irrigation infrastructure emerges from four 
observations about the current situation in Mexican irrigation districts. Firstly, the 
deteriorated state of the irurastructure and the deferred maintenance during the 1980s 
were important reasons that led to irrigation management transfer (see Chapter 2). 
Secondly, the majority of irrigation systems were not rehabilitated before or after the 
transfer. Instead, the CNA transferred the old maintenance machinery and distributed 
new maintenance machinery and government funds for rehabilitation to the WUAs (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). The new machinery was of a lighter type than the older heavy 
machinery, and therefore more suitable for the required job of cleaning lower-level 
canals and drains. Thirdly, around sixty per cent of the current budget of WUAs is 
dedicated to maintenance, thirty per cent to operation and only ten per cent to 
adrnirdsfration. Maintenance is thus the largest expenditure of WUAs (see Chapter 9). 
Fourthly, maintenance resources can be scarcer than water. This is especially true in 
cases such as the Left Bank or Autlan-FJ Grullo, where water is abundant, but it applies 
more generally also. 
On the Northern Coast of Nayarit, the high rainfall and tropical temperatures cause 
rapid vegetation growth. Water plants, weeds, grass, shrubs, and trees grow much faster 
than in other irrigated areas of the country. This demands an enormous maintenance 
capacity, in terms of personnel, machines and resources, which the WUA finds difficult 
to meet. Sometimes it is necessary to clean a canal twice instead of once a year because 
of the accumulated vegetation, silt and water plants. During and after the rainy period 
(las lluoias), the extensive network of primary, secondary and tertiary canals and drains 
has to be cleaned by the WUA's machinery. Manual weeding, cleaning and herbicide 
application is also used, but to a lesser extent. Individual water users do not always meet 
their obligation to clean their stretch of field canals before the irrigation season starts, but 
this is not the topic of this chapter. During the period of October to March, the WUA 
uses the machinery to clean the earthen drains to have them open for the rainy season 
during which they have to process large volumes of water. The lined canals are cleaned 
the whole year through. Especially near the beginning of the irrigation season, the WUA 
deploys the machines on the canals to make them ready for the irrigation season. 
The presentation of the annual maintenance report 
In October 1998, the association organises its annual informe (reporting) in the open 
assembly space of the Villa Hidalgo ejido6. Inuring this large public event, the board 
presents its yearly management report7. The political significance of the event is 
mderlined by the participation in it of the Governor of Nayarit and the state Minister of 
Agriculture, and the attendance of several regional politicians, ejido corrurdssioners and 
functionaries of rural organisations. The governor, the rninister, the board and several 
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other prominent figures together form the presidium. They are seated in front of an open 
space on a high podium behind a wooden counter, which is generally used in Mexican 
political events for the authorities. A large banner behind them states the occasion: The 
second informe of the current aclministration of the association. The twenty-five 
delegates are seated behind a row of tables below the podium, protected from the sun by 
a light material hanging above them. An open space exposed to the hot sun behind the 
delegates separates them from the crowd of attendees at the back, among whom there 
are many lower functionaries, ejidatarios, water users and other people. The cultural 
specificity of the event is made evident by a local music group of wind and rhythm 
irtstruments that is playing the popular banda music (brass orchestra) and the 
preparation of birria (a local goat meat dish) that will be distributed with beers and soft 
drinks by the canaleros (people in charge of the distribution of water in the field) to the 
few hundred attendees at the end of the meeting. The banda plays on the arrival and 
departure of the governor and subsequently after every individual speaker to reinforce 
their words. The crowd, as it quietly awaits the speeches, becomes animated by the lively 
music and the prospect of good food and drink, and applauds enthusiastically in 
response to the speakers. 
On a platform in the front, a professional announcer equipped with a microphone and a 
sound system introduces the speakers. As the first speaker, the president of the 
association, Nunez, welcomes the governor, other important guests, the delegates, water 
users and the audience. The delegates and the prominent guests at the meeting have 
received the annual management report and can read with Nunez whilst he presents the 
achievements of this year in operation, maintenance and administration, respectively. In 
the report a special section deals with maintenance. It contains a list with fifteen 
categories of maintenance activities (see Table 4) 8 . Having arrived at this section, Nunez 
reads aloud per category the total amount of work achieved (in kilometres, hectares, 
volume or number) and the total expenses incurred. He sums up the entire numbers 
mentioned in the report. The numbers after the comma only seem to add to the 
achievement. Nunez makes some clarifications about the maintenance activities and the 
repair of several machines. In addition, he mentions that the association entered a 
federal programme for the rehabilitation and modernisation of irrigation systems, as part 
of which gates and weirs were rehabilitated. The association and the federal government 
co-financed the programme and both contributed 100,000 Mexican pesos (US$25,000). 
In a similar manner, Nunez presents the data on operation and administration, after 
which he arrives at the total expenses and the sources of revenue. Nunez admits a 
budgetary loss for this year caused by adverse circumstances and a failure to collect 
sufficient fees, but then continues to enumerate the accomplishments and the beneficial 
projects, state and national level organisations in which the association is involved to 
improve the irrigation infrastructure and the productive conditions for the water users 
and producers of this area. When the CNA District Head Becerra, the Minister of 
Agriculture and the Governor have also spoken, the delegates are asked if they approve 
the annual report, after which they collectively raise their hands and express their 
approval by calling d'acuerdo or aprobado (o.k.). 
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Table 4 Annual maintenance programme and report compared9 
1997/1998 Programmed Executed Percentage (%) 
Total maintenance budget $1,357,682 $844,357 62 
1. Qeaning and weeding by 70.7 km 72.7 km 103 
hand $27,080 $39,836 147 
2. aeaning with light 197 km 41.5 km 21 
machine Alamo $54,217 $14,387 27 
3. Manual weeding and 21.6 km 1.4 km 7 
herbicide application $15,973 $13,3467 84 
4. Water plant extraction 187.7 km 119 km 63 
back hoe loader $107,865 $33,489 31 
5. Canal cleaning back hoe 11.7 km 7.7 km 66 
loader $45,341 $32,564 72 
6. Roads and canal banks 1,080 km 62.2 km 0.058 
with loader/ trucks $67,548 $156,965 232 
7. Repair canal lining 0.067 km 0.087 km 130 
$12,661 $11,980 95 
8. Plant extraction with 46.7 km 6.2 km 13 
Caterpillar tractor $76,385 $2,915 4 
9. aeaning drains with 56.8 km 44.2 km 78 
dragline $334,009 $54,768 16 
10. Road construction with 280.6 km 77.1km 27 
motor grader $210,486 $56,079 27 
11. Repair structures by hand 21km 21km 100 
$29,043 $11,027 38 
12. Painting and oiling 100 km 260 km 260 
structures $10,000 $22,118 221 
13. Studies and projects 90.000 km 57.334 km 64 
topographical brigade $108,000 $105,827 98 
14. Machine repair 6km 13.4 km 223 
$100,546 $227,417 226 
15. Supervision of works 1km 0.8 km 83 
$75,000 $61,549 82 
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Whilst the food and drink are being distributed and the banda is playing popular songs, a 
feeling of satisfaction comes over the crowd. When the governor has finished his meal 
and personally answered a number of requests from people that approach him, he 
stands up to indicate that the formal part of the meeting is over. His pall bearers follow 
him to the line of pick-ups that will take them back to Tepic. The popular celebration 
continues until the beer is finished. Then people leave. 
Intermediate analysis 
Neither the maintenance programme nor the report mention a set of stated performance 
objectives or criteria or 'an internally agreed service level' on the basis of which it would 
be possible to establish the operational performance of the association. In addition, it is 
effectively impossible to make a simple comparison between the planned and executed 
maintenance, either in terms of the location of works, or of the actual and programmed 
expenses per maintenance activity. The actual expenses: 844,357 pesos (about 
US$211,089) and programmed maintenance expenses: 1,357,682 pesos (about 
US$339,420) over 1997/1998 differ so much that it is difficult to evaluate the quantity of 
realised maintenance work in relation to the original plans10. The percentages of executed 
work in relation to planned, both in kilometres, cost and cost per unit vary so widely that 
it is impossible to make any general statements about the maintenance performance. A 
comparison with previous years is also clifficult, because the type of information 
presented is different in every annual report. No information from before the transfer is 
publicly available. 
The absence of a publicly available, consensual and standardised system of performance 
assessment makes it impossible to compare and validate assumptions about the 
improvement of maintenance performance, or for delegates or CNA officials to monitor 
maintenance performance in a univocal manner. The only useful conclusion that can be 
drawn from these data is the indication they give of the budgetary importance of 
different maintenance activities and the machines with which they are undertaken. In 
1997/1998 it is striking that the annual costs of machine repair turn out to be very high- It 
is by far the largest item of expenditure and constitutes more than a quarter of total 
maintenance expenditure (see Table 4, item 14)". The second largest expense is the 
construction and maintenance of roads and the strengthening of canal banks with a 
loader, trucks and the motor grader, which add up to a fifth of the total budget (items 6 
and 10), and the third is the execution of topographical studies and projects (one eighth). 
The motor grader, the loader, the hydraulic excavator and the trucks are the most 
intensively used machines, expensive both in terms of work and repairs. Further on in 
this chapter we will see that these sources of expenses are also important sources of 
income for the group in charge of the association. 
Maintenance programmes, budgets and reports are not straightforward regulatory 
devices that are capable of controlling the direction and movements of people, 
technological devices and resource flows in an organisation, and thus the operational 
performance of maintenance. 
In this meeting, the association president does not render account of the operational 
performance. By means of the presentation of an annual report, he rather performs a 
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kind of answerability and transparency to the delegates and the water users. However, 
the meeting and the annual report are, in these circumstances, hardly a source of public 
accountability. In practice, the board hardly involves the delegates in discussions 
concerning basic managerial decisions. Instead they inform them afterwards, if they 
inform them at all. The presentation of the annual report is largely ceremonial and 
obscures the reality of machine-operators in the field. 
The following chapter analyses this type of meetings as cultural performance, i.e. the 
enactment of a cultural repertoire in view of a political campaign. Without going into 
much detail, I shall point out the most important elements. Firstly, for the political group 
organising the meeting it is important who is present at it. They have been rather 
successful, as the most crucial political authorities in the state attend. A significant part of 
the group's electoral constituency that has come to the meeting is able to see this. This 
emphasises how well connected Nunez is. Secondly, the physical organisation of people 
and space reveals who the central actors are in this cultural performance. By giving a 
speech as president of the WUA, Nunez further develops his political profile. Thirdly, the 
skilful mobilisation of a set of cultural commodities - food drink and music - enhances 
the good atmosphere of the meeting and draws attention to the message that needs to 
be got across. The meeting primarily serves to diffuse an image of good management 
and political leadership to the public of users, delegates, functionaries, local leaders, 
politicians, higher political and bureaucratic authorities. 
Impressions in the field 
The manager, Guttierez, and the CNA supervisor, Blanco, make a field trip to show me 
some of the maintenance machinery at work. In Guttierez's air-conditioned and well-
maintained pick-up, the three of us drive along the canals and drains in search of the 
hydraulic excavator that Guttierez put to work in this area yesterday. Although we do 
not know exactly how far the operator has advanced with his work and where we can 
find him, we can spot the machine from a long distance away because it towers above 
the crops and trees. 
The low mobility and high visibility of the machines makes it relatively easy for the 
manager to supervise their movements when he drives through the area in his car. To 
reach the machine via some small sandy roads we have to cross several puddles of water 
created by the sprinklers operating in neighbouring tobacco fields. When we arrive near 
the machine, Guttierez parks the pick-up and we get out. We watch the hydraulic 
excavator removing the lush vegetation from the canal bank of a sub-lateral. The 
operator is moving the hydraulic arm sideways to bring the young trees and shrubs 
down, after which he uses the arm to uproot the vegetation, lift it and put it aside. Blanco 
remarks that for the machine it is not good to use the arm laterally to attack the trees, 
because it could destroy the cables and hydraulic wiring attached to the arm. This 
machine is not really meant for removing such high vegetation, but under these 
circumstances it would be preferable to attack it with the excavating device. Guttierez 
agrees and Blanco makes the same observation to the operator who follows his 
instructions. 
When we drive on, we see parts of the system where the sub-lateral canals are even 
more overgrown, particularly towards the tail-end of the system, when we get closer to 
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San Bias. Small trees indicate that it is more than a year since they have been cleaned. 
We also look at the state of the intake structures, gates, and the weirs, of which many are 
broken and only partly functioning. Parts are missing, such as plates, bolts, cables. Gates 
are held up with barbed wire or with a stick or sandbags underneath, because devices are 
missing, or more water is needed. Guttierez explains that, on the transfer of the system, 
a lot of the canals and drains were in a poorly maintained state and that many of the 
gates and intakes were in media vida (half alive, needing repair). Some canals and drains 
had not been cleaned for many years. Later, on the main canal near FJ Tizate just before 
the off-take of lateral 17, we review two major radial weir gates. We get out and observe 
that the cables of one of the gates are broken, that it cannot be lifted anymore. 
Fortunately, the other gate is functioning, which is sufficient according to Guttierez. He 
claims that, at the transfer, sixty per cent of all the structures were broken, whilst at the 
moment it is around forty per cent, because of the association's repair activities. It is 
Guttierez' opinion that this all has to do with 'the culture of the user'. People steal parts 
of the gates to sell as scrap iron; they move the intake structures without permission, 
sometimes even without a clear purpose. Nowadays this is becoming less frequent, 
because there is already more consciousness among the users about such issues. 
Having discussed the topic with a variety of insiders and outsiders, I get the general 
impression that the condition of the infrastructure has partially improved in comparison 
with the 1980s when the maintenance carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Hydraulic Resources, SARH, was very limited (see Chapter 4). The canals and drains are 
cleaner and the roads are more accessible, people contend. In general, from the 
perspective of water distribution, the delay in water turns caused by silted canals is 
limited to hours or occasionally days, but not much longer than that. This is short in 
comparison to other schemes. The condition of the drains also appears to have 
improved, although it is far from ideal. Siltation and vegetation growth is rapid, and a 
lack of maintenance can cause severe drainage problems, particularly in the rainy season. 
The structures and the canal lining have been in a mediocre but functional condition 
since the transfer. Although a rehabilitation of the infrastructure was not carried out 
before or after the transfer, the association has carried out some minor repair activities. 
Driving through the Left Bank, one notes a striking contrast in the maintenance 
condition of the infrastructure between the top end and centrally located parts of the 
system and the tail-end sections, particularly towards San Bias (sections 9,10,11,12, and 
13; see Map 6). The latter parts clearly have benefited less from the maintenance efforts 
of the association than the ejidos located around Villa Hidalgo. This difference also 
existed to some extent during the government era of irrigation (see Chapter 4). In the 
ejidos belonging to the municipality of San Bias, the canals are generally more silted, and 
this leads to delays in irrigation. The drains and roads are clearly more overgrown with 
weeds, shrubs and trees. In addition, the obvious lack of field drains affects crops 
negatively in the rainy period. Some insiders argue that the lack of maintenance efforts is 
related to the lower irrigation fee payment of farmers in this area. This is partly true. 
However, as will be explained later in this chapter, it is mostly related to the political 
constituency and presence of the political group that took charge of the association. 
Of all four WUAs in Nayarit, the Left Bank manages the largest number of machines, 
because it has the largest irrigated area to maintain. The other WUAs feel disadvantaged 
in this respect. Nevertheless, Guttierez argues that the association does not have 
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sufficient machines in good condition for the maintenance needs of the system. 
Machinery repair is a large drain on the budget of the association. A number of the 
machines were old and in a bad shape when they were transferred and they continue to 
present problems. The old Link-Belt backhoe loader broke down near a canal in FJ Corte 
some time ago and the state of the machine makes it too costly to repair or move it. The 
cfragline from the early 1970s does not work at full capacity anymore. It breaks down and 
has to be repaired regularly12. Another problem faced by the association is that it is 
difficult to acquire spare parts for the new machines they received from the CNA around 
the time of the transfer. The decision to buy certain makes of machines was made by the 
CNA in Mexico City and could not be influenced by the association. Guttierez suggests 
that CNA officials had personal interests in buying these particular machines, as they 
were bought from foreign companies without an ample network of suppliers around the 
country. For example, the motor grader, Huber, was handed over by the CNA 
completely new in 1991, when the patronatos de apoyo (assistant managing boards)13 were 
funchcming (see Chapter 4). It broke down after being used intensely and inexpertly. It 
remained idle for months, because there was no money to repair it. Recently, it was 
brought to a workshop in Tepic where it awaited repair. The particular spare part needed 
was impossible to find in Mexico and eventually had to be imported from Canada. 
Because of the frequent breakdown and disrepair of machines, and to keep up with the 
maintenance requirements, the association participates in an exchange of machines with 
four other associations in Nayarit. This exchange of machines, which happens without 
mutual payment, is co-ordinated by the CNA, according to the availability of machines 
and maintenance needs of these four irrigation modules and one rainfed module in 
Nayarit. Another example is the Hyundai excavator, which was handed over to the 
association around the time of the transfer in 1993. There was a large demand for this 
machine, it was used intensively and new spare parts were needed to keep it working, 
but they were not always easy to find rapidly. 
To do something about the general disrepair of the operational infrastructure, the 
association entered a CNA programme for the rehabilitation and modernisation of 
irrigation systems. It is part of a larger federal government programme Alianza para el 
Campo (Alliance for the Countryside)14, which enables the co-financing of rural 
development investments. A certain number of gates and weirs were repaired or 
renewed. The association financed this by asking the water users for an additional 
irrigation fee of fifteen pesos per hectare (US$2)15. It contributed 100,000 Mexican pesos 
(US$25,000), an amount which the federal government, through the CNA, doubled. The 
works were carried out by a private engineering company from the northern state of 
Sinaloa. This company, which tendered the lowest bid in an open contest for the 
contract, had undertaken similar works in earlier years for the association and the CNA. 
The company turned out to have the lowest bid and was selected after an open 
competition and collective bidding by various companies. Minor repair activities to the 
infrastructure were undertaken by field personnel of the association. 
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73 The Organisation of Maintenance 
An organisational chart 
On a November morning I visit the association's office. Blanco accompanies me. He is 
responsible for supervising and supporting the activities of the association on the Left 
Bank. On our way, the supervisor is good-natured. He is curious about what the 
manager will tell me when I ask him how management functions, and he instructs me 
about what to ask him. Although they are compadres (co-parents), the two men have 
clearly diverging institutional positions and interests. After Guttiérez welcomes us, 
Blanco asks him for an organisational chart of the association. Guttiérez looks in the 
Concession Title, a document that stipulates the terms and conditions under which the 
CNA has transferred the module to the association. He finds the official chart of a WUA 
according to CNA head quarters, studies it, but draws the conclusion that it is not 
correct. Then he starts drawing his own. After a few minutes he shows the chart depicted 
in Figure 3. 
What strikes me immediately is the absence from his chart of a General Assembly, the 
highest authority according to the official chart. I ask Guttiérez about the frequency of 
these meetings of delegates. He responds that it was intended to organise monthly 
meetings, but that many of the twenty-five delegates do not show up, because they have 
their own work. Therefore, they only organise a meeting when they encounter a problem 
that they want to discuss with the delegates. Although Guttiérez does not say who 'they' 
are, it is clear that he is referring mainly to the group of Pérez, Nuñez, and himself that 
effectively has managed the association since its formation. 
Figure 3 Guttiérez' organisational chart 
Guttiérez goes through a pile of documents behind his desk and draws out a copy of the 
annual maintenance programme for 1997/1998. The page that he opens for me details 
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the maintenance budget expenses planned for this year. The expenses (Mexican pesos) 
are divided over the following six major maintenance areas: 
In total, these expenses are about sixty-five per cent of the association's total planned 
budget for the coming year. Maintenance is by far the largest proportion of expenditure, 
because, for operation and adrrurdstration respectively, only around twenty-five per cent 
and ten per cent are allocated16. The maintenance plan details for each canal, drain or 
road the quantity of a programmed activity in volume, area, length and costs. These 
activities vary from levelling roads, dredging drains, extraction of silt and water plants, to 
consolidation of canal banks. 
Guttiérez gives an overview of the mfrastructure that the association operates and 
maintains: 231.95 kilometres of canals (with 271 weirs, 106 lateral intakes and 440 field 
intakes), 193.6 kilometres of drains, and 301.13 kilometres of roads17. For the 
maintenance of this irrigation infrastructure, the association has seven operating 
machines and three trucks at its disposal. This is a significant increase in machine 
capacity in comparison with the SARH days before the transfer (before 1991), when the 
district only had a dragjine, a backhoe loader and a motor grader for both the Left and 
the Right Bank of the River Santiago. A lot of maintenance work was contracted out to 
private firms, because the machines were under repair or there was a huge backlog in 
maintenance. SARH engineers often had links to these private firms through which they 
also benefited personally. Reviewing the maintenance personnel, Guttiérez points out 
that the fact that all of the nine maintenance operators constantly work on one of these 
machines or trucks prevents machines or workers being left idle, as frequently happened 
before. The use of manual labour for weeding, extraction of plants and removal of shrubs 
and trees, and the application of chemicals has been significantly reduced under the 
association in comparison with the situation under the SARH, which employed fixed 
teams of manual labourers. When manual labour is needed for this purpose, temporarily 
contracted teams of workers generally do it. 
In sum, after the transfer of the Left Bank module, maintenance is carried out with more 
machinery and with fewer staff working fuU-time on the machines. This has resulted in 
increased maintenance capacity. According to the annual maintenance report, the 
available maintenance machines (with year of acquisition) are used for the following 
purposes: 
- Distribution net (canals): " 
- Drainage net: 
- Road net: 
- Structures (division structures, etc.): 
- Studies and projects: 
- Supervision and repair of machines: 
384,211 
410,395 
210,486 
69,043 
108,000 
175,547 
1,357,682 TOTAL 
• A dragline Link-Belt to clean drains (1972) 
• A motor grader Huber used for preparing roads (1991) 
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• A backhoe loader Link-Belt and a hydraulic excavator Hyundai Robex (around 1993) 
used for excavating, cleaning and dredging of canals, and the extraction of water 
plants 
• A Caterpillar tractor (1990) and a Clark Michigan loader (1978) for excavating, soil 
transport, preparation of roads, the extraction of plants and removal of shrubs and 
trees, and consolidation of canal banks. 
• A light machine Fiat Alamo to extract water plants from drains and canals and to 
clear their banks from vegetation. 
• Three trucks of different makes for soil transport for roads and canal banks. 
Above, Guttiérez presented a set of documents that separately represent the 
association's organisation of staff, machinery and financial resources in space and time: 
the maintenance programme that centrally plans the spatial and timely distribution of 
maintenance work; the organisational chart, which spells out the vertical distribution of 
decision-making authority and work; the maintenance budget that programmes the 
allocation of financial resources and the technical specifications which prescribe the 
correct use of the machinery. From these accounts, I get the impression that 
maintenance under the association is the mechanical implementation of a central 
process of plarming, decision making and regulation to which a significant part of its 
resources, personnel and machinery is allocated. 
The political group and the machine-operators 
The manager is a central figure because he co-ordinates the association's personnel, 
machinery and resources allocated to maintenance in the field. He is also situated at a 
nodal point of the political group that controls the WUA. Together with the president 
and influenced by the president of the control committee and a wider circle of favoured 
producers, they decide what is done with demands and claims on the machinery. 
Although Guttiérez and Nunez have many other tasks demanding their attention, they 
are often directly involved in the decisions about where to move the maintenance 
machinery. This illustrates its strategic importance. They decide according to group 
interests whether to follow the regular maintenance programme or to dispense particular 
favours and services by means of the machinery. 
According to Guttiérez' organisational chart, the head of maintenance, Jimenez, controls 
the association's daily maintenance routine (see Figure 3). He is responsible for 
supervising the maintenance personnel and monitoring the progress of the maintenance 
machinery in the field, in addition, he is also expected to prepare the annual 
maintenance programmes and monthly reports. However, the paper hierarchy provided 
by Guttiérez does not correspond with the actual working relationships. 
Jimenez is a middle-aged, pot-bellied man, who used to work as a topographer under 
the SARH and the CNA. He is from the state capital of Tepic where the CNA head 
offices are located. When the association was formed in 1993, he was one of the few 
CNA employees employed by the association. Jimenez is regularly to be found in his 
office, which lies in the courtyard at the back of the association's building. With a fan 
directed towards him and maps enthusiastically scattered around the office, he is 
working on some calculation sheets. He is preparing the levelling of a plot or the 
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construction of a drain. At the beginning of the rice cycle, Jimenez is also intensely 
involved in the measurements needed for the layout of bunds in rice fields. The 
concentrated expression on his sweaty face tells me that he enjoys this work. In his 
position as topographer, Jimenez is one of the few persons in the area who has at his 
disposal a complete set of instruments and tools to take topographic measurements for 
agricultural purposes. There are other engineers who claim that they have the necessary 
skills and emphasise that taking measurements is nothing ciifficult, but they do not have 
access to such instruments. This leads to jealous comments about Jimenez' beneficial 
position. Jimenez does his topographic work for the association, but also sometimes 
accepts assignments on a personal basis. For such private assignments, he charges lower 
than the official tariffs of private companies. They are a lucrative business, both for the 
association and himself, given the large interest and the limited topographic capacity in 
the area. Pérez, Guttiérez, Norberto and a group of favoured rice producers particularly 
benefit from Jimenez' services. Because Jimenez is not really part of Pérez' group, he 
appears thankful to Guttiérez for allowing him to work, to accept private assignments 
and make some extra income. Consequently, he displays loyalty to him. 
In addition, Jimenez does not have a pick-up or a radio of his own. He only goes to the 
field from time to time to supervise the machine-operators. Leopoldo, the person who 
distributes diesel and oil among the machines and the trucks, uses the only pick-up 
allocated to maintenance. Leopoldo is a compadre of Pérez. Jimenez depends on 
Leopoldo when he needs to go to the field. Leopoldo does not really like his superior, 
Jimenez, because he is always ordering him around on matters about which he is not 
really competent. For example, he tells him to do things more quickly, to repair a 
machine, when this is not really possible. Leopoldo is of the opinion that he only tWnks 
of himself as important and that this is very tiring. So Leopoldo tries to avoid him and, 
when possible, does not always comply with his instructions. According to this 
alternative organisational hierarchy, it is much more important to comply with the 
instructions from Guttiérez, Pérez, or Nunez. 
Because the head of maintenance does not have at his disposal a pick-up, radio contact 
or close relations with his operators, he is unable to monitor the movements and work of 
the machine-operators. Therefore, he is unable to check the report sheets they hand over 
to him and which form the basis of the maintenance reports to the CNA. These sheets 
mention their location, daily progress, and fuel consumption, data that he uses for his 
monthly reporting to the CNA. It follows that for relative outsiders to the daily 
maintenance routine, such as CNA district officials, the delegates, let alone farmers, it is 
very difficult to survey the use and movements of the machines in order to monitor their 
operational performance and make the management accountable. 
Hence, in practice Jimenez is both socially and materially severely constrained in these 
tasks, as he is not authorised to make decisions regarding the machinery or personnel 
and oversee the maintenance work effectively by means of a pick-up. These tasks thus 
largely rest with others. For example, Blanco assists with the maintenance programming 
and budgeting (because of a supposed lack of expertise on the part of Guttiérez and 
Jimenez), and the secretary usually does the monthly reporting. Jimenez is only partly 
responsible for plans and reports on the quantity and quality of work 
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Instructing the operators and steering the maintenance works in the field falls to 
Guttierez and his employees and confidants, Leopoldo and Aldama. Guttierez keeps in 
close contact with them by radio. Besides his maintenance work, Aldama is also an active 
delegate from the El Corte ejido. At the beginning of the 1990s, he was the treasurer of 
the rice refinery near La Sauta, until it was closed down because of financial problems in 
1994. From this period, he knows both Ernilio, the large rice producer who preceded him 
as treasurer, and Perez, who was a member of the board18. Aldama maintains friendly 
relations with Perez and his group. This is why he was asked to be a vocal (stand in) for 
President Nunez, whom he would replace in the event of something happening. 
Presently, he supervises the work of the association's three trucks. Usually he 
accompanies one of the truck drivers and thus can often be found in the field. Guttierez 
maintains a relation of friendship and trust with Aldama, and leaves him a lot of 
discretion in his work. 
Together with Guttierez I attend a few alcoholic encounters with Aldama, a heavy 
drinker, somebody who competes with Diego in terms of his bodily dimensions. One 
particular afternoon we see the trucks parked close to a cantina. We enter the place 
where Aldama, the three truck drivers and the operator of the loader are drinking. 
Guttierez pays for some of their beers and we drink, exchange jokes and laugh with 
them in an amicable atmosphere. When we have left and are driving back to Villa, 
Guttierez imparts an instructive insight: 'You have to leant that it is very important to 
coexist with the workers'. He explains that they very much appreciate it if you spend some 
time and drink with them. This is very important for your relations with them and their 
motivation to work, he states. The maintenance of relations of friendship with the 
operators through these kinds of encounters appears important to Guttierez, because it 
generates a sense of belonging to a group and enhances worker loyalty. 
Behind Jimenez' office lies the half-covered workshop of the mechanic, Juan. As I make 
small talk with Juan, we look at the machine park in the courtyard where vehicles await 
use or repair. Some machines have been parked here for a long time, because no money 
is available for their repair, or because of the difficulties of acquiring the spare parts. Juan 
suggest that it also has to do with the fact that some operators do not have the skills or 
experience that it takes to correctly operate and maintain a machine. He gives the 
example of the Clark Michigan tractor used for mamtaining roads and canal banks. 
Although it was still in a reasonable state when it was transferred, it presently breaks 
down constantly. The former operator was very irresponsible and did not maintain the 
machine. He did not know, until it was too late, that the four wheels have to be greased 
every now and then. The new operator is more responsible and skilled in this respect. 
There are good operators if you look for them, but they are not always hired because 
other criteria come into play. 
Most of the nine operators are related in some way or belong to Perez' group. This 
means that expertise is not always the most important criterion for recruitment. What is 
also important here is that these people owe their secure job and income to Perez, 
Nunez and Guttierez, and are thus expected to be loyal to them. Some of these 
confidants have better working conditions and incentives than others in the association. 
In addition, they are allowed to extract private benefit from their work or are allowed 
extra leeway in their work without being reprimanded. This creates an obligation. 
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Others, who do not answer to the clientelist expectations of the group, endanger their 
position and are likely to be in less beneficial and crucial positions, like the canaleros, 
the maintenance workers are not unionised and can be easily fired. Although salaries 
were raised significantly after the transfer, this was in part nullified by the annual rate of 
inflation, as salaries were not mdex-linked. The maintenance workers have become more 
dependent on their superiors for their job security than in the government days. 
7.4 The Socio-Material Practice of Maintenance 
Actual patterns of maintenance 
The assembly of delegates and the management agreed early in Nunez7 term as 
president that they preferred a spatial zoning policy for the use of the maintenance 
machinery. This meant that a machine would finish the maintenance of canals or drains 
in a particular zone or section according to a fixed route, before moving to another zone. 
It was also agreed that in addition to quantities and costs, the annual maintenance report 
would mention the locations of maintenance works. These measures were expected to 
rationalise the execution of the maintenance programme by mirurnising the cost of 
displacement of machines and preventing misuse of the machinery. With the zoning 
policy and the maintenance programme, it would be easy to review the progress on a 
map of the irrigation system, as the planning and corresponding advances along the line 
elements (canals, and so on) can be made visible. The delegates were aware of, but could 
not prevent, this zoning principle being dropped just a few months into Nunez7 
presidential period, because Nunez7 group mobilised the machines according to personal 
and group interests. In practice, a much wider field of forces, priorities and pressures was 
at work than the paper planning of maintenance and such a zoning policy reflected. 
As a result, the daily practice of maintenance shows enormously complex and irregular 
patterns of machine movements from one spot in the system to the next (Sijbrandij, 
1989; van der Zaag, 1992). The maintenance work appears to be delivered at random, the 
traces distributed like those of a spiders legs (see Map 8). These patterns are hardly 
intelligible from the programmed maintenance activities on canals, drains and roads, or 
from the zoning policy that demands certain continuity and fixed machine routes. The 
maintenance programme is in reality only in part decisive in determining the 
mobilisation, work, routes and movements of the machines. The programme does not 
prescribe a fixed time schedule or spatial sequence in which the planned work is 
arranged, so it leaves open when and where a machine is allocated. 
The machine-operators or truck drivers are constantly moving along a web of canals, 
drains, fields and roads. The machine-operators travel a lot across and sometimes 
outside the system. When they are finished in one spot, they get instructions to move to 
the next. At night, the heavy machinery is usually left in the field where the day's work 
finishes. Operators are brought to their machines by pick-up in the morning and work 
all day long on a canal or a drain, usually with no other companion than the noise of 
their machine. The diesel distributor, Leopoldo, who brings, checks and refills their 
diesel and oil is their most frequent visitor. He also brings them instructions from 
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Map 8 Madiine-operator movements 
Source-, (van der Zaag, 1992:119) 
The operational performance of maintenance is hampered because the moderate 
physical condition and the frequent breakdown of machines produce irregular and 
discontinuous patterns of movements and work. This is caused by their very intensive 
use. Although the repair of machines is carried out much more quickly than under the 
government, it may still take considerable time, because of the lack of spare parts or 
financial resources, and it is often necessary for a machine to discontinue its route and 
work in order to be returned to the association's yard or a workshop somewhere else. 
When the repair is completed, there may be other priorities preventing it from returning 
to the spot where it was working. Another bottleneck which hampers the advance of 
regular maintenance is the displacement of machinery when emergencies arise, such as 
the sudden flooding of the river, canals or drains that may threaten fields or villages. In 
some cases, the association is asked by local politicians to send their machinery for the 
resolution or prevention of such emergencies. 
The political group in charge of the association thus controls the actual decisions about 
the day-to-day use and movement of the machine-operators. Nunez and Guttierez in 
particular are centre stage in determining the use of the machinery and their operators, 
strongly influenced by Perez, the treasurer Norberto and a network of favoured large 
producers who regularly lay claim to the use of machines. Guttierez benefits from the 
close ties that he has with the group of confidants that works in maintenance, who are 
Guttierez or the president about where to go after they have finished in their present 
location. This is because he is in touch with the office through his radio. 
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instrumental in the movement of machine-personnel in line with the group's pragmatic 
needs. The machine-operators take part in a cascade of social, material and political 
performances of this political group. As such, the mobile machine-operators are like the 
flexible legs of a spider that move around a dispersed network of canals and weave a 
web of relations. This web of relations extends beyond, and shifts the physical 
boundaries of, the irrigation system, as we will see below. 
The Hyundai operator and the canalero outside the irrigation system 
I have described the following scene before in Section 6.4, where I emphasise how Diego 
provides his patron, Perez, with privileged access to irrigation water. Here I will focus on 
the particular use of machinery. In the middle of the main irrigation season in 1998,1 
clrive with Diego down one of the sub-laterals in his section. Diego is in a hurry to check 
whether sufficient water is reaching the end of the canal. Perez owns two large 
properties at the tail-end of two sub-lateral canals in Diego's sections. Diego remarks 
that these properties are officially not part of the irrigation district and that they lie 
immediately outside it. The association is not obliged to give him servicio here...(but it 
does). Not many people are likely to notice this, because these lands are situated far 
from the easily reachable main canals and the paved roads. 
At the end of the lined canal we find a reasonably new outlet structure that lets through 
the water flow that Diego has just ensured. The canal outlet lets the water stream into 
what looks like an earthen drain. In the field, a few bomberos (pump operators) have 
installed a pump near this drain and are using this flow of drainage water to irrigate 
young sorghum with a sprinkler installation. The structure and the drains were 
constructed only three years ago. The association's machine-operators worked day and 
night on the immense job of removing the vegetation, levelling the land, constracttng 
field drains, and making it ready for irrigation. Two years ago, Perez had started 
producing rice and sorghum. 
Further down the field, an association operator is deaning the drain with the hydraulic 
excavator, Hyundai. He is glad of some distraction in this remote spot and so we have a 
chat. The man is one of the assodation's most experienced and capable operators. As 
machine-operator, he worked in several Central American countries on the Pan-
American Highway running from Mexico to South America. Although his salary is much 
lower now that he works for the assodation, he is happy with the steady income. He and 
the Hyundai are almost constantly engaged throughout the year, and they move around 
a lot in the area. 
We discuss the fact that the drains on which he is working are not construrted correctly, 
as they do not have a gradient and the water has no way out. In practice, they are used 
as canals. Because they convey a lot of silt-laden water, they rapidly fill up with sediment 
and have to be deaned regularly. The operator wants to make them a lot deeper but 
thinks that there will not be enough time, because the excavator is needed somewhere 
else. To do a good job on the three drains, the operator estimates he needs about sixty 
hours or one week of work, but he doubts that he will be given the time to finish it, 
because there is an almost constant demand on his machine. He says that he will have to 
wait and see what Nunez wants. 
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The men continue to talk about Perez7 recent agricultural and political operations and 
laugh about his way of achieving things. As his clients, they respect and enjoy the 
productive and political skill of their patron, in which they participate. 
Machine-operators beyond boundaries 
The example above reveals how Perez, as leader of the political group in charge of the 
association19, uses its operational arrangements to expand his network of irrigated 
agricultural production. Machine-operators, canaleros on motor bikes, outlet structures 
outside the irrigation system, and drains that turn out to be canals, are the composite 
entities that take part in this. These operational arrangements thus enable Perez to 
engage in more than operational performances and extend beyond the boundaries of the 
irrigation district. 
By means of the machine-operators, the political group maintains a web of social and 
political relations that constitutes a source of revenue and political support. Below we 
will explore several examples. Firstly, a wider group of favoured large producers, who are 
part of the outer circle of the group, benefits from privileged access to the machinery, 
personnel and resource flows involved in maintenance (see also Chapter 6). Because 
these producers own large areas of land in need of levelling and preparation for irrigated 
rice, sorghum and maize production, or where the canals and drains need to be cleaned, 
they occasionally make requests to use the machine-operators. These activities might fall 
within the maintenance programme, but they also might not. These producers make 
daims on the use of the machinery and are granted favours by the assodation's 
management. The machine-operators are thus used not as collective but group assets in 
order to reproduce bonds or create alliances, in spite of the fad that the expenses are 
charged to the wider constituency of users. These favoured producers may come to the 
office, make a phone call to Guttierez or Nunez, or call them on their radio, in order to 
impart their request. They are generally asked to wait some days until the machine in 
question is finished its work in hand and becomes free. When their request is approved, 
the machine is moved to the private plot of the producer, or the canal, drain or roads that 
are conneded to it and require work. Norberto and Fjrulio, with whom the group shares 
many different organisational, economic and political interests and friendship bonds, 
often make such daims and are consequently frequent users of the machinery. 
Secondly, the assodation's machine-operators are also mobilised for purposes other 
than operational and productive ones. Norberto, for instance, in his function as treasurer 
of the assodation and ejido commissioner of Sauta also deployed the Caterpillar, the 
Hyundai and the Clark Michigan loader for several weeks in 1998 in the construction of 
an asphalt road to Sauta. It is undear what the assodation earned from these 
investments. However, Norberto personally benefited a lot from the situation. His 
motive was not just finandal but also political, as he faced elections in his ejido and 
expeded to generate political support and to improve his public image as a leader by 
organising an important public work for his people that greatly improved access to the 
village. 
Within the rural political economy and the sub-tropical coastal landscape of Nayarit, the 
type of heavy machinery the assodation has at its disposal is a scarce and highly strategic 
asset for which there is an almost constant demand for a variety of uses . The public 
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works enabled by machine-operators are an appreciated source of political support and 
legitimation for politicians, government officials, ejido and rural leaders, who seek to 
improve their public image of competent and effective leadership. Under the PRI (Partido 
Revolucionario Institutional: Institutional Revolutionary Party), building these types of 
public infrastructure projects was a common practice for acquiring political support. 
Public roads, bridges, village squares, sports fields, drainage and sewage systems are 
good examples (see also Chapter 8). Maintenance machinery is therefore at times a 
much-demanded political tool that is subject to different claims. The mobilisation of the 
machines often occurs in exchange for support between politically allied groups and is 
part of a cultural exchange of favours (favores) and services (servitios poHticos) to establish 
and maintain friendships and political alliances. There is of course a reciprocity in such 
types of exchange. Depending on the time and circumstances, some form of capital is 
expected in return: e.g. cash payment, favours, and political support. 
Thirdly, another highly strategic use is the leasing out of the machine-operators in order 
to generate an extra source of revenue and support for political campaigning, as we will 
see in the next chapter. This has both financial and political aspects that are often 
mtertwined. The association's rates for leasing out these machines per hour (around 125 
US$ for the hydraulic excavator, Hyundai) are below the commercial rates, particularly in 
view of the lack of heavy machinery in the area. 
For example, the association's board gives ample support to Don Victor Gamez, a large 
cattle holder, with a few hundred hectares of pasture. The very existence of the holding 
depends on almost constant and ample access to water for his pasture, and access to the 
association's machinery for field improvement activities, such as levelling, making field 
canals and drains and soil transport. The motor grader, the trucks, the loader and their 
operators are used for these purposes. Although Don Victor pays a good fee per hour of 
machine use to Guttierez in return, these services come relatively cheap to him, because 
the fee charged is below the commercial rate. However, the rationality behind such 
exchanges or transactions is never only commercial. The leasing of the machine-
operators is often enmeshed with friendship relations, political transactions and alliance 
buflding. Don Victor, who has been a personal friend of the Perez and Guttierez families 
for many years, is an influential man with close political and business relations with the 
most important political families and entrepreneurial groups in Nayarit. He is one of the 
members of the Alica group, the largest entrepreneurial group in Nayarit, which 
supports one of its affluent members, Antonio Echeverria, and a political successor of 
Don Emilio Gonzalez, the influential ex-governor, in his campaign to become the new 
governor in 1999. His support for Nunez' campaign at the coast and in the capital may 
be useful to gather support among local leaders, politicians, government officials and 
businessmen. 
Particularly when the association's financial situation is deteriorating towards the end of 
the irrigation season or in the rainy period, when fee collection drops, this revenue flow 
is crucial for the association and the group in charge when it is running a campaign. It 
has been especially important because Nunez does not have additional sources of 
revenue from other walks of life, apart from his affluent patron Perez. However, what it 
costs to let a machine work, and the payback, is not publicly known. The way in which 
the acquired cash is allocated is not very transparent for outsiders, observers or 
delegates, as this machine use is not programmed, reported or admiriistrated per job and 
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no receipts are given to the beneficiaries. In addition, as the next chapter shows, the 
machine-operators are even put to work outside of the irrigation system. This is difficult 
to monitor. For these reasons, this is a crucial source of revenue for Nunez' group and 
enables them to organise and finance campaigns to support his political career and 
ambitions. 
Another case in a similar category of machinery leasing is when an ejido requests the use 
of the machinery for improvement activities in or around the ejido. This might happen 
via the ejido's delegate or an ejido commissioner applying for the machinery. The chance 
of such a request succeeding depends very much on the relationship of this delegate or 
the ejido committee with Nunez7 group and it is considered a personal favour that they 
dispense. For example, the FJ Corte ejido commissioned the Hyundai and its operator to 
make a drain in order to drain a pond of water close to a village compound. The pond, 
which grew during the rainy period, threatened to inundate the compound. The ejido 
board, the association and the municipality reached an agreement to co-finance this 
safety measure. The association would put in their machine, the ejido paid five to ten per 
cent of the expenses, and the municipality paid for the diesel and the operator. Again 
this was not merely a commercial deal, but also embedded in Nunez7 political friendship 
relations with this ejido committee. The delegate for this ejido is Aldama, who is close to 
both the ejido's president and to Nunez. Nunez might expect the ejido to support him in 
pursuing his political ideals. 
Early in 1998, Nunez follows a similar path to that of his political patron, the regional 
deputy for the Left Bank, Perez, and uses the association as a springboard to advance his 
political career. He wins the elections for presidency of the Municipal Peasant 
Committee (CMC) of Santiago ixcuintla in February 1998. Subsequently, in 1999 Perez, 
Nunez and Guttierez campaign for a range of political and administrative positions at 
the municipal and state level. Perez' group acquires political and financial support from 
the aforementioned favoured producer groups, ejido committees, and influential 
politicians and leaders by dispensing a set of favours and services through the 
association. The machine-operators and maintenance works play an important role here 
in acquiring the necessary political and financial capital for their political campaign. 
The downside of the aforementioned political use of the machinery by the group means 
that the maintenance efforts are not equally distributed over the irrigation system. In 
part this explains the striking difference in maintenance conditions between the core 
political constituency of the group and the areas that fall outside it, to the benefit of the 
former and the detriment of the latter. The fact that the boundaries of the irrigation 
system intersect with municipal and electoral district boundaries causes this complicated 
situation (see Chapter 4). This defines the constituency of the political group based in the 
WUA and consequently also the networks of political support that they favour and 
sustain. Their political constituency covers the central and largest part of the irrigation 
system that belongs to the municipality of Santiago Ixcuintla. Because Perez represents 
this electoral district in his function as deputy of the state parliament, this territory has 
been the historical support base of his group. It mainly consists of ejido committees, 
producer groups, entrepreneurs, and clientele in and around the village of Villa Hidalgo. 
Nunez initially also acquired a good deal of his support for the municipal CMC election 
from this area, particularly through the association. 
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However, this political constituency excludes the coastal fringe zone at the tail-end of 
the irrigation system, which belongs to the San Bias municipality. This means that the 
ejido committees, delegates, influential agrarian leaders and producer groups from that 
area are not part of the political constituency of Pérez' group21. Ejido presidents, 
delegates, and politicians complain that they cannot exercise effective leverage over the 
association to get regular maintenance and special works with the maintenance 
machines, as a result of which less maintenance work is carried out here than upstream. 
A former politician from the Autan ejido of the municipality of San Bias complains about 
the fact that, since the transfer of the irrigation districts, they do not have the possibility 
of intervening anymore when they want to question the allocation of water or machines. 
'When the SARH still administrated, we were always in the position to phone the Secretary of 
Agriculture and ask about what was happening. We had the right to protest. Now if you call 
Tepic (i.e. the CNA), they tell you that the system is ours'. The message they get is that, as 
water users, they have elected the board and they should change it when it no longer 
satisfies. The effect is that local politicians cannot exercise influence over the use of the 
machinery. It appears that, in terms of maintenance service provision, the physical 
boundaries of the irrigation system have contracted and exclude the San Bias area. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The presentation of maintenance reports and organisational charts provides managerial 
idealisations of the allocation of personnel, machines and resources. This practice 
reproduces the managerial myth of regulatory devices that are capable of rationalising 
and determining the directions and movements of people, technological devices and 
resource flows in an organisation. Underlying this is the idea that people, technologies 
and resources engaged in irrigation management are strictly mobilised according to an 
operational set of rules and service provision objectives. This reduces the role of, for 
example, maintenance machines to technological inputs that have a fixed operational 
purpose. The assumption is that their operational performance automatically follows 
from the O&M manual and the maintenance programme: a hydraulic excavator is used 
for cleaning x number of canal stretches, a truck for transporting y quantity of material. 
This type of account projects an image of ideal orders and the separated worlds of 
people, machines and resources involved in actual maintenance practices. This hardly 
provides a source of public accountability. However, the conclusion is not that these 
representations are completely meaningless, but that they are part of the wide array of 
ordering practices and performances that shape everyday management. 
This chapter presented a socio-material analysis of maintenance that yields a number of 
analytical insights to challenge approaches that analyse irrigation schemes as systems 
with fixed boundaries. Following the erratic patterns of machine movements in the 
irrigation system shows that they go beyond the physical boundaries of the irrigation 
system and even shift these outwards. In other, less favoured parts of the system that do 
not fall within the constituency of the group in charge, the result is a contraction of the 
boundaries. This partially excludes groups of users from services for which they pay fees. 
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This analysis allows an understanding of how a political group, through its connection 
with machine-operators, engages in multiple performances. It shows that the use of 
maintenance machinery contributes not only to the operational performance of 
maintenance in the irrigation system, but also to other social, material and political 
practices and performances that transcend and change what are conceived to be the 
boundaries and objectives of the irrigation system. These performances, which 
contribute to the formation and reproduction of the political group and its outer circle of 
favoured producers and political clientele, have a detrimental effect on the operational 
performance of the irrigation system. In the case that I have studied, the political group 
that controls the Left Bank WUA mobilises the machinery with a view to reproducing 
itself and enhancing its interest, rather than achieving a defined level of service provision 
that is agreed upon by the user representatives. 
The concern for maintenance is nothing new. IXtring the 1980s, the lack of federal funds 
for SARH irrigation districts was largely translated into a severe lack of maintenance, 
leading to deferred maintenance and an increasing need for rehabilitation (Palacios 
Vêlez, 1994). This led to many problems in water distribution, in terms of delayed water 
turns and large areas of irrigation districts that could not be irrigated. The SARH 
maintenance departments experienced five major constraints: 
1. Strong control on the part of the federal office and long adrruTdstrative lines 
(Kloezen, 2002) 
2. Severely restricted financial budget and financial dependency on the federal office 
3. Frequent breakdown of machines and tight bureaucratic rules for the purchase of 
spare parts 
4. O&M responsibilities residing in different departments 
5. Lack of accountability to the water users (van der Zaag, 1992). 
An additional set of observations from actual field research gives rise to a more 
comprehensive form of analysis of maintenance performance. The SARH maintenance 
department was led autocratically by its head, who enjoyed high discretionary power 
and controlled the use of the maintenance machines almost entirely (Sijbrandij, 1989; 
van der Zaag, 1992; Kloezen, 2002). For Autlân-FJ Grullo, Sijbrandij (1989) and van der 
Zaag observe that the machinery was used as a personal asset to help out friends (van 
der Zaag, 1992: 123) or a favoured company (116). Further, the hiring out of machines 
outside the system for private persons and institutions generated extra income. This type 
of practice occurred to such an extent that a maintenance operator exclaimed about the 
movement of machines: 'this is pure politics' (115). Van der Zaag concluded that heavy 
machinery is a scarce and contested resource; in the case of the FJ Grullo system, it is 
even much scarcer than water. My conclusion is that maintenance machines, personnel 
and resources are mobilised for more than just operational performances, for example for 
political purposes. This does not alter after transfer. 
The policy of transfer has undeniably produced significant changes in the organisation of 
maintenance, but they are not unambiguous improvements. The partial improvement of 
maintenance under the WUA can in large part be explained by the following changes 
after the transfer. Firstly, the WUA benefited from a large degree of autonomy from the 
federal government and the CNA, and the localised control over maintenance. Secondly, 
the financial resources for maintenance have increased considerably since the 1980s 
202 The Success of a Policy Model 
when the system was under government management. Direct control over a 
maintenance budget and the incoming irrigation fees enable the WUA to allocate 
resources more flexibly and swiftly. Thirdly, the financial leeway and the cancelling of 
tight bureaucratic rules for the purchase of spare parts contributed to the quicker repair 
of machines, thus preventing loss of time and working capacity. Fourthly, the WUA has 
a larger and more adequate machine capacity, because of three new and lighter 
machines received around the time of the transfer. Fifthly, a reorganisation of the 
personnel and longer working days for the maintenance workers have contributed to 
increased maintenance capacity. Fewer maintenance personnel are employed, but they 
are nearly all working on a fixed machine and for more hours per day. 
Nevertheless, I find little evidence that the changes in maintenance are the result of 
financial or electoral accountability to the water users or the control of the association's 
assembly of delegates. In addition, the frequent and prolonged breakdown of machines 
is to a lesser extent still a problem due to other reasons, such as their intensive and 
sometimes inexpert use, financial problems, or the difficulty of acquiring spare parts. 
Although the changes in maintenance have contributed to an increased maintenance 
effort under the WUA, this has not equally benefited all irrigating farmers and different 
parts of the system. Specific producer groups and parts of the system have received 
preferential attention, because of a relationship with the political group in charge. This 
has put other farmers and parts of the system at a disadvantage. Further, the question is 
whether the partially improved maintenance can be sustained in the longer run, given 
the frequent disrepair of the machinery and the continuing deterioration of the 
infrastructure. It cannot undo the fact that a major rehabilitation has never taken place 
since the 1970s, something that will become a problem in the not so distant future. 
Finally, when I back away a little and consider the argument made in Chapter 3 that the 
maintenance machines played an important role as catalyst in the acceptance of the 
transfer and that the new machines were understood as personal trophies by local 
leaders in the negotiation with the CNA, it becomes more understandable why the 
machines are used as personal and group assets employed for political purposes. By 
means of the machine-operators, the political group maintains a web of social and 
political relations that constitutes a source of revenue and political support. In the next 
chapter we shall see how this group uses this as a basis for the purpose of organising a 
political campaign. The above analysis, showing that irrigation systems do not have fixed 
boundaries and clear-cut outputs and that machines enable multiple performances, 
demonstrates that contemporary irrigation performance studies are flawed in this 
respect. 
Notes 
1 In the irrigation management literature, performance criteria are used as managerial and 
bureaucratic yardsticks to assess irrigation performance and the outcomes of policy interventions that 
seek to improve management These performance criteria are taken to be stated management targets 
(Guda and Lincoln 1987), mternally agreed service levels (Van Hofwegen, 1996; Bos, 1997), internally 
set standards and indicators (Small and Svendsen, 1992). Such techniques can help managers to 
monitor the quality of operational performance (Murray-Rust and Snellen, 1993) in relation to a 
defined and agreed level of service provision (Huppert et at, 2001). Further, because organisational 
practices are made available to outside enquiry, the measures are thought to encourage managers to 
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become transparent about means and ends, more managerial in response to market forces and more 
accountable to water users (Vos, 2002; Kloezen, 2002). 
2 This in spite of the illustrious example of Karl Wittfogel (Wittfogel, 1957). 
3 Annex 5 of the 'Titub de Concesión': Instructivo de operación, conservación y administración 
decentralizada del modulo 2, 'Asociación de Usuarios de la Unidad de Riego Margen Izquierda Rio Santiago, 
AC', del Distrito de Riego Num. 043 Estado de Nayarit, (CHA, 1993) 
4 See IWMI's benchmarking project at http://www.cgjar.org/iwm_/. 
5 Measured in length or area of maintained canals, drains or roads or volume of extracted material. 
° Land reform communities created after the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Before the revision of 
Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992, ejido land belonged to the state, with a combination of 
community (ejido) and private (ejidatorid) usufruct. Ejido members are called ejidatarios. 
1 I will focus on the presentation of maintenance results of this year by the association's president. 
8 Further, another list of executed maintenance works is included, neatly ordered according to the 
location of works on canals, drains, or roads. This long list is not presented by the president during this 
event. 
9 Constructed on the basis of the association's annual maintenance report 1997-1998. 
1 0 Structural over-budgeting results in low irrigation fees, and this has made it possible not to 
increase irrigation fees too much. 
" Second annual report of activities, 'Asociación de Usuarios de la Unidad de Riego de la Margen 
Izquierda del Rio Santiago, AC. Modulo 2'. 
1 2 The Clark Michigan loader and the Caterpillar tractor are also repaired on a regular basis after a 
period of intensive use. Also a black Dodge truck is under repair at the moment after having been used 
intensively for transporting sand. 
1 3 Mexican legal entity board, trust, council. 
1 4 The Peso por Peso programme, initiated by President Zedillo. 
1 5 Assuming to irrigate and collect fees for more than 12,000 hectares. 
, 6 The average programmed maintenance budget is sixty to seventy per cent of the total budget and 
thus is the most important source of expenses and money. 
1 7 The numbers after the comma are not skipped and seem to add to the achievement. 
18 'Vocal' (speaker): member of the board with voice and vote but without a post. 
" Firstly as president of the association and later as president of the control committee. 
2 0 Some geographical, climatic and infrastructural factors contributing to this demand are the high 
rainfall and vegetation growth, the undulating terrain and the historical absence of substantial levelling 
and plot level drainage programmes in the irrigated areas. 
2 1 The ejido presidents and delegates from San Bias were evidently not part of this campaign, 
because of their earlier conflicts and differences and because they are allied to another CMC in San 
Bias. 
Photo 18 The new bridge over the River Santiago 
Photo 19 A public work carried out with maintenance machinery 
Photo 20 Ejido commissioners arriving at the rally 
Photo 21 Waiting for the election results 
in front of the CMC building 
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The Cultural Performance of an Election Rally: 
Using the WUA as a political platform 
DRAMATIS PERSONAE: 
Nunez 
Uribe 
Bruno Nava 
Gutuerez 
WUA staff 
Pérez 
Felix Torres 
Rigoberto Ochoa 
Don Ernilio Gonzalez 
Leal, Gerardo Soto, FJ Güerro 
Ejido commissioners 
Mayor 
second president of the WUA, ejido president, candidate president CMC 
Nunez' right hand in the ejido, a board member ofSanidad Vegetal and co-
ordinator campaign meetings 
ejido commissioner and second person on Nunez' list of candidates 
manager of the WUA 
canaleros, maintenance staff 
former president of the WUA, local deputy and large producer and leader of a 
political group 
mayor ofTepic, patron of Nunez' group 
governor (1993-1999), CTM leader 
governor (1981-1987), CTM leader 
current and former presidents of the tobacco producers' organisation ARIC 
president, secretary, and treasurer of an ejido committee and the president of 
the control committee 
municipal president of Santiago Lxcuintla 
PROPS: 
Santiago River 
Left Bank 
Right Bank 
Bridge 
Cantinas and restaurants 
Irrigation infrastructure 
WUA office 
CMC building 
Crops 
Maintenance machines 
Pick-ups, motor bikes 
Radios, telephones 
Drink 
Food 
Green flag, green shirt 
Local newspapers 
Revenue flows 
river feeding the irrigation module and separating the Right and the Left Bank 
river bank and run-of-the-river irrigation system 
river bank and irrigation system in extension 
palm-log bridge replaced by a concrete bridge, connects the Left with the Right 
Bank 
recreational venues on the embankment of Santiago, apt for political 
encounters 
network of connected canals and drains of distinct levels 
in Villa Hidalgo 
municipal peasant committee in Santiago 
beans and tobacco 
machinery to carry out maintenance and public works 
means of transport 
means of communication 
soft drinks, beers 
frijoles charros (fried beans) with tortillas, birria (goafs meat dish) 
identification symbols for the green list 
el Diario de Aztldn, Meridiano de la Costa, Realidades de Nayarit 
generated to finance the campaign 
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8.1 Introduction: Organisational Models of Resource Management and Politics 
Resource management theories have underpinned the Mexican policy model of 
irrigation management transfer (TMT) to local user organisations and raised high 
expectations for improved management performance. Central to most such theories is 
that they view resource allocation as an act of service provision to a defined group of 
users. In this view, service provision consists of largely technical and financial operations 
to control means and deliver resources, performed by a functional management entity 
that is especially created for this purpose. Service provision, i.e. activities concerned with 
the acquisition and distribution of power and authority, is generally understood as 
something that is essentially different from politics. 
In irrigation management literature, 'politics' usually has negative connotations 
(Mollinga, 2001). Interference by politicians is thought of as a major obstacle to 'efficienf 
or 'rational' water management. External political intervention in water management is 
reported to generate irregularities, rents, spoils, and privileges for the benefit of select 
groups or to affect staff transfers and promotions in irrigation agencies (Ostrom, 1992; 
Repetto, 1986; Uphoff et al., 1991). Hence, politics is defined as a problematic 
phenomenon to be excluded from service provision. In prescriptive models for service 
provision, politics is defined as external to resource management, and hence effectively 
excluded from the analysis (Huppert et al., 2001). It is this assumption or prescription 
that this chapter will critically evaluate. 
My argument is that resource allocation is profoundly and inherently political. There are 
different forms of politics possible, some more beneficial than others to the interests of 
its diverse user groups, but it is impossible to exclude politics from the allocation of 
resources altogether. The relationship between the two is reciprocal and recursive, 
implying that both are a precarious outcome of their mutual interaction or reordering 
(Law, 1994). This means on the one hand that resource allocation - I am of course 
particularly referring to irrigation management - is a politically contested terrain, as is 
acknowledged by recent analytical approaches (Mehta, 2000; Mollinga, 1998, 2001; 
Mosse, 1997). But, the converse is also true. Politics permeates resource allocation, and 
vice versa. To illustrate this, this chapter shows how irrigation management 
organisations and their resource allocation practices can be appropriated in support of 
the advancement of political candidates to elected government offices and the electoral 
campaigns of political parties, whilst disabling and excluding others from such 
opportunities. This urges us to re-consider IMT as a political process that not only 
reshapes and reorders the organisational control over irrigation management practices 
but can also have a critical impact on the emergence, consolidation and success of 
political actors and their parties. 
Below I will present three congruent analytical approaches to water management that 
maintain such a separation between politics and service provision. The first example uses 
irrigation management approaches based on the normative premise that irrigation 
management entities (should) function as autonomous and special purpose 
organisations. In line with neo-institutional economics, the transfer of irrigation 
management is .examined by these approaches in terms of the improvement of rules and 
corresponding mcentives for service provision (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1993). The 
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structure of rules and incentives is considered to provide the basic direction and energy 
for organisations to meet their stated performance objectives (Ostrom, 1990; Vennillion, 
1991). Public service organisations are characterised by their bureaucratic rules, 
hierarchical structure, rent-seeking and upward accountability (Merrey, 1995), whereas 
Water Users' Associations (WUAs) in contrast have a better structure of incentives to 
manage according to externally agreed purposes and performance standards (Vermillion 
and Johnson, 1995). In addition, the latter are downwardly accountable to the water 
users, because their budgets depend on farmers' irrigation fees (Small and Carruthers, 
1991). The release from government constraints liberates WUA managers' 'will to 
manage' (Oorthuizen and Kloezen, 1995; Vermillion, 1991), it redirects their professional 
energies, and increases their efforts towards operation and maintenance (O&M) (Moore, 
1989). Management theories assume that a manager's predisposition is to react to such 
greater managerial autonomy in innovative, creative and business-oriented ways in 
response to technical and market exigencies (Hales, 1999). In addition, the electoral and 
financial accountability of the WUA management to water users is considered the key to 
more transparent and accessible decision making and more appropriate and flexible 
management solutions to locally specific problems (Verrrullion, 1991). This set of 
structural and organisational factors that apply to autonomous and special purpose 
organisations is expected to result in more efficient and cost-effective service provision 
and thus in improved management performance and financial cost-recovery (Merrey, 
1995; Small and Carruthers, 1991). 
A related approach describes irrigation systems as a set of nested systems, each of which 
has its own particular set of objectives (Bos et al., 1994; Small and Svendsen, 1992). Five 
hierarchically ordered systems are recognised: irrigation system, irrigated agricultural 
system, agricultural economic system, rural economic system, and politico-economic 
system. The linkage between the systems is that the outputs of one system become part 
of inputs of the next system, establishing a means-end framework. Such relations are by 
implication asymmetrical. The nested system places irrigation management in the service 
of superior levels of objectives. In this analytic scheme, politics and irrigation 
management are thus completely discrete and asymmetrical activities that interact solely 
on the basis of a means-end framework. 
A third analytical approach discerns an external and an internal dimension of 
governance (Rogers, 2002; Rogers and Hall, 2003), which is a sophistication of what was 
earlier plainly called a technical and a political dimension of governance 0ohnson and 
Minis, 1996). Although Rogers (2002:10) acknowledges that there is a political element 
to water governance, he states that: 
xthe politics of water governance are typically the sociological factors 
(structures, institutions, etc.) that lie outside the immediate operations of 
water provision (...). The governance of water is nested within these 
factors. Politics is factors outside the water sector, reflecting the more 
general sociology of the country involved, that is to say, of the water 
provider's setting.' 
The politics of water governance (exterior governance) thus provides an external setting 
for the water provision enterprise (interior or water governance). Water governance can 
draw strength from external governance structures. Conversely, if the service provider 
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succeeds, it can also validate and strengthen the politics that made it possible. Further, 
political interference and conflict can paralyse services, or prevent the emergence of new 
forms of service provision. External governance can thus work either for the good or the 
ill of the service provider or resource manager (Rogers and Hall, 2003). A favourable, or 
at least neutral, external environment is found to be critical for the existence and success 
of a water service provider (Rogers, 2002; Rogers and Hall, 2003). According to this 
approach, the relation between the political setting and water governance varies 
between positive, negative or neutral, but they remain external to each other. Therefore, 
it is hardly surprising that there is a strong focus on decentralisation as a way of 
providing an enabling environment for effective service provision 0ohnson and Minis, 
1996; Rogers, 2002). Rogers uses the Mexican model of water reforms as an example of 
providing such an enabling environment for effective provision. In line with most policy 
literature, his version is surprisingly a-political and focuses mainly on the CNA's 
(Comisión National del Agua: National Water Commission) ability to implement the 
reforms and provide a supervisory and regulatory framework that assists WUAs to fulfil 
their (technical) requirements to become self-sufficient, well performing and productive 
modules (Espinosa de León and Trava Manzanilla, 1992; Gorriz et al., 1995; Johnson, 
1997a; Palacios Vélez, 1997; Garcés Restrepo, 2001; Rogers, 2002 1). 
At the core of these three approaches to water management lie two crucial analytical 
limitations. In the first place, there exists the belief in a systematic distinction between an 
internal, autonomous, or single-purpose enterprise of service provision and an external 
political environment. Though politics and resource allocation may be related, they 
remain mtrinsically separated and asymmetrical activities. Hence, politics is inaccurately 
perceived as an exogenous variable to resource distribution. In the second place, the 
conceptualisation of the irrigation management transfer policy as a way of prowling an 
enabling environment for effective service provision obscures its political and 
institutional effects. These limitations are problematic because they reduce resource 
allocation to an a-political enterprise of service provision, empty of history and culture. 
By obscuring the fact that resource allocation is profoundly political, these theories de-
politicise both the policy process of IMT and the everyday resource practices of user 
organisations that emerge from this. 
In the wake of what is widely agreed to be a certain decline or retreat of the state 
apparatus, we find the upsurge of a range of forms of power and authority that have not 
been well described or analysed to date (Ferguson, 1998). New organisational actors, 
termed user organisations, emerge to occupy the institutionalised policy domains that 
these neo-liberal reforms have vacated. The criticised type of analysis under-emphasises 
the possibility that devolution may trigger politically motivated resource allocation and 
institution building, driven not by the expected entrepreneurial responses to local 
technical or market exigencies, but rather by ambitious exigencies looking to control 
policy areas vacated by state downsizing (Hales, 1999; Snyder, 1999). Further, this type 
of analysis obscures the fact that control over infrastructure, people, and resource flows 
provides political opportunities. The political and producer elite groups that frequently 
come to dominate these user organisations are in a favourable position to appropriate 
these resources by generating and sustaining political support among electoral 
constituencies and lubricating campaign politics (Fallaw, 2002). Under such 
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circumstances, these political incumbents are able to convert a WUA into a platform that 
enables political ascendancy. 
De-centring Mexican politics 
In Mexico, Water Users' Associations (WUAs) are an interesting case in which to study 
the everyday entanglement of resource allocation, producer organisation, and politics. 
For several decades, the corporatist peasant organisations are no longer the privileged 
interlocutors for resource allocation and the political representation of rural producers 
vis-a-vis government institutions, the agro-industrial enterprises and other forces. At 
present there exist multiple organisations that represent demands and forms of 
participation that do not operate along corporatist lines (Vargas Velazquez et al., 2000). 
Like other types of producer organisations, WUAs constitute new spaces to represent 
producers and acquire control over an organisational and physical network that 
generates important social, material, cultural, and political resources. The WUAs become 
public institutions that are uniquely placed to articulate positions of power and political 
affiliation, provide opportunities to challenge authority, and canvass political support in 
culturally and historically specific ways (Mosse, 1999). Put differently, resource 
management by a WUA depends on how power and authority are articulated through 
these public institutions and how diffuse networks of political patronage and personal 
obligation are intertwined with resource allocation (Mosse, 1997)*. 
My approach builds on an emergent literature that analyses the complex relations 
between the organisation of resource allocation and politics (e.g. Mosse, 1997; Fallaw, 
2002). In my view, politics cannot be reduced to utilitarian means-end relations based on 
material self-interest, according to which public organisations are used instrumentally by 
rent-seeking officials and politicians to optimise access to resources for political purposes 
(Repetto, 1986; Mollinga, 2001). I favour a broader understanding of Mexican politics 
that acknowledges that the political is constantly expressed and articulated in terms of 
cultural forms and performances (Cohen quoted in Thompson, 1997). As a result, my 
view of politics includes both cultural performance and ritual in institutional settings 
(Beezley et al., 1994; Munro, 1999), and the social and material practices of resource 
distribution that reinforce these (e.g. Adler Lomnitz, 1994; Auyero, 2000; Fallaw, 2002). It 
is through these specific cultural practices and performances that political authority is 
produced, maintained, or expanded. 
Munro (1999) identifies certain forms of organisational behaviour as cultural 
performance. He shows how managers construct their cultural performances to make 
themselves visible to one another, both as members of a group and as individual 
managers who are identifiably 'in control' (Strathern, 2000). An emphasis on cultural 
performances focuses on the accomplished ways people make cultural material visible 
and available. Display is critical here. If culture is elusive and in the background, or 
constitutes an 'imagined reality' (Parkin et al., 1996), cultural performance is the show 
that expresses and envisions the cultural. When managers (or politicians) try to show 
others what they are doing or have done, their actions take on a 'performed-for-an-
audience' aspect. For example, Gupta (1995) shows how even bribe giving is a cultural 
practice that requires a great degree of performative competence. 
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Like a ritual, performance tries to persuade participants of the way the world is. Rather 
than being an empty or opaque show of form, it is meant to have transformative and 
engaging effects on the participants in a performance. Munro's understanding of cultural 
performance is not limited to exhibitions taking place during state ceremonies and public 
rituals (Beezley et al., 1994). Therefore, it can be introduced in connection with everyday 
resource use practices and events in which political actors engage. This stimulated me to 
think about politics as a de-centred endeavour, mvolving particular social and material 
practices of resource distribution in a multiplicity of spatially distributed sites and 
locations and (in)formal performative settings. In this manner, seemingly unrelated and 
dispersed practices in which the WUA was involved, such as the organisation of clrinking 
parties in cantinas, water allocation practices at canals, and the movement of 
maintenance machinery in the field, became politically intelligible as contributing to the 
formation of a political alliance and culminating in a major election event. 
This chapter presents a situational analysis (Gluckman, 1958; Van Velsen, 1967) of an 
election rally that evidences the political use of a WUA. The value of this method is not 
to prove the typicality of the case, but rather to infer some theoretical insights pertaining 
to the relation between politics and resource allocation. First and foremost, the case 
substantiates the claim that resource allocation is mtrinsically political. Further, the 
ethnographic account demonstrates how a local political group appropriates the WUA, 
and draws on its staff, facilities, and resources for political ends that extend beyond 
immediate concerns for the irrigation system and its user constituency. By using the 
WUA as a platform, this group asserts authority and expands its support base for the 
advancement of political candidates to elective offices in the municipal government. 
Analysing the election rally as a cultural performance illustrates how resources are 
mobilised politically, not in an instrumental manner, but according to culturally and 
materially specific and established ways of conducting politics. In the particular case that 
I study, this adversely affects the resource base of the WUA. 
Before presenting and analysing how the election rally unfolds as a social drama, I will 
have to set the scene and indicate how the choreography of the event has come about 
and how actors and resources have become enrolled in its performance. The chapter 
thus continues with an overview of the contemporary political and institutional 
processes of rural transformation that give rise to the election rally. Then, I will situate it 
on the electoral calendar of Nayarit and outline its spatial and chronological delimitation. 
This will lead me to sketch out the political and organisational landscape in which the 
election rally takes place. Then, the political campaign that precedes the election rally is 
described. Section 8.2 contains a situational analysis of the rally itself. In Section 8.3, the 
event is used as starting point for an analysis of the political nature of resource 
allocation, the WUA as a political platform and the rally as a cultural performance. In the 
final section, 8.4, the conclusions of this chapter are drawn. 
The region, producer organisations and electoral politics 
The WUA on which I focus is located on the Left Bank of the River Santiago, on the 
Pacific Coast of Nayarit, Western Mexico. The management and politics of the WUA on 
the Left Bank of Santiago municipality is embedded in a wider field of political parties 
and producer organisations operating in the municipality of Santiago, on the Northern 
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Coast, and in the entire state of Nayarit. Since the beginning of the 1990s, under the 
influence of a series of neo-liberal policies and political reforms launched by the national 
government of President Salinas (1989-1994) and subsequently President Zedillo (1994-
2000), this wider political and institutional field has undergone drastic changes. Hence, 
the transfer of irrigation management to WUAs is only one of a series of convoluted 
changes, ocajrring at various political and aclministrative levels. 
Several partially connected political and institutional processes of rural transformation 
were unfolding in the region during the 1990s and led to the emergence of 'new7 
organisational actors with overlapping constituencies in an increasingly competitive 
political arena. The three most important processes are presented in this section. Firstly, 
deregulation policies in agriculture affected what had long been the principal motor of 
economic development and the prime source of income, organisation and political 
control in Nayarit: tobacco production (see Chapter 4). This induced the dismantling of 
the government parastatal for tobacco production, Tabamex, the re-entry of 
multinational tobacco enterprises in the productive process, the decline of corporatist 
representations of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM: Confederation of 
Mexican Workers) and the national peasant confederation, Confederación Nacional de 
Campesinos (CNC: National Peasant Confederation)3, and the establishment of the 
tobacco producers' organisation, Asociación Rural de Interés Colectivo (ARIC: Rural 
Association of Collective Interest)4. Secondly, bureaucratic retrenchment of the Ministry 
of Agriculture vacated policy areas that were also taken over by new producers' 
associations, such as the WUAs in the irrigation districts, and Sanidad Vegetal, a 
municipal section of the producers' organisation that protects plant hygiene, prevents 
the spread of plant diseases, and authorises the transportation of agricultural products. 
Thirdly, the weakening of political and corporatist structures of the ruling party, Partido 
Revolucionario Imtilucional (PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party), and a more 
competitive electoral landscape in recent years led to a more open political arena. As a 
result, several political parties disputed electoral positions, and the imposition of political 
candidates became more complicated for the PRI. 
These processes of state disengagement and political reform in the rural sphere 
coalesced towards the end of the decade with the onset of a series of political campaigns 
and elections in Nayarit. Their political ramifications could be observed during the 
elections to the Comité Municipal de Campesinos (CMC: Municipal Peasant Committee) in 
Santiago at the beginning of 1998. Two of the aforementioned producer associations 
facilitated the rise of political groups that disputed control over the CMC. In this chapter, 
I will present a situational analysis of an election rally in these heavily contested 
elections. I will especially focus on the political group that used the Left Bank WUA as a 
political platform to challenge the political control of ARIC over the CMC. These two 
producer associations were appropriated by different political groups that had their 
networks and patrons in the PRI. In this sense, they were only partly 'new7 political 
actors. Just as Tabamex and other bureaucratic agencies had played a central role in the 
political life of Nayarit during the 1970s and 1980s, these producer associations gained in 
political importance, particularly in rural areas where agriculture still constituted a major 
source of income and investment, such as in Santiago. These organisations did this 
amongst other things by launching candidates for electoral positions and/or giving 
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political, organisational, and financial support to the campaigns of allied politicians and 
of the political party, PRI. 
The Nayarit electoral calendar provides some insights into the political point in time at 
which the rally takes place. Every state in Mexico elects a governor for a period of six 
years (sexenio). Nayarit is administratively divided into twenty municipalities and 
politically into eighteen electoral districts. Local elections for mayors and deputies take 
place every other three years. The CMC elections in February 1998 occurred in the run-
up to local and state elections in Nayarit. In July 1999, the voters elected a new governor, 
but also voted for the renovation of the local congress and the municipal presidencies in 
the state5. Subsequently, internal elections in both ARIC and the Left Bank WUA took 
place during the second half of 1999. During pre-election years in Mexico, bureaucratic 
and political groups align themselves with candidates that have a chance of being 
appointed or elected to key posts in the upcoming aclministration6. Political contenders 
gather electoral, organisational and financial support among politically influential or 
financially affluent organisations, leaders and groups within their constituency, or 
among other interest groups. Both the ARIC and the WUA group were engaged in the 
same type of political activity, although not always openly. In this manner, they 
positioned themselves as candidates for mayor, deputy or other political or 
aclministrative functions with a view to increasing their political influence. In addition, 
their political activity was also directed at mamtaining their influence in the producer 
organisations from which they operated. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, ARIC was established as a state-level organisation for 
tobacco producers to formally represent their interests in the annual tobacco price 
negotiations with the four major multinational tobacco companies working in Nayarit. 
The organisation also provided a set of basic services to the tobacco producers, such as 
social, medical and life insurances, which are financed by the companies. Besides 
providing these services, ARIC proved to be generally incapable of negotiating 
substantially higher tobacco prices. These remained far below official world market 
prices7. Decisions of this kind lay with the companies and higher governmental levels. As 
a result, ARIC lost credibility among tobacco producers and many called for its removal. 
The livelihoods of many of the smaller ejidatariossdepend in large part on the small profit 
margins from a few hectares of tobacco and beans, the insurances provided by the 
tobacco cultivation, and income or remittances from seasonal migration to the US by 
members of the family. The producers considered ARIC to be an organisation that 
represented the interests of the tobacco companies, the governor and the PRI 
government. The headquarters of ARIC are located in Tepic, close to the offices of the 
tobacco companies and the state government. Its president and managers were criticised 
in the local press for never visiting the region and for not attending to the problems and 
questions of tobacco producers. 
Despite its unpopularity among the majority of producers, ARIC was a financially 
affluent and politically influential rural organisation. ARIC received a stable source of 
income from the tobacco companies. They subtracted a fixed amount for ARIC from 
every kilo of tobacco that was supplied by a producer, resulting in substantial budgets. At 
the national level, the Nayarit ARIC that represented a large majority of the nation's 
tobacco producers was affiliated to the CNC and became one of its more influential rural 
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associations (De la Fuente and MacKinlay, 1994). Since its creation, ARIC was controlled 
by the group of its first president, popularly called El Gtierro (The White). Although he 
was a popular leader on his own account, he owed his political career and this position 
to Don Emilio, the patriarch of PRI politics in Nayarit. At the state level, the financing by 
ARIC of the political campaigns of several PRI governorship candidates enhanced their 
political fortunes. The FJ Guerro group, and the successors that FJ Guerro appointed, 
exerted patronage and built a selective support base among agrarian leaders and ejidos in 
the tobacco producing municipalities on the Northern Coast of Nayarit. The CMCs 
proved to be central in this respect, particularly the committee representing the 
municipality of Santiago, where most tobacco is produced. Both FJ Guerro and the 
current president, Gerardo Soto, started out as CMC president in Santiago before 
leading ARIC. A close connection existed between ARIC and the CMC, manifested by 
the financial and aclministrative support the latter received. At the beginning of 1998, 
this pattern was continued when ARIC put forward Leal as their new candidate for the 
presidency of the CMC. Leal was the brother of the former municipal president of 
Santiago from the major tobacco producing ejido of Amapa nearby Santiago. Yet, despite 
support from ARIC and the municipal administration, the political tide was shifting. 
Leal's competitor, Nunez, for the presidency of the CMC belonged to another political 
group whose political constituency was the Left Bank part of the electoral district XII in 
the Santiago municipality with Villa Hidalgo as its centre9. Here they controlled a variety 
of local organisations, most importantly the Left Bank irrigation module of which Nunez 
was president. Nunez was the owner of a plot of a few hectares in the ejido of Solorceno, 
which he did not cultivate but rented out and later sold. Consequently, the association 
was his only source of income, although officially he did not receive a wage as president. 
Nunez followed a similar path to that of Perez (see Chapter 4) and used the association 
as a platform to launch his political campaign and promote himself as a candidate for the 
political position of president of the CMC. During the course of 1997 and 1998, the 
group attempted to expand their support base in ejidos and among producer groups on 
the northern bank of the river with a view to establishing themselves politically in the 
municipal capital of Santiago, and indirectly in the state capital of Tepic. Nunez and 
Perez positioned themselves in the local media and on public occasions as 
spokespersons representing the interests of the rural and the ejido sector and specific 
producer groups, such as bean and tobacco producers, in the municipality. As part of a 
larger scheme, the political group supported the candidacy of their patron, Felix Torres, 
the mayor of Tepic, who registered as one of the six PRI candidates for governor of 
Nayarit. They expected to benefit from his influence in the party and with the departing 
governor to negotiate public positions in the party, sectoral organisations or the state 
bureaucracy for some of his confidants. 
In support of its political ambitions to attain elective office, the group draws on a 
heterogeneous set of resources to which the association provides access and mobilises 
these resources. This range of financial, human, and material resources serves to 
organise a political campaign in the form of a series of private encounters to mobilise a 
popular support base. Only with the help of these means is Nunez able to build a broad 
but precarious alliance of support among ejido commissioners that challenges ARIC's 
authority as the dominant producer organisation in the region. In addition, these 
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resources enable Nunez and his group of followers and employees to organise and 
execute three political meetings to secure popular support. At these meetings the 
distribution of food and beer among potential voters acquires supreme cultural and 
political importance. 
According to the conventional corporatist practice, the list of PRI candidates for local 
political positions was negotiated behind the scenes as a 'power quota' among 
competing political groups and, in the end, unilaterally decided by the governor or the 
party. A nomination by the PRI for mayor, deputy or president of the CMC usually 
guaranteed one's election, because of the PRI's virtual monopoly on elected public 
offices (cf. Enge and Whiteford, 1989: 126). In Santiago, as in many other Mexican 
towns, the PRI recruited a significant number of nominations for such posts among 
representatives of the local sections of the PRI affiliated organisations, CNC, CTM, and 
Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP: National Confederation of 
Popular Organisations). The groups that controlled these sections bargained and 
competed behind the scene for positions. They manoeuvred within their corporatist 
structures and the party, bunt alliances, and looked for the support of political patrons. In 
return, corporatist organisations were expected to deliver the votes and organisational 
support of their rank and file for the PRI, even if this required coercion or fraud10 
(Samstad, 2002). In the past, the groups controlling the CMC in Santiago had been 
reasonably successful in using the CMC to bargain for the positions of mayor and 
deputies. In the last three decades, the CMC delivered a mayor for four three-year 
electoral periods. 
The CMC president chairs the monthly assembly meetings in which ejido commissioners 
discuss administrative and political matters affecting agriculture and the ejidos. Further, 
the CMC officially represents the ejidos in their relations with the political and 
bureaucratic bodies of the municipal, state, and federal government. A CMC president's 
participation in committees for the rural and agricultural sector enables him to win 
influence over government agricultural policy and the allocation of funds and subsidies 
at different governmental levels. In this position, he is also able to make friends with, 
and put pressure on, responsible government officials concerning access to government 
resources and other policy matters. For example, in former government days, the CMC 
president was a member of the SRH District Cornmittee and influenced the annual 
establishment of irrigation fees. 
The political influence of the CMC slowly decreased after the 1980s because of the 
reduction of financial flows from the federal state due to budgetary restrictions, and a 
reduced say in production issues as a result of state disengagement. Nevertheless, in 
Santiago this tendency was tempered, as the favourable relations that the CMC 
maintained with ARIC and the PRI mayor provided some financial support and 
permitted it to continue functioning as a privileged space of negotiation with political 
and government institutions. As a result, the CMC president still acquired access to 
political and bureaucratic offices, committees and officials in the municipal capital of 
Santiago, the state capital Tepic, and even in Mexico City. To move between these 
different spheres of influence and have access to different governmental levels helps to 
establish an extensive networks of contacts, mutual favours and resource exchange 
something that is essential for a political career in Mexico. In his capacity as municipal 
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ejido representative, a CMC president is able to claim government support for the rural 
sector and negotiate funds and subsidies. The degree of control he acquires over these 
flows can serve as a source of patronage vis-à-vis ejido commissioners and rural leaders. 
The CMC thus remained a strategic staging post for gaining access to positions in the 
municipality and political ascendancy generally. For the last couple of years, this 
opportunity had been controlled by the ARIC-based group. As the CMC elections 
occurred in the run-up to an important election year, they were decisive for the future of 
both competing political groups. 
At the same time, these organisation-based pritsta groups had to take into account a 
changing political spectrum. By the mid-1980s, the electoral arena had been liberalised 
and the political space for opposition had expanded to the extent that the PRI found 
itself increasingly challenged at the ballot box (Klesner, 1997). During his presidential 
term, Zedillo (1994-2000) promoted a series of electoral and party reforms that further 
reinforced a trend towards more competitive and transparent elections. Nayarifs 
governor, Rigoberto Ochoa, who was scheduled to leave office after the elections of 
1999, apparently responded to these national reforms and increasing demands for 
internal démocratisation, popular consultation and a reduced role for the corporatist 
sectors in the nomination process of the PRI. He gave a public signal to this effect in 
view of the upcoming elections by retraining from publicly favouring or mtervening on 
behalf of one of the two candidates for the CMC in Santiago and their antagonistic 
groups within the PRI11. The elections among the ejido delegates were really decisive in 
this respect, unlike most preceding ones. In addition, the electoral spectrum had become 
much more competitive and pluralist during the 1990s. An electoral victory for the PRI in 
Nayarit and.many Mexican regions was less secure than ever, particularly in the 
municipality of Santiago. PRI candidates for mayor or deputy not only competed more 
openly amongst each other for the candidacy, but also had to compete with other 
political parties in order to win the popular vote. In addition, opposition forces 
attempted to establish a foothold in the campaigns for the CMC, ARIC and the WUAs. 
After winning the elections, Nunez subsequently used the CMC as a springboard in the 
municipal capital from which to launch Perez as PRI candidate for mayor of Santiago. As 
CMC president, Nunez had access to the municipal, state, and federal organisation of 
the PRI and influence in the designation of political posts. As the representative of the 
peasant sector in the municipality, he expressed his preference on behalf of the peasant 
sector for Perez and mobilised support for him among ejido commissioners, government 
officials and politicians. With highly competitive state and local elections coming up, the 
national PRI was eager to provide such government programmes and resources to gain 
back its declining popular support. Nunez attempted to benefit from this, by publicly 
Wghitighting the PRI's role in acquiring government support for his constituency12. 
Subsequently, Nunez' group mutually supported each other in campaigning for a range 
of elective and (non-elective) administrative positions in the municipal and the state 
government or in a producers' organisation during the elections of 1999. Summarising, 
this political group appropriated rural organisations, among which the WUA and the 
CMC, to extend its influence and construct an ascending path to the municipal 
presidency and other political offices. 
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The setting of the rally 
On a February morning in 1998, an election rally took place in the municipal capital of 
Santiago Ixcuintla. Nunez, the president of the WUA in Villa Hidalgo, organised this 
pre-election meeting accompanied with a breakfast for his supporters. The rally is to 
round off Nunez' campaign for the presidency of the CMC. Nunez heads a list (planilla) 
of candidate board members that he compiled of ejido leaders13 from around the 
municipality. The list was registered as the green list and is popularly referred to in the 
local press as Unidad Campesina (peasant unity). The CMC integrates the fifty-four ejidos 
in the municipality of Santiago. Every three years, these ejidos are authorised to send 
four ejido commissioners for the election of a new CMC board14. After the rally, Nunez, 
together with his candidate board members and a crowd of voting ejido delegates and 
supporters, collectively walk up to the election poll at the local CMC building. They 
manage to present a small majority of 101 ejido commissioners, sufficient to win the 
elections. It is my intention here to focus on the organisational and performative 
elements of the election rally and the campaign through which Nunez wins the election 
and assumes the leadership of the CMC. 
In Santiago, an embankment protects the town from flooding by the river. It lies close to 
the town's centre and the local CMC building and is thus a convenient spot for Nunez to 
gather his political supporters from both banks of the municipality. The rally will take 
place in an outdoor venue at the side of the embankment. The event was announced to 
start at an early hour, but it is still quiet at the embankment when I arrive. I take the time 
to enjoy the fresh morning air and look around. In about an hour, whilst the heat 
increases, commercial activity will start to bustle along the cobblestone road at the 
embankment. Women sell fish and shrimps, and traders display their colourful plastic 
Tupperware and other household items. The muddy vans of tobacco producers coming 
from the corners of the municipality are stationed along the embankment. Their owners 
will be fetching the week's groceries or buying insecticides at the market and the shops 
in the centre of town. Later on in the day, some of them may pause at one of the 
restaurants or cantinas located along the embankment. Groups of musicians with 
instruments stroll along the pavement on their way to play in those venues that are 
usually reserved for male recreation. When these mariachis (regional music groups) or 
combos do not find customers for their songs, there is always a jukebox blasting. Until 
the evening falls, their loud banda music (brass orchestra) reverberates through the hot 
and humid air. Next to an artificially lit hotel of questionable reputation, offering rooms 
for forbidden pleasures, there is a spot where the town's drunkards gather around a last 
bottle of cheap mescal, to eventually sleep it off on the pavement. 
Although the embankment appears to be a somewhat marginal zone on the periphery of 
Santiago, it is located within a stone's throw of the central plaza (square). As in any other 
Mexican town, the plaza in Santiago is the administrative and political centre of town, 
where the municipal palace and several other important political and government offices 
are situated. This apparently paradoxical vicinity, and some of my initial experiences at 
the embankment that follow here, will illustrate that in Mexican politics, and particularly 
on the Northern Coast of Nayarit, the centre and the periphery, government offices and 
cantinas, or the political and the festive, are innately mtertwined. 
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On one of my first working visits to Santiago, I was taken by some government 
engineers to one of the cantinas on the embankment. They are slightly darkened venues 
that respectable women do not frequent. After we seated ourselves around a table, a 
waitress brought us our first round of beers. Whilst we were cMriking, the men then 
informed me, to my great surprise, that our waitress was in reality a transsexual. In fact, 
all the waitresses were. The engineers pointed out enthusiastically that these converted 
waiters walked so much better than real women. These (wo)men made themselves very 
attractive with their big breasts, shaven legs, and feminine walk. So, their intent in 
bringing me here had been to warn me, in order that I would not get confused when I 
was drunk, the men explained. Nothing funnier than that. Their roaring laughter told me 
not take them too seriously, as their genuine fascination with 'these girls' was alternated 
with albures. In Mexico, albures, playful jingles, developed as language games that persist 
among the popular classes15. The engineers exchanged a succession of such jokes and 
mental word games that revolved around the most skilful ways of trying out and 
provoking the other. Despite the alcohol in my blood and the loud distracting music 
from the jukebox, they required me to remain alert. Apparently simple questions, like 'do 
you like chilli?, contained implicit allusions to my implied homosexuality or other 
deviant sexual preferences. At the time I felt tremendously incapable of responding 
skilfully. This sort of humorous exchange appeared to be an all important pastime 
among drinking men in the cantinas of rural Santiago, engaging people of different 
status and class backgrounds. In a pleasant atmosphere, this practice draws people 
together and generates bonds of trust and friendship between them (see also Chapter 6). 
In my time in Santiago I learned that I only really gained respect and became part of a 
group of males, when I was capable of laughing about, responding to, but preferably, 
cracking albures myself. 
The engineers prudently pointed out from the crowd of townsmen and farmers some 
locally well-known people in the cantina. Several ejido leaders and local politicians were 
seated at the tables around us. We also saw local business people and I was told that 
union representatives, municipal and other government officials like themselves also 
frequented the bars here. Like most ordinary people, they were also drinking, laughing, 
and discussing affairs with friends, associates, or allies. The engineers exchanged some of 
the gossip and rumours circulating about these local celebrities and their most recent 
endeavours. This revealed a typical Mexican and male fascination with power and 
sexuality, languages which are mtimately intertwined and mutually reinforcing. 
Through gossip, laughter, fascination and speculation, our conversation arrived at the 
recent conspicuous activity of Nunez, who was spotted several times around here in the 
company of ejido commissioners, inviting them to extensive drinking sessions. One 
engineer secretly revealed the fact that Nunez was engaged in a campaign to become 
president of the CMC and aspired to succeed Perez as deputy for District XH. The men 
continued to speculate about Perez' plans to participate in the elections for mayor of 
Santiago, but reckoned that his chances of becoming the PRI candidate and winning the 
elections were not so large, as he was hardly known at this side of the river. Of course, 
you never know in the PRI what the support from his patron, Felix Torres, could do for 
him. 
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Through these initial experiences, it became clear to me that these apparently marginal 
recreational spaces such as cantinas and restaurants are central to forging social and 
political bonds in this rural sphere. They are convenient places for the organisation of 
festive encounters in which collective clrinking and eating and popular music take on 
political importance. Three reasons come to mind. First of all, in these pleasurable 
encounters, it matters who is the person who invites others and provides them with 
drink, food and music. This act creates a basic inequality, which presupposes a certain 
reciprocity16. Being provided with such pleasures creates a feeling of obligation and the 
need to return this favour. Secondly, the collective enjoyment of food, music and beers 
and the mutual exchange of jokes and gossip contribute to an atmosphere of trust 
between people that are united in celebrating matters of mutual interest (see also 
Chapter 6). Political bonds depend on a certain level of trust between people that favours 
will be reciprocated in the future (Dealy, 1992). This is a useful basis to negotiate 
problems and agreements, exchange favours, conspire around shared ambitions and 
political plans, and celebrate commitments. Thirdly, a well-performed drinking session 
or a comida polttica (political meal) has an immense additional value for a political 
candidate to establish and celebrate commitments, gain support, and free resources and 
facilities for an electoral campaign. Aspiring politicians patronise such events to organise 
their support within the cultural hemisphere of the Northern Coast of Nayarit. These 
get-togethers clearly have a performative quality and require skilful orchestration and 
the profuse dispensing and enjoyment of food and drinks. What occurs is that these 
shared experiences make it visible to, and felt by, the invitees that they are part of 
something; it includes individuals in a larger collective. Therefore, these localised cultural 
practices and performances can contribute to building and consolidating a political 
alliance and support base, something that Nunez was involved in at that moment. 
Nunez' campaign 
Following Nunez' group in their daily work for the association taught me some other 
things as well. Perez, Nunez and Guttierez, its leading members, were not only 
responsible for the management the WUA, but were also involved in electoral struggles 
for political positions and in different commercial dealings. In fact, in their everyday 
practice they were politicians, popular leaders and managers at the same time, who 
switched between their roles in 'the governmenf , 'civil society organisations', and 'the 
markef. Often it was difficult, not to say impossible, to establish where one role stopped 
and the other began. They were inextricably interwoven and mutually reinforcing. While 
I was tracing Nunez' footsteps, it was evident that the presidency of the association gave 
him the opportunity to increase his local standing as a public figure and develop a profile 
as political leader. The office building of the association in Villa Hidalgo was useful for 
receiving guests and doing business in a confidential environment. Nunez had a special 
desk for this purpose. Behind it, he worked on matters for the association, but also for 
his ejido and the local PRI, and he co-ordinated his campaign for the CMC. When he 
received ejido commissioners or other important people, Nunez displayed with 
splendour the great responsibility that managing the largest irrigation system in Nayarit 
entailed. He would give orders to the secretaries, make an important call, decide on the 
application of large sums of money and hence demonstrate the important position that 
he had as president. From behind this desk he also had the authority to distribute 
favours to help out an ejido commissioner regarding a canal or the use of a machine. 
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Another thing that struck me initially was the frequency with which Nunez and 
Guttierez would spend their working hours outside the office or away from the field. At 
least several times a week they invited producers, ejido leaders, government officials, or 
politicians to a local cantina or a favourite seafood restaurant of theirs. Whilst enjoying 
beers, local specialities and music, they would discuss local politics, develop complicities, 
exchange favours, and negotiate arrangements in a pleasant atmosphere, much as 
described above. Humour and gossip contributed to establishing relations of trust. Often 
there was a subservient group member present: canalero Diego (see Chapter 6) or 
Leopoldo, the association's driver and maintenance assistant. They performed an 
important role in animating and entertaining the visitors with jokes, stories, and 
anecdotes. Diego caused hilarity with his fatness, extravagant eating and drinking, and 
verbal abuse of the opponents of his patrons. Leopoldo performed a similar role with 
hilarious gay parodies. In addition, they opened beer bottles for the invited guests at a 
tempo that would make most of them drunk. They also knew when to order a music 
group to play the songs liked by important men. When the atmosphere was right, 
Guttierez would impress his guests by singing a couple of his favourite ranchero songs 
with a deep masculine voice, celebrating the beauty of Nayarit, its mountainous 
landscape and lush vegetation, and the abundance of wonderful seafood and pretty 
women. Interestingly, the managers of the association took visible pleasure in organising 
these parties and proudly displayed their proficiency and generosity in this field and 
enjoyed the performative skill of their endeavours. 
What could not go unnoticed was the amount of time, labour, and resources that Nunez' 
group and his subordinates in the association invested in organising these festive 
occasions. For association insiders, it was evident that in organising these occasions as 
part of his campaign, Nunez' group was drawing on the association's resource base. In 
this way, Nunez and his group controlled a large complex of infrastracture, facilities, 
resources, and revenue flows that connected them with a constituency of beneficiaries: 
ejidos, producer groups and other water users on the Left Bank. Through this complex, 
they were in the position to dispense resources, deliver services and distribute favours to 
the voting ejido commissioners from the municipality, as also those from the Right Bank, 
in order to generate political support, and to third parties in exchange for financial and 
political support for Nunez' political campaign. Hence, the association's resources were 
concentrated on bunching and consolidating the political careers and realising the 
ambitions of its main political proponents. This political appropriation of facilities, staff 
and other resources was intensified during Nunez and Perez' campaigns for the CMC 
and the mayorship of Santiago. 
In the year preceding the CMC elections, Nunez' campaign was directed at building a 
broad alliance of ejido leaders, activists, and producer groups to support him in 
challenging the ARIC-based political group and in competing for the presidency of the 
CMC. He consolidated his original support base on the Left Bank, partly constituted 
through the association and its network, and extended it by incorporating ejido leaders, 
organisations and groups that operated in ejidos on the larger Right Bank of the river. 
Nunez' presidency of the Solorcefio ejido gave him access to the CMC meetings in 
Santiago. This opened up the possibility of developing personal relations with ejido 
commissioners not affiliated to the inner circle of the dominant ARIC group, or to 
becoming acquainted with those who had removed themselves and were critical of the 
ARIC's leadership in the hope of enlisting their support in publicly opposing and 
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mcrirruTiating them; or renewing links with leaders who were politically close to his 
patron, Felix Torres. Nunez and a few close associates were building an alliance by 
gathering and negotiating support among this select but diverse group of opinion 
leaders. These opinion leaders in large part consisted of a professional class of political 
leaders, entrepreneurs, and activists with political ambitions and the capacity to mobilise 
a group of followers for the upcoming CMC elections. The very same people frequently 
have a track record in their ejidos, local committees, producer or political organisations. 
Several of them will figure actively in the following description of the election rally. Their 
followers, generally with less experience, profile, resources and ambition, will be 
presented as flat characters, because they are not important to the development of the 
story. Some of the popular leaders that supported Nunez belonged to opposition parties, 
such as the PRD, which is remarkable given the fact that the rally involved a PRI-
affiliated organisation. Nunez formed a fragile alliance that was only temporarily stable 
and effective until the elections, without the alliance having a shared political identity 
and common views on how to tackle the problems of the ejidatarios of the region. 
Nunez associated himself with several opinion leaders among the ejido commissioners 
and convinced them to become part of his alliance, amongst other things by promising 
them a position on his candidate list for the CMC, or by negotiating a set of favours and 
resources for them. The private negotiation of these favours, resources, and positions 
offered by Nunez often occurred during festive encounters patronised by him as 
described above, or sometimes as a result of public celebrations, such as a local rodeo or 
the annual festivities of an ejido. Nunez and his close associates thus built a precarious 
alliance and consolidated it by organising and attending a corollary of drinking parties 
and 'political meals' throughout the municipality. A select audience of ejido leaders and 
activists were invited by them and treated to ample beer, food and music. 
The association's president unified several of the diverse currents in his alliance by taking 
a strong anti-ARIC position. He launched a crusade against ARIC, denouncing the 
corruption, nepotism, and incompetence of its leaders. In this manner, he mobilised 
general discontent among tobacco farmers and other producer segments in the ejidos of 
the municipality. The political messages through, which Nunez united different groups 
centred on the deplorable state of agriculture in the region. Recurrent topics of Nunez' 
conversation were the problems that ejidatarios experienced in terms of low prices for 
crops such as beans and tobacco, the poor marketing possibilities, and the lack of 
government programmes to solve these problems. Nunez and his collaborators fiercely 
attacked ARIC and his opponent's group for being responsible and accused them of 
acting against the interests of the peasants. LXiring the drinking parties, stories were told 
about ARIC officials passively sitting in their remote offices in Tepic, not corning out to 
the field, and ignoring the problems of producers. Rumours about their corruption or 
moral decadence were actively fed. Their incompetence and immorality was often 
expressed and joked about in sexual metaphors, which denied them masculinity. 
Nunez acquired publicity and popular support by sponsoring a campaign of 
recrimination against his competitors and ARIC by journalists in local papers. At the 
same time, these papers projected a favourable image of Nunez7 leadership. His 
coalition, called Unidad Campesina, was portrayed as the real representative of the 
peasant sector's interests, the one that would achieve better prices, marketing 
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opportunities, and support programmes. This type of local paper is read by many 
politically informed ejidatarios and farmers, and is an important popular source of news 
and opinions. An informed friend of mine warned me not to take these papers as 
independent news sources, because they play up to their paymasters and their owners. 
Local politicians pay the reporters to publicise their version of the news as part of an 
election campaign. As a result, they often contain the most serious mutual accusations of 
corruption and incompetence that make or break public images17. To sum up, this 
publicity campaign was an expensive affair for Nunez that was financed from revenue 
sources within the association. 
It is important to emphasise that the election rally was not an isolated event. It 
concluded a series of private encounters during the preceding months at which Nunez 
painstakingly constructed an alliance of support. Nunez's campaign subsequently 
culminated in three political rallies in a row meant to mobilise the popular support that 
he had acquired and at which he would publicly assume leadership of the alliance. 
During this series of private, and later more public, meetings a regional culture of power 
was enacted (De Vries, 2002). Much of the acting out of this culture during the election 
rally had been prepared, mirrored and reiterated during these earlier events. As part of 
an even larger framework, the meeting enacts a personalist and populist regional culture 
of power that has greatly influenced politics in the small state of Nayarit over a longer 
time span of several decades. It also evidences a material culture involving the generous 
and ritual offering of food and drink to popular crowds of potential voters and material 
benefits to selected leaders to reinforce the political support that the rally is meant to 
generate. The election was actually meant to take place after the second public meeting, 
but the sitting CMC president cancelled it at the last moment, according to Nunez 
because their opponents were afraid of losing. The third and last in this series of public 
rallies, which was followed by the elections, is described below. 
8.2 The Election Rally 
I turn towards the venue on the side of the embankment where Nunez is preparing for 
today's elections. It consists of an enclosed space in the open air with a swimming pool 
and a long buUding with a bar and kitchen at the back. The plastic tables and chairs that 
are carefully positioned in the open space facing a speaker's platform await the arrival of 
more than a hundred ejido delegates. In about an hour, Nunez' supporters will enjoy 
breakfast together and listen to Nunez' speech here before going to the polls. Nunez and 
Uribe are seated behind one of the tables. The latter is Nunez' right hand in the 
Solorceno ejido, and a board member of the municipal section of Sanidad Vegetal. Uribe 
has been involved in co-ordinating his campaign for the presidency of the CMC during 
the last months. Nunez, a short man, wears a green shirt, matching the colour of the list 
that he is heading. Nearby a green flag is being raised on a flagpole. 
Both men are reading the local newspapers. I greet them and ask what the papers have 
to say. Nunez silently passes me this morning's edition of the local paper El Diario. A 
front-page article announces that today elections will be held at the CMC between two 
antagonistic groups. Nunez is supported by 'honest ejido leaders' with a 'democratic 
vocation', whilst his adversary, Leal, heads the red list and represents the most 
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reactionary and discredited current, supported by the tobacco producers' organisation, 
ARIC. The last group is headed by its patron and ex-president the 'corrupt Magdaleno 
Hinojosa', alias El Guerro (The White), and its current president, Gerardo Soto, who 
evoke sad recollections among people from the countryside, according the paper. Nunez 
seems to be pleased with these favourable reports. 
Around eight o'clock, Leopoldo, the association's maintenance assistant, parks the pick-
up that he drives for the association. In the back he carries several huge pans containing 
a locally common breakfast dish of meat, tortillas and beans and brings them into the 
kitchen. I ask him what time he got up at to fetch breakfast. He tells me that he woke at 
4.30 and started to collect ejido delegates and Nunez supporters from the most remote 
ranches (rural hamlets) in the municipality. His pick-up was loaded and he estimates that 
he transported 50 to 100 people. Many of these people have no means of transport and 
their ejidos are not serviced by public transport. They would not have come otherwise, 
he explains. The opportunity to do some shopping in Santiago, and then the prospect of 
having good food and doing some proper drinking on election day, persuaded several of 
them to come. After doing this, he returned to Villa Hidalgo to collect the breakfast. 
Whilst I am talking to Leopoldo, other association staff members (canaleros [persons in 
charge of distribution water at field level], machine operators and truck drivers) now 
start arriving. They have collected ejido commissioners from other ejidos around the 
municipality and transported them in the back of the association's pick-ups. Most are 
men wearing sombreros or baseball caps and ordinary clothes, indicating a modest 
peasant background. They get off the pick-up and sit down at the tables. Slowly the 
place starts to look crowded. 
Several well-known ejido leaders and peasant activists from the region are arriving 
under their own steam. Nunez has clearly succeeded in bringing together a wide 
coalition of political leaders and activists, producer groups and organisations that have 
supported him during his campaign. Some of the ejido commissioners that I see arriving 
have actively helped Nunez with his campaign for the CMC and are now registered as 
part of his candidate board. When Nunez wins the elections, they expect to get a 
position within the CMC. For example, there is Bruno Nava, the Pozo de Ibarra ejido 
cornmissioner who will be appointed as 'bean marketing' president, exploring new 
opportunities for selling beans at a higher price. He will be responsible for enlisting 
political support and government resources for this. Others have negotiated some 
personal favours with Nunez that I happen to have heard about. For example, an activist 
from Santiago acquired a job for his son as assistant at the association. 
Another of Nunez' supporters is Nacho Xavier, the current president of Sanidad Vegetal 
and a colleague of Uribe. A week ago at a campaign meeting he fiercely attacked the 
ARIC-based group and accused them of using ARIC's pick-ups to transport ejido 
delegates to elections and of using organisational funds to offer bribes in exchange for 
votes. He claimed that this kind of corruption had to stop and that Nunez in contrast did 
not spend a single peso on his own political campaign. Vlrgen and Uribe intend to stand 
for re-election at the end of this year and require Nunez' support against the candidate 
that the ARIC-based group is putting forward. At that same meeting, another ejido 
commissioner continued the recriminations against the competing ARIC group and 
stated that he did not want to have anything to do with people like FJ Guerro, Gerardo 
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Soto, Leal and their followers. 'Nunez confronted them and he was not afraid of them. If only 
Gerardo Soto, the current leader of ARIC, had more vision. But that is not the case, so a change 
is badly needed. That change is provided by Nunez' planilla'. After this a young man stood 
up and emphasised the need for unity among the attendees. He said that it was in the 
interest of the government that peasants would not unite but, rather, remain divided. 
From the crowd that is present, it is evident that Nunez has been able to ally both groups 
that operate within the PRI and some opposition groups in his effort to capture the 
CMC. For example, we see Domingo Xavier, an ejido cornmissioner and ex-deputy for 
the PRD. At an earlier campaign event organised two weeks previously, he deployed his 
skills as orator in favour of Nunez and his spirited speech drew an enthusiastic response 
from the audience. He claimed to have suggested Bruno Nava as secretary of the planilla 
and said that he had a lot of confidence in him, which he emphasised by firmly shaking 
his hand afterwards. 
Several of the organisers of Nunez' campaign walked nervously around counting the 
ejido commissioners present and allowed to vote. They were checking a list drawn up on 
the basis of the two earlier public events. The campaign event two weeks previously in 
the auditorium of the CMC had had quite a good turnout of delegates. To attract the 
commissioners, Nunez and his collaborators promoted the meeting by spreading the 
word that they would serve beers and birria, a popular goafs meat dish often consumed 
in rural areas of Western Mexico at festive occasions and political events. At the 
beginning of the event, some of the few women in the crowd of sombreros and baseball 
caps were asked to serve the birria on plastic plates. Nunez and Uribe were actively 
distributing the plates of food from the front stage to the back of the auditorium among 
the seated delegates who patiently awaited their food. Nunez asked the women to serve 
small portions, because he was concerned about whether there would be enough to go 
round. When Uribe opened the meeting, he mentioned the lack of food and added that 
hopefully people felt satisfied. With their stomachs filled, the beer also slowly found its 
way to the thirsty throats in the audience. Uribe continued with the presentation of the 
two other members of Nunez' planilla. The candidates were enthusiastically applauded 
and greeted with cheers. 
Meanwhile, Nunez and Uribe took their seats behind an elongated podium block as part 
of the presidium positioned on the stage in front of the auditorium. They were 
surrounded by large signs for the PRI and the CNC. In the presidium they were 
accompanied by a locally well-known agricultural engineer working for the federal 
government and another official representing government authority and agronomic 
expertise. Uribe welcomed them. He indicated a tall güero (white man) seated in the first 
row and introduced me as an engineer from Holland, here on a technology exchange. 
Uribe praised the fact that people like 'engineer Eduardo came all this way to co-operate 
with us on the Left Bank, thanks to our president of the Left Bank!. I stood up and 
uncomfortably greeted the people in the auditorium who were applauding. 
Subsequently, the audience listened to a series of speeches started by Nunez and 
followed by a number of supporting ejido leaders. The audience responded approvingly 
with shouts of encouragement, loud exclamations, clapping and jokes. Although the 
floor was opened for other comments from the audience, most commissioners chose not 
to speak in public. The interventions were made by the politically more experienced and 
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eloquent participants. These were usually better educated and not without means, 
judging by their clothes and conduct. 
At that meeting, Nunez counted around 142 voting supporters, more than the 109 votes 
required, and concluded that this would be enough to win. Nevertheless he urged the 
ejido comissioners to convince their colleagues to come to the elections, because they 
still needed more support for a secure victory. After the event, the organisers of Nunez' 
campaign were optimistic but indicated their insecurity, as the turnout and loyalties of 
delegates remained unpredictable until the very end. These rallies were not necessarily a 
reliable indicator of actual voting at the poll. Delegates could easily change sides during 
the weeks before the election, because of a similarly pleasant event, or promises and 
payoffs that the opposing group could offer in the meantime. At the event that was held 
after the postponed elections, only around eighty people turned up. The organisers were 
slightly concerned about the difficulties of again mobilising all of these voters next time. 
In response, Nunez pleaded that people's interest and commitment should not (diminish 
and all present should urge their friends and acquaintances to come and vote the 
following week. Today at the rally the organisers count around 107 votes, which 
normally would be sufficient to win the elections. However, they note the absence of 
several people who committed themselves to come to the breakfast and worry about 
their votes. Nunez deliberates with his collaborators about what to do. Nunez decides to 
send Leopoldo with his pick-up to collect a certain commissioner who has not arrived 
yet. 
Outside on the pavement, I start a conversation with the principal of the local 
agricultural college in Villa Hidalgo. He has come to express his support for Nunez, in 
spite of the fact that he cannot vote. Like everybody else who was involved in the 
campaign, he was mobilised this morning to bring some of Nunez' supporters from 
ejidos around the municipality to Santiago. The principal only recently migrated to 
Nayarit from the northern state of Sonora. Although he is an outsider, he has developed 
a keen interest in political relations in the region, just like mysetf. This enlivens our 
conversations on the sideline. Recently, he has explained to me his interest in developing 
a bond with deputy Perez' group. Perez has influence on the education committee of the 
state congress, in the university in Tepic, and the preparatory college in Villa Hidalgo. 
So, the principal expects that in the future Perez will be able to secure government funds 
for his school. To this purpose he offered his close associate, Guttierez, the manager of 
the association, a job as part-time teacher in his school, and he gladly accepted because 
of the additional salary. The principal informs me that Nunez' alliance is fighting against 
the predominance of a small group here 'on the Right Bank', which has always 
dominated politically and distributed posts in the CMC, the municipality and in the 
tobacco producers' organisation, ARIC. People from the Left Bank of the river have had 
little influence on politics within the municipality, he tells me. As a newcomer to the 
region, he thinks it is remarkable that a river brings about so much discord. However, 
because Nunez is supported by most ejidos on the Left Bank and has now also acquired 
support in several ejidos on the Right Bank, he can be expected to win the elections. 
Whilst we discuss regional politics, Perez arrives in his white pick-up. He starts to greet 
people around us, particularly the ejido commissioners that he knows from the Left 
Bank. It is as if he came to remind them of a commitment. The principal whispers with 
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awe that this man is a diputado (deputy) and that he belongs to Nunez' group. He is also 
a producer; he clarifies, forgetting my familiarity with the topic. Perez comes walking up 
to us and firmly shakes our hands. The principal confers with Perez about the fact that 
he was to bring the secretary of the Villa Hidalgo ejido with him, but could not find him. 
He gives the impression that he is rendering account to somebody who is behind the 
organisation of the campaign. Perez responds that he will go to Villa to search for him 
and bring him here. He departs and after that I do not see him anymore today. I 
conclude for myself that Perez is playing a role in the background of Nunez' campaign. 
Perez officially represents the private producers of the Left Bank. Therefore Nunez 
cannot afford to be identified too much with him, because they represent contradictory 
interest groups. Nunez refrains from publicly referring to his relations with influential 
PRI politicians, such as Perez, Felix Torres, or the governor. In the local papers he 
explicitly denies such relations and emphasises his prime loyalty to the peasant sector. 
This proximity could harm his coalition that contains opposition forces. Later, the 
principal asks me if I noticed Perez7 muddy boots. He thinks that this is clearly 
deliberate. Perez wants to show that he is an ordinary producer just like all the 
ejidatarios, not an elitist private producer. Despite his background role, Perez clearly 
wants to make his own impression on the ejido commissioners, with a view to future 
political ambitions. 
When the principal and I decide to go inside, most tables are already occupied by ejido 
commissioners and their following. The first dishes of pork and frijoles charros (fried 
beans) with tortillas are being distributed on plastic plates among the waiting crowd. 
Besides association personnel and some of the organisers of the campaign, it strikes me 
that Nunez himself is also fully engaged in bringing around the plates of food to his 
potential voters. He personally inquires of several people what they want to eat and 
drink. With careful ceremony, he collects their food from the kitchen and rapidly and 
humbly satisfies their wishes by personally bringing it to them. We proceed towards the 
kitchen and the principal remarks, 'you see, here are the chiefs', pointing at Guttierez. In 
the kitchen, untypically, there are no women. Uribe, Nunez' right hand, and Laguna, a 
canalero from the association, among others, are serving the food from the pans onto the 
plates and handing them to those who are running in and out of the kitchen. We get a 
plate and sit down to eat. I ask the principal why Nunez busies himself so much with 
delivering food to everybody. He explains that Nunez shows himself as people like to see 
him. By bringing around food and drink he shows that he is an ordinary person, open 
and personally approachable by everybody. I add my impression that Nunez wants to 
show that he is their servidor (servant), a word that he has used before, and the principal 
nods enthusiastically to confirm my impression. 
After most delegates have finished their breakfast and look satisfied, Nunez walks up to 
the speakers' platform. He begins a fiery speech in which he addresses them as 
companeros (comrades) and once as hermanos de close (class brothers). Nunez promises 
that when he attains the presidency he will not betray their trust and will truly represent 
their interests, particularly those of the bean and tobacco producers, unlike the present 
CMC and the ARIC who clearly have been neglecting the interests of the campesinos 
(peasants). Nunez intends to fight for a fair price for beans and tobacco and all other 
crops. 'Vamos a luchar par todos...' (we are going to struggle for everybody). He promises 
progreso y Uenestar (progress and prosperity) for all campesinos. Then he states that it is 
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necessary to speak strongly to the governor to make him aware of what they need. 
Nunez also promises to work on bringing in new companies from outside that will 
generate employment, on government projects and infrastructure works, such as the 
new bridge and the expansion of the Right Bank irrigation module. This will make 
agriculture flourish again, as in days of La Costa de Oro (the Gold Coast), a popular 
reference to the rich backdrop of collectively remembered images of the golden years of 
tobacco cultivation and great rural prosperity on the Northern Coast of Nayarit during 
the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Suddenly, Nunez dramatically exclaims that it is 'now or never...' and that 'it is time for 
change1, creating the feeling that urgent action is needed and that a hope for change is 
justified. He claims that they will convince with actions and not with words. Since he is 
totally committed himself, he only asks his audience to be the same. He needs 
everybody's support. With his powerful voice, accentuating gestures and use of mating 
and revolutionary language, he awakens the audience that gradually starts to manifest 
increasing excitement. They applaud and from time to time shout to express their 
approval. At the end of his speech Nunez pleads for unidad (unity). On winning the 
elections, Nunez will offer his opponent the job of secretary of the CMC, in order to 
prevent unnecessary discord, something that they agreed with each other. Nevertheless, 
he does not doubt that victory will be theirs. 'We will win the election', he finishes 
confidently. To round off the speech somebody shouts arriba la planilla verde, supporting 
the green candidate list. In response, the audience cheers and applauds enthusiastically. 
When Nunez7 speech has finished, the crowd automatically flows out onto the pavement 
into a procession, with the green flag taken down from its pole and held triumphantly in 
its forward line. Nunez takes the lead with his planilla behind him and his crowd of 
supporters following. They walk towards the central plaza of Santiago, which they pass 
on their way towards the CMC building. It is only a short walk of a few minutes. The 
procession arrives far too early for the election and thus the supporters wait in the shade 
across the road opposite the entrance. The supporters of the red planilla arrive in smaller 
and disparate groups. It is only around eleven o'clock that the pack of voting ejido 
commissioners is allowed into the large auditorium where they can register to vote. The 
door of the building closes behind them. Nobody else is left in the building, except for 
the mayor, representatives from the PRI and the national CNC. Whilst awaiting the 
result, we have plenty of time to study the pale and flaking paint layers that are coming 
off the dilapidated CMC building. This is a sharp contrast to the freshly painted office of 
the association in Villa Hidalgo. The state of these offices seems to reflect the difference 
in financial situation. The green supporters stand out because of their occasional cheers 
in favour of their planilla and their apparent optimism about their prospects of winning; 
the reds remain quietly in the background. Guttierez functions as Nunez' nerve centre 
outside, co-ordinating the information flows amongst the supporters. 
After more than an hour of waiting, suddenly a bursting wave of cheers rises from the 
CMC building, announcing the immanent result. The door opens and the news comes 
out. Nunez has won the election. The green supporters are happy and wave their flag, 
although anxiety is felt about an unexpectedly narrow victory. The green crowd outside 
flows inside, whilst most of the reds are leaving: Guttierez and the principal are elated 
and see Nunez giving a speech thanking his supporters in the front of the auditorium on 
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the stage. After him, first the mayor of Santiago and then a representative of the PRI 
make speeches, stressing the need for unidad and co-operation to the benefit and 
progress of the peasantry. 
After the speeches, the triumphant supporters move to the Santiago fairground. These 
are premises on the periphery of town, designated to host its annual festivities. A series 
of long tables are placed in the open air to celebrate the victory with a large banquet for 
the ejido delegates and to thank them for supporting Nunez and his green candidates. I 
arrive when the party is in full swing. The large crowd of people indicates that those who 
fancy a free meal of birria with beer somewhat freely interpret the notion of supporter. 
The remains of consumed goat bones and plastic plates on the ground and collections of 
finished bottles on the tables reflect the euphoria that is felt among Nunez' supporters. 
The cheerful song of a spirited ejido commissioner over a speaker system reinforces this 
impression, much to the entertainment of his colleagues around the tables. The 
canaleros are distributing the beers and also consuming one or two themselves. To the 
side of this spectacle, a small group of collaborators around Nunez is seriously evaluating 
the close victory and speculating about those votes that were unexpectedly not cast in 
favour of Nunez. Guttierez tells me that he is concerned that tomorrow will be a very 
busy day in terms of water distribution on the Left Bank. At the moment, there is only 
one canalero in the field, because most of them are here at the election event in 
Santiago. The celebrations continue for hours until all the crates of beer are finished and 
everybody returns home. 
8.3 Analysis 
The association as a political platibrm 
Below I will analyse Nunez' election rally as a cultural performance. Cultural performance 
turns around a concern with what appears on stage, and therefore it may dissimulate (Law, 
1994). The performance of political events often draws the spotlight onto the political 
candidate and his/her popular support and therefore narrows the perspective down to 
what is displayed and made visible to the outside world. A good public performance 
focuses attention on the subject, making one forget the media that make it possible. 
However, to understand how that very same cultural performance is produced and 
organised, what and who contribute and benefit, who are excluded, and what its exact 
effects are on the organisations involved, it is necessary also to look backstage to see the 
mundane events, hidden agendas, power struggles and the resource practices of 
everyday organisational life (Long, 1989; Law, 1994; Reed, 1992; Munro, 1999). On the 
basis of the episode observed above, it becomes evident what enables Nunez' public 
performance and his apparently spontaneous display of generous and charismatic 
leadership. I will concentrate here on two related issues that had most impact on the 
management of the association. 
During the electoral campaigns, the political group in charge of the association 
controlled an array of resources that were concentrated on launching and consolidating 
the political careers and furthering the ambitions of its main proponents to capture 
positions in politically influential organisations. Using the association as a political 
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platform, and drawing and building on its concrete social and material resources, greatly 
facilitated the election victories of Pérez as a deputy and of Nunez at the CMC, and 
continued afterwards. The first issue is, therefore, that Nunez' public performance 
obscures the hard work, time, skill and energy that were invested by his political group 
and a grouping of allied politicians and activists in bunding the alliance of support and 
organising the events. The second issue is that the group drew extensively on the 
association's facilities, revenues and other resources for their political ends. 
So, in the first place the organisation of the election rally is not simply Nunez7 mdividual 
accomplishment as a politician, but the result of a performative competence and a 
distribution of labour and competences among a larger collective (Hutchins, 1995) 1 8. His 
political group played a central role in organising the campaign event and in mobilising 
his voters. During the entire campaign, the group displayed their cultural credentials and 
a mutual task division in organising these events. The field staff of the association 
demonstrated a certain experience in preparing them and the modes of enjoyment, 
based on previous political events during which they provided the organisational 
footwork for Pérez and Nunez. For the staff it became a routine matter to transport and 
arrange tables and chairs, and to fetch and distribute food and drink before and during 
the meetings and popular events organised and patronised by their patrons. Access to a 
radio system greatly facilitated communication among superiors and subordinates, and 
turned out to be particularly handy in the organisation of these events. Further, Guttierez 
and Pérez were actively involved in the co-ordination of the campaign. Guttierez 
supported Nunez at the daily level from the association, in the meantime developing his 
personal political skills, for instance by helping Nunez to write and improve his 
speeches. Although Pérez consciously kept himself in the background, he is Nunez' 
patron. It was he who manoeuvred him into position and educated him in organising 
these very same political events. Another important figure in the organisation of the 
campaign is Nunez' right hand man in his ejido, Uribe, who co-ordinated the public 
events and acted as a speaker. In addition, several local leaders, politicians, activists and 
organisations played a role in the events. Municipal and state level politicians and 
agencies influenced the election from a distance. 
Secondly, over a longer period of time, the group drew extensively on the association's 
staff, facilities, and resources for their political ends. In previous chapters, such 
heterogeneous combinations of human actors, non-human technologies and resource 
flows involved in irrigation management were analysed as operational arrangements. 
This chapter argues that such operational arrangements are used for more than just 
service provision. Nunez' campaign illustrates that controlling these operational 
arrangements significantly enlarged the group's scope for political action. This facilitated 
building and expanding an alliance of political support, but it also freed up resources and 
generated a stream of unreported revenues to organise and finance an expensive political 
campaign. However, the political appropriation of these operational arrangements not 
only had concrete political effects, but also (adversely) affected the operational use of 
these arrangements. This weakened their financial and infrastructural viability, and the 
physical condition of the machinery and transport facilities. In addition, it reinforced the 
gradually deteriorating financial situation of the association, the frequent break-down of 
machinery, and increasing controversy and decreasing support for the group among the 
association's personnel, the delegates, and the CNA, Although the latter were 
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unintended effects, they were largely taken for granted by the management of the 
association whilst they were fully engaged in their campaign. 
I will briefly review the political opportunities and resources generated through 
motorised mobility, maintenance machinery, water distribution, and the financial 
adrninistration of the association and the impacts of their political use on the 
association's resource base and service provision. 
Motorised political mobility 
The association has at its disposal a mobile fleet of motor bikes and vehicles operated by 
its staff and lubricated with gasoline and financial flows. These became useful at different 
points in time as campaign tools and as enablers of the political action of the group in 
charge. These operational arrangements were used as a means of political mobility for 
the candidate and his campaign organisers and of political mobilisation of its supporters 
to expand its political support base in the municipality. This degree of political mobility 
and the opportunities for popular mobilisation in Santiago were formerly largely 
restricted to government or party officials and wealthy producers. 
The election rally was made possible by the mobile fleet from the association and other 
public organisations, and by some supporters with private resources. This enabled the 
transportation of a large crowd of potential voters from the most remote ejidos around 
the municipality to the election event in Santiago". When the organisers of the campaign 
feared that some secure votes would not turn up, Nunez sent out a pick-up to fetch 
them. The association's facilities to transport voters to the ballot box proved to be 
essential in winning the CMC elections. 
Before and after the elections, the president of the association, Nunez, became mobile 
because of his full-time access to an association pick-up truck. As a result, he was always 
able to travel quickly to the municipal capital, Santiago. This enabled him to attend 
meetings and strengthen his political presence at the CMC, the municipality and in the 
PRI, and to develop complicities and political support by organising small parties and the 
three political rallies on Santiago's embankment. Getting to Santiago from the Left Bank 
of the municipality was especially complicated during the rainy season when the 
campaign was at its height, because of the temporary absence of a bridge nearby to 
quickly cross the river. This political mobility also gave Nunez and the organisers of his 
campaign the opportunity to freely move around in the municipality and drive to 
different villages, and even reach the most remote ejidos within an hour. 
In this manner, Nunez was able to organise a series of festive encounters with potential 
supporters and build an alliance of support for his candidacy in the upcoming elections. 
After winning the CMC elections, Nunez enlarged his political action range and mobility 
when he became increasingly involved in his work in Santiago and in the campaign of 
his patrons, Pérez for mayor and Felix Torres for governor. As 1998 progressed, he also 
started to drive more frequently to Tepic for meetings at state level of the CNC, the PRI, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, and other government institutions. Not only did he represent 
the CMC and the association on government committees, but he also met with the 
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governor and other influential PRI politicians and government bureaucrats and engaged 
in political lobbying to advance his political career and that of his group. 
Guttierez and the association's other staff also benefited from the mobility facilitated by 
the use of cars and motor bikes in ways that were exploited politically. Guttierez was 
able to move around the region in his pick-up, with the fuel and maintenance costs fully 
covered. As manager, Guttierez moved around the villages, fields and institutions of the 
Left Bank and interacted intensively with different producer groups. In doing this, he 
represented the interests of his patron, Perez, and superior, Nunez, and became active in 
the organisation of their subsequent political campaigns. Transport facilities provided 
him the opportunity to visit village festivities, organise drinking parties in local cantinas, 
and offer favours in exchange for the ejido commissioners' support in the upcoming 
elections. In addition, the canaleros moved around in the field on their motor bikes and 
were remarkably well informed about the region and the political and agricultural issues 
at hand. As such they constituted an important source of political information for Perez7 
group. In addition, they facilitated political footwork, through the preparation of events 
and the diffusion of information and documents from and to Santiago and among the 
supportive forces of the alliance around the municipality. Their access to a radio system 
also facilitated communication and quickened the exchange of information. 
During 1998 and 1999, Nunez intensified his number of flights to Mexico City to 
represent the association and the three other irrigation modules in Nayarit at the 
National Association of WUAs (ANUR) and the CMC at the CNC and PRI headquarters, 
something that conveniently coincided with the preparations of the 1999 elections in 
Nayarit. In the capital, he looked for opportunities to commercialise beans for his 
constituency of peasant producers from the Santiago municipality. At the national CNC 
and the PRI, he pleaded for government support programmes along these lines, as this 
was one of the promises he had made during his campaign for the CMC. In the light of 
the upcoming elections and the PRI's need for popular support, these institutions were 
more willing to receive him. Under these favourable conditions, he was able also to 
represent the interests of his group, keep abreast of national and state level political 
developments and to develop relations in the capital. As the CMC had access to very few 
financial resources and had no means of transport, he continued to move around in the 
association's pick-up, although gradually allocating less time to the daily management of 
the association. In addition, his increased travel expenses were financed to a large extent 
by the association. 
Maintenance machinery movement 
The association controlled a stock of heavy machinery, such as a dragline, a hydraulic 
excavator, and several trucks. In Chapter 7,1 have argued that heavy machinery is as a 
commercially and politically interesting asset for which there is an almost constant 
demand. For example, the public works that are enabled by heavy machinery are an 
appreciated source of political support and legitimation for ejido and rural leaders, who 
seek to improve their public image of competent and effective leadership. Because the 
machines are mobile and difficult to survey, the group freely moved the machines 
around in line with its most immediate financial and political interests. 
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Nunez used the machinery mainly to advance his political campaign in two ways. Firstly, 
the mobile machines constituted an important resource to generate political support and 
expand the action range of Nunez' political alliance to the Right Bank of the 
municipality, which had previously been left uncovered. Nunez and Guttierez sent 
around maintenance machines and trucks to do agreed favours or provide services to 
several ejido cornmissioners outside the Left Bank irrigation district who played an 
important role in acquiring support for his alliance20. Secondly, the group used the heavy 
maintenance machinery as a source of (iUegitimate) revenue to finance its political 
campaigns. To run a political campaign, Nunez required a substantial and steady source 
of revenue. This need was partially fulfilled by privately renting out the machinery to 
third parties who paid an hourly rental fee. In the period prior to the CMC elections, 
different machines were spotted doing private jobs. Employees critical of the association 
would point out to me that, for example, the trucks were engaged for weeks in 
transporting gravel and sand to the private holdings of a wealthy and favoured cattle 
farmer for the construction of farm roads. Other machines were used to prepare the 
roads, level parcels of land and construct field canals. The indebted beneficiary paid for 
the material plus the agreed hourly rate directly to the president or the manager. These 
revenues were invested in the campaign in one way or another21. 
The unfortunate impact of the political use of the machinery was that the Left Bank 
infrastructure received insufficient maintenance, in particular the tail-end section of the 
system that did not belong to the electoral constituency of the group, because it is part of 
the San Bias municipality. Further, the condition of the machines deteriorated due to 
their intensive and inappropriate use and a failure to maintain them22. As a result, 
substantial repair costs were incurred, and expensive spare parts had to be ordered from 
outside the region, as a consequence of which the motor bikes, trucks and machines 
were often left unused for long periods. 
Water distribution 
Nunez' political group, via the team of canaleros operating the irrigation iiurastacture of 
the Left Bank module, gave privileged access to irrigation water to several large, favoured 
producers in exchange for special fee payment agreements and political support23. 
Because the Left Bank system generally does not suffer from water scarcity, the effects of 
this practice were not extremely serious for other producers and ejidos, except for the 
unpredictability of irrigation turns. These arrangements, which were kept secret from the 
assembly of delegates and the CNA, freed up unreported revenue flows for the 
management that were invested directly in the organisation of the political campaign. 
Water itself was unsuitable as a political resource for buuding a broad alliance of support, 
i.e. in exchange for political support and votes from ejido commissioners, because it was 
not a scarce good and its distribution network is spatially limited to the Left Bank 
irrigation module. This made it unsuitable for expanding Nunez' support base to the 
Right Bank of the river. 
Administration and financial revenues 
This political use of the association's operational arrangements for mobility, 
maintenance, and water distribution drained its financial reserves, as it led to huge fuel, 
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labour, repair, and other expenses. In addition, Nunez directly diverted financial 
resources from the acuxuxiistration of the association to his campaign, something that 
also adversely affected the organisation's financial status. With those financial resources, 
he paid among other things for the series of parties he organised and the publicity 
campaign in local papers. When the campaign for the CMC took place, the association's 
revenues from irrigation fee payments for the main irrigation cycle quickly dried up, 
much earlier than in other years. As early as halfway through the main irrigation cycle in 
March 1998, just after the elections, the association experienced severe cash flow 
problems, which meant that the payment of salaries and bills was postponed. As a result, 
the association's personnel did not receive wages for periods of several weeks, 
something to which they had grown accustomed over the years. Efforts to actively 
prevent fee default were insufficient during the campaign period, and only intensified 
after the elections. The association requested a loan from BANRURAL, with its 
properties as collateral, which it could only finish repaying ten months into the next 
main irrigation cycle (1998/1999). 
After becoming president of the CMC, Nunez increased his political radius of action. His 
travel and other political expenses remained considerable, as the elections of 1999 were 
approaching and he and his patrons were again aspiring to elective positions. The CMC 
itself turned out to have few revenue sources, particularly after ARIC stopped its financial 
support, and the municipality also appeared not to be very forthcoming. This is 
understandable from a political viewpoint, as these entities were controlled by different 
groups within the PRI that competed for the same political positions, for example the 
municipal presidency. As a result, in the association the final balance of Nunez' last year 
in office (1999) was negative. All these factors led to growing discontent and more 
articulated criticism among the association's delegates and staff and with the CNA and 
the state government. 
The election rally as a cultural performance 
The election event unmistakably reflects a personalist and populist political culture that 
is more common in other regions of Mexico and bears clear traces of the clientelist and 
corporatist set of relations that have dominated Mexican politics over several decades. I 
especially focus here on specific cultural traits of politics that show its performative 
aspects and a degree of regional specificity. After surruriing up the following five 
elements, I will continue with how this contributes to legitimising political authority and 
leadership, whilst acquiring and managing political support for Nunez7 alliance. Firstly, 
policy issues have an ambiguous role in this form of rural politics. Secondly, a statist 
discourse continues to prevail. Thirdly, there is an interesting contrast embodied in the 
type of leadership that is displayed - a contrast that accentuates servitude and humility 
on the one hand and authority on the other. This is most clearly expressed in the leader 
who personally patronises his supporters and distributes food and drink among them to 
bind them to him and legitimise his leadership. A fourth element is the performative 
balance between a campaign of recriminations against opponents and an emphasis on 
the fact that the political alliance represents consensus and unity. Finally, an important 
element of the campaign is manifested in the culturally and materially specific forms in 
which the political leadership appeals to, engages, and mobilises supporters, such as 
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through the display and enjoyment of the good side of life, the profuse dispensing and 
consumption of food and drink, and collective regional recollections of past prosperity. 
In view of the central role that the WUA plays in the organisation of the event, and the 
way in which its operational arrangements and resources enable Nunez and his alliance 
to acquire political support, it is surprising to see that the association does not figure at 
all in the policies that Nunez proposes to carry out as president of the CMC. This 
tempers our expectations about potential benefits accruing to the association as a result 
of the participation of its management in regional politics. More generally, the event 
exposes an ambiguity concerning the role of policy in contemporary rural politics. This is 
not to say that policies are unimportant. The issues of low crop prices and the 
malfunctioning of ARIC are general concerns among many peasants and producers, and 
a basis around which Nunez' alliance was formed. But there is also a performative aspect 
to challenging these issues of general discontent. Virtually everybody agrees about them, 
but little can be done to change them from this level, given international market 
relations and political relations between the multinational tobacco enterprises and 
national and state government in which ARIC's position is strengthened and left 
unchallenged. The issues about which Nunez makes representations to the federal and 
state government on behalf of his constituency, however, are insufficient as a basis to 
build a political alliance and gain popular support. This is borne out by the rest of the 
analysis, which emphasises the culturally and materially specific forms of political 
engagement and mobilisation engaged in by Nunez. 
Nunez' call to attract more companies from outside the region to create employment is 
perhaps a new element in an otherwise rather conventional statist discourse that 
emphasises the need for state support for the peasantry. This is understandable, because 
it is the raison d'etre of the corporatist organ he wishes to represent. Nunez' demands 
for a return of populist redistributive policies, like federal price support for the bean 
producers, and his support for the construction of large infrastructural works in the 
municipality appear outdated in times of state disengagement, but are to be understood 
in the context of the approaching elections. During this period, the PRI did its best to 
regain electoral support along the established lines of targeted supports and subsidised 
goods to the popular classes, and infrastructural works of large symbolical importance to 
regional development. This creates some room for negotiation, interest representation 
and performative display for local PRI representatives, such as Perez and Nunez. 
Displays of leadership and authority 
During the campaign events, Nunez gets to perform a central role, manifesting his 
authority as the political leader of the alliance that he has united. The campaign 
meetings serve as special occasions to commemorate the leader's good deeds and strong 
points. They display and legitimise his leadership position via different media: his visible 
acts like the physical distribution of food, his spoken discourse, the praise he receives 
from other supporters, the applause and response he gets, and the written press that 
reports his triumphs to the outside world. 
Nunez is presented by himself and others as an honest leader from a humble peasant 
background who represents a wider imagined constituency of peasants (campesinos) and 
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the ejido sector in the municipality of Santiago. He displays his commitment to act as a 
servant to his companions and struggle for their interests, and he makes it clear that he 
expects their commitment in return. Nunez claims to fight for progress and the well-
being of all ejidatarios, and claims the opposite for his opponents. Yet, this humble 
approach to representing his electoral base coexists with the contrasting image of an 
authoritative or strong leader. The change that Nunez promises to bring about, the 
confidence he displays about winning the elections, his firm stance towards the governor 
and his opponents, his charismatic and expressive body language, not to mention his 
eloquent discourse, all contribute to the same impression. They show a strong and 
resolute leader with the commitment, authority and capacity to lead, to serve the 
interests of his constituency, and to enforce change. The rally also affords him an 
opportunity to reiterate the moral values on which his authority rests. Humility and 
authority are clearly two sides of the same coin; both appeal to people's ideals about 
leadership and, as a result, legitimise Nunez' candidacy. 
Eloquently, Nunez situates himself as a vital link in the transition from the rural past to 
the future. His revolutionary language and the symbols that surround him revive popular 
recollections of a prosperous regional past and call to mind a revolutionary peasantry 
historically united in the struggle for land and liberty. To generate hope for a better 
future, Nunez refers to the introduction of new government programmes, large 
infrastructural works, companies from outside. He and others create a sense of urgency 
and a need for radical change, which the alliance promises to bring. Nunez' symbolic act 
as leader of the alliance continues when he walks at the front of the ritual procession 
towards the election poll, with his direct collaborators and supporters behind him, 
embodying the hierarchy of authority in his alliance in a way that echoes fragments of 
the Mexican Revolution. Finally, having been elected and inaugurated as president of the 
CMC, Nunez rewards his supporters in style by means of a large festive banquet with 
alcohol, food, and live music. 
Besides positioning himself in relation to his associates and voters, he also positions 
himself as a legitimate and responsible leader vis-a-vis the governorship, the PRI, the 
CNC, and the municipality. This requires a fine balance between dismissing and 
antagonising his opponents, and pleading for unity and consensus as is the customary 
practice within the PRI. In the run-up to the election, Nunez and his associates thus 
launched a campaign of denouncements to blacken the name of his rival, whilst towards 
the end of the campaign, they emphasised the need to reconcile differences and their 
willingness to even work together with their opponents. Further, a signal that Nunez 
sends out is that his alliance is a legitimate force with a significant support base and that 
he is a leader within the PRI whom it cannot afford to lose. Defecting to the opposition is 
no longer as inconceivable as it was before (Klesner, 1997). 
Several members of the alliance reinforce Nunez' leadership by publicly granting him 
their support. They glorify Nunez as a potent and courageous leader by claiming that he 
is not afraid to face and challenge his opponents or the governor, and that he will bring 
about radical change. Others associate him with appealing to sources of government 
authority, agronomic expertise and foreign advanced technology. Again others fiercely 
discredit the leadership of ARIC and the competing political group by telling of their 
corruptness and disclosing their misuse of resources for political purposes. The most 
The Cultural Performance of an Election Rally 237 
striking example reveals a rather ironic aspect of the performance. The president of 
Sanidad Vegetal fiercely criticises their adversaries for using organisational resources in 
support of their campaign, ignoring for a moment the fact that he and Nunez are doing 
exactly same thing. This is something of which insiders are conscious. 
Finally, Nunez makes a visible effort to personally bring food and drink to his potential 
voters, to emphasise the fact that it is his priority to patronise and cater for their 
individual needs. All of his energy is directed at personally pleasing individual delegates 
in a larger audience. The performance visualises the image of a political leader 
committed to serving the needs of his people. In addition, it also emphasises that it is 
Nunez in person who provides them with these pleasures and to whom they should be 
thankful. Through this act, Nunez reminds several individual ejido commissioners of 
their mutual complicities and commitments developed before, over a longer period, at 
earlier encounters, or through the promise of a favour or a job. For the wider audience of 
ejido commissioners, this personal act positions Nunez as the legitimate political leader 
who qualifies for popular support and is worthy of receiving their vote. 
As I have argued before, the provision, the coUective consumption and enjoyment of 
food and alcohol implies a certain reciprocity and nurtures relations of trust and cuatismo. 
The form of wet politics that Nunez and his associates practice is directed at generating 
votes at the ballot box (Fallaw, 2003). Further, the event conveys and articulates a sense 
of common identity and purpose for the alliance, whilst masking existing social divisions 
and class distinctions. The ideology of unity is reinforced through the name of the 
alliance and by pointing out to the crowd that they are all campesinos (Enge and 
Whiteford, 1989:180). Nevertheless, in spite of incurring feelings of obligation, trust and 
identity, the commissioners may still decide not to vote for Nunez, and their voting 
behaviour remains to some extent uncontrollable and unpredictable, because of the 
(formerly unknown) secrecy of voting. But the rally is more than a simple transactional 
or coercive setting, it is also a performative setting that works implicitly, to concentrate, 
influence, and guide an audience of voters on their way to the polls. The performative 
setting, the choreography and sequence of events, and the enjoyment of the mtrinsic 
qualities of the performance also generate an emotional state among the audience that 
enhances a favourable electoral result. Alcohol, food and music have a significant 
contribution to make in terms of producing these altered states of consciousness. 
This election rally is an orchestrated performance in which disparate groups are 
gathered, united in a wider alliance, and orientated to vote for its leader. First of all, the 
widely advertised prospect of such enjoyment attracts a sizeable audience of potential 
voters from all corners of the municipality. Secondly, it actively works to relate the 
mdividual ejido commissioners to a larger collective, the alliance, which at the outset of 
the campaign was still very fragmented. In other words, the collective experience of the 
corruriissioners has an engaging effect on them, by making them part of an alliance. 
Thirdly, collective enjoyment plays a major role in inspiring and canalising positive 
emotions in favour of the leader. Evoking, canalising, and capitalising on collectively 
experienced emotions, such as enjoyment, comradeship and the euphoria of belonging 
to a wirining alliance, has the effect of strengthening the coherence of the alliance. It is 
not by chance that the organisers carefully monitored the collective mood of the events, 
reflected by the audience's emotional responses, such as applause, laughter, and 
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satisfaction. Both the number of well-disposed delegates and the pleasant atmosphere 
among them made the organisers more confident of victory. By joining the emotional 
and the political, the performance of this event relates the mdividual to the collective and 
simultaneously to its leader in a culturally specific manner. 
Post-analysis 
The importance that Nunez and his associates attach to the public distribution of food 
and drink is not peculiar to the president of the WUA. It is something that, for example, 
the competing group of El Guerro is also known to engage in. In Nayarit, as in many 
other states of Mexico, political leaders have a popular tradition of patronising public 
festivities during which popular crowds are collectively pleased through the profuse flow 
of beer and local specialities, adorned with revolutionary discourses and live musical 
performance24. During such events, the politicians (in Nayarit) are personally 
approachable to discuss and resolve the needs of ordinary people. Organising these 
public modes of enjoyment, particularly during election time, is a central means to 
garner popular electoral support for the PRI government, as well as for select socialist 
parties with post-revolutionary governmental experience. Nunez acquired such cultural 
skills via an implicit political training by his patrons, Perez and Felix Torres, who in turn 
emulated the political style and leadership qualities of the patriarch of Nayarit politics, 
Don Emilio. Don Emilio, in turn, was influenced by the syndical populism of his patron, 
Fidel Velazquez, national leader of the CTM for several decades, and by the popular 
politics of Alejandro Gascon who was mayor of Tepic (1972-1975) and won the 
governorship of Nayarit for the Partido Popular Socialista (Popular Socialist Party) in 
1975, although the latter victory was never acknowledged by the PRI. Both politicians 
again were influenced by the founder of both the CTM and the PPS, Lombardo 
Toledano. 
De Vries observes a similar phenomenon in the nearby state of Jalisco. He observes that 
the art of managing people entails that they should become part of a whole, of a wider 
design. But in Mexico, and particularly in the state of Jalisco, this cohesion should occur 
in a culturally specific way, which is with food and drink, with musical groups and 
mariachis. This involves organising parties and recognising the ejidatarios' yearning for 
community. Such a particular culture of power is important in developing a style of 
management and involves a willingness to engage in personalised relations with 
ejidatarios and the ability to organise public modes of enjoyment (De Vries, 2002). 
In addition, Ben Fallaw (2003) demonstrates the importance of 'wet politics' for 
consecutive socialist governments in the state of Yucatan around the time of the Mexican 
revolution. They benefited from the revenues generated by a state-run monopoly on 
alcohol, whilst illegal revenues greased and lubricated the provincial politics machine. 
Alcohol also became central to the political culture of Yucatan socialism and the 
government's ability to mobilise electoral support by using the power of alcohol to draw 
lower class males to rallies and polling stations. Political intermediaries distributed 
alcohol in exchange for the promise of votes. The ritual and generous offering of alcohol 
turned voting into a wet fiesta and the possibility of drinking (and being entertained with 
musical bands at civic festivals) came to be seen as a basic entitlement by male peasants 
and workers. The way in which these politicians organise their electoral support is not 
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8.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that, in contrast to resource management theories that analyse 
resource allocation as an enterprise of service provision and suppose that politics is an 
exogenous variable, resource allocation is mtrinsically political. The chapter has 
illustrated how a user organisation can become a political platform for a select group of 
users who appropriate its operational arrangements and concentrate its resources on 
launching and consolidating the political careers and ambitions of its main proponents 
through access to representative positions. Analysing the final election rally as a cultural 
performance has illustrated how resources are mobilised politically, according to 
culturally and materially appealing, meaningful and established ways of engaging in 
politics and representing power and authority. 
The implication for institutional economics and resource management theories is that it 
cannot be assumed that the restmcturing of rules and incentives that occurs with the 
transition from government to user management of public resources produces 
managerial responses that are in conformity with a unidimensional economic rationality 
and therefore bound to result in improved service provision. A broad variety of human 
rationalities exist, and therefore a much wider set of economic, political and cultural 
responses are possible outcomes of these policy transformations, as we have seen in the 
case of Irrigation Management Transfer. This theoretical implication is much more 
broadly applicable than to this particular case alone, as these ideas are very influential 
around the world in conceptualising resource allocation policies and practices. 
Although the influence of politics over resource allocation can be very detrimental, as we 
have seen, it is not an option to simply exclude it from our field of vision. A useful and 
obvious route to argue this is to substantiate the claim that resource allocation is 
politically contested. However, I choose to posit the idea that the relation between 
politics and resource allocation is reciprocal. Just as politics permeates conflicts and 
decisions over resource allocation, the canalisation and concentration of resources also 
lubricates 'the politics machine'. If we follow this machine metaphor, it does not suffice 
to analyse the mechanical workings of the politics machine, but an urge should be 
created to explore the untrodden territories of 'machine polities'. Similarly, our focus on 
the politics of water conflicts remains unsatisfactory if we do not also penetrate the 
surprising, given the cultural and ceremonial significance of alcohol, food and music in 
popular celebrations around Latin America. In many regions of Mexico, politics also 
appropriated specific elements of campaigning from Catholic folk festivals (Beezley et al, 
1994; Fallaw, 2003). 
In sum, the public display of leadership authority and the building of an electoral support 
base necessary to win elections occurs through engaging with a culturally specific 
register that is the product of a national and regional political history. Among other 
things, this often requires politicians to patronise festive encounters and rallies, celebrate 
complicities and the joining of forces, and organise collective enjoyment and the public 
dispensing of food and drink. With variations, this can be found in many other regions of 
Mexico. 
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possibilities of 'wet polities', mquiring into how different interconnected sets of resource 
flows lubricate and grease politics. These flows can serve as fuel for political machinery, 
or as the lifeblood of a political body, to use another metaphor for resource politics. 
Finally, motorised political mobility should persuade us to do away with static versions 
of state politics and awaken our interest in the spatial mobility of political action. 
I have looked at a particular case of resource politics, but I suppose that the approach I 
used can provide interesting insights into the co-evolvement of resource management 
and political regimes in other places. It has the potential to produce new, provoking 
ideas about the interaction of material and political culture. Allowing politics to re-enter 
the analysis of resource allocation has another great advantage, that is, it allows the 
normalisation of politics. This brings politics back into the discussion of everyday 
practices of resource distribution, not as an external determinant, but as something that 
is at the same time also being constituted by such contingent and heterogeneous 
practices. This involves moving away from a state-centred towards a more decentred 
focus on politics, which includes culture and everyday organisational and resource 
practices in the understanding of politics. 
It has not been my intention to argue that every form of water user organisation is 
bound to be perverted by politics, although the kind of politics looked at in this case 
appeared as particularly erosive to any kind of egalitarian, democratic or sustainable 
resource management. I do not mean to say that this form of politidsation of resource 
management is necessarily a generalised phenomenon in water users' associations in 
Mexico, but it is also certainly not an exceptional development. The exact extent of its 
occurrence needs to be established through other research. Without doubt, there are 
equally significant examples available of a more symbiotic relation between politics, user 
organisation and resource management. My analysis merely implies that, in looking at 
new forms of policy, organisation, or technologies of resource management, it is crucial 
also to consider the political use and implications of such forms of reordering. 
Notes 
1 His case study is presented by the main proponent of the success of the Mexican model, the ex-
CNA director Dr. González Villareal. See also Chapter 10. 
2 Regarding both references to Mosse, I have significantly revised his phrases to use them for my 
own purposes. The responsibility for the contents is mine. 
3 The CNC is one of the three major corporatist organisations incorporated in the dominant 
political party, PRI, and for a long time provided much of its political stability and control. At the state 
level, the CMC is superseded by the Liga de Comunidades Agrarias y Sindicatos Campesinos (League of 
Agrarian Communities and Peasant Unions). 
4 Complete name: Asociación Rural de Interés Colectivo de Productores de Tabaco Constituyente 'General 
Esteban Baca Calderón'. 
5 Eighteen deputies (MPs) represent their district in the State Congress in Tepic. 
6 See, for example, Grindle, 1977; Greenberg. 1970. 
7 ARIC was politically subjected to agreements between the federal and state government and the 
companies. Further, they depended economically on the companies, which were unwilling to pay 
higher prices. 
8 Land reform communities created after the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Before the revision of 
Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992, ejido land belonged to the state, with a combination of 
community (ejido) and private (ejidatorio) usufruct. Ejido members are called ejidatarios. 
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' For Perez' political group, 'the Left Bank' effectively means their self-proclaimed political 
constituency. This definition excludes the coastal fringe zone at the tail-end of the irrigation module, 
which belongs to the San Bias municipality, and a small fraction that belongs to the municipality of 
Tepic. The effect of this can be observed in the lack of maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure in the 
San Bias area and the fact that WUA delegates from San Bias feel that the Left Bank obviously excludes 
them (see Chapters 4, 7 and 8). The use of this spatial and political denomination is thus specifically 
used by this group to distinguish themselves from 'the Right Bank', the municipal capital of Santiago, 
and San Bias, and particularly from the competing political groups belonging to those places. It is also a 
way of positioning themselves vis-a-vis the state government and acquiring popular support among 
the population as the legitimate leadership of the Left Bank. People and politicians who live on the 
Santiago side of the river are not at all preoccupied with establishing their difference in relation to 
people from the other side of the river. In fact, people hardly ever identify themselves as originating 
from the Right Bank. Concluding, this type of spatial or territorial politics of belonging thus represents 
a very selective political strategy with clear inclusionary as well as exclusionary effects. 
1 0 When the decision was made, the political struggle ended for the time being. The official version 
read that the candidate was chosen lay consensus'. An implicit rule of the political game in the PRI was 
to accept failure, discipline followers and call for united support for the chosen contender. The implicit 
promise that there would be another chance was always left open. 
1 1 This of course does not preclude the possibility of his supporting one of the candidates outside of 
the public domain. Neither does it preclude the possibility that a negotiation between political groups 
at the state level may lie behind this election result. This was difficult to establish due to the closed 
nature of the state level PRI ranks. However, it can certainly not be the only explanation, because 
relations among different groups in the PRI were tense in view of the question of the governorship the 
following year. 
1 2 Nunez (and many other regional politicians) claimed government resources and demanded 
support programmes that would secure higher bean prices and benefit the many small-scale bean 
producers in the area. Because the former government parastatals were abolished, newly formed 
producer cooperatives were provided with a loan to collectively market the bean harvest and achieve 
higher prices. The PRI sought to win political support for the new PRI governorship with this action, 
and local politicians, such as Nunez, benefited from that by publicly emphasising their role in this 
scheme. 
1 3 The ejido assembly elects an executive committee, consisting of the following ejido 
commissioners: a president or comisariado ejidal, a secretary, and a treasurer. In addition, the assembly 
chooses a control committee. 
1 4 Each of the fifty-four ejidos is allowed to send its president, secretary, and treasurer of the ejido 
committee and the president of the control committee, which implies a total of 216 votes 
1 5 They serve as a vehicle for transmitting ideas of social and political protest or sexual misbehaviour 
(Beezleyetal.,1994). 
1 6 Something that is expressed in the saying "There is no such thing as a free lunch'. Nobel laureate 
Milton Friedman took this phrase to summarise the nature of all (economic) transactions as the title for 
a book (Friedman, 1975). 'What Friedman said was mat for every benefit there is an offsetting cost, and while 
mat cost may be temporarily imperceptible it exists indeed, and will eventually make itself known'. See 
www.greekshares.com/afford.asp. 
1 7 Notwithstanding this, I find them useful to follow the actions and positions of local producer or 
political leaders and their groups, the kind of discourses they engage in, and the image of the political 
leadership, connections and public authority that they want to project. 
1 8 See also Chapters 5 and 6. 
1 9 This practice is very similar to the way in which government cars, personnel and resources used to 
be and still are mobilised for PRI events. The difference is that, in this case, the transport is mobilised 
and financed from non-government resources diverted from a WUA. 
2 0 Public roads, village squares, sports fields, drainage and sewage systems are good examples of 
much-demanded public works. Heavy machinery is therefore at times a strategic political tool, which is 
subject to different political or electoral claims (see Chapter 7). 
2 1 This type of private job was not programmed and usually no receipts were given to the 
beneficiaries. The financial revenues generated by these operations were not reported in the books, and 
their allocation was completely non-transparent for observers or delegates. The association's 
accountant was a cousin of Perez and not hired for the purpose of critical oversight. 
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2 2 Most of the machinery was already rather obsolete and in need of repair; only a few items were 
new when the association started using them. The WUA employed machine operators, most of whom 
were not professionally trained but were close associates of Pérez. 
2 3 The rationale behind providing privileged access was never just financial, but was enmeshed with 
relations of friendship, commerce, and political support. 
2 4 It also corresponds with the specific cultural likings of many rural people on the Northern Coast of 
Nayarit for generous leaders who publicly share their wealth and sponsor the (embodied) alcoholic and 
gastronomic pleasures of the common people. This has to be understood in the context of 
heterogeneous factors such as relatively low levels of education among the population, late 
urbanisation, the political dominance of one party over a long period, the tropical dimate (as drinking 
men like to emphasise), the widespread tobacco cultivation causing a seasonal period of peak income, 
etc. The Northern Coast of Nayarit is an area with one of the highest beer consumption rates per capita 
in Mexico, comparable to Sinaloa. 
Photo 23 An ejidatario in the office about to pay his irrigation fee 
Photo 24 An assembly meeting from the back 
Photo 25 After the assembly 
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DRAMATIS PERSONAE: 
Nunez 
Guttíerez 
Blanco 
Ochoa 
Becerra 
Norberto 
Silvio 
Pérez 
Delegates 
Network of favoured producers 
Laguna 
Diego 
Rigoberto Ochoa 
president of the WUA 
manager of the WUA, Laguna's superior 
CNA unit head for the Left Bank 
CNA State Director of Nayarit: the supreme representative of the CNA in 
the state 
CNA district head and former head of operation 
treasurer WUA, ejido president Sauta 
secretary WUA 
former president of the WUA, local deputy and large producer and leader of a 
political group 
twenty-five representatives of ejidatarios and private producers in the general 
assembly of the WUA 
\arge producers with whom the WUA reaches financial agreements and who 
get privileged access to services 
canalero (see Chapter 5) 
canalero, Guttierez' cousin (see Chapter 6) 
governor (1993-1999), CTM leader 
PROPS: 
Irrigation fees 
Water in blocks 
PROCAMPO 
Financial agreements 
Financial contracts 
Aiianza para el Campo 
Fuel voucher 
Financial documentation 
Concession Title 
Maintenance machines 
Spare parts 
Crops 
AmadoNervo 
Irrigation infrastructure 
WUA office 
fees paid by individual farmers to the WUA for irrigation, maintenance, and 
administrative services 
WUA pays the CNA per received volume of water according to an annually 
determined volumetric water price 
Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo: Direct food crop subsidies based on 
plot size 
informal agreements with favoured producers to allow postponed fee payment 
in exchange for financial compensation 
formal agreements with tobacco companies to advance irrigation fees 
Alliance for the Countryside: federal support programme for the rural sector 
•voucher for a certain quantity of gasoline 
annual budgets/reports, monthly reports 
establishes the legal terms for the concession of the infrastructure by the 
government to the WUA 
machinery to carry out maintenance of irrigation works 
machine parts 
beans, tobacco, cereals, rice, etc. 
headworks of the Left Bank module, concrete diversion weir 
network of connected canals and drains of distinct levels 
in Villa Hidalgo 
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9.1 Introduction 
At the core of contemporary theories and policies on user organisations in natural 
resource management lies the idea of accountability. Two kinds of accountability 
relations are generally considered to be important for user organisations: on the one 
hand, the relation with a circumscribed community of resource users; on the other hand, 
the relation with a regulatory government authority. Although these normative ideas 
have become engrained in the formation, and effective in the dissernination, of 
government policies that organise irrigation, as demonstrated in the first part of this 
book, it is not always clear what relation they bear to actual organisational practices and 
behaviour. For that reason, this chapter investigates these two forms of accountability in 
the case of a Water Users' Association (WUA). I will start with the WUA's relation to the 
Comisión National del Agua (CNA: National Water Commission) as regulatory authority 
or final arbiter. At a later point in the chapter I will discuss the relation of the elected 
directive board and management of the WUA with the assembly of delegates, which 
represents the larger community of water users and is formally the WUA's highest 
decision-making authority. I explicate below my reason for focusing particularly on the 
financial management of the WUA. 
Since the early 1980s, advocates of neo-liberal irrigation reforms have proposed to solve 
the problem of the poor performance of large-scale and publicly managed irrigation 
systems through the introduction of quasi-market incentives into their management 
(Kloezen, 2002; Repetto, 1986; Uphoff et al., 1991). In line with these ideas, a major 
motivation behind the Mexican Irrigation Management Transfer (TMT) programme was 
the reduction of public expenditure on irrigation management by creating financially 
self-sufficient WUAs that would recover the full operating costs of irrigation systems 
(Espinosa de León and Trava-Manzanilla, 1992; Gorriz et al., 1995; Johnson, 1997a; 
Trava-Manzanilla, 1994). Two central concepts in this respect are financial autonomy 
and accountability. The expectation is that the substantial increases in irrigation service 
fees that water users pay after the transfer will enable the WUAs to achieve financial 
autonomy from the government. Because henceforward the WUA management is 
dependent on the water users' fees, it is forced to be accountable to users' needs, since 
only satisfied users will pay (Vermillion and Johnson, 1995). The literature also discusses 
the introduction of positive financial incentives such as performance bonuses and higher 
wages, which are expected to lead to improved individual performance of personnel 
(Johnson, 1995). 
Following the neo-liberal doctrine, resource management theories generally identify 
WUAs as the natural opposite of government institutions. It has become accepted 
wisdom that, on the one hand, public irrigation management is generally constrained by 
upward accountability, rent seeking, hierarchical structure, bureaucratic rules (Merrey, 
1995), and a lack of incentives to manage according to users' needs (Vermillion and 
Johnson, 1995). On the other hand, WUAs are blessed with a set of virtues that are a 
remarkable inversion of all of these aforementioned vices. Hence, they are represented 
as semi-autonomous service provision entities that are accountable to their user-clients, 
because they are dependent on their clients' demand for water and other services and 
their willingness to pay irrigation service fees according to market rates. WUAs are seen 
as co-operative institutions owned by their users, directed by representative assemblies 
elected by users, and financed through the fees paid for irngation services by users. The 
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staff is therefore doubly responsible to the membership through both electoral and 
financial channels and obliged to work well to satisfy the users. In other words, the staff 
is hired and directly controlled by the users themselves, and that stimulates a better 
quality of service provision (Kloezen, 2002). Unsatisfactory or rent-seeking staff 
members can lose their jobs through the mediation of delegates. Individual water users 
who try to free ride by withholding fees without a valid reason may be deprived of water 
(Moore, 1989)1. 
The theory postulates financial accountability in WUAs to work as follows: Firstly, the 
financial autonomy of WUAs and their dependency on the collection of user fees is 
expected to create a set of incentives that increases the amount of managerial effort that 
the WUA invests in improving the quantity and quality of operation and maintenance 
(O&M). Secondly, the WUAs' structure of rules allows for more flexible and responsive 
management that delivers more appropriate services. This generates more satisfied users 
willing to pay their fees, and thus improves fee collection. Thirdly, financial autonomy 
leads to cost-effective management, reducing unnecessary costs and improving revenue 
collection. Fourthly, WUAs will also effect greater water use efficiency, because their 
financial autonomy completely depends on this scarce resource (Oorthuizen, 2003). 
Fifthly, the introduction of a set of financial accounting and auditing measures and 
requirements is believed to improve the transparency of the WUAs' financial 
management to the users and the CNA. The use of computers, well-trained professional 
staff and external auditors has facilitated auditing. The WUAs' 'Concession Title' further 
requires and enables internal and external auditing on the basis of the submission of 
annual budgets and regular approval of expenditure accounts and O&M reports2. These 
interventions generate improvements in transparency that help WUAs to become 
financially accountable (Kloezen, 2002) and therefore manageable 'from a distance' by 
both the users and the CNA. 
In theory, electoral accountability functions in the following manner: Democratic 
electoral principles in the representative structure of WUAs make the management 
downwardly accountable to their users, unlike former government institutions. The users 
appoint delegates to represent their ejido3 or private producers' association in the WUAs' 
assembly. Their prerogative to elect and appoint allows them to replace managers or 
personnel when they do not perform satisfactorily. 
In contradiction of the theory, this chapter will illustrate that a WUA can operate as a 
body that is largely unresponsive and non-transparent to its user delegates as well as to 
the regulatory authority, CNA. This shows that formal, direct and isolated accountability 
relations between a service provider, water users, and a government authority do not 
work automatically. In this particular case of a WUA, several political, institutional and 
financial practices and processes subvert and mediate these supposed control 
mechanisms and therefore nullify the effectiveness of formal accountability relations. It 
follows that preconceived ideas about accountability are not useful for understanding the 
combinations of forces working in and on WUAs and their impact on managerial 
performance. 
The chapter continues as follows: Section 9.2 starts with the problematic practice of fee 
collection in the WUA and then introduces the actors, hierarchies and settings of the 
CNA and the WUA that are involved in the tatter's financial crisis. Section 9.S follows 
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with detailed accounts of two consecutive assembly meetings organised as a reaction to 
the deteriorating financial situation of the association, interjected with short explanatory 
comments. Then, in Section 9.4 the lack of accountability that emerges from the picture 
presented of the meetings is analysed within wider political, institutional and financial 
relations. I assess how different state, market and community institutions and 
mechanisms influence the practice of accountability in WUAs. Finally, I draw conclusions 
and emphasise the need to transcend conventional public-private and state-society 
dichotomies to understand actual organising practices of user organisations that manage 
public resources. 
9.2 Financial Accountability: The CNA and the WUA 
Fee collection and financial management 
When the government bureaucracy managed the irrigation district, fee collection was 
severely limited. The irrigation fees were kept at a low level and rarely adjusted for 
inflation or cost increases. Attempts to increase the fees, or improve the rates of 
collection, generally met fierce opposition from local political leaders (often Comité 
Municipal de Campesinos: Municipal Peasant Committee, CMC), who derived political 
support among their political clientele in the irrigation district, primarily the ejidatarios 
(see Chapter 8). In fact, the fees were usually the outcome of negotiated agreements 
between the district engineers and local ejido leaders (van der Zaag, 1992). On the Left 
Bank, the CMC president was a member of the District Committee and influenced the 
annual establishment of irrigation fees. At the end of the 1970s, the CMC president 
ritually pressured for the lowering of proposed fee increases to acquire political support 
among rural producers, something that benefited his election as municipal president. 
The District Head would give in to this pressure, as he started the ritual negotiations on 
purpose at a higher level in order to arrive at what he desired4. Nevertheless, the 
District's leeway for fee increases was thus limited because of political criteria (see also 
Chapter 3). 
Irrigating farmers were meant to pay their irrigation service fees at the government 
offices in FJ Tizate, but many farmers did not pay them. Meanwhile, the district did not 
put much effort into collecting them, because these funds were directly channelled to 
Hacienda (Ministry of Finance) in Mexico. The district was left unaffected by the low fee 
collection, because its budget depended not on it, but on other political and bureaucratic 
factors. Canaleros (people in charge of distributing water in the field) and district 
engineers sometimes benefited from this situation, because they received bribes from 
farmers who wanted access to water without paying the irrigation fee. 
After management transfer, the CNA district remains in control of the headworks and 
wholesales water 'in blocks' to the WUAs. The latter pay the CNA for the services it 
provides according to an annually determined volumetric water price that differs per 
module. Because the Left Bank module is a run-of-the-river system in which the 
diversion of water occurs by means of gravity, the CNA incurs low costs with the O&M 
of the headworks. Therefore, the Left Bank WUA pays by far the lowest water price of 
1.17 pesos per 1000 m3, whilst the other modules' water price is two to five times higher5. 
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Two other modules, the Right Bank of the River Santiago and Valle de Bandleras, are 
situated above the level of the river and therefore require a pump station to drive water 
into the main canal. As a result, the CNA incurs high electricity expenses, which it has to 
recoup from these modules. Because the federal subsidies on electricity were removed 
recently, there is more pressure on the producers to pay their fees and the modules to 
pay their debts to the CNA in order to cover the electricity bills. Otherwise there will 
simply not be any water, because the electricity will be cut off. On the Left Bank, water 
has never been that scarce and expensive. As a result, the producers and the WUA 
management have no experience with rationing water use. In the event of the Left Bank 
not paying its water debts to the CNA, as recorded below, the CNA has the legal 
possibility of cutting off the water to the whole system. Such cuts have never been 
maintained over a prolonged period however, presumably because of the enormous 
impact, political upheaval and legal problems that it would cause6. 
In recent years, the federal CNA in Mexico City increased its pressure to have districts 
completely finance their budgets, initially with the exception of salaries, from the 
payments made by WUAs for water. In response, the CNA district lowered its budget by 
cutting costs and increased the financial contributions of the WUAs, which was possible 
because of their improved fee collection. As a result, the district achieved a 100 per cent 
fee recovery rate in 1996-1997 for the first time, as the programmed CNA district 
expenses and the actual recovered revenues from the WUAs corresponded (see 
Appendix 7, Table 6, column 6) 7. Although this was an important achievement, in itself it 
did not guarantee the WUAs' self-sufficiency. It is interesting to note that the budget of 
the Left Bank WUA is twice as large as that of the CNA district, and it finances about a 
third of the tatter's. This distribution of financial power and the CNA's partial 
dependency on the Left Bank is clear-cut and, as we will see, this influences other 
political and institutional aspects of their relations (see Appendix 7, Table 6). 
The original policy objective for WUAs was to become self-sufficient by seasonally 
charging land and crop-based fees to individual farmers. This should generate enough 
revenues to cover not just an association's own expenses but also a share of the CNA 
district budget8. After the transfer, the irrigation fees per hectare of irrigated crop were 
raised significantly and a nunimal fee was introduced for land within the module that 
was not irrigated. Particularly after the 1992-1993 cycle, when one association was 
officially formed for the entire Left Bank module, the fees increased considerably (see 
Appendix 7, Table 6, column 2). However, after this initial fee increase, the fees and fee 
collection did not increase in proportion to inflation and the expenditure of the 
association. Perez, the then president of the association, prevented substantial fee 
increases, as he was afraid of losing political support in the ejidos that had elected him as 
deputy. Only this year (1997-1998) the fees were increased by thirty-three per ctent, and 
an incidental thirty-five peso levy per hectare was imposed for a special rehabilitation 
project and maintenance of the main irrigation infrastructure. Nunez, president of the 
Left Bank Water Users' Association, and the board had severe difficulties in having this 
increase accepted among the delegate assembly and ejido commissioners on the Left 
Bank'. Hence, in these financial matters, politics continues to play a role. 
During its first full productive year, 1993-1994, the WUA's self-sufficiency - actual fee 
collection over actual expenditure - significantly improved, and exceeded 100 jper cent 
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(see Appendix 7, Table 5). However, thereafter the self-sufficiency decreased, leading to 
negative annual balances in 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. During the latter year, self-
sufficiency recovered slightly from this negative trend, partly because of increased fee 
levels. The actual expense patterns of the association appear to be moving in the 
direction of the CNA guideline that WUAs should allocate sixty per cent of their budgets 
to maintenance, twenty-five per cent to operation and fifteen per cent to administration 
(Kloezen, 2002). The revenues paid to the CNA for managing the headworks, which are 
not part of this guideline, have decreased in relative terms over the years as a proportion 
of the overall budget. These financial data from official WUA and CNA reports should 
not, however, be taken as a transparent and absolute reflection of the financial status of 
the WUA. For example, the data reported on fee collection by the association do not 
always correspond with those of the CNA (see Appendix 7, Tables 1 and 2). In addition, 
several expenses and revenues are not reported in the books by the WUA management 
(see Chapters 7 and 8). Further, these essential self-sufficiency and fee recovery rates are 
not systematically reported in the WUA's annual reports. Both the data and the reports 
from which they stem hardly reflect the kind of financial crisis that took place during the 
main irrigation cycle of 1997-1998, with which this chapter deals. 
Hence, in spite of the optimistic expectations of the financial autonomy advocates, fee 
default continues to be a serious problem for the WUA. Farmers are supposed to pay 
their fees before they receive their first irrigation turn, and this is expected to ensure high 
fee collection rates flohnson, 1997a; Palacios Velez, 1997; Vermillion, 1997). 
Nevertheless, this formal rule formulated by the CNA in the by-laws of the WUA is not 
and has never been a generalised custom. Reasons for this that are mentioned among 
farmers are a lack of money, the idea that water (as a public good) should be provided 
free like before, the bribes that need to be paid to the canaleros and a lack of trust in the 
financial management of the WUA. Hence, the WUA continues to be confronted with 
the practical difficulties of refusing irrigation turns to defaulting water users". In 
addition, it does not have effective sanctions to discipline free riders that take their 
irrigation turns before paying their fees (see Chapter 5). 
As the theory predicts, the WUA's direct interest in fee collection motivated the 
management to increase its effort in relation to fee coEection, although not necessarily 
through the improvement of services (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Hence, the increased fee 
collection does not necessarily imply improved user satisfaction. In any case, the WUA 
management realised that remaining dependent on individual farmers to pay the 
increased irrigation fee would lead to a very erratic and insecure income flow, which 
would not be sufficient to finance the running costs of the association. However, they 
had other possibilities of increasing their revenues, thereby circumventing the 
(un)willingness of mdrvidual users to pay their fees and rendering user satisfaction 
inconsequential. Five types of financial shortcut mechanisms with government and 
market institutions and selected clients reduced their dependence on, and 'downward 
accountability' to, the larger mass of individual users. To start with, halfway through the 
1990s, the association's management negotiated two important financial agreements 
with government and market institutions that secured more than half of their annual fee 
coEection in the agricultural year 1997-1998". 
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Firstly, following the example of other WUAs in other states, the management of the 
association reached financial agreements with the state level of the Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture (SAGAR) and the multinational tobacco companies to overcome this 
problem. A special office of SAGAR administered an extensive crop subsidy programme 
Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo (PROCAMPO: Direct Agricultural Support 
Payments Programme), for basic food crops, such as beans, maize and sorghum, 
initiated by the Salinas adxninistration (1989-1994). The WUA negotiated a deal whereby 
farmers registered as water users could only receive this annual subsidy on presentation 
of a receipt from the WUA that confirmed their fee had been paid. The disbursement of 
the subsidies took place at the WUA office in Villa Hidalgo. A long line of ejidatarios had 
no option but to sign for the automatic deduction of the irrigation fee from their 
PROCAMPO subsidy. Otherwise, they could not receive the remainder of the money. 
Among them were many bean producers, who register as not irrigating (dairning to use 
residual moisture from the soil) but have to pay a minimal fee for maintenance and 
rehabilitation. Through this financial agreement with a public subsidy provider, the 
assodation effectively ensured fee payment from an important section of the waiter users, 
the PROCAMPO benefidaries, amounting to slightly more than a quarter of all the 
collected fees in 1997-1998. 
Secondly, another contrad was signed with the four multinational tobacco companies 
that are active in the region. The assodation followed the example of WUAs in other 
regions, which negotiated similar agreements with regionally important agro-industrial 
enterprises12. The tobacco companies agreed that they would advance the irrigation fees 
of their tobacco producers to the WUA and dedud these expenses before the final 
disbursement of these farmers' profits. For the WUA, this secures about a quarter of their 
annual fee collection. However, in order to effectuate this finandal shortcut and bank the 
revenues, the assodation needs to conned its own administration with that of the 
tobacco companies. To prevent legal problems, the companies will only transfer the 
irrigation fee for individual tobacco producers, who are organised in groups, when they 
receive a group leader's signature to confirm that they are receiving water. 
This linking occurs through a set of aclministrative procedures and operations that 
require detailed knowledge of the complicated field situation and the operational 
arrangements of people, land, water and technologies engaged in tobacco production 
and water distribution (see Chapter 5). The canalero plays an important part in this 
intensive task of intermediation between the two administrations and the field situation 
(see also van der Zaag, 1992). Hence, the canaleros, who work in the sections along the 
Santiago River where a lot of tobacco is grown, are crudal intermediaries for the 
management to access an important and relatively secure source of income. Collecting 
and handing in the signatures and administrative data takes them several months, 
during which time the assodation receives periodical payment as and when fees are 
colleded. The management pressures the canaleros to complete this task; the latter in 
turn complain about the many demanding tasks they have to fulfil. 
Although these finandal shortcuts provide a large portion of the revenues and have 
significantly improved fee collection, they are, for unknown reasons, not reported in the 
annual reports of the assodation. The fad that the management does not publidy refer 
to these agreements renders fee collection largely non-transparent to the user delegates. 
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The CNA district was instrumental in reaching the first agreement and is informed about 
the second agreement, but in ways other than through the WUA's financial reporting. 
Thirdly, as reported in Chapter 7, the management has access to an additional and 
strategic source of revenue through the leasing of maintenance machinery. The way in 
which this revenue is allocated is not very transparent for outside observers or delegates, 
as it is not programmed, reported or aciministrated per job and no receipts are given out 
to the beneficiaries. For these reasons, this source of revenue is available to Nunez' 
group to organise and finance other walks of life. 
Fourthly, the board reached agreements (convenios) with a number of larger producers of 
sorghum, rice and pasture, allowing them not to pay their fees until harvest time. The 
claim was that they were not able to pay their fees at the begirming of the season due to 
temporarily unfavourable circumstances. This aforementioned select group of politically 
and commercially favoured producers (see also Chapter 6) supported, both financially 
and politically, the group in control of the association. At a later date, it was established 
that the latter group received from these producers financial contributions that remained 
outside the association's accounting. As these agreements were reported neither in the 
financial reports nor in the assembly, they remained non-transparent and difficult to 
control. 
Fifthly, the association participated in the federal government programme for the rural 
sector Alianza para el Campo through which they received financial support for a number 
of essential rehabilitation works on the infrastructure executed during 1998. Because this 
programme works under the condition that fifty per cent of the expenses of the planned 
works have to be financed by the counterpart, the management financed this with a levy 
of thirty-five pesos per hectare on top of the irrigation fee. 
Because revenue sources and expenses are not always accurately reported in the annual 
financial reports of the association, I henceforth refrain from using its data as absolute 
facts about its financial status and use them rather as indicators of quantities and trends. 
This also implies that I think that the financial situation of the association is not 
transparent to user delegates and the CNA. 
The actors and the setting: The Assembly of Delegates and the CNA 
According to the association's organisation chart, the general assembly of delegates is its 
supreme body of authority13. Every three years it elects the three members of the 
directive board and the two members of the control committee from among its own 
members. It also has the faculty of removing board members. The general assembly 
consists of representatives from the twenty-four ejidos that lie within its command area 
and one representative of the association of private landholders. Ideally, a regular 
assembly meeting should be organised every month, in which the board renders account 
of their daily management decisions. Extraordinary assemblies are only convened for 
special matters. At the start of 1998, the last 'assembly', as people call the meeting, had 
been organised several months previously. The monthly frequency is never met because 
of the low attendance of delegates according to the manager, Guttierez. So the board 
only organises assemblies when very urgent matters come up, he tells me. Below, two 
Accountability in Times of Financial Crisis 253 
consecutive assemblies organised in April of 1998 are discussed. The first is a regular one 
convened by the board, and the second is an extraordinaiy assembly organised at the 
request of the CNA district. 
In the everyday management of the association, few delegates visit the office, as a 
consequence of which they are hardly involved or informed. An exception is Aldama, 
Nunez^ stand-in for the presidency, but he is employed as a maintenance worker (see 
Chapter 7). Of the ciirective board and control committee, the president Nunez is around 
most, followed by Perez, president of the control committee, and the treasurer, 
Norberto. In most cases the latter two do not stay for long because they are occupied 
with many other agricultural, organisational or political activities. The secretary, Silvio, 
only comes in occasionally. This indicated order in frequency of presence also reflects the 
extent to which each of them is involved in the association's management and informed 
about the decisions taken. 
Most of the delegates that do turn up to assemblies are confidants of the political group 
that controls the association and originate from ejidos in the political constituency of this 
group: the Left Bank of the municipality of Santiago. They also voted the current board 
into office. Conspicuously absent are most delegates from the municipality of San Bias, 
who voted against the board and are critical of the management and its bias in service 
provision that excludes their ejidos from particular services and privileges. This can be 
understood from an historical perspective on the formation of the association and the 
difference between the municipal and political constituencies (see Chapters 4 and 8). 
Although most delegates are not very well informed through the assemblies, they are 
aware of, or suspect, how things are managed in the association. Some may not find it 
problematic. Several others have their doubts. They have varied motivations for not 
voicing such opinions in public or when an assembly is held. Several delegates maintain 
friendship relations with Nunez and the board, sustained through small personal 
favours, occasional festive meals, and even compadrazgo (co-parenthood). This generates 
a sense of friendship, loyalty or complicity that forms a basis to connive with the board. 
Some owe their position to Perez or Nunez, or fear losing it through the influence that 
these politicians have on their ejido committee. Others fear the cacique (political boss) 
Perez, el licenciado14, as he is called. Awe, respect and admiration are accorded to him 
because of his university education as a lawyer, his political profile and relations with the 
governor and other politicians, and rumoured violent nature. Most delegates do not have 
the same degree of education and network of political friends and feel insecure about 
opposing him and his close associates. The few delegates who have tried to comment 
upon the actual course of business have desisted, realising the fruitlessness of their 
action. 
The Concession Title mentions the possibility of CNA officials attending the assemblies 
as external observers. The only CNA official who normally avails of this opportunity is 
the local CNA unit head, Blanco. He works under the CNA District Head in Tepic, but 
has his office on the Left Bank in FJ Tizate and supervises the association's activities as a 
kind of technical advisor. He mediates the administrative link and channels information 
between the CNA district and the association and needs to manage conflicting loyalties. 
At the association, Blanco assists in a number of administrative tasks that!the CNA 
requires it to fulfil, but for which the manager lacks the interest and takes no time, such 
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as for instance the programming and reporting of O&M activities. In exchange for these 
services, Guttierez now and then helps him out with fuel vouchers when he has 
exhausted his limited monthly fuel budget. This enables him to move from Santiago to 
Villa Hidalgo and around the entire Left Bank system. Sometimes Guttierez invites him 
to a drinking party. They are building up a friendship relationship. However, under 
pressure from his superior, cracks have started to appear in this relationship. Blanco 
sometimes dislikes his superior, the District Head, after being authoritatively ordered 
around, but he is also dependent on him, particularly because of the threat of being 
transferred to another irrigation module in Nayarit, away from his residence in Santiago. 
These different loyalties are further complicated because both men are his compadres." 
The District Head, Becerra, maintains more distant and accommodating relations with 
the association. He is critical of several aspects of its management but does not make this 
publicly known and claims that he cannot intervene at this moment, as these are matters 
for the delegates. As we have seen, the district is financially dependent upon the WUAs 
and shares an interest in acquiring subsidies and programme support from the federal 
government. In addition, Nunez and Guttierez, who, whenever he visits the association, 
tend to invite him to a copious meal with all the seafood specialities, music and drink 
that makes the coast such a pleasant place, usually treat the District Head with respect. 
However, the District Head's approach to the Left Bank Association has recently 
changed, motivating him to request an extraordinary assembly. At a meeting at the 
superior CNA level of the Alto Rio Llerma and Santiago Basin, where all District Heads 
in this region were gathered, CNA officials pointed out to him the poor financial 
performance and agricultural productivity in the Nayarit modules. Since then, he has 
clearly been concerned to improve the reports on the degree of self-sufficiency that are 
being sent to the CNA head quarters in Mexico City, because currently they suggest that 
the situation in the WUAs is slipping from his control. In addition, the financial crisis 
concerns him because he is more than ever financially dependent on the WUAs. The 
State Director of Nayarit, Dr. Ochoa, has worked in this function for about six years, but 
was never closely concerned with the association, leaving this completely to the District 
Head. He also must have received orders from higher bureaucratic levels motivating him 
to attend an assembly for the very first time. Both CNA officials have to be extremely 
careful about what they do. Because of their positions as deputy to state congress and 
CMC leader, their membership of the agricultural committee at the state level, and their 
relations with the governor and with the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Imtitucional: 
Institutional Revolutionary Party), Perez and Nunez can exert political pressure for their 
removal or transfer. 
The preceding episode: A financial crisis 
In March 1998, about a month after the association's president Nunez' electoral victory 
at the CMC in Santiago, the association's financial problems are mounting. In the 
preceding months, Nunez' group had materialised its control over the association and its 
resources in at least two ways: firstly, through the political campaign that enabled Nunez 
to occupy his new political office at the CMC; and secondly by physically constructing a 
new office for the association. As demonstrated in the preceding two chapters, this 
campaign involved the intensive political use of resources such as the maintenance 
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machinery, pick-ups and personnel. The buüding of the new office required the purchase 
of land and materials and the payment of contractors. Together, these two major projects 
have thus already completely drained the assodation's finandal resource base early in 
the season. As a consequence, it is not capable of paying its debts to the CNA in relation 
to the consumed 'water in blocks'. In response, the CNA distrid exerts pressure on the 
assodation to fulfil its finandal obligations, and the formerly relatively harmonious 
relations deteriorate. Subsequently, the assodation tries to solve its problems by 
requesting a loan from a local bank and increasing its pressure on the canaleros and the 
user delegates to improve the lagging fee collection. 
Aware of the assodation's financial situation, I ask canalero Laguna (see Chapter 5) 
whether they have yet been paid their salaries. He lets me know that this is not the case, 
and half-jokingly asks me to lend him some money. Laguna continues that this situation 
is very de-motivating, because he has to work hard, the users are constantly asking him 
for water at short notice, whilst he is not being paid. 'And on top of that, they blame you', 
pointing to the manager's office. He explains that they reproach him for not coUecting 
more fees, pushing users to pay their fees, whereas he is doing his best within the means 
at his disposal. When I ask him whether the situation will continue like this, he confirms 
that it will. He states that in former years the difficult period without salaries fell around 
June, July, August during the rainy season, after the main irrigation cyde when the 
tobacco, beans, cereals and vegetables had been harvested and before the new cyde 
would yield fee payment. But this year it is only March and they are already running out 
of money. Laguna whispers that this is the result of their political movements, the 
corruption and the money they put into their own pockets. They have spent all the 
money; it is bad administration, he condudes. 
A week later I witness an encounter between Guttiérez and Blanco, that further reflects 
the CNA district's finandal dependency on the assodation, the serious finandal crisis of 
the latter, and the resulting deteriorating relations between these two institutions. As a 
result, small cracks appear in Blanco's co-operation and friendship with Guttiérez. 
Recently, their difference in income has become a matter of dispute. Guttiérez ridicules 
Blanco's finandal and working conditions as a government worker. Being pressured by 
his superior, Blanco questions the extravagant life style of his compadre, the assodation's 
failure to pay its debts to the CNA, and implidtly its involvement with politics. When 
Blanco has finished the business he came to do, he notifies Guttiérez, who,is working 
behind his desk, that he is going to his office in FJ Tizate and asks him if he does not 
have some fuel money for him. With a dramatic gesture, Guttiérez seizes his wallet from 
his pocket and looks in it. He reports that he is out of money, because he used it up 
yesterday on oysters, a popular seafood at the coast. Then he asks Blanco if he does not 
have any money left for fuel. Blanco confirms this and adds that he has not yet received 
his two-weekly salary. In response to Guttiérez he also grabs his wallet and says that he 
will show him how little he earns. He cannot find the paper but states that he earns 800 
pesos per two weeks. 'Eight hundred pesos per week, Guttiérez corrects him, himself 
earning around two to three times as much. When he turns out to be wrong, he seems 
slightly surprised, but it does not change his attitude. He replies that his salary has not 
yet been paid either. He laughs, visibly enjoying his sense of control. Whillst he starts 
another conversation with somebody else, Blanco again asks (begs?) him for twenty 
pesos, and adds 'hermano' (brother) to his request. At that moment canalero Diego 
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enters and asks in Blanco's presence for petrol money. Guttiérez immediately calls the 
secretary and instructs her to give Diego Ihirty pesos. 'And for me...?', Blanco hazards. 
Guttiérez makes no effort to respond. Diego goes off, whilst a male and female ejidatario 
enter the office and claim Guttiérez' attention. Blanco remains standing in the corner for 
a while and then bestirs himself and walks out without saying goodbye to anybody. The 
scene expresses not only their personal difference in economic standing and a 
humiliating demonstration of difference in power and in control over resources, but also 
a growing institutional rift between the CNA and the association. 
Later that day, two representatives from the bank, BANRURAL,16 visit the association's 
office. For several hours they compile an inventory of the association's assets and 
liabilities, which will serve as collateral for the loan it requested from the bank because of 
its financial situation. They are asking Guttiérez questions about the nature of the 
requested loan of 250,000 pesos. He explains that at that moment they have a debt to the 
CNA of 52,000 pesos, the cost of several months of water let into the system by the CNA 
at the diversion dam. As for the rest, he has to settle a debt of 80,000 pesos17 before he 
can pay the CNA. One of the bankers asks for an explanation of the irrigation fees and 
the amount of collective user debt of 180,000 pesos due to the association. Guttiérez 
explains that not all the fees will be paid, but that they have the advantage of the deals 
with PROCAMPO and the tobacco companies to secure the payment of that share of the 
fees. He indicates that he wants to explore the possibilities of a financial arrangement via 
BANRURAL, where the irrigation fees would automatically be deducted from the 
PROCAMPO subsidies and transferred to the association, without the intervention of 
the users, as already happens in some districts in the North. 
The bankers mquire why Guttiérez intends to repay the loan over a ten-month period. 
He explains that during the corning months and in the intermediate irrigation cycle there 
will be relatively few hectares sown. Therefore they expect few revenues and these are 
needed for the running expenses and to pay earlier debts. The high revenue period runs 
from September to December, when the main irrigation cycle commences. The bankers 
leave with a complete file of the association's concessions, signed documents, bank 
statements, etc. They also ask for proof of other outstanding debts, but accept Guttiérez' 
word that those are not available. 
Again a week later I am present when the CNA District Head of Maintenance from Tepic 
discusses with Guttiérez where to find a spare part for the broken down motor grader. 
After he leaves, I ask Guttiérez why this man was here. He responds that he came to 
collect the debt that the association has with the CNA district. Guttiérez agreed with him 
to pay 15,000 pesos this week and the rest next week. The CNA's increasing pressure for 
the repayment of the debt prevents the association from paying out any salaries, in spite 
of the approaching Easter holidays. 
Guttiérez explains that it was the Head of Maintenance that came, because of internal 
reorganisations in the CNA. He continues that the government wants to remove all the 
posts that do not really deliver. For example, Salinas sold or abolished all parastatals, 
whilst he, Guttiérez, was working to his heart's content with the parastatal Fertimex. He 
relaxes by leaning backwards in his chair, folding his arms behind his neck, and looking 
at the ceiling. I had a pick-up, he recalls with a smile, and I only drove from here to 
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there, and slept in the best hotels. But to this beautiful period came an end, he sighs 
regretfully. 
That the manager's current existence is ever more stressful nowadays is clear from the 
following account of a delegate assembly. My concern is to highlight the manner in 
which the managerial group of the association presents and aims to resolve its financial 
crisis. I am interested in the way it is explained and where the responsibility for its 
occurrence is placed. Further, I will draw attention to the way in which the board is not 
accountable to the delegates in the authorisation of its essential financial decisions. 
9.3 Two Consecutive Delegate Assemblies 
A regular assembly 
On 8 April 1998, I arrive at the association early in the morning because the first 
assembly since my arrival is to be held and I would not want to miss a thing. Guttiérez' 
office is closed, whilst he is involved in an intensive confidential conversation with 
Nunez about the coming assembly. So, I continue to the courtyard where the canaleros 
have arranged chairs for the assembly. They have already been waiting some time for 
Guttiérez who has summoned them to the office, so I talk with them for a while. They 
tell me that they have been redistributed over the module's thirteen sections, due to the 
dismissal of two of their colleagues. One of them was fired recently, because of 
accusations of anomalies in his work, which means that he received bribes from users to 
deliver water. The canalero did not deny to other canaleros that he had accepted bribes 
as more of them do, but he was also most outspoken in his criticism of the board, and 
this, they believed, triggered his dismissal. The other canalero was sent home only 
temporarily until the next irrigation cycle, just like the technician and some other staff, 
because of the seasonal low in revenues. 
The set-up for the assembly is as follows: The board members are seated behind a long 
wooden counter, carried over from a store by the canaleros, who also put up rows of 
chairs for the delegates facing the counter. Just before ten o'clock, the appointed time for 
meeting, Guttiérez irritably comes rushing out of his office and sits behind the counter, 
whilst the five canaleros dash towards the first two rows of chairs. Guttiérez apologises 
for being late. From the back, the scene is reminiscent of a boys' school classroom. 
Diego, in the first row, neat parting in his hair, sits straight and nods now and then to 
confirm the words of his cousin, whilst some of the others demonstrate their reservations 
by their disinterested position on their chairs. Guttiérez commences by stating that they 
do not have the money to pay their next salaries. He appeals for the canaleros' assistance 
in ensuring payment of all unpaid amounts due in respect of irrigation. The secretary is 
printing out a list of debtors per section, with which they will have to work. There are 
many, according to Guttiérez; particularly the larger areas of thirty to forty hectares 
planted with rice will have to be paid for, he urges them. He reminds them that the 
association did its best to pay their last salary and in exchange he expects their co-
operation. Especially now that there are only five canaleros, they need to increase their 
effort. He instructs them not to give any more water to debtors and to remove the intake 
pipe of a sprinkler pump if they are irrigating anyway (see Chapter 5). The canaleros 
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mumble some affirmative remarks. Guttiérez then distributes the lists with some 
specifications about them, after which he walks back to the office. 
Most canaleros walk to their motorcycles and depart. I accompany Laguna, who 
confirms that a considerable number of water users have not paid their fees yet. 
However, he thinks it is not so easy to remove an intake pipe or cut the water when 
somebody is irrigating. Often users get very aggressive when a canalero tries to do that. 
That is why he warns those who do not pay that they should go to the office to do so. If 
they persist, then it is their responsibility. I ask him what happens if they continue 
nonetheless to use water. Laguna claims that he reports this to the office, so that the 
management has to resolve it. To really cut the water they should mobilise the 
authorities, for example the Hydraulic Police in Tepic. However, this has not occurred for 
a long time. It is his opinion that in the end the management itself is to blame for the 
fact that users do not pay their fees. Another canalero at a later point in time makes a 
similar comment. He thinks the management itself is guilty for allowing and trusting the 
users to irrigate at the beginrting of the season, with the promise that they will pay later. 
The canaleros are not to blame when they subsequently do not pay. As a result, users 
laugh at them when they press them to. 
The delegates very slowly come trickling in, although it is past ten o'clock. Blanco also 
arrives. Small groups stand in a shady part of the courtyard talking to each other. There 
is concern about whether sufficient delegates are present to hold the assembly. Nunez 
greets and speaks with some of them for a while. Then he takes his seat in the centre 
behind the counter. Guttiérez sits right next to him, with the secretary of the board to 
the far left. Only after Nunez starts to talk does the treasurer, Norberto, take his place to 
his right. The delegates who keep arriving have also taken their seats. Blanco and I sit at 
the back, whilst the canaleros stand around and listen. 
Nunez observes that it has been a long time since the last assembly was organised, and 
explains this in terms of having been very busy. He mentions that Perez is also aware of 
the meeting and that he will surely arrive soon, but he never does. Nunez says that he is 
aware that the delegates have problems in their ejidos and that they have remarks to 
make. In this meeting their wishes will be met. He does not come back to this later. The 
secretary is given the opportunity to read out the list of twenty-four delegates to check 
the attendance. In total he counts thirteen delegates. Nunez concludes that they have a 
legal quorum (half of the total +1) and that they can continue with the assembly. He 
reads the agenda for the meeting, to which he does not strictly adhere. 
Guttiérez starts off by welcoming all delegates to the association's new building and 
reminds them of the fact that this will be the first assembly here. He is pleased that 
finally they now have their own building and do not have to pay rent any longer, like in 
the old place. Nunez complements Guttiérez by addressing the delegates 'the whole 
construction cost a lot of money, but I think that you agree with the fact that we now have our 
own place'. 
Meanwhile, Guttiérez distributes an overview of the association's expenses and a 
monthly irrigation progress report up to and including March. Subsequently, he gets the 
opportunity to comment upon the progress of irrigated and sowed surfaces in relation to 
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the annual irrigation programme. He presents the programmed and actual irrigated 
areas for the total irrigation year (1997-1998): approximately respectively 19,000 hectares 
and 12,000 hectares (sixty-three per cent); and for the main irrigation cycle (autumn-
winter): respectively 16,000 and 8,500 hectares (fifty-three per cent)1 8. Guttiérez reminds 
the delegates that they should not forget that they programmed so many hectares, much 
more than usually realised, in order to pay the same relatively low water price per 
volume to the CNA as last year (1.17 pesos/m3). 
Guttiérez explains that the fee collection lagged behind because of the unusual rains of 
the previous December and January, in connection with El Nino. The irrigation of beans, 
in particular, for which one or two irrigation turns usually suffices, is much less than 
other years19. Another thing is that the irrigated area under rice is decreasing every year, 
because of problems with weeds and decreasing prices (see Chapter 6). As a result, the 
much less than expected irrigation negatively affects the fee collection. Guttiérez 
expresses the hope that intermediate crops (sowed between the two cycles), the 
perennial crops and the crops of the spring-summer cycle (during the rainy season) will 
recover part of this backlog. 
The treasurer is called upon to report on the financial situation. He takes the sheet with 
the monthly financial reports that Guttiérez has just distributed among the delegates and 
systematically enumerates all the items and the totals (see Appendix 7, Table 7). 
According to the programme, around 2,700,000 pesos need to be collected in the 1997-
1998 cycle. To date 1,400,000 pesos have been collected. This means a fee recovery rate 
of fifty-two per cent, but this is not mentioned on the paper. The missing fees have not 
been collected yet. He continues to summarise recent data on water consumption and 
required payment to the CNA. 
- Total water consumption (m3) : 131,000 
- Required payment to the CNA (pesos) : 150,000 
- Actual payment (pesos) : 100,000 
- Debt to the CNA (pesos) : 50,000 
The treasurer limits himself to reading all the figures; this does not evoke any response 
from the delegates. Nunez concludes for him that the association is behind with its 
payments to the CNA. He finds this worrisome, as they should not fall into the bad habit 
of red numbers. He calls on the help of the delegates to improve the fee collection, 
because he thinks that fee default is also their responsibility. A delegate confirms that it 
is indeed also their responsibility, but that they have not been able to do much so far. In 
former years, the list they received of fee defaulters in their ejido enabled them to do 
something. Nunez is quick to respond that those lists are ready right now and that they 
will be distributed among the delegates after the meeting. 
A delegate from the Villa Hidalgo ejido opines that canaleros have to be more vigilant in 
correctly registering the areas irrigated and indicating the producers who have not paid 
their fees. They should also ensure that these producers pay. Nunez supports this attack 
on the canaleros and publicly addresses Guttiérez about this. The secretary stands up 
and expresses the view that those canaleros who do not do their job should be changed. 
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The treasurer's presentation of the association's expenditures to date reveals that these 
have exceeded total revenues, but he prefers to emphasise that actual expenditure 
generally lags behind programmed expenditure. Nunez intervenes, saying that they have 
taken administrative measures to curtail expenditures. For example, the ejidos that 
request machinery for their works now have to pay for the cost of their operation -
including the salaries of the operator; and the staff of the association has been reduced. 
In reaction, the aforementioned delegate from Villa Hidalgo congratulates the board on 
the measures they have taken to reduce personnel and expenditure. Nunez continues to 
explain that there were a number of unforeseen expenditures that were not incorporated 
in the original budget and for which they did not ask permission from the majority of 
delegates. He mentions the newly constructed building and the 50,000 pesos lent by the 
bank to purchase the ground. 
Nunez now informs the delegates that they have requested a loan of 250,000 pesos from 
BANRURAL and that the bank has already approved it. He argues that it is important for 
the assembly to approve this loan. "The word is yours', he says, after which he continues 
to explain that, with the increased problems with weeds in rice and the low prices, it is 
likely that a smaller area will be irrigated and fewer fees collected. The loan is therefore 
very necessary to prevent financial problems and to continue the operation and 
maintenance activities. He concludes by observing 'I believe you agree with this loan'. In 
response, the secretary emphasises the need to continue with the development of the 
administration. One delegate warns the board about the risk of the association's current 
financial performance. He remains a sole voice, as his concern is not taken up by others. 
Under the last item of the meeting, a canalero asks for support for the construction of a 
road near Villa Hidalgo. Nunez does not grant him this, but refers him to the governor to 
request support and to the treasurer who has some recent experience with similar road 
construction. A little later the treasurer makes a sudden interjection, saying that the 
operators of the machinery should make better use of it. This would reduce repairs and 
expenses. 
At the end of the meeting, Guttiérez distributes printed lists of fee defaulters per ejido to 
the delegates and calls on them to discuss this list at the upcoming ejido assembly and 
help the association to improve its financial situation. 
When the meeting is over, Nunez waits a little while until the two to three slightly 
critical elements have left and then invites the remaining nine delegates and the board 
members, plus the CNA unit head, for a copious lunch in a nearby restaurant. Nunez 
uses this pleasant occasion to re-confirm his relations with the better-disposed 
delegates. A pleasant conversation ensues that touches upon the price of sorghum and 
recent political developments in the state, leaving managerial issues to one side. 
Comments 
What is striking in this meeting is the way in which the managerial group explains the 
financial crisis. The major causes of the association's mounting expenditures are not 
discussed: the presidents political campaign, the use of the machinery and the building 
of a new office. Instead, the manager and president understandably choose to focus on 
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the cusappointing fee collection and conveniently disregard their own role in this. Their 
explanation narrows the set of causes down to external problems, such as climatic 
phenomena and agro-ecological production difficulties, and to the insufficient efforts of 
the canaleros and the delegates to collect fees. 
The management proposes to counter this financial crisis through a selective number of 
solutions: 
- Permanent and temporary personnel reductions to cut costs 
- Increased pressure on the canaleros to increase the fee-collection effort 
- The mobilisation of the delegates to improve fee collection 
- A loan to counter the most immediate lack of funds. 
The fact that some delegates approve the dismissal of a rent-seeking canalero can be 
interpreted as sign of accountability of the staff to the delegates (Kloezen, 2002: 149-
151). However, when rent seeking is understood as a broader phenomenon not limited 
to lower level personnel and not necessarily merely economically motivated, it is also a 
good way for the management to cut costs, discharge critical elements, and control staff. 
In his motivational talk to the canaleros, the manager basically attributes the financial 
crisis to their lack of effort to collect fees, and therefore the failure to pay their salary is 
presented as their own problem. The canaleros are expected not to object to such a 
presentation of affairs. On the optimistic assumption that satisfied users pay their fees, 
one may expect that this motivational talk will cause canaleros to increase their effort 
and to do their work better, which would then result in higher fee payment. To some 
extent the latter may occur, but such an interpretation does not acknowledge the 
problem that canaleros face in trying to exclude free riders, not least because of the 
informal agreements that the management has made with select groups of farmers. 
Instead of the delegates making the managerial group accountable for their financial 
decisions, it is the other way around. The delegates are made accountable by the 
management for their lack of effort to collect fees in their ejidos. Just as with the 
canaleros, lists of fee defaulters are passed around to facilitate this activity. 
The idea that the management is hardly accountable to the delegates is strengthened by 
the fact that no assemblies were held to consult the delegates in a period when the 
management took comprehensive financial decisions, such as the political campaign, the 
expensive, intensive and destructive use of the machinery, its use outside the module, 
the construction of a new office and the request for a loan. These decisions are not the 
subject of discussion; they are presented as unforeseen expenditures or 'approved' by the 
president in the name of the delegates. This distribution of power and a sense of 
complicity or loyally are sealed with a convivial meal that rounds off the meeting. 
The following episode of this financial drama recounts an extraordinary assembly in 
which the CNA tries to make the association accountable for its financial operations. 
Nevertheless, it fails to address the underlying political causes of the crisis and to 
motivate the delegates to speak up and take control over decisions in the association. 
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An extraordinary assembly 
Preamble 
Three weeks later, an extraordinary assembly is organised, this time on the initiative of 
the CNA. It is rumoured that Ochoa, the State Director of the CNA, will come, but 
nobody is informed about which topic he wants to address on this exceptional visit. The 
CNA unit head is extremely nervous about this senior boss coming to his area. Guttierez 
takes it in a more relaxed manner. Blanco asks him why Nunez has not arrived yet and 
why the delegates were not asked to arrive earlier, so that at least they would be on time. 
He mentions that Ochoa is a very difficult person who will arrive on time and will want 
to start right away. 
Suddenly, a convoy of several new and large CNA pick-ups comes to a standstill in front 
of the office of the association. Ochoa and Becerra arrive with an entourage of CNA 
officials in their slipstream. They enter the office and vigorously start shaking hands with 
the manager, the office staff and the delegates. Nunez phones a little later and promises 
to be here in ten minutes. Guttierez asks Ochoa for permission to wait for him, but, as 
after fifteen minutes Nunez has not arrived, Guttierez decides to start the meeting 
without him. He gestures to the delegates to sit down and takes a seat in front of the 
audience at the left end of the counter. He welcomes Ochoa, who is seated in the centre 
of the counter and calls on him to speak. On either side of Ochoa sit the secretary and 
the treasurer of the association. Becerra sits strikingly quietly in the right corner. In 
contrast to other occasions he hardly intervenes during the meeting. Instead, he prefers 
to listen submissively to the words of his superior, as if he has been severely 
reprimanded. I count around eleven delegates, and later two or three more, but this time 
the procedure of establishing a quorum is skipped, to move on to more urgent matters. 
The canaleros, who are standing at the back, after some time silently take responsibility 
for distributing soft drinks among the attendees. 
The State Director of the CNA speaks 
With a powerful voice and authority, Ochoa delivers an oration for almost half an hour. 
The one-sided flow of words is interrupted just once. He starts to tell the delegates that 
he wants to exchange thoughts with them about the association's administrative 
situation. The District Head, Becerra, had asked him to speak with the board about this. 
His reaction was that he would want to speak with everybody, mducling the delegates. It 
is his opinion that the assodation was not just the board, but also the delegates. This is 
important to him, he emphasises. The delegates represent the users from different ejidos 
and in their name they have to take decisions and express their opinions about how the 
assodation should function. 
In Nayarit there is only one irrigation distrid consisting of four modules, Ochoa explains 
to the delegates. In Valle de Banderas, in spite of a water shortage, the WUA is 
performing well administratively. In other parts of the distrid there are also problems 
with water availability, but they find themselves in a better state than here. The Left 
Bank is by far the largest part of the distrid, but despite a surplus of water 'we are doing 
poorh/. The first point he wants to discuss is that the assodation is behind in its payment 
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to the CNA for the used 'water in blocks', in the amount of 60,000 pesos20. He claims that 
Valle de Banderas always pays its debts on time. Ochoa rhetorically asks how it is 
possible that a module under these favourable conditions has such a low percentage of 
fee collection, namely just forty-five per cent. Ochoa draws a comparison with Sinaloa 
and Sonora, where he worked before, and where fee collections of around ntaety-five 
per cent are reached. 
According to the law, it is compulsory for the user to pay his fees. If this does not 
happen, the CNA has the power to cut off the water until the association pays. Ochoa 
argues that fee collection is everybody's responsibility the board, the manager... 
Meaningfully he states that 'friendship is one thing, but commitments (compromisos) are 
another'. These should not be confused. He goes on to make it clear, however, that it is 
also the delegates' responsibility. They also have the right to be involved in decision 
making. They have elected Nunez, but they can also correct him. If they think that the 
manager is not performing well, they have the capacity to remove him; or if they want 
the board to change certain things in the administration, they can give voice to this. But 
rights, Ochoa declares, also entail responsibilities. It is the duty of a delegate to ensure 
that the users in his ejido pay the fees. The responsibility should be very personal, as if 
the delegate would otherwise have to pay the fees himself. 
The State Director continues with a penetrating voice and an expression of concern on 
his face to discuss another point of attention: the machines. He tells the delegates that 
according to his information several machines have not been used for a very long time 
and that as a result they are behind programme. He questions how it is possible that the 
machines are left unrepaired for such a long period. If it is due to lack of money, then 
they have not done enough on fee recovery. Ochoa acknowledges that the transferred 
machinery was old and in poor shape in large part, but this was because there was 
nothing else available. Therefore it is the responsibility of the board and the manager to 
manage the machinery well and appoint skilled staff. Friendship cannot be a reason for 
employing somebody, he suggests. 
Ochoa warns the delegates that if the machines are not in use and not meeting their 
targets the CNA could decide to take them away and deploy them somewhere else. This 
should be prevented. In Mexico City they can also see from the reports that machines are 
left unused. He runs through a list of machines that have broken down or are left 
unused: the backhoe loader, the motor grader, a tractor, etc. Further, he mentions that 
he has received information that the ckagline is presently working on the Right Bank, 
which is not the idea for the machines, when the Left Bank programme has not been 
finished yet. It is suggested that the delegates go to Valle de Banderas to see the 
maintenance situation there. Ochoa explains a few things about the module and how, 
despite difficult circumstances, they were able to improve ... 
Then suddenly Nunez comes bursting in. When he enters, he crudely interrupts Ochoa's 
oration and politely calls 'good afternoon' to the delegates. Several delegates return his 
greetings. Whilst Nunez passes through the rows of chairs, the other board members 
anticipate his corning by changing seats, so that he can take a seat next to Ochoa at the 
centre of the counter. As a consequence, the District Head is forced further into the right 
corner, almost pressed up against the wall. 
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When the dust from this long-expected arrival has settled, Ochoa regains the audience's 
attention. He summarises for Nunez what he has been telling the delegates about his 
worries with regard to the administration of the association, about the low fee recovery 
and the diversion of the machinery. Another point that he wants to discuss is that the 
governor has indicated that he wants to make a tour (recorrido) of the four irrigation 
systems in Nayarit. His intention is not to speak to the delegates but to visit the 
countryside (el campo). Ochoa recalls a most embarrassing moment not too long before 
when the governor on a tour in San Pedro pointed an overgrown canal out to him and 
emphasised how unpleasant this was for him. He wants to prevent this from happening 
again. He informed the San Pedro WUA and they cleaned the canal and told him that 
now he could send the governor around. 
Towards the end of his oration Ochoa makes a number of smaller observations - for 
example, that the association is several months behind in its maintenance, operation and 
aclministration reports to the CNA. He reminds the people that reporting is an obligation 
and that it is important to do this on time, because the CNA has to send them through 
to Mexico City. Further, he praises the opportunities presented in the government 
programme Alianza para el Campo, which is insufficiently used in his opinion. 
To round off, Ochoa returns to his observations regarding the responsibilities of the 
delegates. He states that an assembly should be organised every month, so that the 
delegates are well informed to take decisions. It is his intention to visit these monthly 
meetings. At the end of his monologue he acknowledges that his observations have 
perhaps been hard, but that he wants them to be clear. It is possible that he is wrong 
and, if that is so, this should be said to him. Finally, he invites the delegates to express 
their views. 
Comments 
The CNA State Director comes to deliver a message to the board and the delegates. 
Although he claims to have the intention of exchanging thoughts with the delegates, his 
interventions are structured in the form of a monologue. His uni-directional flow of 
words is interrupted only once by Nunez, who wants to show he is not impressed by 
Ochoa's demonstration of authority and joins him in the driving seat of the meeting. 
Ochoa indicates several concerns. His principal message is a warning that the association 
needs to fulfil its financial obligations to the CNA, or otherwise the CNA has the power 
to sanction them for not complying. By contrasting the favourable conditions but poor 
results of the Left Bank with other modules that perform better according to him in 
terms of fee collection, he indicates that paying its debts to the CNA is really the most 
minimal requirement that the WUA needs to fulfil. A second point that Ochoa discusses 
is the poor condition and use of the machinery leading to a backlog in maintenance, 
which he also claims to be able to penalise by taking the machinery away from the 
association. A third problem is the delay in the association's reporting. Finally, Ochoa 
demands a monthly assembly meeting, which he intends to visit. 
Although the message is clear, it is not entirely straightforward. In spite of the absence of 
deputy Perez, who is engaged in his campaign for mayor and of whom the CNA officials 
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have most to fear politically, Ochoa does not directly criticise the board or make it 
accountable for its decisions. Publicly opposing political candidates of the government 
party, the PRI, could lead to open confrontation, something that is politically veiy risky 
and thus unfeasible for the CNA officials. The board could appeal to political 
mechanisms in the state government beyond the control of the CNA. Although he 
appears to be aware of the underlying political causes of the financial problems, he only 
hints at them in his remarks about friendships and agreements. Rather, Ochoa 
cautiously attempts to mobilise the delegates by informing them about their rights and 
responsibilities and telling them to take seriously their personal duty to participate 
actively in the assemblies and to assist in fee collection. 
Ochoa makes it clear to which institutions he feels accountable as CNA director: the 
federal CNA in Mexico City and the governor of Nayarit. His circumspect approach to 
the board of the WUA anticipates the contrasting expectations from these different 
political levels and government institutions. Yet, the immediate pressures that have 
motivated him to undertake this unusual mission are open to speculation. 
Nunez and Guttiérez' response 
In a routine manner, Nunez takes the initiative to respond. He apologises and provides 
an excuse for being late. His welcome to Ochoa is courteous, according to a common 
Mexican formula, letting him know that the new offices also belong to him ('también es 
tuya!). Nuñez also thanks him for his observations, which he qualifies as firm but useful. 
In his response, Nuñez follows Ochoa's points of critique that he has written on a paper 
nameplate. In relation to fee collection he acknowledges that it has lagged behind. 
However, he reports that, because of the unexpected recent rains (unlike most other 
years), fewer producers have decided to irrigate their beans and therefore more of them 
pay only a rninimal fee. Others registered at the time of PROCAMPO reimbursement for 
a minimal fee, yet later they did plant a crop and started to irrigate without paying the 
rest. The fact that many fees have not been paid is the fault of the canaleros, Nunez 
opines. They should take care that the fees are paid or otherwise users should not get 
water. It has reached the point that five consecutive salary periods could not be paid, but 
that is the canaleros' fault. 
About the machinery, Nunez states that several came to a standstill because it was 
difficult to get spare parts. One machine that they received after the transfer is probably 
the only one of its kind in Mexico, and therefore it is very difficult to acquire parts for it. 
The motor grader broke down after being lent out as part of a CNA-organised exchange 
programme for machinery among the irrigation modules in Nayarit. They contacted 
companies as far away as Canada to obtain a certain part, which delayed the repair. 
About the dragline that is working on the Right Bank, he tells the delegates that it had 
broken down some time previously and there was no money to repair it. They needed 
the machine on the Right Bank, so the deal was the association would lend it out in 
exchange for the Right Bank water association repairing it. Nuñez continues that given 
the lack of repair funds they requested a loan of 250,000 pesos at BANRURAL. This loan 
was approved at the last assembly meeting. 
266 The Success of a Policy Model 
Immediately after Nuñez has finished, Guttiérez follows. The beginning of his argument 
is basically an extensive repetition of what his superior has said. Then he adds three new 
things. Firstly, he mentions that the association has reached agreements with several 
sorghum and rice producers, who could not pay their fee at this moment. They promise 
to pay their fees at harvest time. Secondly, the assembly was informed at its last meeting 
about the fee collection lagging behind. He uses Blanco's presence to increase the power 
of his words. Every delegate was given a list of fee defaulters, but unfortunately this has 
not led to their payment yet. Thirdly, the dragline is working on the Right Bank because 
the tobacco companies made an urgent request for help as more than 100 hectares of 
tobacco was drying out. He defends the decision to send the machine, although he 
admits that in principle they are not obliged to send machinery. 
When Guttiérez is finished, Ochoa again invites the delegates to make comments, but 
Guttiérez resumes and states that it is a good Ihing that delegates make comments. He 
continues to talk for several minutes, for example about his expectation that in the 
coming (rainy season) cycle there will not be so much rice planted as preceding years, 
because of a problem with weeds (see Chapter 6). Then the treasurer invites the 
delegates to tell the meeting without hesitation what people are saying in the streets. 
Comments 
Much as in the last assembly, the president and the manager of the association devolve 
direct responsibility for the financial crisis upon the canaleros, and shift attention 
towards the role of the delegates and external causes for the lack of fee recovery. The last 
assembly is now presented as an occasion where the delegates were informed about 
these problems and then approved a number of decisions, such as the loan and solutions 
to counter low fee collection, which suggests a shared responsibility and accountability 
between the board and the delegates. Consciously or not, both the president and the 
manager follow a discursive strategy to talk as much as possible and display confidence 
in their decisions to the delegates. This has the result of their recovering the urinative in 
the meeting and leaves little space for the delegates who would like to take up the State 
Director's invitation to speak. Although Nuñez and Guttiérez largely succeed in 
deflecting the state representative's invitation to the delegates to participate, some of the 
audience finally do speak. 
The delegates 
In the front row, a canalera has been asking for permission to speak for some time now. 
He grasps the first opportunity and asks why the dragline is working on the Right Bank. 
Nunez explains that the deal was in exchange for its repair, an explanation that satisfies 
the delegate. 
Another delegate expresses his opinion that, for every machine, there should be one 
skilled operator who knows how to maintain it. Nuñez responds that they could not find 
them in Villa Hidalgo, the neighbouring village of El Corte, or in any other village in the 
surrounding area. The delegate then confirms Guttiérez' assertion that the delegates 
were informed at the preceding assembly about the fee collection problems and that they 
received a list of fee defaulters. 
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A third delegate remarks that the management should not tolerate sorghum and rice 
producers not paying their fees. He is critical of the fee defaulting rice producers who 
already pay a relatively low fee, considering the quantities of water that they expect. 
Guttierez immediately objects that the list of fee defaulters consists of tobacco producers, 
bean producers, rice producers, etc. Nunez adds that many of them irrigate with pumps 
from the river and only pay a minimal fee. 
The secretary of the board intervenes and says that last year there was a lot of resistance 
to the fee increase and that it was therefore a very difficult decision. His words are 
confirmed by nods from delegates who remember this. At the time he supported this 
decision and now they can see how necessary it was. In response, another delegate 
reminds the meeting that during the fee negotiations they were promised that, if the fee 
increase were realised, the association's financial problems would be over. But now it 
appeared that this was not the case. After a while Nunez responds to this critique with 
an air of contrition: 'Indeed there have been decisions that we should not have taken', but then 
emphasises that they were always in favour of the association. In response, two 
delegates make remarks about the building of the office. 
When the discussion returns again to the machines, Norberto suddenly stands up and 
states loud and clear that he does not agree with the machines working somewhere else, 
when their programme has not yet been completed. Further, he reminds everybody of 
the fact that at the last meeting he had pleaded for better treatment of the machinery. 
Nunez is clearly annoyed and reacts, saying that Norberto is also a member of the board 
as treasurer and therefore should also take responsibility. He mentions that it is 
remarked that the machines can only be found in Sauta with Norberto. He is therefore 
also responsible for the decisions, Nunez argues, whilst Norberto looks straight ahead 
and does not respond to these accusations. Nunez continues that it is asked how it is 
possible that machines can only be found with Perez and in Sauta. He asks the meeting 
'Is Perez still in the association then? - a question that is left hanging in the air. 
The Director's final words 
Towards the end of the meeting Ochoa indicates that he wants to make a few 
concluding observations. He repeats most of his earlier observations. For example, he 
opines that the machines need to be used in a better way. The need to repair them as 
quickly as possible should be a constant concern for the manager. At this point, Ochoa 
offers the help of the CNA. He also expresses the view that the machines should only be 
lent out when the programme is completed. The CNA has been flexible in perrmtting the 
exchange of machines between modules, but this should not be to the detriment of 
programmed activities. Where they use the machinery is thereafter entirely their 
decision, in which he and even the governor cannot intervene. 
Ochoa emphasises again how important it is for the association to pay its fee to the CNA 
and that for this they have to ensure that users pay their fees. If necessary, the CNA has 
the power to close down the intake and not let water run into the system. He states that 
it is a good thing that they have acquired a loan, but the question is who is going to pay 
the interest? Nunez nods in response. To conclude, Ochoa asks if there are any other 
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observations, and this engenders another series of remarks by Nunez, Guttierez and 
some delegates. 
The secretary rises and states that he is willing to organise a monthly assembly if that is 
what Ochoa wants, and he asks Ochoa about his intentions to visit these. Ochoa again 
confirms his interest in being informed and attending them. But he also asks the 
delegates to invite their colleagues, as not all the delegates participate in the association. 
Ochoa thanks the delegates, stands up and walks away from the long counter. 
Everybody then stands up. Ochoa starts shaking the delegates' hands and, after, those of 
the canaleros who have been listening at the back. Then he walks through the office, 
greeting some people, and walking on to his pick-up. Soon afterwards the CNA convoy 
of cars leaves for Tepic. 
After the meeting 
When the CNA officials have left the building, Nunez still has a few announcements to 
make regarding the outcome of negotiations in Tepic that he attended this morning as 
CMC president. One is about the minimum price of sorghum. Another is about the 
CMC's attempt to collectively sell beans for smallholder ejidatarios from the municipality 
at better prices in Mexico City. This was one of Nunez' electoral promises, in which he 
has been unsuccessful so far. He acknowledges that they have experienced many 
setbacks, but claims that they are not yet defeated. After this, the delegates leave or form 
small groups to discuss the meeting. 
At the back of the courtyard, the CNA Unit Head, Blanco, is discussing things with 
Guttierez and the favoured delegate Aldama, who is also a maintenance worker for the 
association. Blanco has been remarkably quiet during the meeting, because he does not 
want to emphasise his own role in initiating it. Guttierez opines that the meeting was 
hard, but also good. The delegate looks meanmgfully at Blanco and wonders aloud how 
it is possible that Ochoa was aware of these things. Blanco makes a joke to which 
Guttierez has to laugh and this distracts attention. Guttierez notes that their misfortune 
is that all the machines broke down one after the other. Somebody says something 
critical about the absence of several delegates, to which Blanco responds that it was 
fortunate that the delegates from San Bias were absent, suggesting that they would have 
been much more critical in the presence of Ochoa. When Guttierez has walked away, 
Blanco summarises the meeting with 'it was a scolding". The delegate again subtly 
questions his role in this, which Blanco denies by stating 'No, not me, I work here'. Then 
his eye falls on me. 'Look out for him, he works for the DEA'21, he jokes, again shifting the 
attention away from himself. 
I walk towards canalero Laguna and tell him that, according to the board, it is all their 
fault. 'You see", he says indignantly, 'they blame us1. It is striking that during the meeting 
the canaleros keep in the background and are apparently expected not to speak, in spite 
of their being critiqued. Laguna swallows his critical note, so that a delegate who is close 
to Nunez and joins our company cannot hear it. This delegate also speaks of a scolding. 
He is of the opinion that they should not have built the new office, although now at least 
they save the monthly rent that was paid for the old one. 
Accountability in Times of Financial Crisis 269 
Together with Blanco I depart, after we have helped to put away the chairs. In his pick-
up he relaxes and he repeats that it was a scolding, for everybody. But it is good that they 
are finally concentrating their attention on the poor administration. Something has to 
change, he states. Blanco admits that a fee recovery rate of forty-five per cent is very 
low22. The problem is that they reach agreements with friends and acquaintances. Blanco 
thinks that the canaleros are right when they say that it is not their fault. The only thing 
that would really help is cutting the water supply from the dam. 'Let's talk clearly, why 
beat about the bush?' Blanco asks. There is a lot of money here, but they use the 
association for their positions. You shall see that when Perez is on campaign, they will 
use the machinery politically. 'That is the problem, everything is polities', he opines. 'What 
do you think Nunez' campaign cost?' 'But we are also guilty", Blanco declares. The CNA 
allows the association to programme far too many hectares in order to lower the amount 
paid to the CNA 
I ask him about his CNA superiors. He informs me that they are around long enough to 
know what is happening. 'They know everything, they just cannot say a thing'. Ochoa and 
Becerra do not really intervene, because they do not want problems with deputy Perez. 
That is why they enlisted the help of the delegates, he explains, they want them to exert 
more control over the board. The delegates were not informed about everything; for 
example, the fact that a machine was working on the Right Bank was new to them. After 
the meeting Ochoa had told Blanco to be more vigilant (ester pendiente). This is easy for 
Ochoa to say, he declares. Ochoa is in a position to say something like 'remove that 
machinery from there". 'But if I say something like that they won't let me in anymore'. Yet, he 
has high hopes that things will change after this. At the next assembly they will want to 
project a different image in order to demonstrate that the association is working. 
With regard to the Valle de Banderas module, I ask Blanco whether it really functions 
much better than their association. He tells me that they also faced many problems and 
that three consecutive presidents were removed from their positions. However, just like 
on the Right Bank of the Santiago River, that module depends on pumps to get water 
into the system. The users need to pay their fee to cover the high electricity expenses; 
otherwise there is simply no water. On the Left Bank, water is always available. 
Epilogue 
In theory, the association's management is accountable to the assembly, but in practice 
important decisions, such as the loan request, informal agreements on fee collection, and 
the use of machinery, are taken without consultation with the delegates or approved 
post-hoc. Admittedly, the important decision to increase fees was indeed discussed and 
approved by the assembly, partly because it immediately affected the delegates, as they 
had to defend it to the users. The CNA State Director's attempt to activate delegates to 
take charge of the former type of decisions does not suddenly change the general pattern 
and make the board accountable. His plan fails for the moment. Although some 
delegates bring forward a few points on which the board needs to render account, they 
do not really take them to task on these issues. The atmosphere prohibits it. In this 
respect, the fact that the most critical delegates from the municipality of San Bias are 
absent is favourable for the board. The most serious, yet covert, critiques of the! financial 
management are rendered ineffectual by the president, who remorsefully accepts 
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coUectrve responsibility for some unspecified decisions and subsequently averts personal 
consequences by stating that they were made with the best of intentions. 
Retrospectively, several interventions on the part of board members have to be seen in 
the light of political ambitions to be re-elected to the board, preferably as president, in 
the coming year. Firstly, the unexpected declaration of the treasurer that he opposes the 
machine use unpleasantly surprises his president, who gets back at him with a razor-
sharp and specific counter accusation by implicating him in the use of machinery for 
purposes other than maintenance. This effectively results in the treasurer's silence. 
Nunez' response clearly illustrates that public comments about the management are not 
appreciated. Secondly, the secretary more cautiously departs from Nunez' line and 
makes a gesture in the direction of the CNA by demonstrating his willingness to 
organise monthly meetings. Thirdly, with the newly constructed office and his display of 
it as a home to the delegates and the CNA, Nunez demonstrates his achievements as 
president and qualifies for re-election to the board23. 
In a longer time perspective, the pressure exerted by the CNA appears to produce 
results, but this can be deceptive. Firstly, financially, the fee recovery rate increases from 
fifty-two to sixty-six per cent in the remaining months of the productive year, and the 
association achieves an eighty-four per cent self-sufficiency rate. The WUA's annual 
financial report mentions a budget deficit, but does not fully reflect the financial crisis. 
Secondly, the frequency of meetings indeed increases in the year after this extraordinary 
assembly. However, the patterns of interaction hardly change. It is interesting to note 
that the State Director does not fulfil his promise to attend the assemblies. A few months 
later he is removed from his position. It remains open to speculation whether there is a 
link with his intervention in this meeting. However, his transfer is particularly 
understandable in the wider perspective of approaching state elections. Similar to 
national elections (see Chapter 2), this generates a political and bureaucratic struggle in 
the broad field of public, private and community institutions of Nayarit. The governor 
then anticipates his succession through a transfer of high bureaucratic officials24. Thirdly, 
weeks and months after the meeting, the association's machines continue to work 
outside the module, and its resources continue to be mobilised in support of the group's 
political aspirations. The board is not made responsible for such decisions. Relations with 
the CNA district further deteriorate. The effect of the CNA pressure was thus largely 
financial, involved political risk, but did not succeed in addressing the political root 
causes of the managerial problems in the association. 
9.4 Analysis 
This case of a water users' association shows that the financial autonomy of user 
organisations and the introduction of quasi-market incentives resulting from the transfer 
of irrigation management do not necessarily lead to their self-sufficiency and financial 
accountability. In addition, the WUA does not fulfil the theoretical expectations 
concerning the improvement of quantity and quality of services, let alone its longer-term 
financial, organisational or infrastructural viability. Hence, the organisational model that 
is used in theory and policy does not correspond with the actual organisational practice 
in a number of ways. 
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As the theory predicts, there has indeed been a managerial effort to decrease 
unnecessary expenditure and increase revenue in order to achieve self-sufficiency. 
Nevertheless, in response to the financial crisis the effort at cost-effective management is 
selective and part of a wider set of political and institutional considerations. On the one 
hand, the management reduced expenditure by firing and giving flexible contracts to 
canaleros, and it increased the pressure on both canaleros and delegates to improve fee 
collection. Meanwhile, the management itself did not fulfil its minimal obligations to pay 
the canaleros' salaries and consult and inform the delegates. On the other hand, the 
enormous investment of time, money and resources in Nunez' political campaign, and 
the informal agreements with favoured clients, increased costs and lowered fee recovery. 
This is not addressed as a problem. These are just some of the problems that hamper the 
association in achieving self-sufficiency. 
One can also recognise a managerial effort to improve and make particular services more 
appropriate. However, this effort is also selective, for example towards particular client 
groups belonging to their political constituencies, some of which lie outside the irrigation 
system, and others who are not water users at all, such as the tobacco companies that 
negotiate an agreement and contract a machine. Other user groups are excluded because 
they lack the political or financial clout to demand services. For example, maintenance 
machines are hardly employed in the San Bias area (see Chapter 7). Rather than a 
uniform improvement of services, a concentration of services occurs, targeted at those 
who are either politically influential or financially capable enough to support the political 
group in control of the association (see Chapter 8). 
Further, in spite of the transparency norms that underlie the organisational charters and 
audit procedures, the WUA management establishes several largely non-transparent 
administrative shortcut mechanisms. These financial agreements with a broad array of 
federal subsidy providers, agro-industrial companies, a bank, and privileged groups of 
politically influential and financially capable producers, contribute to financial autonomy, 
but also to a lack of financial accountability to water users and the CNA. They imply that 
the management is only to a limited extent directly dependent on fee-paying users and 
their satisfaction with the services delivered. Several of these shortcut mechanisms give 
greater autonomy to the management and help them to escape financial accountability 
mechanisms. In addition, the interlocking of the WUA in a network of new 
dependencies by reason of these agreements puts the meaning of 'financial autonomy' 
and its causal connection with improved performance into perspective. 
The way in which this WUA operates in practice does not correspond with the 
organisational model that stems from policy, underlies its own organisational charter 
and postulates that user organisations are accountable to their user constituency (see 
also Chapter 3). What is more, in this case it is even the other way around. The board 
disdaims cured responsibility for the finandal crisis and instead tries to make the 
canaleros and delegates accountable for their limited effort in fee collection. In important 
finandal and O&M decisions, the management is to a limited extent accountable to the 
assembly of delegates that represents the larger community of users. The assembly does 
not function as an autonomous body with transparent audit and performance data, 
regular meetings and the necessary political and institutional counterweight to challenge 
derisions or remove unresponsive staff or directives. At times, the management does its 
272 The Success of a Policy Model 
best to manifest the ideals of accountability and transparency to make its actual lack in 
practice appear less problematic (see also Chapter 7). 
Most active delegates are tied in some way to the board. An historical account of the 
formation of the association (see Chapters 4 and 8) clarifies the different relations of the 
board with the more active and well-disposed delegates and with those who do not 
attend meetings, because they belong to a different political constituency and 
municipality. Even when delegates intend to, it is difficult for them to exert pressure on 
the board and to hold the management directly accountable for the performance of its 
duties. 
The meetings recounted above further reveal that the political use of resources was 
ongoing for several years without interference from the CNA, which only came into 
action when the district's own source of revenue was under threat. The CNA's pressure 
appears effective in settling its outstanding debts, yet it does not directly address the 
political root causes of the association's financial crisis. Instead, they attempt to mobilise 
the delegates in these matters, but without success. The three CNA officials from 
module, district, and state level all seem to fear the accusation of mtervening in the 
association. This is risky, as it can be understood as a political act, which might generate 
counter pressure from the politicians involved favouring their transfer. For the moment, 
the CNA appears politically impotent to intervene effectively, partly because of larger 
political and electoral considerations. This practice contrasts with the image of a neutral 
oversight agency that can correct a service provider when it transgresses pre-determined 
rules. 
In summary, the formal financial and elective accountability relations that theory and 
policy assume are weak in practice. Actual accountability relations are not isolated one-
to-one relations that determine the functional behaviour of a limited set of key actors 
within an irrigation context. For example, the independent financial power of fee-paying 
water users is subverted by several shortcut mechanisms. Further, the assembly of 
delegates is unable to act as its highest and autonomous decision-making body. In 
addition, the CNA can only exert limited regulatory control over the WUA and is 
incapable of directly addressing the political and rent-seeking problems at hand. 
Contemporary accountancy technologies do not suffice to achieve transparent auditing 
and govern the WUA's managerial conduct from a distance. 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that financial self-sufficiency and accountability are not an 
inevitable outcome of the retreat of state agencies and the financial autonomy given to 
lower level managerial bodies, such as WUAs. Oorthuizen (2003) comes to a very similar 
conclusion when he examines the relations between financial autonomy, accountability 
and management performance in the case of the National Irrigation Administration 
(NIA) in the Philippines. He finds that the NIA decreased the amount of managerial 
effort put into O&M services. Further, it drastically cut expenditures, leading to a 
deterioration of services, particularly in politically disadvantaged tail-end areas, and 
increased fee collection efforts. The NIA concentrated its services and collection efforts in 
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the politically more interesting upstream areas. In addition, Oorthuizen also finds no 
proof that financial autonomy induces downward accountability and argues that 
accountability needs to be understood from an historical perspective and a perspective 
that goes beyond the boundaries of an irrigation system. 
These findings are difficult to explain for those who analyse resource management 
organisations as autonomous service provision entities. The reason is that they analyse 
them as separate units with clear boundaries and internal rules and incentives that 
dictate rational managerial responses to the idealised forces of state (final arbiter), 
market (dispersed competition), and society (democracy). My findings suggest that, to 
understand how the emerging opportunities of a new organisational model are 
appropriated, we cannot separate resource management from the wider and more 
enduring political and cultural relations of power, and the social and material relations in 
resource distribution. 
Michael Moore (1989) identified a myth circulating about Taiwanese Irrigation 
Associations that explained their good performance as resulting from financial and 
electoral accountability. This popular myth can also be recognised in the way the 
Mexican WUAs are generally represented in resource management theories and policies. 
It postulates that WUAs' self-sufficiency and managerial performance are stimulated by 
their accountability to users operating through the two mechanisms of social control 
enshrined in the liberal doctrine: the ideal market model of 'dispersed competition' and 
the ideal of electoral democracy. The facts presented in this case run contrary to the 
myth. Like Moore, I find that the actual mechanisms for conttolling management are 
more political than dispersed and democratic, and that they depend on the existence and 
balancing of concentrations of institutional power. 
To understand the combinations of forces actually working in and on WUAs, and the 
impact that they have on their financial and managerial performance, conventional 
public-private and state-society dichotomies no longer suffice. Some differences in 
irrigation management under state agencies and WUAs are obvious, such as hierarchical 
structures and bureaucratic rules. However, this case points to less obvious similarities or 
continuities, for example rent seeking on different levels, a lack of accountability to water 
users, and free riding behaviour of irrigating farmers. Repetto (1986) and many experts 
and policy makers after him considered these as characteristic of public irrigation 
management, but in this case it appears that they are more widely dispersed. Therefore, 
the idealised organisational forms that correspond with conventional dichotomies 
between state, society and market can no longer explain the persistence of such 
phenomena and their effects. This requires an interpretative framework that analyses the 
cultural and political nature of organisational power relations (accountability) and 
resource distribution practices (e.g. rent seeking), situated on a wider playing field. 
In the WUA that I have studied, a political group effectively controls the resource 
arrangements and resource flows of the WUA, obtains and distributes significant rents 
and material benefits for its political purposes, resulting in a situation of 'unresponsive, 
unreliable and unequal service provision' (Repetto, 1986). This situation is sustained 
financially through a set of negotiated agreements that interlock the WUA in a network 
of financial, institutional and political dependencies that transcend conventional 
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boundaries between state, market and society. The group also sustains itself, whilst 
being largely unresponsive to its user constituency and the CNA, by mamtaining or 
developing alliances with political actors, government institutions and state levels, such 
as the governorship, the party, the municipality, the peasant union and the bureaucracy. 
Bureaucratically, the WUA still comes under the government agency CNA, which 
delivers water, extracts fees, defines the organisational form and requirements, monitors 
and intervenes in its operation. Multiple political, institutional and economic actors and 
forces, social and material arrangements, thus constitute the wider playing field of the 
WUA in which power, finance and resources are unequally distributed and flow 
unevenly. 
Another continuity identified is that WUAs, like former government agencies, do not 
possess effective sanctions to clisdpline farmers who take their irrigation turns before 
paying their fees (see Chapter 5). The WUA aims to become self-suffident by seasonally 
charging land and crop-based fees to individual farmers before they receive their first 
irrigation turn. This system of cost recovery presupposes co-ordination mechanisms that 
are not automatically in place: local patterns of sodal control and accountability, 
technical and managerial control over water supply and demand, and timely fee 
collection (Moore, 1989). In addition, as water is a public good that flows almost 
continuously in the irrigation channels during the productive season, it remains 
practically impossible for WUAs to exdude fee defaulters or free riders. 
Finally, bureaucratic appointments and transfers of personnel remain important means 
of political control, even when the federal state is retreating. Wade (1982) indicates that, 
in public irrigation management, staff transfer determination is the politician's basic 
weapon of control over the bureaucracy, and thus the lever of surplus extraction from the 
clients of the bureaucracy. In this case of WUA management, for involved politidans 
transfer is not so much a lever as a means of protecting their control over the 
organisation and particular politically motivated forms of resource extraction and 
allocation. 
Notes 
1 Part of this section is based on what Moore identifies as a myth about Taiwanese Irrigation 
Associations that can also be recognised in how the Mexican WUAs are generally represented (Moore, 
1989). 
2 'Esquema de las principales funciones de supervision en distritos de riego transferidos' (Outline of the 
principal functions of supervision in the transferred irrigation districts), CNA Subdireccion General de 
Operación, Gerencia de Distritos y Unidades de Riego, Subgerencia de Transferencia, 1998. 
3 Land reform communities created after the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Before the revision of 
Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992, ejido land belonged to the state, with a combination of 
community (ejido) and private (ejidatorio) usufruct. Ejido members are called ejidatarios. 
* Interview with former District Head of Secretaría de Agricultura Y Recursos Hidráulicos, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources (SARH) (28 July 1999). 
5 Instead of being the outcome of neutral market forces of supply and demand, the pricing of water 
is the result of largely non-transparent calculative procedures carried out by the CNA district. These are 
based on data submitted by the WUAs and the CNA district about programmed irrigated surfaces and 
financial budgets. The district presents the outcomes of the Hydraulic Committee to the four WUA 
presidents for approval. The presidents of the four modules, which are located apart from each other, 
hardly appear to negotiate collectively in this respect, except under the co-ordination of the District 
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Head. The CNA determines the percentage of the CNA district budget that a module has to finance 
(see also Kloezen (2002). To determine the volumetric water price for a module, its programmed 
expenses plus the ŒA-determined share of the district budget are divided over the module's 
programmed water volume (based on the programmed number of hectares and estimated water use 
per crop per hectare). This administrative procedure encounters the longstanding bureaucratic practice 
of programming a much larger irrigated surface for the Left Bank than that actually irrigated. Around 
19,000 hectares are programmed, close to its designed command area, rather than the 10,500 hectares 
irrigated on average since 1982. This has been possible because of the ample availability of water 
provided by the diversion dam on the River Santiago, a favourable condition that two other modules do 
not enjoy. A larger programmed irrigated area in combination with relatively low costs for the 
allocation of water means a lower volumetric water price. Because the Left Bank irrigates by far the 
most hectares of all modules, it still pays the largest part of the CNA budget (see Appendix 6, Table 2, 
column 7). Nevertheless, by accepting this planning practice the CNA implicitly favours the Left Bank 
module. This is where political relations come into play. 
6 Mexican law prohibits the refusal of water to a crop after a first irrigation turn has been applied. 
7 As opposed to the definitions that I have chosen, the District Chief referred in this case to 100 per 
cent self-sufficiency (autosuficiencia). 
8 Much depends on the exact definition of self-sufficiency. Here I keep to Kloezen's definition: 
actual fee collection covers actual expenditure. This definition thus excludes revenues other than fee 
collection. Kloezen defines the fee collection rate as the actual over programmed fee collection 
(Kloezen, 2002:154). 
* In addition, the fees for different crops were not based on their estimated water consumption, 
which was particularly inexpensive to producers with rice and pasture (250 pesos), crops that consume 
infinitely more water than tobacco and beans (170 and 100 pesos). This favoured a select group of large 
politically and commercially favoured producers (see Chapter 6). 
1 0 Cutting the water to an individual farmer is practically impossible, as farmers can take water 
without permission and in the absence of the canalero. This is particularly easy with the much-used 
mobile pumps for sprinkler installations (see Chapter 5). Cutting the water to an entire sub-lateral 
canal will usually harm many other users and create much political unrest. 
" Calculations based on data from the 'Segundo Informe de Actividades, Asociación de Usuarios de la 
Unidad de Riego de la ¡Margen Izquierda del Río Santiago, AC, Modulo 2,1997-1998'. 
1 2 For example, in Irrigation District 094 FJ Grullo (see van der Zaag, 1992), the WUA has a formal 
agreement with the local sugarcane refinery, thus ensuring the largest part of their fee recovery. 
1 3 According to the concession title that was designed by the CNA and determines the conditions 
under which the irrigation module is transferred to the WUA 
" Title of bachelor, used to address (among others) a lawyer, and expressing respect. 
1 5 Ritual co-parent. 
1 6 A former government bank for the rural sector, which was not left unaffected by state 
disengagement policies under presidents Salinas and Zedillo. 
1 7 Amounts of approximately US $31,250 (loan), US $6,500 US (CNA) and US $10,000. 
1 8 I present approximates, because in some cases I do not have the exact number, and a higher 
degree of exactness is not required for the reader to capture the general trends. 
1 9 Beans are traditionally hardly irrigated in this region that was formerly seasonally inundated. See 
Chapter 4. 
2 0 Approximately US$ 15,000. 
2 1 Drug Enforcement Agency. At the beginning of my stay, this was a serious possibility that people 
considered when they wondered about my presence in the region. This is understandable in a region of 
intensive drug transportation, into which DEA agents have been known to penetrate. By this time, 
however, it had become a popular joke about me. 
2 2 This rate is not included in the data presented to the delegates, and it is not clear how exactly the 
CNA calculated it. 
2 3 The association's charters forbid him being re-elected as president. 
2 4 Ochoa has been succeeded by a senior civil engineer from the Ministry of Electricity who is from 
Nayarit, unlike Ochoa, and was responsible for the completion of the Aquamilpa Dam. This major 
project in the Sierra of Nayarit on the River Santiago includes a hydro-electrical plant that will provide 
electricity to Nayarit and several other states. As such he developed good relations with the governor. 

10 
The Success of a Policy Model: 
Irrigation management transfer in Mexico 
'I'm hopeful. I know there is a lot of ambition in Washington, obviously. But I 
hope the ambitious realize that they are more likely to succeed with success as 
opposed to failure.' 
George W. Bush 
Interview with Assodated Press, January 18,2001. 
10.1 Introduction 
Feel free to read this quote again! President Bush made this cryptic statement shortly 
after becoming the world's most senior policy maker. I remember feeling puzzled and at 
the same time intrigued, after reading it for the first time. The apparent self-reification in 
the president's 'secret to success' initially struck me as quite amusing, because it leads to 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. But when you further penetrate his words, they unveil a latent 
message to the ambitious policy makers of Washington: in order to succeed you require 
'success'. I will argue that this is a cultural orientation that has become increasingly 
influential in international policy circles. Bush's motto serves as an excellent entrance to 
discuss the cultural construction and promotion of policy models in international policy 
networks. In this chapter, the Mexican policy model of Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT) will serve as an exemplary case to analyse this process. 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, water management in Mexico has been radically 
reformed in the past fifteen years under the influence of neo-liberal government polides. 
The creation of the Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA; National Water Commission) in 
1989 and the transfer of government irrigation districts to Water Users' Associations 
(WUAs) (1989-present) exemplify this. Internationally, Mexico's Irrigation Management 
Transfer programme has been heralded as a 'success' and has drawn widespread 
attention because of its rapid implementation. Consequently, this example has been 
propagated as a model for other countries seeking to improve the performance of their 
public irrigation systems and cut burgeoning public expenditures (Groenfeldt, 1998). 
From the beginning of the 1990s, the Mexican water reforms spearheaded an important 
shift for international development agendes from projed-spedfic lending operations 
towards a sedoral investment approach aimed at supporting policy and institutional 
reforms in the redpient countries. As components of 'the Mexican success', the sedor-
wide approach and time-slice loans have become fashionable policy instruments. This 
shift in policy and aid strategies has coindded with the attempts of international 
institutions to redefine their role as knowledge brokers standing at the forefront of ideas, 
exemplified by the ambition of the World Bank to become 'the knowledge Bank' 
(McNeill, 2003). These combined developments have required multilateral funding and 
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development agencies to think in terms of more sophisticated and increasingly 
internationalised exemplary models (Mosse, 2004) 1. As a result, best practice scenarios, 
universal win-win situations (EDI, 1995), and success narratives have become 
increasingly popular in the international policy literature. Several of these international 
policy trends come together in the widely publicised success of the Mexican BMT policy 
model. 
Policy discourse usually presents the 'success'2 of a policy as a self-evident fact that 
basically explains its own diffusion. To evaluate critically this instrumental view of policy, 
I shall argue that the success of a policy model is only a success within the cultural and 
ideological understandings and practices of a policy network. Further, the chapter 
contends that success is the outcome of a cultural process of policy making that 
produces, promotes, and disseminates a policy model, i.e. a particular, stabilised 
interpretation of policy-related events that is used to generate similar policy in other 
parts of the world. By taking this cultural and constructivist perspective, the chapter tries 
to transcend the deadlock of instrumentality in conceptualising how policy works. 
The FJ Grullo Irrigation District (094) in Jalisco was the first to be transferred to a water 
users' association in 1989. Although at international conferences the success of the 
Mexican BVfT was being proclaimed, in this district nobody referred to success in a 
similar way. Without doubt the practice of irrigation management had changed 
significantly, but people differed about the extent to which these changes were beneficial 
to them. This often depended on their own position in the transfer process and vis-a-vis 
the local groups involved in the WUA. In everyday practice, the changes to 
organisational and managerial practices were much more complex than is usually 
discussed in policy documents. 
Whilst opinions differed in the field, in the national (Mexico-City based) press there was 
a striking lack of coverage of the transfer. Very few independent academic sources or 
media discussed the matter in public3. This contrasted with the lively political debates in 
the media on the drastic legal reforms concerning the ownership of land (article 27 of the 
Constitution). The government bureaucracy, in particular the CNA, controlled the 
information that was released on the progress of the transfer, both inside and outside the 
country. The reports they issued on the success of the policy were part of the 
government campaign to promote the president's reforms, as is common in Mexico, but 
it also satisfied the international donors financing the reforms. 
It struck me that policy documents on IMT and Participatoiy Irrigation Management 
(FTM)4 increasingly discussed and replicated the success of the Mexican case. Usually this 
was based on an extensive description of the procedures followed and the formal rules 
that came into effect, but there were very limited descriptions of actual management 
practices of WUAs or of broader policy outcomes. In conversation with a World Bank 
official during a PIM promotion event, I asked why he considered the Mexican case to be 
a success. He pondered and answered: 'because nobody denies that it is a success'. I thought 
that this was a very funny answer, but it also made me think. Perhaps the fact that 
nobody was challenging the success of the policy model at the international conferences 
organised to promote it was not so surprising; but how can such a forceful interpretation 
of the publicly unquestioned 'Mexican experience' emerge? 
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Later in 1996, at an international policy meeting in Mexico, my attention was caught by 
the public effort made by CNA officials, irrigation experts and leaders of water users to 
reiterate the success of the Mexican transfer. Tellingly, clistinguished Mexican and 
foreign irrigation engineers privately acknowledged the existence of problems with IMT 
and with some WUAs in terms of their long-term financial, infrastructure and 
organisational sustainability. However, this only emerged anecdotally and did not seem 
to change their overall views. Again, the strikingly persistent argumentation and the 
consistent public representation of the model as a success struck me, despite the 
information that problematised the model from my point of view. So, how could this 
come about? 
The next section starts answering these questions by presenting a cultural and 
constractivist perspective on policy making to analyse how policy is produced, promoted 
and disseminated. This is followed by an outline of the policy network that generated a 
policy narrative framing the success of the Mexican IMT experience, which later evolved 
into a policy model. Section 3 presents the policy model in its own terms and shows how 
success is culturally produced. Subsequently, the same section contends that the 
Mexican policy model gained further credibility and exposure by being visualised 
through audio-visual technologies and performed at international policy events. Finally, 
section 4 draws the conclusions of this chapter. 
10.2 The Production and Promotion of a Policy Model 
A cultural and constructivist perspective on policy 
The definition of success and the need for policy models are not self-evident, but depend 
on the view of policy to which one adheres. In the policy literature the dominant view 
understands policy as a rational, problem-solving process (Apthorpe, 1986; Shore and 
Wright, 1997; Stirrat, 2001). According to such an instrumental or linear model, all 
policies run through the successive phases of problem identification, policy formulation, 
implementation, and impact evaluation. Policy analysis is typically based on the 
description of a gap between a desired and an actual state of affairs. This tension induces 
a set of policy-engineered transformations with specified objectives to close the gap. As 
the political decision to pursue a policy is taken as a given, the usual concern of 
instrumental policy analysts is how to implement the policy, how to realise models in 
practice, and bring institutional reality in line with policy prescription (Mosse, 2004). 
Within this instrumental approach underlying much of the policy literature on the 
Mexican IMT policy, the following set of positivist assumptions is common: there is an 
objectively knowable world, which is intelligible through the application of rational 
thought; reality consists of empirically verifiable facts, there to discover through scientific 
analysis, experimentation and hypothesis testing; these facts are systematically related 
through cause and effect relations; because the world 'out there' consists of 
systematically related facts, planned interventions with pre-designated results are 
possible (Stirrat, 2001). Within this epistemic framework, a problematic term like success 
is reified into an objective category. This implies that success can be measured with clear 
criteria and neutral methods by impartial researchers with universal theories. Policy 
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analysis thus assumes that a coherent set of policy objectives can serve as the objectified 
criteria to evaluate policy outcomes. The success and dissemination of a policy model is 
believed in the end to be supported by empirical evidence. The instrumental view of 
policy making is problematic because of the artificial dichotomies it erects between policy 
design and implementation, and politics and bureaucracy. It is popular among 
politicians, bureaucrats, and experts, as it provides a useful rationale for legitimising their 
activities and task division. 
In contrast to the instrumental view, a constructivist approach to policy making argues 
that the success of a policy is not simply an empirically verifiable and self-evident fact, 
whose diffusion and standardisation result from its own impetus (Latour, 1987). Success 
depends upon the stabilisation of a particular interpretation of events that explains the 
origin, implementation, and outcomes of a policy. The success of a policy is not simply 
inherent or given at the outset, but arises from the ability to continue recruiting support 
and so impose a growing coherence on those who argue about or oppose such an 
interpretation (Latour, 1996; Mosse, 2004; see also Chapter 2 and 3). The more interests 
and policy actors are tied up with the particular interpretation, the more stable and 
dominant the policy becomes. A stabilised interpretation of the origin, organisation, and 
outcomes of a policy becomes a policy model when it is used to validate and enforce the 
need for similar reforms in other places through a prescriptive set of guidelines for 
replicating its success. In the present context, the network of active supporters enrolled 
in the proliferation of a policy will be called a policy network5. 
A policy is thus not finished after its political design. On the contrary, policy making is 
an ongoing process that transcends the artificial boundaries between politics, 
bureaucracy and impact evaluation. In my view, policy making includes not only 
politicians and technocrats, but also the officials, researchers, experts and consultants 
who play a role in the production, promotion and dissemination of a policy. 
When we follow this approach, policy is not viewed as temporally fixed and a linear 
process that unilaterally orientates practice. Rather, policies are subject to a continuous 
process of cultural construction aiming to mobilise and maintain political consent among 
the epistemic communities to which they are directed and which they shape. An 
epistemic community is 'a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain' (Haas, 1992: 3). The trajectory of a policy model 
mobilises, unites, and circumscribes dispersed and diverse epistemic communities of 
policy makers, who become part of the policy network and increasingly share a number 
of cultural values, understandings, and practices. Success can become a powerful 
'mobilising metaphor' in this process (Mosse, 2004), but only as an outcome of the 
cultural work of production, translation, and promotion of a policy model that manages 
to mobilise and maintain the support of an expanding policy network. 
Therefore, this chapter reviews how the Mexican IMT model was culturally constructed 
and promoted by a policy network, with the aim to understand its capacity to enrol a 
range of epistemic communities and institutions that make policy. The chapter offers a 
retrospective perspective on the variety of cultural means, practices, and events through 
which the success of the Mexican experience was narrated, visualised, and performed. 
This will allow us to see how success is culturally represented with a view to rendering it 
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appealing and worth pursuing to a target group of peers from other nations and 
organisations. 
In my view, policy is represented and disseminated through a broad range of cultural 
means, practices and events, not only through language, discursive practices and textual 
resources (Apthorpe, 1986; Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996). The policy model is conveyed 
through policy documents and policy impact studies, but also through other cultural 
artefacts (Stirrat, 2001), practices and events, such as promotional videos, PowerPoint 
presentations and policy meetings, as I shall show. Analysing the model in this manner 
means it is not understood as an objective representation of reality. It is tailored to 
specific judgements of a target population of policy makers, donors, and experts who 
played a role in the cultural promotion and dissemination of the model. 
To delimit my argument I shall summarise why the making of the model is also a 
profoundly political process with far-reaching macro-economic consequences (these 
issues are covered in greater depth in Chapters 2 and 3). Firstly, the Mexican transfer of 
irrigation districts was a politically contested process and its proclaimed success needs to 
be unpacked in relation to the social reality and everyday practices of different groups of 
water users and their disputed practices of resource distribution under WUAs. In making 
my argument I shall not discuss the impacts of IMT on the actual irrigation management 
practices, and I shall therefore refrain from qualifying IMT as either a success or a failure. 
Secondly, the IMT policy and its success also need to be understood as a product of an 
ongoing struggle between political and bureaucratic elites over control of the Mexican 
government bureaucracy, the irrigation districts and related financial flows. Thirdly, the 
political and financial pressure that international organisations impose co-determines 
why policy models are constructed, enforced and adopted by countries. However, 
although the development of my analysis inevitably involves a critical stance towards 
what individual authors have argued, no criticism of individuals and their motives, 
values and beliefs is implied. 
Fourthly, the CNA was successful in achieving the resumption of international funding 
for water policy, which funding had been halted since the beginning of the 1980s. The 
loan supported its full irrigation and drainage programme, including the IMT 
programme (see Appendix 2). The World Bank changed from project-specific lending 
operations towards a sectoral investment approach aimed at supporting policy and 
institutional reforms in Mexico. Subsequently, the time-slice loan for 'sector-wide 
reforms' came to be considered as a success and was applied more broadly (World Bank, 
2001). In Mexico the time-slice loan of US 1.2 billion financed approximately 85 per cent 
of irrigation and drainage construction (construction of irrigation infrastructure, 
rehabilitation, deferred maintenance, O&M equipment), 13 per cent of other project 
actions, and 2 per cent of support actions, of which only 1 per cent for institutional 
development. Yet, through the Mexican policy model, this loan became publicly known 
and was credited with generating institutional reform, a policy shift from a supply to a 
demand orientation, and from hardware to software. In fact, the loan resumed financing 
new construction and rehabilitation projects. A minute part of the economic capital 
invested in the Mexican irrigation sector generated huge symbolical capital for the 
reform package and resulted in the legitimation of what was basically a renewed 
investment in construction and rehabilitation. 
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Besides the political and economic factors that drive policy processes, policy making is 
also a cultural process. The Mexican policy model was produced to appeal culturally, 
ideologically and aesthetically to particular epistemic communities in order to enrol them 
in the promotion and replication of the model. Its target audience consisted of a select 
trans-national elite of politicians, technocrats, irrigation experts, donor advisors, and 
other stakeholders that dominate policy making in political, financial, agricultural and 
hydraulic institutions across the world and who had to be brought on board to support 
the policy process. In these policy spheres, the disdplines of engineering, economics and 
law were particularly influential. The policy model thus reflected a number of generalised 
standards, understandings, and practices within the epistemic communities taken into 
consideration. Some examples are: 
- Blueprint thinking, which assumes that a model is universally replicable when it is 
working successfully in one place, is influential within the engineering disdpline. 
- Designing standardised solutions for a large diversity of irrigation systems is common 
among planners, who operate through routinised bureaucrades. 
- Selling success is a structural element of the donor world. Promises are made that 
within a limited time frame problems will be solved, and for this politidans and 
policy makers need successful models. The tendency is the flight forward: if one 
policy model does not work, jump to the next promise (Mollinga and Bolding, 2004). 
- The instrumental charader of policy models, i.e. the handy checklists they offer, and 
their apolitical nature, help policy makers to support their argument for politically 
difficult decisions (Kloezen, 2002). 
Presidents Bush motto for this chapter defines success as an important cultural 
orientation of policy makers that has become increasingly influential in international 
political networks: to succeed you require success. This message makes an mtuitive 
appeal to ambitious policy makers who read it as follows: you can succeed in your career 
by replicating or capitalising on earlier policy successes. The Mexican policy model 
accommodates such ambitions by offering guidelines to replicate its success. Policy 
makers to whose ideas, ambitions, and practices it appeals will try to jump on the 
bandwagon and attempt to replicate or imitate it. Those on the bandwagon generally 
find it difficult to resists replicating it in fields where it 'sort of applies, without seeing 
the cost that this entails (McNeill, 2003). 
The policy network and the proliferation of the Mexican model 
The idea of an irrigation management transfer policy emerged from political and 
bureaucratic transformations spanning several decades, but only became viable in the 
late 1980s when the Mexican government faced a severe economic and political crisis 
(see Chapter 2). In 1976, the Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos (SARH) arose 
from a controversial fusion of the Secretaría de Recursos Hidráulicos (SRH; Ministry of 
Water Resources), a traditionally strong and affluent hydraulic bureaucracy, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. At the end of the 1980s, a technocratic segment of water 
resource planners from the SRH supported the eledoral campaign of the presidential 
candidate, Salinas de Gortari, and proposed a package of water reforms to him, among 
them the creation of an autonomous water agency and IMT. Through the reform 
package, these hydrocrats6 not only regained autonomy for the hydraulic bureaucracy 
with the CNA but also recovered control over the irrigation districts and achieved the 
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resumption of international loans for the water sector - all of which had been lost to 
them as a result of the fusion7. 
Besides the necessary political support from the Mexican presidency, this group of 
hydrocrats gained support from several multilateral institutions in terms of funding and 
expertise on policy reform and water management organisation. From 1987 onwards, a 
succession of World Bank8 and FAO missions advised the Mexican government and the 
Ministry of Agriculture on how to reform their irrigation policies, providing extensive 
input into policy debates on reforms required for the resumption of international loans 
for the irrigation sector. At the end of 1991 the loan to reform the Mexican irrigation and 
drainage sector was approved. The CNA kept the World Bank and the FAO regularly 
informed and organised field visits to show the advances made with the transfer policy. 
Around this time the policy network emerged. Although the initial progress was slow, 
the process accelerated during the second half of 1991 and a switch was made from a 
gradual process to a 'fast track' implementation. By 1992, the speed and scale of the 
transfer and the improved levels of self-sufficiency surpassed the original plans and 
surprised the officials of the different institutions. 
Senior officials of these different institutions started to point to the success of the 
Mexican policy at international policy meetings and to loan applicants. These are the 
roots of the policy network in which the 'Mexican success stor/ became defined and 
legitimated. The epistemic communities that originally constituted this policy network 
belonged to several aforementioned institutions, such as SARH/CNA, the World Bank 
(IBRD), IADB, and FAO, that shared a similar educational and technocratic background 
and set of ideological views and expert theories on irrigation management and the role 
of the state. These coinciding cultural and ideological understandings, values, and 
practices shaped the construction and promotion of the policy model. 
The policy network generated and disseminated a policy narrative around the success of 
the Mexican TMT case that became dominant in the thinking on irrigation management 
and user participation for the following decade. The Mexican transfer experience as 
captured in the narrative started to serve as a crucial point of reference to promote, fund 
and research neo-liberal irrigation reforms in other third world countries. As a result, the 
policy model grew to consist of a standardised interpretation of the origin, organisation, 
and success of the Mexican transfer, inescapably leading to a prescriptive set of 
guidelines for replicating this successful policy in other countries. 
From the beginning of the 1990s, the Mexican policy model gained currency. 
Promotional activities were organised and financed by the policy network. The success of 
LMT in Mexico was increasingly referred to at international irrigation policy meetings, in 
loan negotiations, and publicised through policy documents, research reports, and other 
means. The network also started to expand institutionally. 
As from 1992, the policy network co-operated in organising an mtensifying succession of 
international policy events and research conferences that contributed to the promotion 
of the Mexican model and the dissemination of its success (Economic Development 
Institute in Mexico, 1994/1995; Colegio de Postgraduados (CP)/International Irrigation 
Management Institute (UMI, later IWMI characterised at some point by insiders as 'the 
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Temple of TurnoverO in Mexico 1996/1998; Turkey, 1996; Tokyo, 1997; ITMI/FAO in 
China, 1994; Thailand, 1996, etc.). A large stream of foreign policy makers, irrigation 
experts, and donor advisors were invited to Mexico to attend courses and conferences 
and see with their own eyes that transfer was actually taking place, and successfully. As 
an outcome of these events, the policy network produced and circulated an ever-
increasing flow of policy documents, conference papers, practitioners' manuals, audio-
visual technologies, CD-ROMs, and internet applications, improving the exposure of the 
policy model among target populations of policy makers, irrigation experts, and donor 
consultants. The policy model thus became increasingly known, fashionable, and 
accepted among policy makers and their constituencies around the world. 
Since Mexico had shown that IMT 'worked' and was 'successful', the Mexican policy 
model became to an increasing extent an 'obligatory passage poinf for national policy 
makers who had to use its guidelines when designing their water sector policies and 
negotiating financial support with multilateral banks. As the model gained currency and 
achieved a dominant status within international policy arenas and donor organisations, 
financial and political pressures and incentives increasingly converged around LMT. A 
growing number of national governments from the developing world and their hydraulic 
bureaucracies began to consider IMT policies. 
Initially, the policy network remained a rather dispersed network that lacked a clear 
centre. This changed halfway through the 1990s. Inspired by Mexico's 'exciting 
experiment', the Economic Development Institute (EDI), the educational arm of the 
World Bank,' launched the establishment of the 'International Network on Participatory 
Irrigation Management (LNPIM) (Gorriz and Groenfeldt, 1995). This organisation for 
policy makers and irrigation experts institutionalised the production and promotion of 
IMT/PrM, in which the Mexican policy model played a major role. The network's mission 
is 'to facilitate PIM through the exchange of people, ideas and training materials' 
(fdoezen, 2002: 32). INPIM began to co-ordinate the various follow-up meetings in 
countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, India, Egypt, Morocco, Colombia, etc. that 
subsequently launched IMT policies. 
Throughout the 1990s, the Mexican policy model showed itself to have an enormous 
evocative and mobilising power in terms of promoting IMT among policy makers, 
researchers, experts and financiers and their institutions around the world, which among 
other things contributed to: 
- Changing international agendas for irrigation reform 
- Aligning political will, bureaucratic and financial support for IMT policies 
- Reproducing the IMT model via an expanding and consolidating policy network 
- Reordering bureaucratic sources of power, finance, and expertise involved in 
irrigation. 
Given its broad exposure and impact, a remarkably select number of people are 
responsible for the large body of literature on the Mexican IMT experience circulating 
within the policy network. Not more than around ten mdrviduals have played a 
prominent role in producing, promoting and disseminating the 'unquestionable success' 
of the policy model (Garces-Restrepo, 2001). In publications and at conferences, their 
names constantly recur and their careers have become inextricably linked with the 
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Mexican policy model of IMT and PIM. Among this group of policy makers at least three 
epistemic communities can be identified as originating from the institutions that made 
up the policy network: senior CNA officials, international irrigation experts, donor 
officials and advisors: 
The first epistemic community consists of senior Mexican hydrocrats who were closely 
involved in developing and implementing the transfer of irrigation districts as CNA 
officials at the beginning of the 1990s. A sub-division can be made between a group of 
planners and a group of irrigation engineers (see Chapter 3), who started and developed 
their career in the planning and operation departments of the hydraulic bureaucracy 
(SRH). Several of them became internationally respected engineers. 
A second epistemic community consists of international experts who specialised in 
institutional reform policy and user participation in irrigation management and worked 
for different international institutions such as IWML International Food Policy Research 
Institute (EFPRI) and FAO (Kloezen, 2002). They have developed an expertise in 
researching, testing and reporting on the performance and impact of new institutional 
arrangements that can be applied by policy makers around the world. Most of their 
research output has contributed to the production and dissemination of a much-
repeated set of guidelines for successful transfer. As such they became promoters of the 
reforms and contributed to making the policy model, and in that sense they should be 
considered as policy makers. 
The third epistemic community within this policy network is composed of World Bank, 
EDI officials, donor advisors, and consultants, who were closely involved in constructing, 
financing, and promoting the Mexican IMT model and have associated themselves with 
its success. Policy models that can illustrate early successes, like the Mexican case, are 
instrumental in achieving the political acceptance of reforms by national governments. 
Although these three epistemic communities never constituted a coUective, they shared a 
number of traits. Most had an irrigation-related PhD from a prestigious American 
university and dedicated an important part of their career to irrigation management, 
water planning and water user organisation. Further, they developed an international 
career undertaking consultancies, short-term or longer-term contracts for different 
multilateral organisations and became part of a trans-national class of technocrats, 
consultants and experts. In addition, the first two epistemic communities, predominantly 
consisting of engineers, played a most prominent role. Economy and law were two other 
influential disciplines. 
Over time, the trajectory of the policy model mobilised and united these epistemic 
communities of trans-national policy makers. To an increasing extent their activities 
overlapped, paths crossed, and interrelations multiplied through multilateral institutions, 
conferences, professional associations, etc. Through these influences they increasingly 
shared and disseminated a number of cultural and ideological understandings, values, 
and practices associated with policy making, something that can be summarised as a 
cultural paradigm. They coincided in a number of professional and technocratic views 
and understandings regarding irrigation policy, the role of the government and irrigation 
performance assessment. This self-reinforcing congruence shaped the construction and 
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promotion of the policy model and its acceptance and fashionability among peer 
communities and policy elites in relevant political, financial and hydraulic institutions 
around the world. 
As an outcome of the momentum that the policy model gained, this select number of 
people became known as 'reformers, champions and experts'. In this prestigious role 
they increasingly functioned as a kind of cultural broker who mediated and performed 
the success of the model. Hence, they were asked to organise and were invited to 
international congresses and training seminars, where they reported on their experiences 
with the Mexican model and its lessons. Further, they co-produced a vast stream of 
promotional materials that conveyed the success of the policy model and set out the 
guidelines for successful IMT in different ways, such as consultancy reports, manuals, 
and PowerPoint presentations. Their promotional work helped to extend the model's 
scope among a target group of trans-national policy makers and mobilised political and 
financial support for IMT10. 
As President Bush predicted, the success of the policy model was rewarded with all kinds 
of successes in other fields. Various sorts of opportunities for career advancement 
opened themselves up to these policy makers in the form of consultancies, contracts, 
trips, etc. These incentives and the prestige that they were personally awarded only 
confirmed their belief in the success of the IMT policy model. The model also contributed 
to the internationally favourable reputation of the Mexican government ('politically 
committed to reformO and the CNA ('catalytic institution7). Through their excellent 
reputation and continued cooperation, the CNA re-established high-level access to and 
achieved considerable leverage in the World Bank, which assisted them henceforth with 
accniiring new loans for the water sector. It is understandable that success thus gradually 
became a firm conviction of these policy makers and advocates, closely related to other 
positive cultural values that turn out to be self-reinforcing and rewarding in the public 
promotion of policies, such as optimism and enthusiasm. These policy makers became 
endowed with the optimism that the initial success of the policy model would 
automatically lead to more successes in other fields and places. 
That policy makers tend to depict the outcomes of promoted policies as a success and 
learn to sustain this is not at all surprising. In cognitive psychology it is well established 
that people attribute success and failure in self-serving ways. Success tends to be 
attributed to one's owns actions, while failure is often attributed to external causes. This 
protects self-esteem and enhances public esteem. The position and career of senior 
managers and bureaucrats are often an outcome of previous policy successes. 
Throughout their institutional careers they experience well-advertised success as a 
resource of career advancement (Vaara, 2002). However, the enrolment of policy makers 
in the promotion and replication of a successful policy model is much more than the 
result of a psychological characteristic or strategic intent. Rather, I am arguing that they 
become part of an emergent and self-reinforcing cultural process. This accelerating 
dynamic can generate 'cascades of adoption' and 'institutional mimicry', very similar to 
fads in the business community and fashions in popular culture (Di Maggio and Powell, 
1983; Strang and Macy, 2001). 
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10.3 The Success of the Mexican Model 
The policy model 
According to the policy model, the Mexican government initiated the IMT programme at 
the end of the 1980s as a result of mounting budgetary pressures at a time of financial 
crisis in Mexico. Public management of the irrigation districts led to poor irrigation 
performance and decreasing levels of productivity because the government bureaucracy 
lacked the incentives and responsiveness to optimise management performance. Hence, 
the government adopted the policy of transfening the irrigation districts to water users 
out of necessity, because it simply lacked the funds to carry out basic management 
functions. 
The Mexican government wanted water users to participate in the effort to bring the 
irrigation districts back to their formerly high levels of productivity. Participatory 
Irrigation Management can improve the productivity of irrigated agriculture, the 
sustainability of irrigation districts, while lowering costs for both the farmers and the 
government. PIM is therefore truly a win-win situation. Since the government was 
politically committed to effect the transfer and the policy objectives were clear from the 
beginning, the transfer process was made easier (EDI, 1995). 
In 1989 the CNA was established as a sole water authority with a mandate to transfer 
management of the country's irrigation districts to WUAs. The CNA divided the 
irrigation districts into modules that were manageable from a hydraulic point of view. 
Then it began a promotional campaign to encourage water users within these modules 
to organise in WUAs, an organisational form that is recognised under Mexican law. To 
complete the process, the WUA receives a temporary concession for the use of the 
infrastructure and the machinery. The CNA subsequently has evolved into a provider of 
services to support farmers' own management effort (EDI, 1995). 
The speed and magnitude of the transfer pleasantly surprised all involved, as the 
beginning had not been without difficulties. The CNA had to solve legal problems, 
organise the users in WUAs, convince them of the need for sharp fee increases, and deal 
with opposition (Palacios-Velez, 1997). Initially the CNA organised discussions with 
leaders of farmer, producer and marketing associations, and later with the water users. 
Hundreds of meetings took place between the CNA and WUAs in which the terms of 
management transfer were negotiated. Major issues were the terms for the transfer of 
maintenance equipment, the rehabilitation of infrastructure before the transfer, and the 
increase in irrigation fees. The WUAs realised that in order to sustain the system, they 
had to raise irrigation fees and improve collection rates (Kloezen, 2002). 
Firstly, the most productive irrigation districts, which were best organised and had the 
most enthusiastic farmers, were transferred. The most important criterion for selecting 
districts was the potential of the user organisation to become financially self-sufficient 
with users paying the fees of operation, maintenance and administration. The results of 
the newly established WUAs were very promising. They achieved self-sufficiency within 
a short time. In addition to financial autonomy, the organisation also had to become 
adrninistratively self-sufficient and rely on its own staff rather than on CNA staff. The 
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fact that the modules were designed as single infrastructural entities with clear physical 
and functional boundaries (Johnson, 1997a) enabled the WUAs to function as 
autonomous and special purpose organisations for irrigation management. The new 
irrigation institutions are more efficient and perform irrigation tasks better than 
bureaucratic organisations. Their structure of rules and incentives stimulates WUA 
managers to respond better to costs and benefits (Ostrom, 1992). The WUA leadership 
and staff are directly chosen and appointed by the water users and they also depend 
financially on them (Johnson, 1997a; Merrey, 1995; Vermillion, 1997). The key to success 
is accountability. WUAs act to contain the cost of water management while improving 
operational performance because it is in their direct interest to do so. Improved quality 
and cost efficiency of irrigation management will normally enhance the profitability of 
irrigated agriculture enough to offset the increased cost of irrigation to water users 
(Vermillion, 1997). 
Water users agreed to take over operation and maintenance (O&M) responsibilities, 
because they believed that a better job could be done with direct and full control over the 
revenues from fee collection. Despite initial difficulties, the process of transfer was 
carried out successfully. However, after the transfer of the modules to the WUAs, a new 
set of problems was detected, such as water rights and legal questions, financial self-
sufficiency and investment requirements, operation and maintenance, environmental 
problems, and leadership problems. Broader socio-economic problems, economic crisis, 
water scarcity, or the speed with which the programme was implemented cause these 
'second-generation problems'. The long-term success of the irrigation sector and the 
sustainability of the transferred districts would depend upon how the government, the 
CNA, and user organisations addressed such second-generation problems Johnson, 
1997b; Johnson, 1997a; Palacios-Vélez, 1997; World Bank, 2001). 
The IMT programme in Mexico, 'one of the largest and most ambitious programmes of 
management transfer' (Maldonado Rojas, 2000), is considered an 'unquestionable 
success' (Garcés-Restrepo, 2001). Clearly there are many conditions that are specific to 
Mexico, and therefore the Mexican case is not a blueprint that should be copied by other 
countries. It does, however, offer ideas that can be adapted to other countries. The trends 
are becoming universal in the irrigation sector: governments have overextended their 
reach beyond the point of efficient management and there are many benefits in 
harnessing the management potential of water users. In Mexico the paradigm of PIM is 
working well. What lessons does Mexico offer for replicating this kind of win-win 
situations? (EDI, 1995) 
- First of all, strong government commitment to the IMT programme is required at the 
highest levels. Mexico's debt crisis in the 1980s fuelled government commitment to 
withdraw from management functions. 
- Second, new management arrangements need to be grounded in a solid legal 
framework. Clearly defined ownership of water and other assets, rights and 
obligations have been important in successful irrigation management. 
- Third, financial autonomy and self-sufficiency of WUAs is considered a fundamental 
prerequisite for effective user management (Palacios-Vélez, 1997; Veimillion, 1997). 
In Mexico, water users pay a fee prior to water delivery so that the financial basis of 
the organisation is secure. 
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- In addition, other elements of the Mexican model that are deemed essential for 
success are a strategic training and promotion campaign to forge consensus among 
stakeholders (Palados-Velez, 1997; Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999) and the need for 
promoters and 'champions' who mobilise support within the government agency 
(Groenfeldtl998). 
The more these key enabling factors are present in an IMT programme, the more likely 
IMT is to be successful and WUAs to be sustainable and effective (Vermillion and 
Sagardoy, 1999). 
Reviewing the model 
In line with most policy makers, the policy model subscribes to an instrumental model of 
policy, which views policy making as a problem-solving activity that follows a linear logic 
of successive temporal events. (See The Production and Promotion of a Policy Model 
above.) The model presents the IMT policy as the only obvious solution to the objectively 
identifiable problems of the Mexican irrigation sector. This policy then manages to 
transform the original state of affairs of government-managed disorder into a new 
equilibrium of user management, which is repeatedly dassified in terms of success. From 
the Mexican experience, a set of lessons and explanations are derived. The charaderistic 
elements that are believed to have caused success are then interpreted as generalised 
conditions or determinants for 'successful IMT' (Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999), 'win-
win situations' (EDI, 1995), or even 'effective water governance' (Rogers, 2002). Further, 
the policy literature presents the emergence of worldwide interest in the Mexican model 
and its partial replication in other countries as a spontaneous process that naturally 
follows from its success. 
The Mexican policy model is structured as a black box that inevitably leads to a successful 
transfer. The set of lessons and guidelines inferred from the Mexican case are positivist 
and prescriptive templates for knowing and acting upon the world (Stirrat, 2001). This 
forces national policy makers who also aspire to achieve successful transfer in their 
country along a route of 'obligatory passage points' or marks that identify with the 
Mexican success (Latour, 1987). To follow this scenario seems the only rational thing to 
do. The byroads or shortcuts are systematically dosed off, because they are prone to 
failure. 
The policy model is prescriptive, because it sets out what inescapably ought to be done 
and what stands to reason, rather than providing informative and descriptive accounts of 
actual practices or outcomes 'telling it as it is' (Apthorpe, 1986; Apthorpe and Gasper, 
1996). For example, IMT in Mexico is couched in terms of an unavoidable and logical 
response of the Mexican government in economic crisis to counter the threat of 
decreasing cost recovery, irrigation investment and deteriorating irrigation infrastructure. 
Similarly, the model has a normative orientation and focuses on the extensive 
explanation of the offidal procedures followed and the formal rules that came into effed. 
The limited empirical description of actual processes of transfer and user management 
practices is usually selective and biased, and tends to confirm the central propositions of 
the model. As a result, the empirical evidence provided follows and reaffirms the ideas 
and theories, in short the cultural paradigm, that underlie the IMT policy model. The 
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lessons and guidelines for other countries to follow perfect the prescriptive and 
normative character of the model. 
The policy model is strengthened by appeals to objectivity, neutrality and rationality, 
which confer on it legitimacy and authority. For instance, the presentation of quantitative 
data suggests objectivity. The model also reifies an area of expertise, with the effect that 
it appeals to experts from particular epistemic communities and excludes laymen. For 
example, the frequent use of acronyms (LMT, PTM, IWMI, CNA, etc.) and technical 
jargon works to place the policy model in the wider field of expertise and official 
institutions, whilst making it less transparent to outsiders. Institutional sources that are 
cited grant the document legitimacy and an official status, e.g. the World Bank (Stirrat, 
2001). 
The transfer process and user management are de-politicised by the policy model, 
because it ignores how the policy was politically contested in different irrigated regions 
and quarters of Mexican society, and excludes the conflictíve aspects of daily 
management and resource distribution in WUAs. This obscures the (un)intended policy 
outcomes and political side-effects of the IMT policy, such as the renewed autonomy for 
the hydraulic bureaucracy and the politicisation of WUAs, which could potentially falsify 
the model (Ferguson, 1990). (See also Chapter 2 and 3.) 
What is most striking is the asymmetrical use of the labels of 'success' and 'failure'. Prior 
to IMT, the failure of public irrigation policies and irrigation systems is the norm and 
success the exception, whereas after IMT success prevails and failure is hardly ever 
reported. When problematic aspects such as insufficient fee recovery or deferred 
maintenance are discussed, they are explained by external factors and called 'second-
generation problems'. They are presented as temporary threats to an inherently 
successful transfer, rather than serious indications of partial failure or structural 
problems. This subtle rhetorical technique acts in conjunction with the employment of 
asymmetrical standards of evidence. Transfer and user management are 'innocent until 
proven guilty7, whereas government management is 'guilty until proven innocent 
(Wade, 1996). Such devices make it almost impossible to falsify and refute the model or 
deny its success. 
The main thrust of the model is that the success or failure of the Mexican IMT 
programme can be assessed with a straightforward set of criteria (the policy objectives) 
by impartial researchers with neutral methods and unproblematic theories. In contrast to 
such a view, I shall show that a clear and coherent set of objective criteria for assessing 
the success the IMT policy that is shared by both policy makers and researchers is 
lacking. It is not at all so clear what is really meant by success, and this varies according 
to the circumstances. Specified claims of success are usually only partially validated by 
straightforward empirical evidence about the realised objectives, improved irrigation 
management practices, or the long-term outcomes of the policy. To back this claim, I 
shall briefly review the four objectives that are generally mentioned for IMT and the 
evidence provided for their successful attainment": 
First of all, there is a general consensus in the policy literature that the Mexican 
government transferred its irrigation districts for financial reasons. The objective was to 
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reduce public expenditure on irrigation management, as it had become too large a 
financial burden. A higher degree of cost recovery among the water users in irrigation 
districts should bring about this public investment reduction (Espinosa de León and 
Trava, 1992; Gorriz et al., 1995; Johnson, 1997a; Trava-Manzanilla, 1994). In fact, the 
public expenditure on irrigation was reduced Qohnson, 1997a), though the degree of this 
reduction is debated. While some argue that annual government subsidies fell from 
US$40 million in 1989 to zero by 1993 (Vermillion, 1997), others claim that the 
government subsidies reduced from eighty per cent to only twenty-five per cent in just 
five years (Palacios-Vélez, 2000). Nevertheless, there are few data available on the 
impact of transfer and other neo-Iiberal policies on overall government expenditure in 
the water or agricultural sectors (Vermillion, 1997). 
There is also general agreement that the WUAs improved the recovery of O&M costs, 
and achieved a high degree of self-sufficiency and financial autonomy within a few years 
of initiation (Garcés-Restrepo, 2001; Johnson, 1997a; Kloezen, 2002; Palacios-Vélez, 
1998). Fee collection rates rose from only 15 per cent before transfer to 80 to 100 per cent 
afterward. By the second year they are usually above 80 percent, and after a few years 
around 100 percent in the majority of modules (Gorriz et al., 1995; Johnson, 1997a). The 
IMT programme and the resulting increase in irrigation fees have permitted the 
irrigation districts to improve their self-sufficiency from thirty-seven per cent in 1991 to 
eighty per cent in 1994 (Johnson, 1997b). 
A second concern from which the transfer emerged was the need to ensure long-term 
infrastmctural sustainability. The increased cost recovery and self-sufficiency of WUAs 
would solve the problems of lack of funds for required maintenance (Johnson, 1997a). 
Despite the improved cost recovery under WUAs, it is uncertain what this means for the 
long-term viability of the WUAs, particularly their infrastructural viability (Kloezen, 
2002; Palacios-Vélez, 1997). In Chapter 10 I show that financial self-sufficiency of the 
WUA does not at all automatically imply the irürastructural viability of a module. 
Likewise, an impact study of the Colegio de Postgraduados demonstrated that in many 
WUAs the fee recovery was insufficient to cover total management costs (mduding 
O&M) (Palados-Vélez, 1994b). WUAs indicated that they cut back on the maintenance 
programme when there was a lack of fee recovery. Another concern is the increase of 
deferred maintenance, because the annual fee increase does not keep up with monetary 
inflation (Kloezen, 2002; Palados-Vélez, 1997). WUAs and CNA staff revealed that the 
actual fee levels were less than half of what they felt they should levy to manage the 
modules at optimum level (Kloezen, 2002: 152). Another concern is that the wages of 
CNA personnel operating the sources of water (e.g. a dam) and the primary canals are 
only partly paid by the WUAs, which means that their budgets are not really self-
suffident 0ohnson, 1997b). The initial high degree of finandal self-suffidency of WUAs 
is thus hard to maintain, and it is questionable what self-suffidency really means when it 
does not secure adequate investment in (deferred) maintenance, let alone the 
rehabilitation of infrastructure. Of course, these problems are bound to be more serious 
outside the seled number of commerdal districts partly rehabilitated as part of the 
international loan. In condusion, the empirical evidence with regard to finandal 
objectives is significant, but difficult to judge from a longer time perspective. There 
remain many uncertainties about what this implies for the overall viability of the 
irrigation districts in the long run, particularly infrastructural viability. 
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A third objective of the Mexican government was to bring the irrigation districts back to 
their formerly high levels of productivity by making water users co-responsible for the 
operation and maintenance of the system (Gorriz et al., 1995; Groenfeldt, 1998; 
Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999). The irrigation districts should retake their leading role 
as productive zones in the agricultural sector and increase agricultural production12. 
However, to date IMT has not had a major impact on crop production (Johnson, 1997a). 
Kloezen does not find convincing evidence of agricultural and economic productivity 
improvements either (Kloezen, 2002). Several other authors admit that the causal 
relationship between management transfer and productivity increases is not so direct as 
for financial viability. So far, impact research in Mexico has shown no significant increase 
in area irrigated, cropping intensity, yields before and after transfer, or gross economic 
returns 0ohnson, 1997a; Palacios-Vélez, 1997; Vermillion, 1997). 
A fourth objective was to improve and sustain system performance and to increase 
efficiency of water use. There is little evidence of such an improvement, as two IWMI 
impact studies show. For Alto Rio Lerma (Oil) in Central Mexico, Kloezen (2002) comes 
to similar findings as my own study. He concludes that WUA management has not 
improved water distribution, according to performance measurement of water 
application (relative water supply). He found a considerable continuity in allocation and 
distribution practices before and after IMT. According to Kloezen, the most positive 
impact of IMT has been the improvement in maintenance services, especially at the 
lower system level. However, it is uncertain whether this has solved the deferred 
maintenance problem and whether it is sustainable in the long run. In addition, Kloezen 
considers the provision of non-irrigation related services by WUAs as a positive effect of 
IMT. Unlike Kloezen, another IWMI study on the Lagunera District in North Mexico 
does make claims about success (Levine et al., 1998). In spite of its practical limitations 
which prevent the study from concluding about management performance 
improvements or changes in the hydraulic performance of the system, data still suggest 
that the combination of CNA and the transferred modules has been generally successful 
in managing their water operations. The facts that 'policies are taken seriously', 
'management can and does implement the policies', and head/tail problems are lacking 
are presented as evidence of the effectiveness of module water management in terms of 
O&M improvement. 
The empirical evidence to support the success of IMT on the basis of the 
abovementioned criteria is often partial and inconclusive. Reduced government 
expenditure, improved fee collection rates and maintenance services are undoubtedly 
important partial arguments for daiming that the IMT policy has had positive outcomes. 
However, the reported outcomes on productivity, management performance and 
infrastructural sustainability do not offer conclusive evidence. In a similar vein, Hales 
(1999) observes that evidence provided on the link between decentralisation and 
organisational performance is usually somewhat equivocal and he suggests that 
although decentralisation does generate a stronger concern with finandal performance 
(and its measurement), it is not dear whether this concern translates into performance 
outcomes. The question remains as to whether realising short-term financial objectives is 
suffident evidence to claim a successful reform in terms of achieving more sustainable 
and productive irrigation districts in the long run. Nonetheless, the lack of darity about 
what is really meant by success and the ambiguous evidence have not in any way 
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prevented or corrected the celebration of the Mexican model and the multiplication of 
references to its success. Impact studies rather tend to report selectively on the positive 
and neutral outcomes of IMT. To conclude, we cannot consider success to be a verifiable 
claim that is validated with straightforward empirical evidence by neutral researchers. 
The Mexican policy model is only a success within the specific cultural and ideological 
understandings and practices of the policy network that has produced and promoted it. 
Interestingly, Vermillion and Sagardoy (1999) arrive at similar conclusions when they 
review a large body of impact studies from around the world. They argue that the 
adoption of irrigation management policies is probably not informed by validated 
expectations about enhanced performance, but rather by government's financial 
constraints. Vermillion and Sagardoy disqualify much of the reported research fmdings 
as a basis for generalisation or broad conclusions, because of a lack of quality and 
comparability of data and research methods. However, they do not home in on the 
recurring tendency to report positive impacts and guidelines for success. Yet, they come 
very close to an explanation when they observe the following biases in impact research: 
- the selection of favourable sites 
- a reliance on secondary government data, leading to overestimation of performance 
levels 
- the tendency to report the perspectives of stake holders in the outcome of transfer 
- the possibility that many authors are promoters of the reforms (Vermillion and 
Sagardoy, 1999). 
These conclusions are reinforced by a similar observation of Hales (1999) that authors 
who have written about radical decentralisation do so more as advocates than detached 
observers. It follows that the success of the Mexican IMT policy is construed through a 
set of culturally and ideologically biased practices that are shared and reproduced in a 
policy network. 
The cultural production of success 
The presentation of empirical evidence regarding the impacts of IMT is part and parcel of 
the cultural production of success. In this section I present a number of the cultural, 
aesthetic and ideological understandings, biases, and practices that are commonly used 
to validate and convey the success of the Mexican model. These serve to mobilise 
potential support for the model among targeted populations of policy makers in favour 
of reforms that are promoted by the policy network. By making an appeal to particular 
predominating cultural understandings, the policy model becomes credible, imaginable, 
forceful and replicable among epistemic communities of influential policy makers. Below, 
five typical ways of validating and representing success are discussed: firstly, the 
celebration of the speed and scale of reforms; secondly, the ambivalence about means 
and objectives; thirdly, the biased use of positive and quantitative data; fourthly, 
prescriptive evidence; fifthly, idealisations of actual practices associated with policy, 
theory and disdpline. 
Firstly, the speed and magnitude of the transfer as indicators of success are central to the 
policy model. From the second half of 1991 onwards, a 'fast track' was followed, which 
meant that the policy was carried out much faster and on a broader scale than originally 
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planned in the time-slice loan agreements with the World Bank in 1991 (see Chapter 3). 
Within a relatively short period of less than a presidential term of six years, the majority 
of irrigation districts in the country were transferred. This became a source of 
international status and prestige among policy makers13. The number of WUAs 
organised, the hectares transferred, the number of meetings convened are presented as 
evidence of success. Observers were also pleased that the WUAs demonstrated their 
ability to manage the modules, even the larger ones (Johnson, 1997a). The fact that they 
actually 'worked' was seen as a sign of success. 
Nevertheless, although the speed and scale of IMT is undoubtedly an impressive result 
for policy makers, it says little about actual policy outcomes. They do not guarantee 
positive impacts. The impact of fast and efficient implementation could just as easily be 
detrimental. Moreover, there were good reasons to opt for the gradual process of policy 
implementation that was originally planned, as many irrigation districts were believed 
not to be ready for various reasons (Castro, 1995; World-Bank, 1991). Hence, the 
accelerated speed of the transfer is mentioned as a cause for second-generation 
problems (Palacios-Vélez, 1997; World Bank, 2001) 1 4. Thus, while the tempo and 
magnitude of reforms may even have a negative impact on policy outcomes, 
nevertheless they create a certain prestige and status and nurture certain cultural 
standards for measuring success among ambitious bureaucrats, managers, and 
politicians. Hales (1999) also concludes that evidence of the increasing spread and 
popularity of new organisational forms cannot be considered as reliable evidence of their 
liberating effects, given that their adoption is as much prone to fashion, or expectations 
of institutional environments, as to considerations of effectiveness. 
Secondly, the ambivalence about the hierarchy of means and objectives of a policy in 
some cases produces self-validating arguments. For example, attaining a high degree of 
self-sufficiency is defined both as a requirement for, as weÜ as the evidence of, successful 
transfer. The means of a policy become ends in themselves. This implies that the 
implementation of a policy according to plan already makes it a success. A similar type of 
self-fulfilling prophecy occurs when the participation of water users is taken both as a 
means and as an objective of transfer. 
Thirdly, the presentation of positive quantitative evidence in connection with 
performance indicators validates the central message of success in different ways. Policy 
documents and impact studies tend to focus selectively on positive and neutral policy 
outcomes that are interpreted in a favourable manner. Policy makers and experts 
generally prefer to demonstrate the impact of IMT with quantitative 'facts and figures', 
because they appeal to positivist concerns of objectivity, neutrality and preciseness and 
confer authority (Stirrat, 2001; Wade, 1996). Another reason for this bias is an increasing 
call in the development field for 'evidence-based decision making7 and controls over 
decisions and performance, in what has been called the 'audit society' (McNeill, 2003). 
However, surprisingly firm, anecdotal, or normative conclusions are based on limited 
performance data, non-transparent survey techniques and questionable research 
methods. In most cases the data sets originate from the CNA and other sources within 
the policy network and are often difficult to check for reliability. In the absence of the 
presentation of significant data, statements such as 'results show...' or 'data suggest...' 
validate strong positive qualifications, such as that WUAs are managed 'well' or 
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'successfully'. In the absence of reliable measurement, surveys among water users are 
another way of validating the improvement of irrigation management performance. For 
example, a survey carried out in four districts indicates that eighty per cent of the 
interviewed farmers think water management by WUAs has permitted an improvement 
in agricultural production (Palacios-Vélez, 1997: 31). Furthermore, the absence of 
negative impacts is presented as a positive outcome, a powerful rhetorical technique. 
When it is clear that an increase of yields in Alto Rio Lerma cannot be attributed to the 
transfer, the fact that it did not result in yield declines is taken to be a positive outcome 
(Garcés-Restrepo, 2001). 
Fourthly, in policy and impact studies, policy, theory, and empirical evidence on policy 
outcomes and organisational practices are often mutually validating (Mosse, 1999; 
Palmer-Jones, 1995). The model is usually validated by neo-institutional theories on 
'aafting institutions for setf-governing irrigation systems' (Ostrom, 1992). This body of 
theory advances the essential role of water users in the design of successful irrigation 
management arrangements. A classic example of how policy, theory and empirical 
evidence can mutually validate each other is when user participation is presented as '.. .a 
way of bringing irrigation management into line with proven management theory' 
(Groenfeldt and Sun, 1997). The automatic connection that is made here between certain 
policies and success is telling. Below I present a number of examples and show how 
policy, theory, and disciplinary images of an ideal order validate the idea of success. 
In policy documents it is common to idealise actual user management in line with policy 
prescriptions. They often take the view that organisational practices correspond with 
formal rules (see Chapter 5). This rule conformity is then identified as an indicator of 
success, independent of outcomes. When water management institutions are evaluated 
in this manner, success becomes setf-fulfilling, defined in terms of the prescription of the 
model itself (Mosse, 1999). However, in practice rules are not always followed and, if 
they are, this does not necessarily assure positive outcomes. An example is the idea that 
Mexican water users pay their irrigation fees to the WUA before the first irrigation turn 
of the season. The conclusion follows that this ensures high fee collection rates, because 
farmers need to pay their fee before receiving any water flohnson, 1997a; Palacios-Vélez, 
1997; Vermillion, 1997). This is an understandable misconception, based on a rule 
formulated by the CNA in the by-laws of the WUA. However, it is not a generalised 
custom. In Chapter 10 I have shown that fee default is still a serious problem for WUAs. 
Many WUAs are still confronted with the practical difficulties of refusing irrigation turns 
to defaulting water users16. 
Another manner in which policy prescription shapes the production of empirical 
evidence is that qualitative evidence on improved WUA management or beneficial policy 
outcomes frequently contain a prescription in them. Outcomes or actual practices are 
rhetorically framed in the light of new objectives or future interventions. The latter need 
to be fulfilled in order to achieve desired outcomes and to make the success complete. 
Long-term success is just within reach, it seems, provided that a range of additional 
interventions are carried out, as the following quote illustrates. As a result, it is 
complicated to evaluate actual management practices, because of the expectations of 
future success that are evoked: 
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"Wiih increased O&M budgets including more funds for maintenance, 
and more responsive staff, the transfer program has created a situation 
that is much more sustainable than the situation in the irrigated sector 
prior to transfer. For long-term sustainability, there are additional 
changes that are required to ensure the program is sustainable over 
time. The system of water fees needs to be changed.... They also need to 
shift to a system where the module collects a fixed amount... as well as 
a volumetric fee....' Qohnson, 1997a: 28) 
In addition, the reference to theoretical or disdplinaiy ideas about 'best practices' also 
triggers the idealisation of organisational practices. These ideas are appealing and seem 
factual to the targeted audience because they refer to certain commonsensical theoretical 
understandings in the dominant clisdplines of economy, engineering and law. An 
example is the emergence of 'support systems' among WUAs (Garcés-Restrepo, 2001). 
Originally, this was never an objective of transfer and is sometimes questioned as an 
appropriate objective. Nevertheless, the fact that WUAs are taking over responsibilities 
previously provided by government agendes, such as agricultural extension services, 
technical assistance, legal matters and tiaining programmes, is seen as part of their 
success. This idea about success seems to originate in the fad that neo-institutional 
economics identifies the provision of external support services as a requirement for 
sustaining management organisations (FQoezen, 2002). 
A third way in which policy documents evoke success and so appeal to policy makers 
and experts is to call upon certain disdplinary images of an idealised order. Such images 
allude to cultural myths, acquired tastes and dreams of utter control among epistemic 
communities and within policy drdes (Chambers, 1988; Law, 1994). An example is the 
concept of volumetric water pricing to which the policy literature on the Mexican model 
refers (Gorriz et al., 1995; Johnson, 1997a; Plusquellec et al., 1994). The power of the 
concept lies in the future potential that international epistemic communities of 
hydrocrats, irrigation experts and donor offidals attribute to it. The idea of 
simultaneously delivering, measuring, and pricing the water per volume counts as a 
rational and modern form of irrigation that promises to materialise effident water use, 
exad cost recovery and increased net farm income (Gorriz et al., 1995; Johnson, 1997a; 
Plusquellec et al., 1994; Repetto, 1986; Vos, 2002). In an ideal hydraulic system of 
volumetric water control, users request water and are charged for the volume delivered 
at their intake. This creates a finanrial incentive not to apply more water than strictly 
needed. This potential solution to both technical and economic ineffidendes of water 
distribution is considered to be the desirable way forward. However, the approval that 
this idea evokes in the engineering and economic cUsdplines is more evident than its 
practicality on the ground. For most medium and large-scale irrigation districts in 
Mexico, it remains a promise and is not practical at all. The required infrastructure for 
volumetric delivery and measurement is not in place, or does not function as such. 
Moore (1989) argues that worldwide there are few cases documented of actual 
volumetric water pricing in large-scale gravity irrigation systems with many small 
farmers in developing countries (Bolding et al., 1995; Moore, 1989) 
Another image of idealised order stems from the emphasis on the creation of a 
supportive legal framework. However, in Mexico the National Water Law of 1992 was 
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more an outcome of the initial process of transfer and the experience gained during this 
period than a precondition to the transfer (see Chapter 3). 
Visualisation of the model 
The policy network has produced and distributed a large stream of cultural artefacts to 
promote IMT. Besides policy documents and other textual resources, audio-visual 
technologies, computer software and Internet applications have increased the 
persuasiveness and visibility of the policy model. These technologies circulated and 
increased the exposure of the model among target populations of politicians, 
technocrats, irrigation experts, and donor consultants. Once saved on disk or cassette, 
the model can easily and rapidly circulate by fax, electronic mail, and the Internet, 
making heavy suitcases with policy documents redundant (Latour, 1999). This sort of 
technology visualises the policy model through a number of appealing digitalised images 
of the Mexican experience, and thus allows increasingly large audiences to personally 
observe the model as something concrete and imagine similarly successful scenarios for 
other countries. 
For example, a video production with the telling title 'Participatory Irrigation 
Management: Seeing is Believing' was co-produced by the EDI and the CNA and 
presented to foreign policy makers and experts to promote the Mexican case and its 
lessons (EDI, 1995). With the rapidly alternating pictures, it is possible to present very 
graphic contrasts of the situation before and after IMT, therefore powerfully 
demonstrating its success. Selected pictures effectively stand for the larger promises and 
symbolise the idealised orders that IMT must fulfil: waving wheat implies productive 
irrigated agriculture; modern irrigation technologies stand for efficient irrigation; 
computers suggest transparency; and modern, light machinery demonstrates improved 
maintenance. In practice, however, these images are idealisations of actual managerial 
practices. Nevertheless, these carefully produced sets of images effectively evoke a 
sensation of success among audiences. 
Another example comes from a presentation of two World Bank/EDI officials who were 
promoting the benefits of PIM. In a PowerPoint presentation they showed different 
national cases of irrigation reforms, among which Turkey, Mexico and the Philippines. 
These countries were represented by strongly contrasting images of moving animals: 
from a speeding cheetah to a slowly creeping tortoise. The Mexican model was 
characterised as a 'Big Bang' and as innovative. I was impressed by the combined power 
of these words and images and amused by how this graphic contrast instantly identified 
the speedy with the successful. Also the audience had to laugh, but at the same time 
they were left dazzled and speechless by these crude but persuasive presentational 
devices. Nobody had the presence of mind to counter this powerful imagery with 
Aesop's fable of the hare and the tortoise. 
The cultural performance of success in policy events 
As mentioned earlier, the emergence of foreign interest in the Mexican model was not a 
spontaneous process, but the result of a concerted promotional effort within an 
emerging policy network. 
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These international policy events are analysed here as cultural performances that 
represent the success of the IMT model (Munro, 1999). They were carefully targeted, 
structured and arranged in order to appeal to a target group of key policy makers and 
persuade them to join in with 'the universal trend' to IMT/PIM. These events comprised 
intensive personal encounters with key policy makers during which the success of the 
Mexican model was performed through a mixture of formal sessions, study tours, and 
field visits to pilot areas. The effects of such encounters were substantial. The events 
proved enormously effective not only in terms of promoting and disseminating the 
policy model, but also in consolidating and expanding the policy network. 
The excitement, inspiration and altered opinions produced in policy makers resulted in a 
shift in policy agendas of several countries. As the slogan goes, 'Seeing is Believing' (EDI, 
1995; Groenfeldt, 1998): 
"Bringing policy makers into contact with PIM cases can be a powerful 
ingredient in swaying long-held opinions. Study tours, if carefully 
arranged and the right people are involved, can make dramatic differences 
in the outlooks of mdividual officials. During a one-year period (1992-
1993) when Turkey was considering an ambitious programme of 
accelerated IMT, nearly 50 senior officials visited Mexico (largely with 
World Bank financing) to see for themselves what a transfer programme 
looks like. Those visits have been credited with imparting both lessons as 
well as confidence that resulted in the government adopting a dramatic 
transfer programme in 1993.' (Groenfeldt, 1998:22) 
In the Turkish case mentioned in this quote, teams of political and administrative leaders 
and bureaucratic officials were carefully targeted to participate in these visits. This 
resulted in the Turkish government adopting an ambitious and speedy PIM programme 
(Groenfeldt, 1998). 
In February 1995, the EDI and the CNA jointly organised the aforementioned PIM 
training seminar of a week in Mexico (Gorriz and Groenfeldt, 1995). The audience 
consisted of national policy makers from India, Pakistan, Morocco, Egypt, Indonesia and 
World Bank task managers working in different regions of the world. The objectives of 
the seminar in Mexico were to learn and understand the Mexican experience and to 
study it as a case of best practice in PIM. Several elements were important in the 
promotion of the Mexican model: 
First of all, senior officials of authoritative institutions presented the policy model. The 
presentation of the Director of the EDI informed the participants about what the World 
Bank was expecting from countries in terms of future loans for the irrigation sector. 
Several CNA officials presented their views in their publicly acknowledged roles of 
reformers, or what later became known as 'champions'. Of course, the performance of 
these authoritative and respected senior figures added to the weight of the message 
conveyed. For the policy network, the group of Mexican 'reformers' turned out to be very 
instrumental in the promotion of the policy model. These public performances of 
reformers appeal to policy makers, experts and donors and can genuinely energise and 
incite an audience to take a model on as an exemplar. 
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Secondly, the success of the policy model was demonstrated by visits to privileged pilot 
areas. The districts first transferred in Mexico were also the most productive, commercial, 
and best organised. They had the most potential to become self-sufficient and thus had 
'higher chances of success' (Castro, 1995; Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999). The CNA 
started to organise Mexican study tours for water users' representatives and farmer 
leaders from other regions to these pilot areas in order to promote the transfer, and these 
significantly contributed to its acceleration. In this manner, the 'early successes' 
generated more support for the programme and facilitated the later and more difficult 
transfers (Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999) 1 8. At a later stage, the policy network brought 
the transfer in Mexico to the attention of foreign policy makers, World Bank officials, 
irrigation experts, by bringing them to these pilot areas. These privileged areas were 
believed to be typical for irrigation in Mexico (Gorriz and Groenfeldt, 1995). Foreign 
visitors had the tendency to generalise selective findings and to infer lessons for the 
country as a whole. The effect was that foreign policy makers departed from the field 
with the favourable image of the Mexican irrigation transfer as a broadly successful 
policy that would facilitate more modern, commercial and productive irrigation. 
Pilot projects are universally performed as a success in international policy networks. 
Chambers (1988) argues that these 'islands of salvation' are usually umepresentative, 
unlikely to be replicated and project certain myths in development. Nonetheless, they 
are much visited, quoted, and believed by policy-making officials, and thus have 
significant impacts. Chambers illustrates beautifully that the success of pilot projects is 
usually based on the selection of favourable conditions, preferential treatment, 
exceptional resources, and high-level official concern for success. This special attention 
makes it difficult to draw practical conclusions. He argues that the repetitive short visits 
of officials and researchers give rise to insights of uniform superficiality. A succession of 
visitors meets the same farmers, and they tell them similar things. What farmers say can 
be slanted, false, or rehearsed in advance. Visitors do not have the time to crosscheck 
findings, question biases, or perceive costs that offset the benefits that they are shown. 
They depart to their conferences where they repeat to each other their common 
misconceptions. A belief can gain currency that an approach is replicable and should be 
included in policy and plans (Chambers, 1988). In a similar vein, Mosse argues that the 
exceptional allocations of human and financial resources put into well-publicised pilot 
projects, together with the agency needs for good news stories, can conspire and give a 
misleading picture of the performance of the WUAs on a longer term, larger scale, and 
on closer examination (Mosse, 1999). 
Thirdly, the succession of consecutive seminar elements worked somewhat like a funnel. 
The participants were taken from field visits and presentations of the guidelines for 
successful transfer, towards the formulation of national action plans. The policy makers' 
positive excitement and inconsequential enthusiasm about the possible prospects of IMT 
for their country produced by the field visits and the presentations was skilfully 
channelled into commitment towards the desired policy reforms. At that moment 'handy 
check lists' of lessons from Mexico were convenient in activating the inspired policy 
makers and found them in a favourable disposition to work on the basis of these ideas. 
The guidelines were incorporated and adapted by teams of national policy makers to the 
specific situation of their country. The seminar in Mexico was followed by national 
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seminars and workshops in each country to finalise, implement, and evaluate national 
PIM action plans. 
10.4 Conclusions 
President Bush's mtriguing statement at the start of this chapter is a metaphor for a 
cultural orientation that is influential in international policy making. It points to the 
strong belief of policy makers that it is possible to replicate and capitalise on earlier 
successes. Although such a conviction might not correspond with the actual practice of 
policy interventions, it can be hugely powerful in the production and proliferation of 
policy models, best practices, and win-win situations, as well as in mobilising support for 
the international policy networks that sustain them. 
Following these insights, this chapter argued that the production and promotion of the 
Mexican policy model of IMT was a profoundly cultural undertaking. In addition, it 
illustrated how a policy network propagated the success of the Mexican case through a 
range of cultural means, practices, and events. As a result of these efforts, the model 
succeeded in predominating in the debates on irrigation reform. In retrospect, the policy 
network contributed to reordering political and bureaucratic power relations and 
domains of expertise. Further, it helped to redistribute financial resource flows to 
multilateral agencies and national governments engaged with irrigation. Alongside the 
neo-liberal political and economic forces that were exerted on policy makers to reform 
their irrigation policies and that effectuate such changes, I have suggested that there is 
also a cultural process at work that penetrates institutions and mobilises officials to take 
on and replicate policy models. 
The dominant status acquired by the Mexican model in the irrigation world was the 
outcome of the policy network's concerted effort to sustain it. The institutional capacity 
to produce and circulate a stream of cultural artefacts, such as policy documents and 
videos that conveyed the message of success to an increasing audience, was crucial. In 
addition, during international policy events the Mexican model was performed to 
convince influential policy makers. By means of this variety of cultural practices the 
success of the Mexican experience was narrated, validated, visualised, and performed. 
Such activities made it credible and appealing to an ever-larger group of trans-national 
policy makers and acquired their support. 
This chapter has pointed to the importance of analysing the cultural and ideological 
processes of policy making in contemporary international policy networks to understand 
how and why certain policies are pursued and become a success. Until recently, the role 
of multilateral agencies and that of national bureaucracies and policy-making elites in 
governing such processes has not been studied much. I propose that a cultural and 
constmctivist perspective on policy making would be suitable to take on this challenge. 
An interesting line of research that follows from this is the ethnographic study of policy 
in the making. Such an anthropology of the policy process would look at the 
performative and imaginative dimensions of policy making and analyse it as an ongoing 
process of cultural representation that takes place through a variety of social and material 
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means. It requires the development of new analytical devices and methodological tools, 
for which I have provided some initial ideas. 
Notes 
1 The ideas I use from this article are drawn from a draft with provisional page numbers. This draft 
paper was presented at the Advanced Research Seminar of CERES, Wageningen (8 May, 2003). If s title 
was: 'Re-presenting Development: Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice'. 
2 In this chapter the term 'success' is used so frequently, that using quotation marks every single 
time would be irritating. The reader is kindly requested to imagine them every time the term is used 
and not to take its meaning for granted. 
3 Those in academic and research institutions that held more informed views of what was 
happening in the field were often bureaucratically or ideologically tied to the CNA. 
4 The World Bank initiated the approach to participatory irrigation management (PIM), at a later 
stage institutionalised through an International Network on PIM ONPIM). The Mexican model became 
known as an international policy model for IMT or Tarticipatory Irrigation Management' (PIM). These 
two institutional labels refer to the same policy, though the first indicates the process and the second 
the desired outcome (Gorriz et al., 1995; Groenfeldt, 1998). Henceforth, I shall mainly refer to IMT, but 
also imply PIM. 
5 For other uses of the concept of policy network see: Sutton, 1999; Teichman, 1995. 
6 This term is a contraction of hydraulic bureaucrats or technocrats and is used here to refer to 
engineers working in water bureaucracies. 
7 The CNA came under the jurisdiction of the SARH from 1989-94. Since 1994 it has come under 
the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries. 
8 The World Bank experimented with a time-slice loan financing a governmenfs full irrigation, 
drainage and flood control sector programme for a specified number of years. For the World Bank this 
was an important innovation compared to traditional project loans, as it provided more scope for policy 
dialogue and made it possible to reassess investment priorities and redirect financial flows. 
9 EDI provides most external training for the World Bank on high priority policy issues. 
1 0 On several occasions these officials have warned against exaggerated expectations from 
replicating the Mexican model in other parts of the world and point to the specific conditions in which 
the policy worked in Mexico. Notwithstanding this, the policy network persisted in asking them to 
explain the Mexican model at policy conferences. 
1 1 Vermillion and Sagardoy consider management transfer to be successful if it saves the 
government money, improves the cost-efficiency of O&M, and maintains or increases the productivity 
of irrigated agriculture, and achieves financial and infrastructural sustainability (Vermillion and 
Sagardoy, 1999). Other objectives that are mentioned are to reduce the number of public employees in 
the irrigation districts (Johnson, 1997b), and the participation of water users in irrigation management 
through financially autonomous and administratively independent bodies (Poder-Ejecutivo-FederaL 
1989: 77). 
1 2 This appears from a contribution of Dr Trava in the electronic forum on IMT of the FAO 
(September 2001): 1 think we have spent a lot of time talking about the different ways to approach IMT 
(or PIM) or to develop the needed actions to make the program successful but in the meanwhile we 
have lost some perspective on what the overall idea is all about. The overall and basic idea in the end is 
to achieve a productive (socially and economically speaking) agricultural sector*. 
1 3 Between 1990 and 1994 the CNA transferred nearly 2.5 million hectares, roughly three-quarters of 
the total irrigated surface in Mexico (CNA, 1994). See also the section on the visualisation of the model 
below. 
1 4 It is very likely that the international celebration of the Mexican policy model and the prestige it 
created for the political regime and the CNA reinforced this trend of acceleration (see Chapter 3). 
1 5 These surveys are often strongly biased and a questionable basis for making statements about the 
quality of maintenance. It is not uncommon for questionnaires to be administered by canaleros (people 
in charge of distributing water at the field level), or other people who can be identified with the WUA, 
the bureaucracy, or the government in general. This, the strongly biased questions, and the context in 
which they are asked, are all likely to lead to tendentious responses. 
1 6 After a first irrigation turn, it is forbidden by Mexican law subsequently to refuse water to the crop. 
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1 7 For an exception, see Vos, 2002. 
1 8 These privileged districts became pilot areas for international missions organised by the policy 
network. Initially, the CNA wanted to demonstrate the preliminary successes, i.e. the advances with 
the transfer policy. This was important for settling and executing the loan agreement. See Chapter 3. 
11 
Conclusions 
11.1 The Practice of User Management and Outcomes of LMT 
The advocates of decentralisation and neo-institutional theory predicted that irrigation 
management transfer (IMT) would systematically reduce public irrigation expenditure; 
achieve financial self-sufficiency, managerial autonomy and accountability; and improve 
infrastractural sustainability, irrigation management performance and productivity. 
Nevertheless, the case study of the Left Bank irrigation system shows that IMT has 
produced an ambiguous set of changes and continuities. This becomes evident in the 
comparison of the theory with the practice and outcomes of IMT: 
One of the major objectives of the Mexican government in initiating IMT was the 
reduction of public investment in irrigation management. The transfer of management of 
the irrigation system and a subsequently higher degree of cost recovery by water users' 
associations (WUAs) brought about this public reduction in irrigation expenditure. Since 
IMT, fee collection rates have risen. The Left Bank WUA improved the recovery of 
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs and achieved a high degree of self-sufficiency 
within a few years of initiation. However, in spite of the policy objectives, IMT has not 
led to complete self-sufficiency and the concern exists that this problem will persist or 
even become worse. In addition, institutional efforts to increase fee collection have 
interlocked the WUA into a network of new dependencies on the agro-industry, subsidy 
providers and producer elites that challenges the meaning of 'financial autonomy' and its 
automatic connection with improved performance (see Chapter 9). 
Despite the improved cost recovery of the WUA, it is uncertain what this means for its 
long-term viability and infrastractural sustainability. High financial self-sufficiency on 
the part of the WUA does not at all automatically imply the infrastructural viability of a 
module. In Chapter 71 have argued that maintenance is a particularly useful entry point 
to analyse the functioning and viability of irrigation systems. Maintenance improvements 
are undeniable, but they are selective and exclude particular areas and producer groups 
in the tail-end, as they fall outside the political constituency of the group in control of the 
WUA The partial improvement can mainly be attributed to an increased and more 
adequate machine capacity, longer working days, and direct control over budgets and 
revenues for maintenance. However, because these machines are also a scarce and 
highly strategic asset for which there is high demand and a variety of uses in and around 
irrigation systems, their use is very intensive, which leads to breakdowns and high repair 
costs. Further, the question is whether the partially improved maintenance can be 
sustained in the longer run, given the frequent disrepair of the machinery and the 
continuing deterioration of the infrastructure. Deferred maintenance increases, because 
the annual fee increase does not keep up with monetary inflation. A high degree of self-
sufficiency therefore does not secure adequate investment in (deferred) maintenance. It 
can also not reverse the fact that a major rehabilitation has never taken place before or 
after the transfer, something that will become a problem in the longer run. 
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There is also little evidence of an improvement in system performance and an increase in 
efficiency of water use. WUA management has not significantly improved water 
distribution. Admittedly, the improvement in maintenance services seems to have led to 
a higher responsiveness of irrigation services to farmers' water demands, particularly in 
the neglected downstream areas. For the rest, there exists considerable continuity in 
allocation and distribution practices before and after IMT. This continuity lies in the 
persistence of a service relation in which a professional group of canaleros (people in 
charge of distributing water at the field level) and largely unmodified social and 
technological arrangements mediate between the irrigation institution and the irrigating 
constituency. 
Further, this study has not found evidence of agricultural and economic productivity 
improvements as a result of IMT. It has shown no significant increase in area irrigated, 
cropping intensity, yields, or gross economic returns. Of course, this is partly related to 
the crisis in agriculture, and particularly to the decline of tobacco production in Nayarit 
over the last decade and a half, but that still does not validate a causal connection 
between IMT and a productivity increase. Finally, in contrast to the participatory policy 
rhetoric, a low level of direct participation on the part of water users and their 
representative delegates occurs in the WUA. This is upheld by the fmding in this study 
that the formal financial and elective accountability relations that theory and policy 
assume are generally weak in practice. 
Hence, on the Left Bank, IMT did not produce an unambiguous pattern of 
improvements. Reduced government expenditure, improved fee collection rates and 
maintenance services are undoubtedly important partial arguments for daiming that the 
IMT policy has had positive outcomes. However, the reported outcomes on self-
sufficiency, water distribution, productivity, and infrastructural sustainability are neutral 
to negative. The doubt remains as to whether realising short-term finandal objectives 
guarantees sustainable and productive irrigation districts in the long run. The most 
cynical interpretation, which does insufficient justice to the achievements of the policy, is 
that IMT, stripped to its core, means a decentralisation of the costs and problems of 
public irrigation management and a more effective centralisation and accumulation of 
revenues in the hydraulic bureaucracy1. 
In this thesis I have explained the above-described ambiguous pattern as follows. A local 
political group occupied the prindpal functions in the WUA and used it as a platform. 
Through the WUA, the group mobilised a variety of resources, personnel and facilities to 
organise a political campaign with the aim of launching its president onto the munidpal 
peasant committee, CMC. From the WUA, the group distributes favours and privileged 
access to strategic resources to politically influential adors and producer groups in order 
to canvass financial and political support and build an electoral coalition. In this manner, 
they have expanded their support base in order to establish themselves politically in the 
munidpal capital and possibly wilhin the state government. Access to the WUA as the 
platform from which the group acts thus enables the organisation of a campaign and the 
cultural performance of a series of election events, and this results in an electoral vidory 
and the career advancement of the WUA president. 
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Hence, the transfer of irrigation management has opened up new opportunities for local 
groups to advance their political project and new paths for political ascension by opening 
up to them organisational control over local resources. This affects the way in which 
public resources are managed, but also generates new locations of power in the rural 
political landscape of a region. My contention is not that IMT has generally led to the use 
of WUAs as political platforms, the political appropriation of its resources, or that the 
influence of politics over irrigation management is necessarily always detrimental. 
However, my argument is that these are phenomena occurring much more broadly than 
is currently acknowledged, and this substantially affects the outcomes of IMT. Later in 
this chapter I will therefore argue that, in this respect, the Left Bank WUA is not at all an 
isolated case. 
11.2 Discrepancy Between the Policy's Proclaimed Success and its Practice 
The most remarkable feature of the IMT policy is the immense contrast between its 
nationally and internationally acclaimed success as a policy model and its ambiguous 
results and politically contested practice in Mexico's irrigation districts (see also Chapter 
10). In a similar fashion, Pollitt (1995) argues that, in spite of the broadly prodaimed 
success of New Public Management (NPM) reforms, the underpinnings of their 
reputation are actually quite fragile. The paradox is that while the NPM doctrine insists 
that public services must invest much more heavily in the currency of measurable 
outputs, some fundamental aspects of NPM reforms themselves appear to have 
remained almost immune to such requirements. The limited existing evaluations are 
almost uniformly positive. Hence, despite its general call for evaluation, there have been 
relatively few broad-scope evaluations of NPM polides with an adequate set of 
methodologies. However, what explains this discrepancy between the policy rhetoric and 
the practice of transfer? 
Firstly, it is the result of 'escape hatches' between political decision making and 
bureaucratic implementation or technical irrigation management, through which policy 
makers can avoid responsibility (Clay and Schaffer, 1984). Policy analysis is typically 
based on the description of a gap between a desired and an actual state of affairs, or 
between theory and practice. This tension induces the necessity for a set of policy-
engineered interventions with specified objectives to dose the gap. The Mexican policy 
model is therefore structured as a black box that transforms a government-managed 
disorder into a new equilibrium of user management, which inevitably leads to success. 
Secondly, this discrepancy occurs because policy making sets out what inescapably 
ought to be done and what stands to reason, rather than providing informative and 
descriptive accounts of actual practices or outcomes 'telling it as it is' (Apthorpe, 1986; 
Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996). The limited empirical description of actual processes of 
transfer and user management practices is usually selective and biased, and tends to 
confirm the central propositions of the model. The adoption of polides is usually also not 
informed by validated expedations about enhanced performance, but enhanced through 
other practices and performances. Hence, policy models are generally poor analytical 
tools for understanding actual organisational practices, events and effects, on the one 
hand, and the making and proliferation of policy, on the other. 
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Thirdly, many policy approaches work to conceal the political nature of governing public 
infrastructure and natural resource management, for example by concefving 
decentralisation as a way of providing an enabling environment for effective service 
provision, which is understood as an essentially technical task. A particularly effective 
aspect of neo-liberal policy discourse, as exemplified in the case of IMT, is the way in 
which it de-politicises what is actually to a large extent a painful cost-cutting operation. 
The discourse glorifies those policies and its advocates in a language and an imagery that 
are full of a kind of heroic euphoria: rolling back the state', 'champions of reform', 
'strong government commitmenf, 'win-win situations', 'self-sufficiency', and 'the fast 
track of policy implementation'. The use of this discourse and imagery is closely linked to 
the celebration of success. It obscures several things that could potentially falsify the 
model, for example the politically contested nature of the IMT policy, the renewed 
autonomy for the hydraulic bureaucracy as an outcome of IMT and a prolonged 
bureaucratic struggle, and the political use of the WUAs and their resources. 
Success is therefore not a verifiable claim that is systematically validated with 
straightforward empirical evidence by neutral researchers. Instead, as argued in Chapter 
10, the success of a policy model is only a success within the cultural and ideological 
understandings and practices of researchers wimin a wider policy network. This makes it 
hard to refute the model or deny its success. It burdens one with the immense task of 
falsifying the work of a whole policy network whose coherence rests on this idea. 
An interesting understanding of the discrepancy results when I apply James Ferguson's 
(1990) argument about the development discourse in Lesotho to the IMT policy 
discourse: Policy making institutions generate their own form of discourse, and this 
discourse simultaneously constructs 'the irrigation sector' as a particular kind of object of 
knowledge and creates a structure of knowledge around that object. Policies are then 
organised on the basis of this structure of knowledge, and, although they fail on their 
own terms, they have regular effects that include the expansion and entrenchment of 
bureaucratic state power, side by side with the projection of economic and social life that 
denies 'politics' and suspends its effects. The network of institutions that make irrigation 
policy thus works as an 'anti-politics machine' that places political realities out of view 
but performs, almost unnoticed, the pre-eminently political operation of the expansion 
and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power (Ferguson, 1990: xiv). Hence, policy 
discourses have both institutional effects (mamtaining relations of power) and 
ideological effects (de-politicisation). The institutional side effects of the IMT policy, such 
as the concentration of bureaucratic powers and resource flows under a single water 
authority (see Chapter 2), are whisked out of sight through technical discourses that 
naturalise poor irrigation performance under public management, objectify irrigation 
reform as an inevitable response to economic crisis, and de-politicise user management. 
Although this reading is a very convincing interpretation of the discrepancy between 
success and the political practice of irrigation policy and management, there are three 
differences with how I approached this question, which Mosse (2003) handily sums up 
for me: Firstly, Ferguson takes the failure of development interventions as self-evident, 
whereas it is success that is clearly at the centre of this case. Secondly, he does not go 
beyond the instrumentality of policy but merely substitutes the stated policy goals with a 
set of real, unintended ends or effects, and the instrumental rationality of policy with the 
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anonymous automaticity of the machine. Thirdly, his view does not do justice to the 
complexity of policy making as an institutional practice and its relation to actual 
irrigation management, nor to the creativity and skill involved in negotiating the 
effectuation of user management and the making of models, which recriares the 
enrolment of a multiplicity of interests, points of view, intentions and strategies (Mosse, 
2004). 
Ferguson fails to examine the way in which a policy discourse becomes embodied and at 
the same time contested through concrete social and material practices, all of which 
influence how the policy develops, is sustained, and produces various, sometimes 
contradictory, outcomes. This requires the study of the processes through which the 
social behaviour of real life actors in connection with the organisations, resources and 
technologies at stake actually change or is reproduced in relation to the policy process 
and other ongoing processes. In this thesis I have explored such interconnected 
processes not only by studying the articulation of reforms (Chapter 2), the engineering of 
a policy package (Chapter 3), and the making of a policy model (Chapter 10), but also by 
documenting what the policy discourse actually means at the daily level of irrigation 
management by means of an organisational ethnography of a WUA (Chapters 4 to 9). 
Studying the making both of policy and of organisation creates remarkable insights into 
the complex connections between policy and practice. For example, originally the policy 
discourse indicated a concern regarding the lack of infrastructural viability of irrigation 
districts as one of the main reasons behind IMT (see Chapter 2). Chapter 3 indicates how 
the IMT policy only really became practical through a policy package made up of 
particular technologies of governance developed by the Comisión Nacional del Agua 
(CNA). In combination with increasing political and financial pressure and a selective 
distribution of resources, this contributed to reducing and removing resistance to the 
transfer, and consequently led to the acceleration of the transfer process. It is very likely 
that the international celebration of the Mexican policy model and the prestige it created 
for the political regime and the CNA also reinforced this trend of acceleration (see 
Chapter 3). However, the fast track of policy implementation did not unambiguously 
contribute to infrastructural viability of the irrigation districts (see Chapter 10), since it 
led to a skewed distribution of rehabilitation and maintenance resources. The districts 
that were later transferred after this acceleration, often less modern and more in need of 
rehabilitation, did not receive the same resources for rehabilitation as the already 
historically privileged, more modern and better maintained, and earlier transferred 
districts, that are mainly located in the North and Northwest of Mexico (see Chapter 3). 
This has led to the paradox that, on the one hand, the fast track of policy implementation 
was interpreted as a sign of success, whereas in practice it produced reverse effects for 
the infrastructural viability of all irrigation districts in Mexico. 
On the Left Bank and probably in other districts that were transferred at a later stage, 
this pattern resulted in an emphasis on new maintenance machinery for solving the 
problem of deferred maintenance. This machinery played an important role in 
convincing selected local leaders to accept the transfer that they had initially resisted (see 
Chapter 4). Subsequently, the machinery became a source of conflict between those 
leaders and a political tool for the group that took charge of the WUA. This intimately 
affected the further organisational course of the WUA. In addition, it influenced the way 
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in which the machinery especially improved maintenance in the central part of the 
irrigation district that belonged to the political constituency of the leading group in the 
WUA and partially excluded the tail-end section from such benefits (Chapter 7). These 
contradictory outcomes cannot be sufficiently explained by looking at the institutional 
and ideological effects of the IMT policy discourse. What is required is the study of the 
social and material practices that make up actual policy and organisational processes. 
Hence, perhaps rather surprisingly, but with a touch of irony, I concur with the 
viewpoint that the Mexican IMT model is a success! However, it is based on very 
different grounds than might be expected and is a choice that reveals the political nature 
of success. I take success not as reflecting an unambiguous improvement in practice, 
process or outcomes on the ground, but rather for what its policy model achieved 
nationally and internationally: Throughout the 1990s, the policy model has had an 
enormous evocative and mobilising power in terms of promoting IMT/PIM (participatory 
irrigation management) among policy makers, researchers, experts and financiers and 
their institutions around the world. Retrospectively, the policy model has an impressive 
record in terms of playing a key role in the resumption of loans for the hydraulic 
bureaucracy, reordering bureaucratic sources and flows of power, finance, and expertise 
involved in irrigation, exemplified in the reconstitution of a hydraulic bureaucracy and 
the formation of an international policy network promoting IMT/PIM policies. This again 
contributed to changing international agendas for irrigation reform, aligning political 
will, bureaucratic and financial support for such policies, and so on. By means of a range 
of practices, means and events, the IMT policy model was culturally constructed in a way 
that made it convincing, credible, imaginable and appealing to an ever-larger group of 
trans-national policy makers, to bring them and their institutions together and mobilise 
their support, funding and expertise. 
11.3 The Political Opportunities Opened Up by Neo-liberal Policy 
Irrigation management transfer, like other neo-liberal policies that affect control over 
public resources, creates new political opportunities, platforms and patterns of political 
ascendancy. My organisational ethnography has specifically demonstrated how the Left 
Bank WUA became entangled in the regional politics of the state of Nayarit and how its 
personnel, facilities and resources were mobilised for the purpose of an election 
campaign in culturally and historically specific ways. It has not been my idea to argue 
that the Left Bank is a typical case representative of all other WUAs in Mexico. Instead, 
through this case study I have developed an original perspective on the organisation of 
resource politics and a sensitivity for its cultural aspects that allows me to look at similar 
cases and developments through a distinct lens and thus create insights that are relevant 
far beyond the boundaries of this case. Below I will indicate why the Left Bank is not an 
isolated case, firstly by identifying similar cases of WUAs in the literature, and secondly 
by identifying comparable phenomena that occur in the Mexican countryside as a 
response to neo-liberal policies of state disengagement. 
The following authors observe similar phenomena occurring in WUAs to those which I 
have documented, although they vary from my perspective in three ways. Firstly, the first 
two authors use a rather mechanical state-centred model of state-society interactions 
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dominated by particular corporatist and political relations, and this dictates which actors 
they see as empowered by the transfer and how this transforms the existing political 
landscape. Secondly, they do not fully analyse the implications for resource allocation. 
The third author does to some extent, but fails to review the political impact. Thirdly, the 
lack of a cultural perspective in the work of these authors seems to preclude identifying a 
possible diversity of outcomes. 
According to Torregrosa Armentia (1998), the transfer of irrigation districts to WUAs has 
generated power lacunae that become potential areas for the reconstitution of lost power 
and former strength. Traditional political groups and corporatist factions, that were 
removed and lost power as a consequence of neo-liberal government policies, see these 
new power lacunae and will try to reconstitute their control over the users in the 
irrigation districts and their negotiation space vis-à-vis public institutions. In a broad 
review of socio-economic and political changes in nine large-scale transferred districts, 
Torregrosa Armentia takes the perspective of the diminishing power of traditional 
corporatist organisations as her starting point. She observes that the weakening of the 
ejido2 as an institution and the corporately organised ejido commissioners make these 
social-political factions search for their reinsertion and reproduction in other 
environments of local, regional and national influence, such as for example municipal 
presidencies, Sanidad Vegetal, and WUAs. For these groups, it means the reconstitution 
of their power space by means of clientelistic allocation and distribution of resources 
associated with the administration, distribution and control of water for agricultural 
production. Several of these groups have succeeded in consolidating themselves on the 
boards of directors of WUAs, supported by their federal corporatist networks, and 
reconstituting their political power through the control of water. The consequence is that 
water users distrust the WUAs and have withdrawn from participation because they do 
not feel represented by them. The danger that Torregrosa Armentia sees is that in the 
medium term these spaces will become the usufruct of a small fraction of producers, and 
not the spaces of interest representation and participation in decision making for the 
larger collective of water users. One of the specific cases to which she refers is the 
irrigation district at the Coast of Hermosillo (051) in North-western Sonora (Torregrosa 
Armentia 1998: 238). She observes that the management of the WUAs is completely 
interwoven with a major producer association (Asociación de Agricultores del Norte de 
Sonora). The tasks and functions of the WUAs are not clearly delimited, and therefore 
there is no separation between water management and production, the board members 
are the same, the locality and infrastructure are shared, and the provision of marketing 
inputs and loans is integrated (Torregrosa, 1998). 
The findings of Vargas Velazquez et al. (2000) also bolster my case. They identify the 
WUAs as privileged and contested political spaces for negotiation with government 
institutions and for the advancement of candidates to electoral positions. The WUAs 
have become an alternative space of intermediary power between the government and 
the users. Moreover, the WUAs constitute a privileged space of negotiation, from which 
producer groups can demand resources and programmes for the rural sector from 
government institutions, and from which their management have increased their 
influence and their local political networks. The main political parties, Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party), Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution) and Partido Acción 
310 The Success of a Policy Model 
Nacional (PAN: National Action Party) made systematic attempts to take possession of 
the leading positions on the boards of the WUAs, to use these public spaces as political 
platforms to launch candidates for local or federal positions of popular election. These 
parties attempted to control or influence the WUA boards, as the water that they control 
is the most important agricultural input in the region. Hence, WUAs have become 
politically contested spaces that can be used for the advancement of political careers. 
From the perspective of state-farmer relations, the authors review the transfer of the 
large-scale Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district (Oil) to ten WUAs, which together have 
formed ah overarching society of limited liability (SRL). They show that the new WUAs 
have gained ground and a certain degree of autonomy and helped to eliminate the 
traditional hegemony of corporatist organisations and their form of representation of 
peasant interests. The old corporatist organisations were not functional to the state 
anymore, as it needed to integrate new actors, such as rural producers with a capacity to 
compete on the market, agro-industrial companies, and local PRI committee members. 
For the government and for rural producers, the corporatist organisations were no longer 
the privileged interlocutors for resource allocation and political representation in 
irrigation districts and at present there exist multiple producer organisations that do not 
operate along corporatist lines (Vargas Velazquez et al., 2000). With the transfer of 
irrigation management, another organisational form of rural producers is added to the 
spectrum of organisations that represent the interests of irrigating peasants and rural 
producers vis-a-vis government institutions. This implies a rearrangement of forces and 
a readjustment of the forms of intermediation between the state and rural producers 
(Vargas Velazquez et al., 2000). For the leadership of a WUA, these emergent 
organisational spaces open up access to new political constituencies, adrninistrative 
resource flows, government programmes, infrastructure, and strategic assets such as 
machinery. 
According to the authors of this study, the importance of the modules as a political space 
was most evident in two of the four modules analysed: Abasólo and Salvatierra, where 
conflicts emerged between different groups supported by political parties to gain control 
over the positions on the WUAs' boards or to replace the current board. In the case of 
Salvatierra, a member of the board of the WUA successfully launched himself as a 
candidate for the local municipal presidency for the PRD. What was thought to be 
essential by an informed government official was the political use of a wide network of 
relations with local organisations, such as ejido unions, agricultural associations and 
societies of rural production that could be co-ordinated and accessed from the WUA. 
Further, the WUA gained a central role in the organisation and provision of additional 
services to users, such as fertilisers, machines, and the levelling of land. Kloezen also 
reports on the political struggles within the Salvatierra WUA, where the WUA president 
from a well-to-do family with connections in the PRI had gained political leverage in the 
town of Salvatierra because his brother became mayor (Kloezen, 2002:130-131). At the 
end of 1995, when his term ended his position was increasingly challenged by political 
accusations of financial mismanagement and corruption. Although he received support 
from within the PRI and the CNC (national peasant committee), he was forced to accept 
one of his critics as vice-president and general manager. At a later stage, the vice-
president succeeded him as president and successfully used the WUA as a political 
platform to win the elections for mayor of Salvatierra (Vargas Velazquez et al., 2000). 
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Monsalvo Velazquez (1999) concludes, with respect to WUAs in the Alto Rib Lerma 
(010) and the Laguna Districts (017), that in many cases land and water resources are 
concentrating in the hands of a person or a company that controls and starts to demand 
'cuota de voder' (power quota) in the political field. 
Palacios Vêlez (1997) also observes some cases in which those occupying positions on 
the board use the WUA as a springboard to political positions. He refers to one case in 
particular in Valle de Banderas on the Southern Coast of Nayarit. According to 
representatives of this association, WUA funds were used for a political campaign. Such 
actions disrupted O&M and threatened the very existence of the association. A group of 
water users requested an independent investigation, because the former president of the 
WUA used this position to launch himself as municipal president of the neighbouring 
town. Because of the funds that he diverted, he left the WUA with a large debt3. 
Nevertheless, the CNA state representative did not intervene. There was the danger that 
as municipal president the president of the WUA would put pressure on the state 
government to transfer him (see also Chapter 9). This type of investigation should not 
too easily be understood as a sign of accountability, but rather as a weapon of a 
competing alliance for organising support to remove the sitting board and occupy the 
vacated positions. Hence they are often triggered as part of a struggle for power and 
spoils (cf. Wade, 1982:310). 
By reviewing comparable processes of state disengagement in resource management that 
took place in the region and in Mexico, we can also see that neo-liberal policy creates 
political contest over, and use of, organisational spaces and resources and that this is not 
specific to IMT. Snyder (1999) argues that, by vacating institutionalised policy domains, 
neo-liberal reforms give political incumbents opportunities to expand their authority and 
support bases. In an article about the deregulation of the Mexican coffee market and the 
dismantling of the state-owned enterprise Inmecafe, he shows that this triggered 
politically motivated institution building, driven not by technical or market exigencies 
but by ambitious exigencies looking to control these policy areas vacated by state 
downsizing. The distributive effects of this policy generated powerful incentives for 
political action. The possibility to distribute favours, privileged access, and individual 
exceptions to rules, similar to that which I have described in the preceding chapters, 
generates resources by which to govern, build political support and compete for power 
(Snyder, 1999: 177). These kinds of political processes also emerged in similar cases of 
decentralisation in agricultural institutions in Nayarit. For example, Chapter 8 highlights 
the political role of ARIC in Nayarit that emerged after the dismantling of the parastatal, 
Tabamex. As a tobacco producers' organisation, ARIC became an important financier of 
the electoral campaigns of PRI candidates for the governorship. In addition, it enjoyed 
political influence in many tobacco-producing ejidos and municipalities and was 
occasionally allocated, by the PRI, the political post of deputy in these regions on the 
coast of Nayarit. From the situational analysis in that chapter it also became evident that 
a relatively new organisation like Sanidad Vegetal, entrusted with the former government 
task of crop hygiene, is involved in the political struggle between producer organisations 
and the political control of the state government over the marketing of large quantities of 
beans, shattering all promises and hopes of free trade. 
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For several decades now, the corporatist peasant organisations have no longer been the 
privileged interlocutors for resource allocation and the political representation of rural 
producers vis-a-vis government institutions, the agro-industrial enterprises and other 
forces. As a result of a retreat of the state apparatus and a decline in corporatism, we see 
the upsurge of a range of new forms of power and authority. At present, there exist 
multiple organisations that represent demands and forms of participation that do not 
operate along corporatist lines (Vargas Velazquez et al., 2000). Like other types of 
producer organisations, WUAs occupy the institutionalised policy domains that neo-
liberal reforms have vacated, they constitute new spaces to represent producers, and 
they acquire control over an organisational and physical network for resource allocation. 
The political and producer elite groups that frequently come to dominate these user 
organisations are in a favourable position to appropriate these resources by generating 
and sustaining political support among electoral constituencies. Under such 
circumstances, these political incumbents are able to convert a WUA into a platform that 
enables an alternative pattern of political ascendancy. As a result, the WUAs become 
public institutions that are uniquely placed to articulate positions of power and political 
affiliation, provide opportunities to challenge authority, and canvass political support 
(Mosse, 1999: 326). In addition, the WUAs appear to have a remarkable potential to co-
ordinate the wider network of rural organisations and concentrate, control and allocate 
resource flows, facilities and services that are essential to irrigated agriculture. Further, 
the organisation of irrigation districts and water users and the concentration of resources 
and power are subsumed under the direct or more distant control of the hydraulic 
bureaucracy. This provided a basis for its reconstitution and its autonomy from the 
agricultural and the environmental bureaucracy (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
Hence, WUAs are a crucial case for studying the powerful entanglements of resource 
allocation, producer organisation, bureaucracy and politics. Furthermore, they are a 
convergence point for a form of heterogeneous control over people, resources, and 
infrastructure, which is not necessarily located within the state, but also does not 
singularly represent market forces or civil society. To understand such interconnections, 
it is necessary to transcend conventional state-centred models, public-private and state-
sodety dichotomies. 
When the wider pattern of outcomes that these authors observe is reviewed, it is not so 
evident that one particular type of political ador will necessarily appropriate the new 
organisational spaces vacated by IMT and other decentralisation polides - corporatist 
groups, political parties, former government offidals, agro-industrial enterprises, ejidos, 
producer assodations, or possibly alliances between such groups? And it is also 
uncertain for how long such groups or alliances can control these organisations and how 
far-reaching their influence will become over politics and the reconstitution of the rural 
political landscape. This depends on many factors and requires further research. 
Again, a policy like IMT does not produce a homogeneous but a diverse pattern of 
outcomes, as Long and van der Ploeg have argued (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). 
Central and often overlooked elements in the realisation of such uneven outcomes are 
the structural discontinuities or interfaces between for example policy makers and 
farmers (Long, 2001), the heterogeneity in political culture between regions (Rubin, 
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1990), and the nature of local social organisation and how it links with regional and 
national centres of power (Enge and Whiteford, 1989). This is not to reify culture, power 
or politics as unchangeable and inescapable realities, cast in concrete or fixed in genes, 
but to acknowledge the persistance of political and cultural patterns in human 
behaviour, as well as the cÜfferentiation and heterogeneity in relations of power. The 
political opportunities that IMT opens up are appropriated and the WUA's resources 
mobilised by political actors who pursue a rational strategy to gain power and wield 
authority. They do so, however, according to culturally and historically specific ways, not 
according to the universal rational behaviour that the neo-institutional theory underlying 
the IMT model presumes. 
11.4 An International Workshop 
Several of my findings and their analytical interpretation were confirmed during an 
international workshop on drainage organised by the World Bank at the end of 2002.1 
attended the presentation of one of the senior CNA officials, who had been closely 
involved in the actual initiation and organisation of the transfer. As a civil engineer, he 
was part of the influential team of planners that managed the CNA during its first 
presidential term under the Ministry of Agriculture, SARH. Before his presentation, in 
the corridors he confirmed his own role in deciding upon the transfer and stated that 
they had come up with the idea, which President Salinas subsequently 'boughf (see 
Chapter 2). He recalled that the whole project had been very difficult, but that they had 
had very good results. 
In relation to the Alto Rio Lerma district (Oil), the former CNA official remarked that it 
was an example for the rest of the country, because of the hundreds of meetings that had 
been organised to convince the users about transfer. The decision was finally made at a 
meeting with all the top leaders of various parties - there were even representatives of 
the Communist Party there. It was clear to the leaders that the CNA were in favour of 
transfer. An old man asked him whether this meant that they would be able to dismiss 
canaleras. He confirmed this and the leader responded by saying that, if that were true, 
he would immediately sign. The official immediately walked towards this person and 
asked him to sign a paper. In the end, the leaders approved the transfer, in spite of the 
fact that they also had to accept a large fee increase (see Chapter 3). 
Although the official's PowerPoint presentation concerned a research project on 
drainage, the audience of international officials, consultants and researchers had a great 
interest in knowing about the IMT experience, and it became evident that the Mexican 
model was still thought of as relevant to contemporary water management issues (see 
Chapter 10). There was a perceptible respect among the audience for the fact that the 
official stood at the base of this policy. One of those attending asked the former CNA 
official what the main 'drivers' were behind the political will for the transfer in Mexico. 
He responded that there were several: to start with, 'the love and care for our country and 
the irrigation systems'. He explained that the irrigation systems were destroyed when the 
CNA fell under the Ministry of Agriculture. The way to solve this was to transfer the 
districts and to give the WUAs autonomy and their own resources (see Chapter 2). 
Irrigation was behind other sectors in this respect. The banks and CFE (Comisión Federal 
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de Electricidad: Federal Electricity Commission) were already privatised, but in the 
irrigation districts they still had more than 40,000 canaleros. After the transfer this 
number was reduced to 4,000. 'Imagine the problems when we had negotiations with the 
trade unions', he remarked. People laughed. Another important driver was self-
sufficiency. For this the size of the WUA was important. They have to be of a certain size, 
the largest are 20,000 hectares and the average is around 5,000 hectares. He reminded 
the audience that the WUAs are service providers or enterprises: they have to collect 
charges (see Chapter 9). 
The former CNA official was of the opinion that currently the transfer is of great 
importance to the country and its agriculture to further develop. At the moment, the 
producers think that water is the most important resource. At the beginning they 
thought the machines the most important, the offices, the infrastructure, the canals and 
the dams, but now they think water is the most valuable (see also Chapter 7). He 
concluded that nowadays it is more important to become president of a WUA than a 
member of the congress or a mayor (see Chapter 8). Later in the meeting he stated that 
the present second-generation problems of the transfer were transparency and 
accountability. 
This workshop was a highlight that illustrated the importance of several analytical 
interpretations with regard to the IMT policy process. In the first place, it underlined the 
contemporary relevance of cultural performance by policy makers (reformers, 
champions) at international workshops in promoting the success of the IMT model. Even 
if the former CNA official had not intended to speak about the policy model, his 
international and informed audience of experts would have asked it of him. This shows 
that the momentum of the model transcends individual intentions. However, the former 
official was willing to shed light on his role in the process, as it generates a fair amount 
of personal prestige. Secondly, there is the political nature of the execution of the IMT 
policy, as evidenced by the negotiations with selected leaderships of political parties, 
farmers and trade unions (see Chapter 3). Thirdly, there is the powerful political role of 
the WUAs in the rural political landscape (see Chapter 8). Fourthly, there is the a-
political nature of his concepts of WUAs as service-providing enterprises (see Chapter 8) 
and water as a productive resource for agriculture (see Chapters 5 and 6). This stands in 
stark contrast to his own descriptions of WUAs as politically powerful entities that 
consider water, machines, offices and infrastructure to be strategic resources. The 
second-generation problems of transparency and accountability are signalled but not 
explained in the official's discussion. Yet, they become intelligible in a perspective that 
acknowledges the political potential of WUAs and the resources that they control and 
the cultural performance of transparency and accountability (See Chapter 9). Fifthly, 
there is the way in which, according to the official's interpretation, the political power of 
the WUAs even becomes evidence of the success of the IMT policy (see Chapter 10). 
11.5 The Ethnography of Irrigation, Policy and Organisation 
Colloquially it is often said that the study of irrigation has moved from concrete 
hardware to the human software. A shift in attention that may be needed to progress 
further in that direction may be from the formal and normative to the variety of actual 
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social and material practices that constitute and are tied up with irrigation. The 
ethnographic study of policy in the making brings out the behavioural, unofficial and 
unintended aspects in policy making. Ethnographic and social anthropological 
perspectives also permit us to look at the performative and imaginative dimensions of 
policy making and analyse it as an ongoing process of cultural representation that takes 
place through a variety of social and material means. The use of ethnographic methods 
to study organisation and policy is nowadays advocated from various sources (e.g. Grillo 
and Stirrat, 1997; Mosse, 2004; Shore and Wright, 1997; Strathern, 2000). This study thus 
hopes to show the value of such an approach and provide some initial ideas for the 
development of new analytical devices and methodological tools oriented to this 
purpose. 
Notes 
1 In the history of 'transformation' policies, such as land reform or participatory 'community 
development1, it has not been unusual for the costs and problems of development to be foisted upon 
local people, that is without them showing much willingness to take on certain responsibilities. In this 
way the state reduces the costs to itself. Hence, decentralisation under neo-liberal measures is only the 
most recent case of this kind (I thank Norman Long for making this point). 
2 Land reform communities created after the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Before the revision of 
Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992, ejido land belonged to the state, with a combination of 
community (ejido) and private (qidatorio) usufruct. Ejido members are called ejidatarios. 
3 Interview with ex-CNA official, 21* of May 1999. 

Epilogue on the Culture and Politics of the Gold Coast 
I close this book with an epilogue that provides an open perspective on the political 
culture of my research location: the Northern Coast of Nayarit: 
The history of the Northern Coast of Nayarit has been mtimately interwoven with the 
production of tobacco. During the nineteen fifties and part of the sixties, the region 
experienced a real boom in agriculture, and tobacco in particular was a most profitable 
crop. People used to call it: oro verde (green gold). In this period the northern coast 
received its glorious name: La Costa de Oro (The Gold Coast). The national and 
multinational tobacco companies mainly worked with medium and large-scale 
producers, who became the most prosperous farmers in Nayarit. Nowadays, after the 
nationalisation of tobacco production in the 1970s and the dismantling of the parastataL 
Tabamex, the popular recollection of the period during which the Northern Coast of 
Nayarit was called 'the Gold Coasf is still in the minds of many ejidatarios in the region, 
especially now that tobacco is no longer such a profitable crop and only provides them 
with a meagre subsistence that means misery to most of them. 'Now it's not even the 
Copper Coast", people tend to exclaim. With pleasure, tobacco producers recall the days 
when a tobacco producer with four hectares was able to buy a brand new pick-up after 
his annual payment. When people want to express how much money was earned in 
those days, they tell you that the cantinas in the region were packed at the time that the 
companies paid out. Modest ejidatarios contracted mariachi groups that playe 
d all night long for them, whilst they were drinking, until they fell asleep at their table. 
Politicians from Nayarit also like to refer to this collective mythical past of the Northern 
Coast. It corresponds with age-old visions of the abundance in this region (see Chapter 
4) and also holds a promise for the future. 
An experienced official of the former Secretaria de Recursos Hidrdulicos (SRH: Ministry of 
Water Resources) also recalls that people used to earn large amounts of money, but that 
many people used their money foolishly, spending it in the cantinas on beer and music. 
The producers who saved money in those years are now rich. According to this official, 
the rest are as badly off as before. Shortly after this conversation I talked about the same 
matter with two ejidatarios whom I knew from the coast. I remarked that this period of 
great affluence was not so noticeable anymore. One of the two, who is relatively well to 
do, protested that some people improved their houses and conditions and that this could 
still be seen nowadays. The other ejidatario, who worked for the first man, said nothing. 
He only smiled. When I looked at him for an answer, he silently responded by making 
two meaningful gestures. The first was with his right hand extending both thumb and 
little finger outwards, whilst pomting the thumb downwards to his mouth. This is 
Mexican sign language for drinking. For the second gesture, he took up a dance position 
with both arms, holding one behind the lady's back and pushing the other up in the air. 
He finished it off by loosely shaking his shoulders and, whilst we broke into laughter, we 
understood that the lady was not his wife. 
It is also no coincidence that people currently often remember those prosperous days 
when they are together drinking. This evokes a collective sensation of grandeur and 
extreme pleasure, often leading to more drinking. At such a moment many people are 
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proud of this preference and like to expose it. This creates a sense of liberty and heroism. 
A popular traditional song that best represents this powerful and dramatic sentiment is 
called: 'Mi gusto es...' (my liking is...). The tenor of this song that is sung by a male 
singer who is accompanied by loud festive brass music goes something like this: 
'My liking is...' (Unspecified, left open to imagination) 
"Who will take it away from me?' (Nobody, of course, or perhaps...) 
'Only God in heaven will take it away from me' (Well ok, that is in a different league) 
The song then introduces a pretty young lady and 
love, but in the end she also has to understand 
that even if they threaten to shoot him: 
'Migusto es...' 
Most great politicians with clout in the region are 
past masters at mcorporating and putting to 
political use this set of popular recollections 
among ejidatarios and cultural preferences of 
people more generally on the Northern Coast of 
Nayarit. I am especially thinking of two electoral 
scenes in which the performance of such cultural 
competencies became very evident: first, the 
campaign for the municipal peasant organisation 
of Santiago Ixcuintla in 1998 described in Chapter 
8; second, a campaign event of the candidate 
governor for the opposition, entrepreneur 
Echeverría Domínguez, in his hometown Santiago 
Ixcuintla, opportunely organised during its annual 
festivities. Only a few months after the death of 
the PRI patriarch, Don Emilio, all hell broke loose 
in the regional PRI, and divisions emerged over 
his succession. One of his most senior proteges, 
the influential and affluent old guard Prflsta Echeverría Domínguez, saw his way blocked 
to the governorship and left the PRI. He forged an alliance with a diverse range of 
opposition parties, most importantly the PAN, PRD and FT (Partido de Trabajo: Labour 
Party), and won the elections for governor in 1999. A few months before that: 
Imagine a nocturnal carnival with bandas (musical groups) playing all along the 
colourfully lit main street of Santiago Ixcuintla. Cheerful and energetic people crowd the 
streets. The air is filled with music, dance and hormones, and the beer flows. As the 
candidate, Echeverría leads a procession followed by his supporters through the main 
street greeting the drinking and dancing crowds that cheer him on. One after another 
banda that Echeverría passes with his procession immediately stops what it is singing 
and starts playing his campaign song: 'Mi gusto es...' It is a reflection of his excellent 
preparation and financial means. People in the audience sing the song enthusiastically 
with him. The climax of the evening approaches when the candidate governor accepts a 
can of beer from a woman in the crowd. Fortunately, the beer is of the brand Modelo that 
Mi gusto es (Mexican traditional) 
Mi gusto es, 
y quien me lo quitara 
solamente el Dios del cielo me lo quita 
mi gusto es.... 
él amarte jovencita, tope en eso 
tope en eso que al cabo mi gusto es. 
Mi gusto es... 
Pero jovencita 
yo te he de seguir amando 
mi gusto es... 
Linda chaparrita 
yo te he de seguir los pasos 
adonde estés.. 
Aunque me den de balazos 
tope en eso, tope en eso 
que al cabo 
mi gusto es 
Mi gusto es.... 
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Echeverría as entrepreneur distributes in Nayarit. The woman invites him to dance with 
movements that shake the stout fundaments of her body. Echeverría accepts, puts the 
beer can on his head and balances it whilst he dances with her. The people around shout 
and applaud in approval. This is electoral propaganda and commercial advertisement at 
the same time. Using this sort of populism that he has learned in the PRI, he beats this 
party on its home ground. 
A few blocks back, the PRI celebrates its own party with music and drink. I see the PRI 
candidate, Lucas Vallarta, who is also from Santiago, sitting at a long table and talking to 
some old acquaintances. However, it appears that the PRI has not the money to contract 
the best bands and the enthusiasm of the audience is notably less than in the place I 
have just left. At the corner of the street, I spot Nunez with a companion. He greets me 
more enthusiastically than he usually does and appears a bit lost. I notice that he is 
pretty drunk already. He becomes very melancholic and reminds me that he has always 
been there to help me. I am his friend. It is really a sad melancholy, caused by his bleak 
career prospects, it seems. His patrons, Felix Torres and Pérez, have not been chosen as 
the official PRI candidates for the governorship and the mayorship of Santiago, 
respectively. Felix Torres has already swapped the PRI for the PT, but Pérez chose to 
support the PRI candidate, Vallarta. Pérez' name is mentioned as Minister of Agriculture 
and at a later stage, in a final attempt to capture votes for the PRI, Vallarta even promises 
at a campaign meeting that he will make the Left Bank a separate municipality (see 
Chapter 4). 
Nunez' future, however, is not clear. Although his name was initially mentioned for 
mayor, deputy and other important posts, he now has to settle for a minor post in the 
municipality - this in spite of the fact that he organised several protests, occupations, 
and mobilisations, and media opposition to ARIC on behalf of the peasant sector. 
Although he has some other options, not one of them is secure. Nunez recently sold his 
land to his brother and therefore requires a new source of income. In the euphoria after 
his electoral victory at the CMC, his political ambitions surpassed and conflicted with 
those of his patron Pérez, which resulted in a row between them. Pérez temporarily 
withdrew his support and since then Nunez has been leading a more solitary political 
course. Although he will be president of the CMC for another two years, everybody 
knows that there is nothing more there. His term as president of the ejido of Solorceño 
has ended, and the new president has threatened to start an investigation into his period 
in office. Nunez' term in the WUA is also coming to an end, and, worse, criticism of his 
performance is increasing. Guttiérez and Diego have already been removed under 
accusations based on an investigation into managerial affairs at the association. While 
the celebrations continue around us, Nunez recalls that he still needs to talk to 
somebody. He takes his leave of me and vanishes into the crowd. 
In July 1999 Echeverría wins the elections for the governorship, and most municipalities 
and congress seats are won by his alliance of opposition parties. Pérez' group is one of 
the big losers. A few months later they also lose the WUA elections. The electoral loss of 
the PRI and the resulting political changes in Nayarit strengthen the formation of an 
alliance that is organised behind the scenes among dissatisfied ejido delegates, WUA 
employees and CNA officials. It runs its own list of candidates and wins the elections. A 
new board of directors is installed at the end of my fieldwork period. The latter 
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developments indicate that the influence of irrigation is by no means all determining in 
regional politics, but rather that larger political processes influence the management of 
irrigation systems. 
This exploratory account includes elements of the regional history and the political, 
electoral and cultural practices that proved to be important in my ethnography of 
organisation. It shows that particular materials, preferences and ideas are mobilised in 
the cultural performance of election campaigns. Conspicuously, alcohol serves as an 
electoral elixir that brings together people and catches their votes in what is called 
constructive drinking (Douglas, 1987), wet politics (Fallaw, 2003), or the politics of 
enjoyment (de Vries, 2002). Further, elections are publicly celebrated in a way that 
engages an audience of prospective voters with music and through the sensual play of 
bodies in dance. Furthermore, the building of electoral support also occurs through 
identification with the joint glory of regional myths, collective recollections of tobacco 
and prosperity; and ultimately, the sentiments shared through a song. 
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Appendix 1: Plan Nacional Hidráulico 
In 1973, the Mexican Government, the World Bank and the UNDP signed a tripartite 
agreement to develop a National Water Plan by 1975 (Herrera Toledo, 1996). For this 
purpose, the World Bank created a special office in Mexico with four permanent staff 
members to assist in the formulation and evaluation of policy ideas and to advise on 
policy decisions (Buras, 1983). The SRH created a special plan commission as a semi-
independent body under the Under Ministry of Planning to organise a multidisciplinary 
study group to produce the plan. Dr. González Villareal, a civil engineer in the Faculty of 
Engineering of the UNAM, was appointed as the General Co-ordinator of the study 
group. He put together a team of young, dedicated and specialised professionals for this 
purpose, who became his close collaborators.1 The staff of the plan cornmission was 
divided over national and regional planning groups, in which foreign resident advisers of 
the World Bank also participated (Herrera Toledo, 1996). They generated an impressive 
set of studies on land and water resources and their use at both the river basin and 
national level. These studies attempted to match estimates of future water demands by 
the domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors with estimated future supplies and 
specified alternative courses of action for meeting the projected shortfalls (Cummings et 
al., 1989; Herrera Toledo, 1996). 
In an evaluation of the first National Water Plan, Buras2 (1983) points out that at the start 
the PNH study group had a 'definite engineering orientation' with relatively little input 
from economic, agronomic or social disciplines. He states that the first PNH started as a 
super-project in hydraulic engineering and that solutions to the discrepancies in water 
availability were initially sought in the construction of inter-basin transfers and the 
expansion of irrigation.3 Cummings (1974) mentions that the Mexican government 
considered the Sistema Hidráulico Interconectado del Noroeste (SHINO: Northwestern 
Interconnected Hydraulic System), an ambitious plan to expand the irrigated area in the 
arid Northwest by a massive inter-basin transfer of water from the south. However, 
several studies showed the technical and financial unfeasibility of this plan (Buras, 
1983).4 
Although the first PNH had a clear construction bias and this bias did not fully disappear 
in subsequent revisions, the perspective of the study group on water resources was 
significantly broadened, amongst other things due to the integration of the foreign 
advisers. The PNH opened up space for the formation of a team of water planners and 
enabled them to write plans and studies concerning water resource management. They 
1 According to Grindle (1977), senior bureaucrats use their appointive powers to build loyal and efficient 
teams, called equipos. 
2 Buras was appointed to the Advisory Council of the PNH as a foreign expert on water resource 
planning and thus intimately involved. 
3 It was calculated that it was necessary to double the area under irrigation, to 10 million ha, by 2000 
(SRH, 1975; Herrera-Toledo, 1996). 
4 It is remarkable that, in spite of this, SHINO was continued and given a strong push forward during 
the SARH era (CNA 1994b). This illustrates the continued construction bias of the hydraulic 
bureaucracy. 
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developed policy ideas and gained experiences that departed from the traditional 
construction bias of the hydraulic bureaucracy, more specifically of groups within the 
Under Ministry of Construction and their network of beneficiaries. Ex-staff of the plan 
confirm that the influence of World Bank advisors on the development of policy ideas 
was important. This is not surprising, because it was an explicit intention of the Mexican 
government to incorporate such advice in policy decisions. The World Bank was thus 
mtimately involved in putting certain policy issues on the agenda and further developing 
them into concrete options. 
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Appendix 2: Details of World Bank Lending History from 1982 
In 1982, the World Bank had stopped lending to Mexico as a response to the moratorium 
on payments of foreign debt principal declared by the Mexican government in August 
1982. To assess future investment priorities, the World Bank carried out a review of the 
irrigation sector towards the end of 1982. In line with international debates on irrigation 
management (Bottrall 1981), the review concluded that Mexico needed to shift from the 
construction of new irrigation systems to improving the management and efficiency in 
existing systems. To do so, the report made three recommendations: 
Tirst, (...) [a]s it is not in the interest of farmers to observe a run-down in 
the irrigation infrastructure, an across-the-board increase in water charges 
would ease the budget constraints which are the biggest obstacle to 
adequate maintenance. (...) Second, (...) in order to achieve a fair water 
pricing system acceptable to farmers (...) a program of repair and 
upgrading of existing systems needs to be undertaken in most Districts. 
(...) Third, (...) if users are to be increasingly responsible for irrigation 
financing then their role in decision making will need to be increased (...)'. 
(World Bank, 1983a:17-18) 
The report goes on to recommend the bulk sale of water by the government to users' 
associations in the districts, who would then sell and distribute the water to its members, 
citing the successful use of this system in the Rio Yaqui irrigation district. Although 
transfer is not mentioned as such in the report, it is striking to see how its 
recommendations strongly coincide with the core of the IMT programme in the 1990s. 
The 1983 report signified an important shift in the Bank's agenda for the irrigation sector 
in Mexico, which the hydrocracy needed to accommodate to obtain desperately needed 
external funding. In late 1987 and early 1988, the Bank sent several missions to Mexico to 
discuss possible future loans to support IMT and broader reforms in the water sector. At 
one of the national meetings on water held during Salinas' election campaign, Salinas 
asked Dr. González Villareal his opinion on the risks of transferring irrigation districts to 
the users. His answer is iUuminauhg: 
The transfer of irrigation districts to users was already an established 
policy of this administration [of de la Madrid], which has encountered 
some difficulties. (...) Those of the Northwest and North of the country 
are prepared to start taking on their own administration. As a matter of 
fact, in the Rio Yaqui irrigation district users already nearly completely 
manage the maintenance, acuTdnistration, payment and delivery of water. 
(...) In a new programme that will be financed with international credit, 
called 'modernisation of the irrigation districts', a subsequent phase after 
the original construction of the districts is proposed, consisting of the bulk 
delivery of water to the users and an adnunistration run by them (...). 
However, in the districts in the centre of the country (...) we believe that 
the process has to be more gradual. First, some rehabilitation and public 
investment will be needed, before a first phase of organising users, if the 
process is to be effective'. (TEPES, 1987:7; my translation) 
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Apparently, discussions with the World Bank concerning transfer had reached such an 
advanced stage that Dr. Gonzalez Villareal felt confident enough to announce publicly to 
Salinas that international loans for IMT would be formcorning. In 1988 and 1989, the 
Bank sent eight missions to Mexico as part of the loan identification phase of what was 
to become the Irrigation and Drainage Sector Project, with a pre-appraisal mission 
visiting Mexico in April 1990. Extensive discussions were held with Dr. Ramos and his 
team concerning the loan, with emphasis placed on the need to change the water law 
and reduce government subsidies to the irrigation districts to zero. The Bank was very 
eager to ensure the success of IMT and assigned top expertise and adequate resources to 
assist the CNA. Nonetheless, it was only in February 1991 that the appraisal mission 
went to Mexico, and only in December 1991 was the loan approved by the board of the 
World Bank, to become effective in June 1992. 
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Appendix 3: The Pre-1989 Technologies of Governance and the IMT Package 
According to Palacios Vêlez (1993), Río Mayo was one of the first districts in which 
transfer was initiated. Here, a modernisation programme consisting of canal lining and 
plot levelling was carried out during the 1980s as part of one of the few World Bank 
loans to the SARH during that period. SARH engineers told water users that the district 
would be handed over to the users after it was modernised. The impression was created 
that the SARH was testing how the transfer could be organised and that the district 
would be used as a model for other districts to follow. In August of 1986 the then 
Minister of Agriculture, Eduardo Pesqueira-Olea, announced at a meeting in Los Mochis 
in Sinaloa that 'steps are being taken to transfer to organised farmers the operational 
management of the irrigation districts, so that every peso that is paid in water fees will 
be invested in the same district7 (El Financiero, 19 August 1986). This suggests that 
transfer initiatives on the ground were well underway in 1986. Based on instructions 
received from SARH headquarters at the start of 1988, the Río Mayo district office began 
to organise WUAs that would become responsible for the operation and maintenance of 
the infrastructure. A CNA official remembers: 
There was little demand for transfer. A group of users in the Northwest was 
motivated, in Río Mayo, because it is close to Rio Yaqui, where the users were 
already managing the secondary canals. In Mayo they started to organise the 
associations, but when we arrived with the lawyers [in 1989], it was said that it 
could not be done that easily, to carry out a series of changes. Also in Sinaloa 
some things were initiated. The users supported by the SARH did this. But when 
the CNA was created, the decision was taken that it definitely had to be done. 
Another important transfer initiative occurred in the EI Grullo irrigation district, which 
strongly contributed to the definition of key characteristics of the IMT programme. User 
involvement was not new to the El Grullo district, as a team of SARH engineers had 
experimented with a water user commission from 1980 to 1983 to counter the interests 
of a local sugarcane lobby (van der Zaag, 1992). The same team of engineers had 
transferred the La Barca irrigation district to a WUA in 1985, apparently for the first in 
Mexico since the water boards of the 1940s (see Chapter 2). Maintenance tasks were 
handed over to this user organisation. This experiment attracted serious interest on the 
national and international level. This informal group of engineers had studied at the 
University of Guadalajara in the early 1970s. They were led by Engineer Velazco, their 
professor, who was head of the SARH office in the state of Jalisco in the late 1980s. 
In May 1987, Velazco instructed the El Grullo District Head to put water users in charge 
of the maintenance tasks in the district (van der Zaag, 1992). User representatives did 
not accept this proposal, apparently because it was not very concrete at the time. In 
February 1988, the same District Head informed user representatives that the SARH had 
a new policy of decentralising its functions to farmer organisations. He proposed the 
creation of a WUA and stated that he was authorised to hand over madiinery for 
maintenance tasks. Although the FJ Grullo District Head was not in favour of transfer, 
during the first months of 1988 district officials went to the ejidos to explain that the 
SARH could not maintain the district efficiently and that a WUA could do it better. 
Delegates were chosen in each ejido and by the private farmers. In May 1988, the 
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founding assembly of the WUA was held in the presence of the senior SARH official 
who had given the instructions to form the WUA, and a working group was formed to 
draft internal regulations. In November 1988, the regulations were accepted and the 
association's board was chosen (van der Zaag, 1992). 
At the beginning of 1989, a new District Head was appointed by the SARH. This 
engineer had been part of Velazco's team in the 1980s. With this tract record, he was 
fully in favour of transfer and gave a strong impetus to it by handing over maintenance 
machinery to the newly formed WUA and removing the district engineers who had 
resisted transfer. The association started to train new personnel, carried out large-scale 
maintenance in the district, and received visits from national SARH officials and the 
governor of Jalisco. In September 1989, a new district head arrived to become 
responsible for the newly formed FJ Grullo irrigation district, which had recently come 
under the control of the CNA.5 The removed, resistant engineers were reinstated in their 
posts, but in the new CNA district office. They appropriated the WUA as their own 
urinative and changed its regulations to curtail the board's influence and bring it under 
control of the CNA. They also slowed down the process of transfer by delaying the 
transfer of the operation of the irrigation district. The SARH engineers of the 
'Guadalajara group' were removed and were denied any credit for their work vis-à-vis 
the outside world. In CNA documents on transfer, FJ Grullo is presented as a CNA pilot 
project, deleting all references to the pre-CNA phase and the SARH involvement. This 
fits in with the larger bureaucratic struggle of the CNA to become autonomous from the 
larger SARH bureaucracy as discussed in Chapter 1. 
According to Palacios 'one of the first actions of the CNA was to re-establish the independent 
administration of the irrigation districts' (1996:35). The CNA regained control over the Irrigation 
Districts in September 1989, when the separation between the Irrigation Districts and the Rural 
Development Districts that existed before 1985 was re-established. 
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Appendix 4: Steps Involved in First Phase of Transfer Progamme 
Diagnosis: To initiate transfer in an irrigation district, a thorough study is made of the 
district by the Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA) and the CNA to assess the 
feasibility of transfer and to identify possible problems and solutions. Descriptions and 
recommendations are made about the operational, maintenance and administrative 
situation in the irrigation district and the condition of the infrastructure and machinery. 
On the basis of information provided by the CNA District Head and district staff, the 
expenses and time required for rehabilitation and deferred maintenance are estimated. 
Surveys are used to evaluate the willingness of users to participate in the transfer 
process. 
Promotion: After the diagnosis, a vast number of meetings are held with ejidatarios and 
private fanners to present the transfer programme, explain its objectives and determine 
the boundaries of modules. This is carried out by the CNA with the help of companies of 
promoters. During this step, water delegates {delegados de agua), ostensibly elected by all 
farmers, are appointed by the CNA to represent 'the users' in the assembly of delegates. 
To constitute a WUA: After the boundaries of the modules have been determined and 
the user delegates chosen, the CNA and the IMT promotion team help the delegates to 
form a WUA. This entails drawing up the charter of the WUA, obtaining the relevant 
approvals from various government agencies, constituting the WUA as a civil association 
and drafting the Concession Title and its annexes according to formats provided by the 
CNA. The annexes are a set of technical documents that contain basic information on 
the district and the module, a working methodology for different activities, and 
corresponding instructions. 
Acceptance of commitments: When the necessary legal and technical documentation is 
ready, it is time for the WUA to sign an agreement of acceptance of commitments. The 
WUA manifests its acceptance of the conditions of transfer, its willingness and ability to 
take over the management of the module, and its commitment to increasing fee levels 
and mamtaining them to accomplish self-sufficiency. The latter is generally considered 
as the main criterion for transfer. The CNA promises to execute deferred maintenance 
over a period of one or several years and formulates a plan for the rehabilitation and 
modernisation of the irrigation district to be co-financed by the WUA. 
Concession Title: The Title of Concession of Water and for the Use of Hydraulic 
Infrastructure is a comprehensive legal document that is assembled based on the 
prepared documents and handed over by the CNA to the WUA. It stipulates the legal 
framework in which it is embedded, all essential data on the module, and the conditions 
under which the transfer takes place. In addition, the rights and obligations of both the 
WUA and the CNA are detailed, and the technical annexes and legal instruments 
mentioned earlier are included. 
Physical transfer of the module: During an official ceremony, the Concession Title is 
handed over to the WUA. Meanwhile, the district personnel of the CNA are 
restructured, followed by a phased reduction of personnel. 
342 The Success of a Policy Model 
Parallel operation: For a period of generally six months after the transfer, the CNA 
manages the modules in co-operation with the WUAs. The CNA trains the new WUA 
personnel with specific programmes on Operation, Maintenance, Irrigation and 
Drainage, and Adininistration. After this stage, the transfer process is completed and the 
WUAs become fully responsible for the management of the modules. 
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Appendix 5: Nayarit 
Nayarit is one of the smallest states of the Mexican Republic. The name Nayarit is given 
to pre-Columbian clay figurines that are found in the vicinity. The state is located on the 
Western coast that faces the Pacific Ocean (see Map 5). Only in 1917 after the Mexican 
Revolution it became independent from the much larger state of Jalisco, that borders it to 
the south and the east. The state consists of four geograhical regions. The north eastern 
part of the state is dominated by the Sierra Madre Occidental, a mostly wild and nigged 
mountain range descending from the United States along the Western coast. The 
inhospitable Sierra del Nayar is the home to the Huichol and Cora people, indigeneous 
groups that are famous for having resisted the colonization of their mountaineous region 
up to 200 years after the Spanish Conquest. These mountains, like in many parts of 
Latin-America, served as their hiding place suffering from the attacks of the Spaniards 
during the colonial period. This remained to be so until the past century when civil wars 
were striking the country. 
The adjoining south central part of Nayarit is a plateau situated between 900-1500 
meters above sea level that bears clear traces of a volcanic origin. On the northern end of 
this plateau lies the provincial town and state capital of Tepic. Tepic is the commercial 
and political center of the state, that has further benefited from agroindushy and 
differerent services. During the last decades it has expanded rapidly due to a relatively 
late process of urbanization in a state where the economy for a long time remained 
largely depended on agriculture. Today Tepic has a quarter of the almost 1 million 
inhabitants of Nayarit. A large refinery in the center of town explain the waving 
sugarcane fields around the town. 
The Southern Coast of Nayarit is a narrow strip of coastal plain separated from the 
central plateau by western spurs that advance from the Sierra, most eager to reach the 
Ocean, it seems, at which they never quite succeed. The river Ameca that has shaped 
and nurtured the valley of Bahia de Banderas, a town, and an irrigation module, separates 
Nayarit from Jalisco. The nearby town of Puerta Vallarta became a puplar resort for 
national and international tourism that grew explosively since the 1970s and extended its 
influence along the coastline into Nayarit. 
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Appendix 6: Financial Data 
Table 5 Historical overview financial balance of the Left Bank module (in 
Mexican pesos) 
Revenues 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 
1. Fee collection 1,026,303 1,083,085 1,262,363 1,318,400 1,769,726 
2. Rehabilitation levy 190,453 
3. Other revenues 407,958 504,292 372,504 358,512 16,103 
4. Total Revenues 1,434,261 1,587,376 1,634,868 1,676,912 1,976,282 
Expenses 
6. Administration 139,568 149,894 227,752 258,618 311,282 
7. Operation 174,227 199,514 233,869 381,774 393,378 
8. Maintenance 436,981 524,499 690,852 1,012,835 1,122,084 
9. Payment CNA 251,424 264,491 316,776 329,000 270,119 
10. Other costs 3,816 6,219 3,794 3,669 1,561 
11. Total Expenditure 1,006,017 1,144,618 1,473,043 1,985,896 2,098,424 
Total (11-4) 428,244 442,758 161,824 -308,984 -122,142 
12. Adm. share (6/11) 14 13 15 13 15 
13. Op. share (7/11) 17 17 16 19 19 
13. Maint share (8/11) 43 46 47 51 53 
14. CNA share (9/11) 25 23 22 17 13 
Self-sufficiency % (11/1) 102 95 86 66 84 
Source: Data derived from annual reports of the Left Bank Association {Informes de 
Actividades, Asociación de Usuarios de la Unidad de Riego de la Margen Izquierda del Río 
Santiago, AC, Modulo 2,1993-1999"). 
Table 6 Historical analysis of irrigation service fee recovery in the Left Bank's module and its payment for 'water in blocks' 
to the CNA-District (in Mexican pesos) 
Left Bank CNA District LB's part 
1. Irr. surface (ha's) 2. Fee collection 3. Payment CNA (Mx $) 4. Tot surface (ha's) 5.TotfeesWUAs 6. Revenues 7. (3/6) (%) 
Programme 17,595 1,015,665 28,822 1,719,443 59 
1989-1990 Realised 6,208 Not transferred yet 358,355 17,452 Not transferred yet 955,645 37 
(%) 35 35 61 56 
Programme 17,694 1,344,825 29,979 2,276,685 59 
1990-1991 Realised 8.444 Not transferred yet 386,064 21,017 Not transferred yet 1,029,537 37 
(%) 48 29 70 45 
Programme 17,800 777,542 1,881,150 32,073 1,690,867 3,448,370 55 
1991-1992 Realised 8,689 159,458 386,607 18,761 658,115 1,116,353 35 
(%) 49 21 21 58 39 32 
Programme 18,014 788,720 1,774,620 32,766 1,882,770 3,523,870 50 
1992-1993 Realised 10,503 217,522 489,408 21,774 649,760 1,229,772 40 
(%) 56 28 28 66 35 35 
Programme 18,225 1,849,273 597,685 33,902 4,521,606 1,320,943 45 
1993-1994 Realised 17,047 745,516 224,053 29,352 2,586,892 778,303 29 
(%) 94 40 37 87 57 59 
Programme 19,911 1,765,809 597,685 36,525 4,497,837 1,185,673 50 
1994-1995 Realised 14,658 871,727 288,881 27,767 3,180,099 830,160 35 
(%) 74 49 48 76 71 70 
Programme 18,610 1,555,350 518,450 34,231 4,377,177 1,185,673 44 
1995-1996 Realised 11,598 660,636 257,591 25,992 2,754,555 830,160 31 
(%) 62 42 50 76 63 70 
Programme 22,577 1,924,650 329,001 40,124 5,680,278 1,024,561 32 
1996-1997 Realised 16,927 1,072,708 329,000 32,272 4,257,950 1,024,565 32 
(%) 75 56 100 80 75 100 
Source: CNA District, Tepic, 1998. 
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Table 7 Monthly overview of irrigation service fee collection 1997-1998 (in Mexican pesos) 
Oct Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr-Sep Total 
Progr. fee coll. 166,104 254,604 529,098 235,104 206,604 268,404 1,030,837 2,690,755 
Real fee coll. 111,173 410,172 451,091 262,290 57,386 107,993 1,400,105 
Progr. expenses 154,405 210,546 326,846 219,246 214,946 229,548 1,335,218 2,690,755 
Real expenses 49,763 213,537 461,561 178,076 136,676 148,668 1,188,281 
Balance at bank 23,334 121,003 150,625 130,137 - - 425,098 
Source: Data distributed by the association during the second assembly 
Summary 
This thesis studies the emergence, process and outcomes of the Mexican policy of 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT). Under the influence of neo-liberal government 
policies, the transfer of government-managed irrigation districts to water users' 
associations (WUAs) has radically changed irrigation management in Mexico during the 
past fifteen years. Internationally, Mexico's IMT programme has been heralded as a 
success and has drawn widespread attention because of its rapid implementation. 
Consequently, it has been propagated as a model for other countries seeking to improve 
the performance of their public irrigation systems and cut burgeoning public 
expenditures. This study firstly critically examines the emergence of this policy model 
and its proclaimed success. Secondly, it discusses the impacts this has on everyday 
irrigation management. The contribution of this thesis to the study of policy reform and 
irrigation management is that it consistently analyses them as political practices that are 
also expressive of the cultural dimension of human action and social ordering. 
The thesis is the product of intensive fieldwork carried out between 1997 and 1999. The 
first stage concerned a detailed organisation study of the WUA that is called the Left 
Bank of the River Santiago and is located on the Northern Coast of Nayarit in Western 
Mexico. The second stage of my research covered the entire life cycle of the IMT policy, 
from its earliest roots until its international celebration as a policy model. From the 
beginning, the ethnography of an organisation and the study of policy were basically 
mtertwined throughout my research journey, although the emphasis shifted towards the 
latter. 
On the one hand, the thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of the contemporary history 
of the IMT policy. It traces the idea of transfer back to its bureaucratic roots and reviews 
how the idea gained political commitment as the consequence of a prolonged 
bureaucratic struggle. This shows that the IMT policy has a fascinating history that it is 
tied up with the past and the future of the hydraulic bureaucracy (involved with 
hydraulic resources and water management). The formerly influential and autonomous 
Ministry of Water Resources lost its autonomy and its control over the irrigation districts 
in Mexico when it was merged halfway the 1970s with the agricultural bureaucracy 
(responsible for the agricultural sector). At the end of the 1980s, the IMT policy played 
an important role in the reconstitution of the hydraulic bureaucracy in the Comisión 
Nacional del Agua (CNA: National Water Commission), which regained autonomy and 
control over the irrigation districts. 
Initially, the effectuation of the policy was a contested process and the thesis shows how 
the assembling of a policy package responded to this. The actual policy package with 
which senior officials, called hydrocrats in this thesis, had to effectuate the transfer was 
experimented with, resisted and adapted significantly. After some time, this led to a 
standardisation of the package that worked to include and direct favourable leaderships 
and exclude resisting or uncontrollable elements. In the end, this contributed to an 
unforeseen acceleration in the pace of transfer in Mexico and an increasing control of the 
CNA over the process. Hence, I argue that, contrary to what is generally expected, IMT 
348 The Success of a Policy Model 
in Mexico did not lead to a withdrawal of the state from irrigation, but served to reorder 
and strengthen bureaucratic control over irrigation management from a distance. 
On the other hand, this book takes a close look at the everyday organisational practices 
that have emerged in a WUA around the strategic resources of water, maintenance 
machinery and irrigation fees. It shows how a political group based in a WUA maintains 
a network of political and institutional relations by controlling this set of resources. A 
detailed understanding of everyday water use practices is established through two 
contrasting case studies of canaleros in water distribution. These cases investigate the 
role of the canalera in relation to the operational arrangements with which he deals in 
his daily work and his social position vis-a-vis the WUA management. The first of the 
two cases shows how a canalero's work is shaped, not by a set of rules, but by his 
frequent interactions with sprinkler irrigation and small-scale tobacco producers and the 
fact that he has rather distant relations with his superiors. This is used to falsify the neo-
institutional assumption that water distribution in particular, and organisational practices 
in general, are governed by a system of agreed rules and incentives. The second case 
study presents the case of a canalera who is a client to the political group that is in 
control of the WUA and performs an important role in a network of large-scale rice 
producers that irrigate using the surface irrigation method. By focusing on the role that 
this client plays in the distribution of various material and cultural resource flows, I 
illustrate that it is essential in the reproduction of the political group. This case addresses 
the need to revise simple sociological models of patron-client relations in which the 
patron monopolises all the power and resources on which his clients depend. 
Besides studying water use, the thesis emphasises that maintenance is a particularly 
useful entry point to analyse the transfer and functioning of irrigation systems. The 
analysis illustrates that machine use contributes not only to the improvement of 
maintenance performance, in line with formal performance objectives, but also to other 
social, material and political practices and performances that transcend and change what 
are conceived to be the boundaries and objectives of an irrigation system. The approach 
taken illustrates that the managerial group, through their connection with maintenance 
machinery and the works it enables, engages in multiple performances. When the thesis 
focuses on irrigation fees, it demonstrates that, in spite of the expectations, fee collection 
continues to be a problematic issue even under the organisation of water users. 
Although the WUA has found a way of partly overcoming the problem of fee default 
among irrigating farmers, by reaching financial agreements with federal subsidy 
providers and agro-industrial companies, this has not resolved it entirely. This serves to 
challenge the policy view that the WUAs have generally achieved financial autonomy as 
an outcome of IMT and that they are accountable, both financially and electorally, to the 
larger community of water users. 
A situational analysis of an election rally is the starting point to illustrate the political 
nature of resource allocation, the WUA as a political platform, and the rally as a cultural 
performance. It is a central chapter that shows how the political group in control of the 
WUA draws for electoral purposes on the material resources that are discussed in the 
other chapters of the organisational ethnography. It also shows how the group mobilises 
these resources in a culturally specific way to build an alliance of support and engage an 
electoral audience. In this manner the organisation becomes a platform to further the 
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careers of the group's proponents and their ascendancy to important posts in the 
regional government. This aspect of the book illustrates that the continuous political 
nature of IMT and the resource use practices that it generates, affect the outcomes of the 
policy. In addition, it focuses attention on the cultural aspects of irrigation management 
and politics. 
Towards the end of the thesis, I focus on how the Mexican IMT policy became an 
international policy model that was propagated as a success. This exercise in 
combination with the findings from the organisational ethnography puts 'the success of 
the Mexican EMT model' between quotation marks. The thesis analyses the cultural 
process of policy making that has generated the Mexican IMT policy model and follows 
the practices, means and events through which it has achieved increasing transnational 
circulation and popularity. The argument is that the success of a policy model is only a 
success within the cultural and ideological understandings and practices of the policy 
network in which it is generated and disseminated. This aspect of the book results in the 
understanding that policy is political throughout its life cycle and that policy making is a 
continuous and profoundly cultural undertaking. 
Resumen 
Esta tesis estudia la aparición, proceso y resultados de la política mexicana de la 
Transferencia del Manejo de Riego (TMR). Bajo la influencia de políticas neo-liberales de 
gobierno, la transferencia de distritos de riego manejados por el gobierno a las 
asociaciones de usuarios del agua (AUA) ha cambiado radicalmente el manejo de riego 
en México durante los pasados quince años. Internadonalmente, el programa de TMR de 
México ha sido anundado como un éxito y ha llamado la atendón general debido a su 
rápida realizadón. Por consiguiente, ha sido propagado como un modelo para otros 
países que procuran mejorar el desempeño de sus sistemas públicos de riego y recortar 
sus costos. Este estudio en primer lugar examina críticamente la aparidón de este y su 
éxito prodamado. En segundo lugar, habla de los impados que este modelo tiene sobre 
el manejo cotidiano del riego. La contribudón de esta tesis al estudio de la reforma 
política y de manejo de riego consiste en que consistentemente los analiza como 
prácticas políticas que también expresan la dimensión cultural de acdón humana y el 
ordenamiento sodal. 
La tesis es el produdo del trabajo de campo intensivo realizado entre 1997 y 1999. La 
primera etapa se enfocó en un estudio detallado de la organizadón de la AUA llamada 
Margen Izquierda del Río Santiago, sobre la Costa Norte de Nayarit en el Ocddente de 
México. En la segunda etapa de mi investigadón estudié el ddo de vida de la política del 
TMR, desde sus orígenes más tempranos hasta su celebradón internadonal como un 
modelo de política. Desde el prindpio, la etnografía de una organizadón y el estudio de 
la política ligada a ella fue entretejida en todas las partes de mi jornada de investigadón, 
aunque posteriormente el énfasis lo desplacé hada lo segundo. 
Por una parte, la tesis ofrece un análisis extenso de la historia contemporánea de la 
política de TMR. Mi tesis rastrea la idea de transferenda hasta sus raíces burocráticas y 
revisa cómo con esta idea se obtuvo el compromiso político para su puesta en marcha 
como consecuenda de de una lucha burocrática prolongada. La tesis muestra que la 
política de la TMR tiene una historia fascinante que esta ligada al pasado y al futuro de la 
burocracia hidráulica (involucrada con recursos hidráulicos). La Secretaría de Recursos 
Hidráulicos (SRH) anteriormente influyente y autónoma, perdió su autonomía y control 
sobre los distritos de riego en México cuando se fusionó en los años 1970s con la 
burocrada agrícola (a cargo del sedor de agricultura). Hada el final de los años 1980s, la 
política de la TMR desempeñó un papel importante en la reconstitudón de la burocrada 
hidráulica en la Comisión Nadonal del Agua (CNA), la cual recobró la autonomía y 
obtuvo el control sobre los distritos de riego. 
Inidalmente, el cumplimiento de la política fue un proceso impugnado, y la tesis muestra 
cómo el ensamblado de un paquete de políticas respondió a esta lucha. El paquete de 
políticas con el que los fundonarios de riego de más alto rango (hidrócratos) tenían que 
realizar la transferenda fue experimentado, resistido y se adaptó considerablemente. 
Después de algún tiempo, este proceso condujo a una estandarizadón del paquete de 
trabajo que permitió induir y utilizar liderazgos favorables y excluir elementos de 
resistenda o incontrolables. Al final, esto contribuyó a una aceleradón imprevista en el 
ritmo de transferenda en México y a un control credente de la CNA sobre el proceso. 
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Aquí, argumento que, contrario a lo que generalmente se cree, la TMR en México no 
llevó a un retiro del estado de los asuntos de riego, sino sirvió para reordenar y fortalecer 
el control burocrático a distancia sobre el manejo del riego. 
Por otra parte, en este libro muestro observaciones cercanas de las prácticas diarias de 
organización que han emergido en una AUA en tomo a los recursos estratégicos de 
agua, maquinaria de conservación y pagos de riego. Muestro como un grupo político 
basado en una AUA mantiene una red de relaciones políticas e institucionales 
controlando este juego de recursos. Una comprensión detallada de las prácticas 
cotidianas de uso del agua se establece a través de los contrastes entre dos estudios de 
caso de canaleros distribuidores de agua. Estos casos investigan el papel del canalera con 
relación a las disposiciones operacionales con las que trata en su trabajo diario y, su 
posición social vis-á-vis la dirección de la AUA. 
El primero de los dos casos muestra como se moldea el trabajo del canalera, no a través 
de una serie de reglas, sino a través de sus frecuentes interacciones con productores de 
tabaco a pequeña escala con prácticas de riego por aspersión y, aunado al hecho de que 
el canalera mantiene relaciones más bien distantes con sus superiores. Esto es utilizado 
para combatir la asunción neo-institucional de que la distribución del agua en particular, 
y las prácticas organizativas en general, están gobernadas por un sistema de reglas 
acordadas y de incentivos. El segundo estudio de caso presenta a un canalera que es 
cliente del grupo político que esta en control de la AUA y realiza un papel importante en 
una red de productores de arroz en gran escala que riegan a través del método de riego 
por superficie. Enfocándome en el papel que este cliente juega en la distribución de flujos 
de recursos materiales y culturales, ilustro que esto es esencial en la reproducción del 
grupo político. Este caso cubre la necesidad de revisar modelos sociológicos simples de 
relaciones patrón-cliente en las que el patrón monopoliza el poder y recursos sobre los 
cuales sus clientes dependen. 
Además de estudiar el uso del agua, la tesis enfatiza que el mantenimiento es un punto 
de entrada particularmente útil para analizar la transferencia y el funcionamiento de 
sistemas de riego. El análisis ilustra que el uso de maquinaria contribuye no sólo a 
mejorar el desempeño del mantenimiento, de acuerdo a objetivos de desempeño 
formales, sino que también contribuye a otras prácticas y 'performances' sociales, 
materiales, políticas e interpretaciones que trascienden y cambian lo que se imaginaban 
limites y objetivos de un sistema de riego. La aproximación utilizada ilustra que el grupo 
directivo, por su unión con la maquinaria de conservación y los trabajos que permite 
realizar, se involucra en múltiple 'performances'. Cuando la tesis se enfoca en el pago de 
cuotas de riego demuestra que, a pesar de las expectativas, la colección de cuotas 
continúa siendo un asunto problemático inclusive bajo la organización de usuarios del 
agua. Aunque la AUA haya encontrado una forma de superar parcialmente el problema 
de la omisión de pagos entre agricultores que riegan a través de acuerdos financieros con 
proveedores de subsidios federales y compañías agro-industriales, el asunto no se ha 
resuelto por completo. Este punto sirve para retar la visión política de que las AUAs han 
generalmente alcanzado autonomía financiera como resultado de la TMR y que ellas son 
las responsables, tanto financieramente como electoralmente, ante la gran comunidad de 
usuarios de agua. 
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Un análisis situacional de una campaña electoral es el punto de partida para ilustrar la 
naturaleza política de la asignación de recursos, de la AUA como plataforma política y, 
de la campaña electoral como desempeño cultural. Este (análisis) es un capítulo central 
que muestra como el grupo político en control de la AUA utiliza para propósitos 
electorales los recursos materiales, mismos que se presentan y discuten en los otros 
capítulos de la etnografía de la organización. También muestra cómo el grupo moviliza 
estos recursos en una forma culturalmente específica para construir una alianza de apoyo 
y ganar una audiencia de electores. En esta manera la organización se convierte en una 
plataforma para fomentar la carrera de los candidatos por el grupo y su ascenso a 
puestos importantes en el gobierno regional. Este aspecto del libro ilustra que la 
naturaleza continuamente política de la TMR y las prácticas de uso de recursos que 
genera, afectan los resultados de la política. Además, esto enfoca la atención sobre los 
aspectos culturales del manejo del riego y de la política. 
Hacia el fin de esta tesis, me concentro en cómo la política mexicana de la TMR se 
convirtió en un modelo internacional de política que fue propagado como un éxito. Este 
ejercicio en combinación con los hallazgos de la etnografía de la organización pone 'el 
éxito del modelo mexicano de la TMR' entre comillas. La tesis analiza el proceso cultural 
de hacer política (policy making) que ha generado el modelo mexicano de la TMR y sigue 
las prácticas, significados y eventos a través de los cuales ha alcanzado una circulación 
transnacional y una popularidad creciente. El argumento es que el éxito de un modelo de 
política es sólo un éxito dentro de la comprensión ideológica, cultural y de las prácticas 
de la red política (policy network) en la que se ha generado y diseminado. Este aspecto 
del libro resulta en la comprensión de que la política (policy) de TMR es política 
(political) a través de todo su ciclo de vida y de que el hacer política es una continua y 
profunda tarea cultural. 
Samenvatting 
Dit boek bestudeert het ontstaan, het proces en de uitkomsten van Irrigation Management 
Transfer in Mexico (TMT; Irrigatie Management Overdracht). Onder invloed van 
neoliberaal overheidsbeleid heeft de overdracht van de door de overheid beheerde 
irrigatiesystemen aan Water Users' Associations (WUAs; watergebruikers1 organisaties), 
het irrigatie management in Mexico radicaal veranderd. Het Mexicaanse IMT beleid trok 
internationaal de aandacht vanwege haar snelle implementatie en werd uitgeroepen tot 
een succes. Als gevolg hiervan werd het een model voor andere landen die trachtten om 
de performance (prestatie) van hun irrigatie systemen te verbeteren en de publieke 
uitgaven terug te brengen. Deze studie onderzoekt enerzijds het ontstaan van dit 
beleidsmodel en haar verkondigde succes op een kritische wijze. Anderzijds bestudeert 
ze de gevolgen die dit heeft voor het alledaagse irrigatie management. De bijdrage van 
dit boek aan de studie van belddshervorming en irrigatie management is dat het deze 
consistent analyseert als politieke praktijken die ook mtdrukking geven aan de culturele 
dimensie van menselijke actie en sociale ordening. 
Dit proefschrift is het product van intensief veldwerk dat werd uitgevoerd tussen 1997 en 
1999. De eerste fase betrof een gedetailleerde studie van één WUA op de linkeroever van 
de Santiago rivier aan de Noordelijke kust van Nayarit in West Mexico. Het tweede deel 
van mijn onderzoek dekte de gehele levenscyclus van het IMT beleidsmodel. Vanaf het 
begin waren de etnografie van organisatie en de studie van beleid vervlochten in mijn 
onderzoek, ook al verschoof de nadruk in de loop van de tijd van het eerste naar het 
laatste. 
Aan de ene kant biedt dit proefschrift een grondige analyse van de eigentijdse 
geschiedenis van het IMT beleid. Het gaat op zoek naar de bureaucratische wortels van 
het idee van overdracht en beschrijft hoe het idee aan politieke steun won als gevolg van 
een lange bureaucratische strijd. Dit toont dat het IMT beleid een fascinerende 
geschiedenis heeft die verbonden is met het verleden en de toekomst van de 
hydraulische bureaucratie (verantwoordelijk voor hydraulische werken en water 
management). Het voorheen invloedrijke en autonome Ministerie van Waterstaat (Water 
Resources) verloor haar autonomie en de controle over de irrigatie districten in Mexico, 
toen het half jaren 70 gefuseerd werd met de agrarische bureaucratie (verantwoordelijk 
voor de landbouw). Aan het eind van de jaren 80 speelde het IMT beleid een belangrijke 
rol in het wederom oprichten van een hydraulische bureaucratie in de vorm van de 
Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA; Nationale Water Commissie), welke autonomie en 
controle over de irrigatie districten herwon. 
In aanvang was de toepassing van het beleid een omstreden proces en dit proefschrift 
toont hoe de samenstelling van het beleidspakket dit reflecteert. Het concrete 
beleidspakket waarmee de hoge functionarissen (hydrocraten) de overdracht uitvoerden, 
was onderwerp van experimenten, ondervond weerstand en als veranderde als gevolg 
hiervan van samenstelling. Na verloop van tijd leidde dit tot een standaardisatie van het 
beleidspakket, wat toestond dat gunstig gestemde leiders werden geïncorporeerd en 
gestuurd, terwijl het verzet en de oncontroleerbare elementen werden buitengesloten. 
Uiteindelijk droeg dit bij tot een onvoorziene versnelling in de overdracht van irrigatie 
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districten en een toenemende controle van het CNA over dit proces. Daarom 
beargumenteer ik, in tegenstelling tot wat er algemeen verwacht werd, dat IMT niet 
leidde tot een temgtrekking van de staat uit de irrigatie, maar diende ter herordening en 
versterking van de bureaucratische controle over irrigatie management op een afstand. 
Aan de andere kant ontwikkelt dit boek een nadere kijk op de alledaagse organisatie 
praktijken die zijn ontstaan in een WUA rondom de strategische middelen: water, 
machines voor onderhoud en irrigatie belastingen (irrigation fees). Dit laat zien hoe een 
politieke groep vanuit een WUA een netwerk van politieke en institutionele relaties 
onderhoudt door het controleren van deze hulpbronnen. Een gedetailleerd begrip van 
water verdelingspraktijken wordt bereikt door twee contrasterende case studies van 
canaleros die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de dagelijkse waterverdeling. Deze cases 
onderzoeken de rol van de canalero in relatie tot de operationele arrangementen waar 
hij in zijn dagelijkse werk mee te maken heeft en zijn sociale positie vis-a-vis het 
management van de WUA. De eerste van de twee cases laat zien hoe het werk van een 
canalero wordt gevormd, niet door een stel regels, maar door zijn regelmatige interactie 
met kleinschalige tabaksboeren die sprinkler irrigatie bedrijven, alsmede de afstandelijke 
relatie die hij heeft met zijn superieuren. Deze case wordt gebruikt om de neo-
institutionele aanname te problematiseren dat waterverdeling in het bijzonder en 
organisatie praktijken in het algemeen worden gestuurd door een stel overeengekomen 
regels en prikkels. De tweede case studie presenteert de situatie van een canalero die 
cliënt is van de politieke groep die de WUA controleert. Deze vervult een belangrijke rol 
in een netwerk van grootschalige rijstproducenten die irrigeren door middel van 
oppervlakte irrigatie. Door te focussen op de rol die deze cliënt speelt in het verdelen van 
verschillende materiële en culturele hulpbronnen, illustreer ik dat deze essentieel is in de 
reproductie van de politieke groep. Deze case toont de noodzaak aan voor het herzien 
van eenvoudige sociologische modellen van patroon-cliënt verhoudingen te herzien, 
waarbij de patroon alle macht en middelen monopoliseert waar zijn cliënten afhankelijk 
van zijn. 
Naast het besturen van watergebruik, benadrukt dit proefschrift dat het onderhoud een 
bijzonder geschikte ingang is voor het analyseren van de overdracht en het functioneren 
van irrigatie systemen. De analyse laat zien dat machine gebruik niet alleen bijdraagt aan 
de verbetering van het onderhoud, in overeenstemming met performance doelstellingen, 
maar ook aan andere sociale, materiële en politieke praktijken en verrichtingen, die wat 
als de grenzen en doelstellingen van het irrigatie systeem gezien worden overstijgen en 
veranderen. De gekozen benadering illustreert dat het management van de WUA door 
de connecties die zij met onderhoudsmachines maakt, betrokken is bij meerdere 
verrichtingen (performances). Wanneer het proefschrift zich richt op irrigatie belastingen, 
laat het zien dat in tegenstelling tot de verwachtingen, de inning daarvan nog steeds een 
probleem is, zelfs onder de organisatie van water gebruikers. Hoewel de WUA een 
manier gevonden heeft om het probleem van belastingontduiking onder irrigerende 
boeren gedeeltelijk te omzeilen door financiële overeenkomsten met federale 
subsidiegevers en agro-industriële bedrijven, heeft dit het probleem lang niet in het 
geheel opgelost. Dit dient om het beleidsstandpunt te problematiseren dat als gevolg van 
IMT de WUAs over het algemeen financiële autonomie hebben bereikt en dat ze zowel 
financieel als electoraal verantwoording schuldig zijn aan de water gebruikers. 
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Een situationele analyse van een verkiezingsbijeenkomst is het uitgangspunt om de 
politieke aard van de verdeling van hulpbronnen, de WUA als een politiek platform en 
de bijeenkomst als een culturele performance te demonstreren. Dit laat zien hoe de 
politieke groep die controle heeft over de WUA, gebruik maakt van een variëteit aan 
materiële hulpbronnen voor electorale doeleinden. Het demonstreert ook dat deze 
hulpbronnen op een cultureel specifieke manier worden aangewend om een electoraal 
draagvlak te creëren en een publiek van stemmers te onderhouden. Hierdoor wordt de 
WUA als organisatie een platform voor het bevorderen van de carrières van politieke 
leiders en het verkrijgen van belangrijke posten in de regionale overheid. Dit aspect van 
het boek illustreert dat de politieke aard van IMT en het gebruik van hulpbronnen dat 
hieruit voortkomt de uitkomsten van het beleid beïnvloeden. Verder geeft het aandacht 
aan de culturele aspecten van irrigatie management en politiek. 
Richting het eind van dit boek toon ik hoe het Mexicaanse IMT beleid zich tot een 
internationaal beleidsmodel ontwikkelde en gepropageerd werd als een succes. Dit 
perspectief op het beleid in combinatie met de bevindingen van de organisatie etnografie 
plaatst het succes van het Mexicaanse IMT beleidsmodel tussen aanhalingstekens. Het 
proefschrift analyseert het culturele proces van beleid maken en volgt de praktijken, 
middelen en gebeurtenissen waardoor het een toenemende transnationale circulatie en 
populariteit verkrijgt. Het argument is dat het succes van een beleidsmodel alleen een 
succes is binnen de culturele en ideologische begrippen en praktijken van een 
beleidsnetwerk, waarbinnen het geproduceerd en verspreid wordt. Hieruit volgt dat 
gedurende de gehele levenscyclus beleid politiek is en dat het proces van beleid maken 
een continu en intens culturele onderneming is. 
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